X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fstatem_clnt.c;h=9629c1068a0d7a848d440915b0280f8942d8be88;hp=cfc104726757e5a1cb0a449b3221c1a241afb86c;hb=c80149d9f09b3a5a5b1621fa705e900d455334d4;hpb=1f5b44e943d911c3d0bf1445a6dab60798a66408 diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c index cfc1047267..9629c1068a 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -7,46 +9,6 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * - * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by - * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. - * - * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license provided above. - * - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by - * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. - * - * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by - * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license. - * - * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of - * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites - * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. - * - * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in - * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received - * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. - * - * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not - * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third - * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights - * to make use of the Contribution. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN - * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA - * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY - * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR - * OTHERWISE. - */ - #include #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" @@ -60,11 +22,11 @@ #include #include +static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s); static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s); -static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b); static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt); @@ -122,11 +84,6 @@ static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - /* - * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time - * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3 - */ - /* * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by @@ -137,6 +94,17 @@ static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) default: break; + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: + /* + * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only + * thing we can get now is a ServerHello. + */ + if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; + return 1; + } + break; + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; @@ -188,6 +156,10 @@ static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; return 1; } + if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE; + return 1; + } break; } @@ -210,8 +182,8 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) int ske_expected; /* - * Note that after a ClientHello we don't know what version we are going - * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later + * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version + * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later. */ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt)) @@ -234,6 +206,27 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; return 1; } + } else { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST; + return 1; + } + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: + /* + * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early + * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a + * HelloRetryRequest. + */ + if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; + return 1; + } + if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST; + return 1; } break; @@ -385,21 +378,40 @@ static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s) OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; /* - * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time - * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3 - */ - - /* - * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE or TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, - * because we haven't negotiated TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are - * handled by ossl_statem_client_write_transition(). + * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated + * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by + * ossl_statem_client_write_transition(). */ switch (st->hand_state) { default: /* Shouldn't happen */ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: + /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */ + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + + case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY + || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END; + else + st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT + : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: + if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + /* Fall through */ + + case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; @@ -414,14 +426,26 @@ static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: + if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + /* Fall through */ + + case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; - ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_OK: - /* Just go straight to trying to read from the server */ + if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + + /* Try to read from the server instead */ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; } } @@ -455,18 +479,30 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) */ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; } - /* Renegotiation - fall through */ + /* Renegotiation */ + /* fall thru */ case TLS_ST_BEFORE: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { + /* + * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't + * actually selected a version yet. + */ + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } /* * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what * we will be sent */ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; @@ -509,7 +545,8 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + st-> + hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; #else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; @@ -527,7 +564,6 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: if (s->hit) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; - ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } else { return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; @@ -539,7 +575,6 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; - ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } @@ -557,7 +592,6 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; - ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } } @@ -602,6 +636,18 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } break; + case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: + /* + * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not + * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press + * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here. + */ + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING + || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE) + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + /* Fall through */ + + case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: case TLS_ST_OK: return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1); } @@ -612,8 +658,6 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) /* * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the * client to the server. - case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: - return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { @@ -634,6 +678,27 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) /* Treat the next message as the first packet */ s->first_packet = 1; } + + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING + && s->max_early_data > 0) { + /* + * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change + * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead + * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. + */ + if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) + return WORK_ERROR; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + /* + * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing + * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server. + */ + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); + s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; break; case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: @@ -694,6 +759,13 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) return WORK_ERROR; } break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: + if (statem_flush(s) != 1) + return WORK_MORE_A; + if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) + return WORK_ERROR; + break; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; @@ -730,6 +802,16 @@ int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; break; + case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data; + *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; + break; + + case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: + *confunc = NULL; + *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; + break; + case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate; *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; @@ -755,6 +837,11 @@ int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, *confunc = tls_construct_finished; *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: + *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; + *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; + break; } return 1; @@ -779,6 +866,9 @@ size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: return s->max_cert_list; @@ -815,6 +905,9 @@ size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH; + + case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: + return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; } } @@ -836,6 +929,9 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt); @@ -868,6 +964,9 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt); + + case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: + return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); } } @@ -886,21 +985,6 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: - /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */ - if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { - s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; - s->rwstate = SSL_READING; - BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); - BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); - ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1); - return WORK_MORE_A; - } - ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0); - return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; -#endif } } @@ -928,21 +1012,14 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) return 0; } - if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) || - /* - * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared - * "ticket" without a session ID. - */ - (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) || - (sess->not_resumable)) { + if (sess == NULL + || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) + || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) return 0; } /* else use the pre-loaded session */ - /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ - s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; - p = s->s3->client_random; /* @@ -961,7 +1038,8 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) } else i = 1; - if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0) + if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random), + DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) return 0; /*- @@ -1046,7 +1124,9 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { + if (ssl_allow_compression(s) + && s->ctx->comp_methods + && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) { int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) { comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); @@ -1064,8 +1144,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) } /* TLS extensions */ - if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -1107,14 +1186,82 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } -MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; const SSL_CIPHER *c; + int i; + + c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); + if (c == NULL) { + /* unknown cipher */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); + return 0; + } + /* + * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello, + * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error. + */ + if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + return 0; + } + + sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); + i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); + if (i < 0) { + /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + return 0; + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL + && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) { + /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher + * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is + * set and use it for comparison. + */ + if (s->session->cipher != NULL) + s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; + if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* + * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different + * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same. + */ + if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2) + != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, + SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED); + return 0; + } + } else { + /* + * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same + * ciphersuite. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, + SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); + return 0; + } + } + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; + + return 1; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ PACKET session_id, extpkt; size_t session_id_len; const unsigned char *cipherchars; - int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; unsigned int compression; unsigned int sversion; unsigned int context; @@ -1130,19 +1277,31 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) goto f_err; } - /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */ - protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion); + /* load the server random */ + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in. + * Must be done after reading the random data so we can check for the + * TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels + */ + protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, 1, &al); if (protverr != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr); goto f_err; } - /* load the server hello data */ - /* load the server random */ - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + /* + * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the + * message must be on a record boundary. + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); goto f_err; } @@ -1185,15 +1344,16 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) /* TLS extensions */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { PACKET_null_init(&extpkt); - } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) { + } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); goto f_err; } - context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO - : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO; - if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al)) + context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO + : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO; + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL, 1)) goto f_err; s->hit = 0; @@ -1201,7 +1361,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */ if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk, - EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, NULL, 0, &al)) goto f_err; } else { @@ -1233,7 +1393,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) && master_key_length > 0) { s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? - pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars); + pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; @@ -1291,54 +1451,18 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } - - c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars); - if (c == NULL) { - /* unknown cipher */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } /* * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed * version. */ s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version; s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version; - /* - * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello, - * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error. - */ - if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); - i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); - if (i < 0) { - /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ + if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } - /* - * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher - * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is - * set and use it for comparison. - */ - if (s->session->cipher) - s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; - if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; - #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (compression != 0) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; @@ -1381,7 +1505,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } #endif - if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al)) + if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) goto f_err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP @@ -1414,8 +1538,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) - || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, - SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; @@ -1432,6 +1554,101 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } +static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + unsigned int sversion; + int errorcode; + const unsigned char *cipherchars; + RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; + int al; + PACKET extpkt; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + s->hello_retry_request = 1; + + /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */ + errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, 0, &al); + if (errorcode != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode); + goto f_err; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + + if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + goto f_err; + } + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) + /* Must have a non-empty extensions block */ + || PACKET_remaining(&extpkt) == 0 + /* Must be no trailing data after extensions */ + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + &extensions, &al, NULL, 1) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + extensions, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) + goto f_err; + + OPENSSL_free(extensions); + extensions = NULL; + + if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { + /* + * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next + * ClientHello will not change + */ + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR); + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with + * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. + */ + if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done + * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the + * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now + * for HRR messages. + */ + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + ossl_statem_set_error(s); + OPENSSL_free(extensions); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; +} + MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx; @@ -1451,7 +1668,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context)) || context != 0 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) { + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; @@ -1488,10 +1706,12 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); goto f_err; } - if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, - &rawexts, &al) - || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, - rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) { + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, + &al, NULL, chainidx == 0) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, + rawexts, x, chainidx, &al, + PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { OPENSSL_free(rawexts); goto f_err; } @@ -1548,7 +1768,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { x = NULL; - al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; @@ -1562,17 +1782,23 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); goto f_err; } - - exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); - if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx - && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC || - (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 - && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) { - x = NULL; - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); - goto f_err; + /* + * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3 + * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate + * type. + */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); + if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx + && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC || + (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 + && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) { + x = NULL; + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } } s->session->peer_type = i; @@ -1680,7 +1906,6 @@ static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) } if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); return 0; } @@ -1737,9 +1962,9 @@ static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) goto err; } - /* test non-zero pupkey */ + /* test non-zero pubkey */ if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); goto err; } @@ -1752,7 +1977,7 @@ static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) p = g = NULL; if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); goto err; } @@ -1827,7 +2052,7 @@ static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes. */ if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); return 0; } @@ -1876,7 +2101,7 @@ static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); return 0; } @@ -1902,7 +2127,7 @@ static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al = -1, ispss = 0; + int al = -1; long alg_k; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL; @@ -1953,7 +2178,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms, PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) - PACKET_remaining(pkt))) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } @@ -1967,7 +2192,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto err; } - rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalg, pkey); + rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey); if (rv == -1) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; @@ -1975,16 +2200,16 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto err; } - ispss = SIGID_IS_PSS(sigalg); #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif - } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { - md = EVP_md5_sha1(); - } else { - md = EVP_sha1(); + } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto err; } + md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx); + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; @@ -2021,10 +2246,10 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } - if (ispss) { + if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 - /* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */ - || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1) <= 0) { + || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, + RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; @@ -2083,131 +2308,107 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; - unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len; - X509_NAME *xn = NULL; - const unsigned char *data; - const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; - - if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } + int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + size_t i; - /* get the certificate types */ - if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; - } - OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes); - s->cert->ctypes = NULL; - if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) { - /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */ - s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num); - if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num); - s->cert->ctype_num = ctype_num; - ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER; - } - for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++) - s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i]; + /* Clear certificate validity flags */ + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) + s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + PACKET reqctx, extensions; + RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - PACKET sigalgs; + /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */ + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype); + s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL; + s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0; - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */ + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } - /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ - for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { - s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL; - s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + goto err; } - if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + &rawexts, &al, NULL, 1) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + rawexts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) { + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); goto err; } + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } else { - ssl_set_default_md(s); - } - - /* get the CA RDNs */ - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; - } + PACKET ctypes; - while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + /* get the certificate types */ + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } - namestart = namebytes; - - if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes, - name_len)) == NULL) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } - if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + PACKET sigalgs; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } } - if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + + /* get the CA RDNs */ + if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt, &al)) goto err; - } - xn = NULL; + } + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1; - s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num; - sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); - s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk; - ca_sk = NULL; ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; goto done; err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); done: - X509_NAME_free(xn); - sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); return ret; } -static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) -{ - return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b)); -} - MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; @@ -2234,8 +2435,15 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (ticklen == 0) return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */ - if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { + /* + * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise + * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, + * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every + * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive + * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session + * cache. + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) { int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; SSL_SESSION *new_sess; /* @@ -2288,11 +2496,13 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) PACKET extpkt; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, - EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, - &exts, &al) - || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, - exts, NULL, 0, &al)) { + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + &exts, &al, NULL, 1) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + exts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); goto f_err; } @@ -2323,6 +2533,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + OPENSSL_free(exts); ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; } @@ -2332,6 +2543,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); + OPENSSL_free(exts); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } @@ -2465,14 +2677,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al)) goto err; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - /* Only applies to renegotiation */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) - && s->renegotiate != 0) - return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; - else -#endif - return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); @@ -2522,7 +2727,7 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) identitylen = strlen(identity); if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } @@ -2621,12 +2826,6 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); pctx = NULL; -# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK - if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) - (*p)[1]++; - if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) - tmp_buf[0] = 0x70; -# endif /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { @@ -2634,13 +2833,13 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) goto err; } - s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; - s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; - /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */ if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) goto err; + s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; + s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; + return 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); @@ -2760,7 +2959,7 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256; /* - * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it + * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */ peer_cert = s->session->peer; if (!peer_cert) { @@ -2915,7 +3114,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al)) goto err; } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } @@ -3005,10 +3204,8 @@ int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) */ static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s) { - if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey) - return 0; /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys]) + if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL) return 0; /* * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also @@ -3109,11 +3306,22 @@ int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) : s->cert->key, &al)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return 0; + goto err; + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) + && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); + goto err; } return 1; + err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + return 0; } #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m)) @@ -3225,11 +3433,17 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; + } + /* - * This is a historical discrepancy maintained for compatibility - * reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will attempt - * an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a - * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. + * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for + * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will + * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a + * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable + * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd. */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) SSL_renegotiate(s); @@ -3245,16 +3459,18 @@ static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) PACKET extensions; RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; - if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } - if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, - &rawexts, &al) - || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, - rawexts, NULL, 0, &al)) + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts, + &al, NULL, 1) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + rawexts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) goto err; OPENSSL_free(rawexts); @@ -3287,7 +3503,7 @@ int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt) { int i; - size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen; + size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0; int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate; /* Set disabled masks for this session */ ssl_set_client_disabled(s); @@ -3321,7 +3537,7 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt) c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); /* Skip disabled ciphers */ - if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED)) + if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0)) continue; if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) { @@ -3329,11 +3545,29 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt) return 0; } + /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */ + if (!maxverok) { + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver) + && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)) + maxverok = 1; + } else { + if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver + && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver) + maxverok = 1; + } + } + totlen += len; } - if (totlen == 0) { + if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); + + if (!maxverok) + ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " + "SSL/TLS version"); + return 0; } @@ -3360,3 +3594,16 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt) return 1; } + +int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY + && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + + s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING; + return 1; +}