X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fstatem_lib.c;h=6d0778db3f79c2bfcaa1576cc0ffe7860ddcc7cc;hp=32bcad4e2f65b4802239f77f7898b4831a3c29e4;hb=4ce787b97aa66e1b4c1d48f6ec047141408056f7;hpb=f7e393be4725c33739d46a58de94a06ebdc6e49d diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c index 32bcad4e2f..6d0778db3f 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -7,22 +8,32 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by - * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. - */ - #include #include #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include +/* + * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types. + */ +typedef struct x509err2alert_st { + int x509err; + int alert; +} X509ERR2ALERT; + +/* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ +const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { + 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, + 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, + 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c +}; + /* * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) @@ -35,27 +46,30 @@ int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], s->init_num, &written); if (ret < 0) - return (-1); + return -1; if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) /* * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll * ignore the result anyway + * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ - if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, - (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], - written)) - return -1; - + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET + && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE + && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, + (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], + written)) + return -1; if (written == s->init_num) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg); - return (1); + return 1; } s->init_off += written; s->init_num -= written; - return (0); + return 0; } int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) @@ -74,33 +88,67 @@ int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) { - if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) + if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; + } + + /* Reset any extension flags */ + memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); if (s->server) { - if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; - } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && - !(s->options & - SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { - /* - * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't - * support secure renegotiation. - */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); + int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0; + + /* + * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers + * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the + * ClientHello. + */ + if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { + const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && + DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) + ok = 1; + } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { + ok = 1; + } + if (ok) + break; + } + if (!ok) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, + SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); + ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " + "SSL/TLS version"); return 0; + } + if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { + /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ + CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &i, + s->session_ctx->lock); } else { - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; + /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ + CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate, 1, &i, + s->ctx->lock); s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; } } else { + int discard; if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; + CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect, 1, &discard, + s->session_ctx->lock); else - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; + CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate, + 1, &discard, s->session_ctx->lock); /* mark client_random uninitialized */ memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); @@ -152,6 +200,7 @@ static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } @@ -161,8 +210,11 @@ static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, size_t retlen; retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); - if (retlen <= 0) + if (retlen <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; + } *hdatalen = retlen; } @@ -182,43 +234,47 @@ int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; - md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx); - if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (mctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Get the data to be signed */ if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); if (sig == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } @@ -226,20 +282,25 @@ int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto err; - } - } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { - if (!EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, - (int)s->session->master_key_length, - s->session->master_key)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } } + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 + || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, + (int)s->session->master_key_length, + s->session->master_key) + || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { - if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } @@ -255,13 +316,16 @@ int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) #endif if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } OPENSSL_free(sig); EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); @@ -269,7 +333,6 @@ int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) err: OPENSSL_free(sig); EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -280,8 +343,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; #endif - int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; - int type = 0, j, pktype; + MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + int j; unsigned int len; X509 *peer; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; @@ -292,104 +355,109 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; if (mctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; } peer = s->session->peer; pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); if (pkey == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); + goto err; } - pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); - type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + unsigned int sigalg; - if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, - SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - goto f_err; + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); + goto err; + } + if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ /* - * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without - * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0) + * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without + * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 - && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { - len = 64; + if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) + && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 + && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 + || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) + || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 + && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { + len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); } else #endif - { - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - int rv; - unsigned int sigalg; - - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey); - if (rv == -1) { - goto f_err; - } else if (rv == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif - } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx); - - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } + j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); + goto err; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif - if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto f_err; + if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST { + int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; } BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); data = gost_data; @@ -401,32 +469,36 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; } - } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION - && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, - (int)s->session->master_key_length, - s->session->master_key)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto f_err; } - - if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 + || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, + (int)s->session->master_key_length, + s->session->master_key)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto err; + } + } else { + j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); + if (j <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto err; + } } - if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) - ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - else - ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; - if (0) { - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - } + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + err: BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); @@ -443,7 +515,7 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) size_t slen; /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ - if (!s->server) + if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; /* @@ -454,9 +526,9 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) && !s->server && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, - SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); - goto err; + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; } if (s->server) { @@ -471,15 +543,16 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.finish_md); if (finish_md_len == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; } s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } /* @@ -488,64 +561,81 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) */ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->session->master_key, - s->session->master_key_length)) + s->session->master_key_length)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; + } /* * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ + if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } if (!s->server) { - OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len); s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; } else { - OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len); s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; } return 1; - err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; } int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; return 1; - - err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al; unsigned int updatetype; s->key_update_count++; if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, + SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + /* + * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must + * be on a record boundary. + */ + if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, + SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0 - || (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED - && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); - goto err; + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, + SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + /* + * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we + * didn't recognise. + */ + if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED + && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, + SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* @@ -557,33 +647,22 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; - err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen * to far. */ -static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) +int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) { const char *sender; size_t slen; - /* - * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set - * the appropriate error. - */ - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) - return; + if (!s->server) { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; @@ -592,16 +671,20 @@ static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; } - s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, - sender, - slen, - s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); + s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = + s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, + s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); + + if (s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + return 1; } -#endif MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al; size_t remain; remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); @@ -615,32 +698,32 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } else { if (remain != