X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fstatem_clnt.c;h=cd871940ee871c9c9846e25f455ef8959c2c9d02;hp=a3133adcef8ba323bff808b9d3bd9e757779f476;hb=9ac6244b575486dcdbd600c36da78776fde32e11;hpb=d805a57be266ba68ae40f7177aeea69cba2dfe47 diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c index a3133adcef..cd871940ee 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ */ #include +#include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" #include @@ -169,12 +170,25 @@ static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) break; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; return 1; } break; + case TLS_ST_OK: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; + return 1; + } + break; } /* No valid transition found */ @@ -225,7 +239,7 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: if (s->hit) { - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { + if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; return 1; @@ -239,8 +253,8 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; return 1; } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION - && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL - && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL + && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL + && s->session->ext.tick != NULL && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session @@ -282,9 +296,9 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: /* * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if - * |tlsext_status_expected| is set + * |ext.status_expected| is set */ - if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { + if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS; return 1; } @@ -321,7 +335,7 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) break; case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { + if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; return 1; @@ -345,6 +359,13 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) return 1; } break; + + case TLS_ST_OK: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ; + return 1; + } + break; } err: @@ -393,10 +414,15 @@ static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_OK: + /* Just go straight to trying to read from the server */ + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; } } @@ -422,6 +448,13 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; case TLS_ST_OK: + if (!s->renegotiate) { + /* + * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have + * received a message from the server. Better read it. + */ + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + } /* Renegotiation - fall through */ case TLS_ST_BEFORE: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; @@ -478,7 +511,7 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; #else - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; @@ -509,6 +542,23 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } + + case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: + /* + * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more + * convenient time. + */ + if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) { + if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { + ossl_statem_set_error(s); + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + } + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } } @@ -553,7 +603,7 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) break; case TLS_ST_OK: - return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst); + return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1); } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; @@ -562,6 +612,8 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) /* * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the * client to the server. + case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: + return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { @@ -689,7 +741,7 @@ int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, break; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: - *confunc = tls_construct_client_verify; + *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; break; @@ -730,6 +782,9 @@ size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: return s->max_cert_list; + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: + return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; @@ -784,6 +839,9 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: + return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt); @@ -805,6 +863,9 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: + return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt); } @@ -872,13 +933,16 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared * "ticket" without a session ID. */ - (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || + (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) || (sess->not_resumable)) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) return 0; } /* else use the pre-loaded session */ + /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ + s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; + p = s->s3->client_random; /* @@ -940,7 +1004,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) } /* Session ID */ - if (s->new_session) + if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) sess_id_len = 0; else sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length; @@ -1066,6 +1130,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) goto f_err; } + /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */ protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion); if (protverr != 0) { al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; @@ -1081,8 +1146,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) goto f_err; } - s->hit = 0; - /* Get the session-id. */ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { @@ -1109,63 +1172,103 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) goto f_err; } - /* - * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret. - * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. - * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. - * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) - * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application - * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST - * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone - * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if - * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the - * server wants to resume. - */ - if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) - && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->tlsext_tick) { - const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + } else { + compression = 0; + } + + /* TLS extensions */ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { + PACKET_null_init(&extpkt); + } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + + context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO + : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO; + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al)) + goto f_err; + + s->hit = 0; + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */ + if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk, + EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, + extensions, NULL, 0, &al)) + goto f_err; + } else { /* - * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for - * backwards compat reasons + * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared + * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. + * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. + * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) + * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application + * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether + * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session + * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we + * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake + * message to see if the server wants to resume. */ - int master_key_length; - master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); - if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, - &master_key_length, - NULL, &pref_cipher, - s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg) - && master_key_length > 0) { - s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; - s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? - pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars); - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; + if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION + && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) { + const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; + /* + * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for + * backwards compat reasons + */ + int master_key_length; + master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); + if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, + &master_key_length, + NULL, &pref_cipher, + s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) + && master_key_length > 0) { + s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; + s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? + pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars); + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } } + + if (session_id_len != 0 + && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length + && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id, + session_id_len) == 0) + s->hit = 1; } - if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length - && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id, - session_id_len) == 0) { + if (s->hit) { if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length - || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { + || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { /* actually a client application bug */ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); goto f_err; } - s->hit = 1; } else { /* * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server - * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION. + * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION. * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID, * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be * overwritten if the server refuses resumption. */ - if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { + if (s->session->session_id_length > 0 + || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && s->session->ext.tick_identity + != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) { s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++; if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { goto f_err; @@ -1235,17 +1338,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; - /* lets get the compression algorithm */ - /* COMPRESSION */ - if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { - if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - } else { - compression = 0; - } #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (compression != 0) { @@ -1289,19 +1381,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } #endif - /* TLS extensions */ - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { - PACKET_null_init(&extpkt); - } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - - context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO - : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO; - if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al) - || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al)) + if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al)) goto f_err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP @@ -1411,8 +1491,11 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, &al) || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, - rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) + rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) { + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); goto f_err; + } + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); } if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { @@ -1497,8 +1580,18 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) X509_up_ref(x); s->session->peer = x; s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; - x = NULL; + + /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, + sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), + &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; goto done; @@ -1613,6 +1706,8 @@ static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) DH *dh = NULL; BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL; + int check_bits = 0; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) { @@ -1642,7 +1737,8 @@ static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) goto err; } - if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) { + /* test non-zero pupkey */ + if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); goto err; @@ -1655,6 +1751,12 @@ static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) } p = g = NULL; + if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); + goto err; + } + if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); @@ -1800,9 +1902,11 @@ static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al = -1; + int al = -1, ispss = 0; long alg_k; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; PACKET save_param_start, signature; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; @@ -1841,7 +1945,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) PACKET params; int maxsig; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; - EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx; /* * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference @@ -1856,14 +1959,15 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - const unsigned char *sigalgs; + unsigned int sigalg; int rv; - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) { + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto err; } - rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey); + rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalg, pkey); if (rv == -1) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; @@ -1871,6 +1975,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto err; } + ispss = SIGID_IS_PSS(sigalg); #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif @@ -1911,29 +2016,39 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) goto err; } - if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms), - PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) { - EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); + if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (ispss) { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 + /* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */ + || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1) <= 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms), + PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } - /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ - if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), - (unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&signature), - pkey) <= 0) { + if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), + PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) { /* bad signature */ - EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto err; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); + md_ctx = NULL; } else { /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) @@ -1961,6 +2076,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (al != -1) ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } @@ -2002,8 +2118,9 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i]; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) { + PACKET sigalgs; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); @@ -2015,7 +2132,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL; s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; } - if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) { + if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); @@ -2095,21 +2212,30 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al; unsigned int ticklen; - unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint; + unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0; unsigned int sess_len; + RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL; if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint) + || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) { + || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) + || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (ticklen == 0 + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } - /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */ + /* + * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty + * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never + * be 0 here in that instance + */ if (ticklen == 0) return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; SSL_SESSION *new_sess; @@ -2134,22 +2260,45 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) s->session = new_sess; } - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick); - s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0; + /* + * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard - + * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok. + */ + s->session->time = (long)time(NULL); + + OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick); + s->session->ext.tick = NULL; + s->session->ext.ticklen = 0; - s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); - if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) { + s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); + if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) { + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } - s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; - s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; + s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; + s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add; + s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen; + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + PACKET extpkt; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) + || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, + EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + &exts, &al) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + exts, NULL, 0, &al)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + goto f_err; + } + } + /* * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in @@ -2165,13 +2314,20 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t */ - if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen, + if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen, s->session->session_id, &sess_len, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } s->session->session_id_length = sess_len; + + /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; + } + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); @@ -2203,22 +2359,22 @@ int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) { + s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); + if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) { + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen; + s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen; return 1; } - + MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { @@ -2251,14 +2407,14 @@ int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al) } /* - * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and - * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status + * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and + * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise */ - if (s->tlsext_status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing - && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) { - int ret; - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); + if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing + && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { + int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); + if (ret == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT, @@ -2482,6 +2638,10 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; + /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */ + if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) + goto err; + return 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); @@ -2839,80 +2999,6 @@ int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) return 0; } -int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) -{ - EVP_PKEY *pkey; - const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys]; - EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; - unsigned u = 0; - long hdatalen = 0; - void *hdata; - unsigned char *sig = NULL; - - mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); - if (mctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; - - hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); - if (hdatalen <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)&& !tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif - sig = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)); - if (sig == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) - || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) - || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION - && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, - (int)s->session->master_key_length, - s->session->master_key)) - || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, sig, &u, pkey)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto err; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - { - int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); - if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 - || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 - || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) - BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, u); - } -#endif - - if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, u)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) - goto err; - - OPENSSL_free(sig); - EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); - return 1; - err: - OPENSSL_free(sig); - EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; -} - /* * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client @@ -3112,10 +3198,10 @@ int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) size_t len, padding_len; unsigned char *padding = NULL; - len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; + len = s->ext.npn_len; padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); - if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->next_proto_negotiated, len) + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len) || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; @@ -3130,6 +3216,30 @@ int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) } #endif +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + /* should contain no data */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + ossl_statem_set_error(s); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + /* + * This is a historical discrepancy maintained for compatibility + * reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will attempt + * an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a + * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. + */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + SSL_renegotiate(s); + else + SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s); + + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; +} + static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;