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { @@ -660,55 +743,69 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; size_t md_len; /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ - if (s->server) - s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; + if (s->server) { + if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } + + /* + * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the + * message must be on a record boundary. + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, md_len) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ + if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } if (s->server) { - OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, md_len); s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; } else { - OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, md_len); s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; @@ -720,40 +817,39 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { if (s->server) { - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && + !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); - goto f_err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } else { if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, &s->session->master_key_length)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); - goto f_err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); - goto f_err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al)) - goto f_err; } } return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -761,42 +857,42 @@ int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) } /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ -static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain, - int *al) +static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain) { int len; unsigned char *outbytes; len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); if (len < 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, + ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) - && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, - chain, al)) + && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, + chain)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; + } return 1; } /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ -static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al) +static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) { int i, chain_count; X509 *x; STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; X509_STORE *chain_store; - int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) return 1; @@ -822,13 +918,15 @@ static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al) X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (xs_ctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; } if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, + ERR_R_X509_LIB); + return 0; } /* * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we @@ -849,52 +947,58 @@ static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); #endif X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); + return 0; } chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); - if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) { + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); - goto err; + return 0; } } X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); } else { i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); if (i != 1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); + return 0; + } + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; } - if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal)) - goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); - if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal)) - goto err; + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } } } return 1; - - err: - *al = tmpal; - return 0; } -unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, - int *al) +unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) { - int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) + return 0; - if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt) - || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal) - || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *al = tmpal; + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } + return 1; } @@ -903,19 +1007,11 @@ unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is * freed up as well. */ -WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs) +WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) { + int discard; void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { - WORK_STATE ret; - ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); - if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) - return ret; - } -#endif - if (clearbufs) { if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* @@ -925,10 +1021,22 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf = NULL; } - ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); + if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WORK_ERROR; + } s->init_num = 0; } + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server + && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; + + /* + * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3 + * post handshake exchange + */ if (s->statem.cleanuphand) { /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ s->renegotiate = 0; @@ -938,24 +1046,33 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs) ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); if (s->server) { - ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); + /* + * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the + * NewSessionTicket + */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; + /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ + CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good, 1, &discard, + s->ctx->lock); s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; } else { - ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); + /* + * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the + * NewSessionTicket + */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); if (s->hit) - s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; + CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit, 1, &discard, + s->session_ctx->lock); s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; + CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good, 1, + &discard, s->session_ctx->lock); } - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->ctx->info_callback; - if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); @@ -966,24 +1083,32 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs) s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); } - s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE; } - /* - * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do, - * so continue. - */ - if (!clearbufs) - return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->ctx->info_callback; + /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); + + if (cb != NULL) + cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); + + if (!stop) { + /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */ + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + } + return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; } int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) { /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ - int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; + int skip_message, i, recvd_type; unsigned char *p; size_t l, readbytes; @@ -1005,10 +1130,21 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) * in the middle of a handshake message. */ if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, - SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + return 0; + } + if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE + && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { + /* + * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is + * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. + * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do + * not return success until we see the second ClientHello + * with a valid cookie. + */ + return 0; } s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; s->init_num = readbytes - 1; @@ -1016,9 +1152,10 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; return 1; } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, + SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + return 0; } s->init_num += readbytes; } @@ -1066,9 +1203,9 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) n2l3(p, l); /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, + SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); + return 0; } s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; @@ -1077,9 +1214,6 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) } return 1; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return 0; } int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) @@ -1108,21 +1242,21 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) n -= readbytes; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for * Finished verification. */ - if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) - ssl3_take_mac(s); -#endif + if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + *len = 0; + return 0; + } /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ *len = 0; return 0; } @@ -1130,12 +1264,28 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } else { - if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, - s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *len = 0; - return 0; + /* + * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of + * processing the message + * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished + * message. + */ +#define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) + /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET + && s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO + || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + || memcmp(hrrrandom, + s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + *len = 0; + return 0; + } + } } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, @@ -1147,100 +1297,59 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) return 1; } -int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk) -{ - if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) - return -1; - - switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { - default: - return -1; - case EVP_PKEY_RSA: - return SSL_PKEY_RSA; - case EVP_PKEY_DSA: - return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - case EVP_PKEY_EC: - return SSL_PKEY_ECC; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: - return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; - case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: - return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; - case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: - return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; -#endif - } -} +static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { + {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, + {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + + /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */ + {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN} +}; -int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) +int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err) { - int al; + const X509ERR2ALERT *tp; - switch (type) { - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: - al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: - case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: - case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: - case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: - case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: - case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: - case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: - al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: - al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: - case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: - case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: - case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: - case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: - case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: - case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: - al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: - al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; - break; - default: - al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; - break; - } - return (al); + for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp) + if (tp->x509err == x509err) + break; + return tp->alert; } int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) @@ -1271,6 +1380,7 @@ typedef struct { # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. #endif +/* Must be in order high to low */ static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, @@ -1304,6 +1414,7 @@ static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. #endif +/* Must be in order high to low */ static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, @@ -1486,6 +1597,20 @@ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) return 1; } +static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) +{ + if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION + && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; + } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION + && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION) + || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) { + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; + } else { + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; + } +} + /* * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and @@ -1495,7 +1620,7 @@ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) * * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. */ -int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) +int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) { /*- * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: @@ -1520,6 +1645,7 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; /* * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope @@ -1533,6 +1659,7 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after * a HelloRetryRequest */ + /* fall thru */ case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; @@ -1543,6 +1670,10 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; + /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ + if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) + return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; unsigned int best_vers = 0; @@ -1562,7 +1693,7 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION; /* * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about - * wheter to ignore versions 0) { - if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { /* - * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this - * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3 + * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we + * negotiated TLSv1.3 */ if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; return 0; } + check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); s->version = best_vers; s->method = best_method; return 0; @@ -1622,6 +1754,7 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) continue; method = vent->smeth(); if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { + check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); s->version = vent->version; s->method = method; return 0; @@ -1638,22 +1771,46 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) * * @s: client SSL handle. * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. + * @extensions: The extensions received * - * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. + * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. */ -int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) +int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; + int highver = 0; + int origv; + + origv = s->version; + s->version = version; + + /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ + if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, + NULL, 0)) { + s->version = origv; + return 0; + } - /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ - if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) - version = TLS1_3_VERSION; + if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE + && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); + return 0; + } switch (s->method->version) { default: - if (version != s->version) - return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; + if (s->version != s->method->version) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); + return 0; + } /* * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope @@ -1661,7 +1818,7 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) */ - return 0; + return 1; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; @@ -1674,27 +1831,71 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) const SSL_METHOD *method; int err; - if (version != vent->version) - continue; if (vent->cmeth == NULL) - break; - if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION) - return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; + continue; + + if (highver != 0 && s->version != vent->version) + continue; method = vent->cmeth(); err = ssl_method_error(s, method); - if (err != 0) - return err; + if (err != 0) { + if (s->version == vent->version) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, err); + return 0; + } + + continue; + } + if (highver == 0) + highver = vent->version; + + if (s->version != vent->version) + continue; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE + /* Check for downgrades */ + if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > s->version) { + if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, + s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + - sizeof(tls12downgrade), + sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + return 0; + } + } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) + && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION + && highver > s->version) { + if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, + s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + - sizeof(tls11downgrade), + sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + return 0; + } + } +#endif + s->method = method; - s->version = version; - return 0; + return 1; } - return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); + return 0; } /* - * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version + * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version * @s: The SSL connection * @min_version: The minimum supported version * @max_version: The maximum supported version @@ -1712,8 +1913,7 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. */ -int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, - int *max_version) +int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) { int version; int hole; @@ -1807,7 +2007,7 @@ int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) { int ver_min, ver_max, ret; - ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); + ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); if (ret != 0) return ret; @@ -1829,7 +2029,7 @@ int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) * 1) or 0 otherwise. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, const unsigned char *groups, +int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, size_t num_groups, int checkallow) { size_t i; @@ -1837,17 +2037,247 @@ int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, const unsigned char *groups, if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) return 0; - for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) { - unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]); + for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { + uint16_t group = groups[i]; - if (group_id == share_id + if (group_id == group && (!checkallow - || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { - break; + || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { + return 1; } } - /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */ - return i < num_groups; + return 0; } #endif + +/* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ +int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval, + size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, + size_t hrrlen) +{ + unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; + + memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); + + if (hashval == NULL) { + hashval = hashvaltmp; + hashlen = 0; + /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) + || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), + &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } + + /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ + if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ + msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; + msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) + || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + /* + * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted + * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after + * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. + */ + if (hrr != NULL + && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) + || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->s3->tmp.message_size + + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) +{ + return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); +} + +int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); + X509_NAME *xn = NULL; + PACKET cadns; + + if (ca_sk == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + /* get the CA RDNs */ + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { + const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; + unsigned int name_len; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) + || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + namestart = namebytes; + if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + xn = NULL; + } + + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); + s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; + + return 1; + + err: + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); + X509_NAME_free(xn); + return 0; +} + +int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); + + /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if (ca_sk != NULL) { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { + unsigned char *namebytes; + X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); + int namelen; + + if (name == NULL + || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, + &namebytes) + || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + } + + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ +size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, + const void *param, size_t paramlen) +{ + size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; + unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); + + if (tbs == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + + memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); + + *ptbs = tbs; + return tbslen; +} + +/* + * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, + * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once + */ +int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) +{ + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + + s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, + s->s3->handshake_dgst)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} + +/* + * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest + * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request + */ +int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) +{ + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst, + s->pha_dgst)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + return 1; +}