X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fstatem_clnt.c;h=05651d5e69425502b29c45f415ff7ec20dfbac39;hp=c6bc86f0fe4593145a69eddda9d6b3c2aaa91536;hb=d4d78943798df19e5e6ba7c2b1512f1bfa926d2d;hpb=a0f63828e3e542ba71b166b3d0cac05833591065 diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c index c6bc86f0fe..05651d5e69 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c @@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ -/* ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * @@ -156,17 +155,12 @@ #include #include #include -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -# include -#endif +#include #include -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE -# include -#endif +#include -static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s); +static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s); static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s); -static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s); static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b); static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p); @@ -179,7 +173,7 @@ static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, * 1: Yes * 0: No */ -static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s) +static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s) { /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION @@ -211,30 +205,6 @@ static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s) return 1; } - /* - * Export ciphersuites may have temporary RSA keys if the public key in the - * server certificate is longer than the maximum export strength - */ - if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { - EVP_PKEY *pkey; - - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); - if (pkey == NULL) - return -1; - - /* - * If the public key in the certificate is shorter than or equal to the - * maximum export strength then a temporary RSA key is not allowed - */ - if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey) - <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) - return 0; - - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - - return 1; - } - return 0; } @@ -283,6 +253,19 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; return 1; + } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION + && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL + && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL + && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + /* + * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session + * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on + * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if + * the server is resuming. + */ + s->hit = 1; + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; + return 1; } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { @@ -314,12 +297,13 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) break; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: - if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { - if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS; - return 1; - } - return 0; + /* + * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if + * |tlsext_status_expected| is set + */ + if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS; + return 1; } /* Fall through */ @@ -357,9 +341,11 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) break; case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: - if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET && s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; - return 1; + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; + return 1; + } } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; @@ -706,7 +692,11 @@ unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: - return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; + /* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. + * In practice these messages can get quite long if servers are + * configured to provide a long list of acceptable CAs + */ + return s->max_cert_list; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH; @@ -806,110 +796,12 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) return WORK_ERROR; } -/* - * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if - * the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. - * Returns 1 on success - * Returns 0 on error - */ -static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned long mask, options = s->options; - - if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) { - /* - * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are - * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order - * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So - * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of - * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the - * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3. - */ - mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) - | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 -#endif - ; -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT) - if (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) { - if ((options & mask) != mask) { - s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION; - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); - return 0; - } - } else { - s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION; - } -#else - if ((options & mask) == mask) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); - return 0; - } - s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION; -#endif - - mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; - if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask) - s->version = TLS1_VERSION; - mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) - if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask) - s->version = SSL3_VERSION; -#endif - - if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, - SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); - return 0; - } - - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && FIPS_mode()) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); - return 0; - } - - } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { - /* Determine which DTLS version to use */ - /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */ - if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) { - if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, - SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); - return 0; - } - /* - * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error. - */ - if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); - return 0; - } - /* - * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features. - */ - s->method = DTLSv1_client_method(); - s->version = DTLS1_VERSION; - } else { - /* - * We only support one version: update method - */ - if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) - s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method(); - s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; - } - } - - s->client_version = s->version; - - return 1; -} - int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p, *d; int i; + int protverr; unsigned long l; int al = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP @@ -921,10 +813,14 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */ - if (ssl_set_version(s) == 0) + protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s); + if (protverr != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); goto err; + } - if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) || + if ((sess == NULL) || + !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) || /* * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared * "ticket" without a session ID. @@ -976,7 +872,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. - * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. + * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0. * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now * know that is maximum server supports. @@ -1126,100 +1022,26 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) const SSL_CIPHER *c; PACKET session_id; size_t session_id_len; - unsigned char *cipherchars; + const unsigned char *cipherchars; int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; unsigned int compression; + unsigned int sversion; + int protverr; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP SSL_COMP *comp; #endif - if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) { - unsigned int sversion; - - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - -#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION -#error Code needs updating for new TLS version -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 - if ((sversion == SSL3_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) { - if (FIPS_mode()) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - s->method = SSLv3_client_method(); - } else -#endif - if ((sversion == TLS1_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) { - s->method = TLSv1_client_method(); - } else if ((sversion == TLS1_1_VERSION) && - !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) { - s->method = TLSv1_1_client_method(); - } else if ((sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION) && - !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) { - s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method(); - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version; - - if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW); - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { - /* Work out correct protocol version to use */ - unsigned int hversion; - int options; - - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &hversion)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - options = s->options; - if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) - s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method(); - else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); - s->version = hversion; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) - s->method = DTLSv1_client_method(); - else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); - s->version = hversion; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version; - } else { - unsigned char *vers; + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &vers, 2)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if ((vers[0] != (s->version >> 8)) - || (vers[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); - s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | vers[1]; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } + protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion); + if (protverr != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr); + goto f_err; } /* load the server hello data */ @@ -1266,7 +1088,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb && s->session->tlsext_tick) { - SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; + const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, @@ -1307,12 +1129,22 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } } + s->session->ssl_version = s->version; s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len; /* session_id_len could be 0 */ memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), session_id_len); } + /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */ + if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) { + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars); if (c == NULL) { /* unknown cipher */ @@ -1320,17 +1152,15 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } - /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */ - if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) - s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; - else - s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0; - /* Skip TLS v1.0 ciphersuites if SSLv3 */ - if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1) && s->version == SSL3_VERSION) - s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1; /* - * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so - * return an error. + * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed + * version. + */ + s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version; + s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version; + /* + * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello, + * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error. */ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; @@ -1461,7 +1291,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx; unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len; X509 *x = NULL; - unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; + const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; @@ -1506,7 +1336,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); - if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { + if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && i <= 0) { al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); @@ -1522,7 +1352,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) s->session->peer_chain = sk; /* * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate, - * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c + * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c */ x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); sk = NULL; @@ -1530,7 +1360,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end */ - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { x = NULL; @@ -1576,7 +1406,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); done: - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); return ret; @@ -1584,7 +1413,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; + EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx; int al, j; long alg_k, alg_a; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; @@ -1592,34 +1421,25 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa = NULL; #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - DH *dh = NULL; -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; - BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; - EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; - int curve_nid = 0; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; #endif PACKET save_param_start, signature; - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); + md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (md_ctx == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; save_param_start = *pkt; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - RSA_free(s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp); - s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - DH_free(s->s3->peer_dh_tmp); - s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = NULL; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - EC_KEY_free(s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp); - s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL; +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) + EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp); + s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL; #endif alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; @@ -1661,8 +1481,14 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ + /* + * Dummy "if" to ensure sane C code in the event of various OPENSSL_NO_* + * options + */ + if (0) { + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { + else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) @@ -1695,55 +1521,16 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) /* We must check if there is a certificate */ if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS)) - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); - } else -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { - PACKET mod, exp; - /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */ - if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; - } - - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &mod) - || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exp)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if ((rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&mod), PACKET_remaining(&mod), - rsa->n)) == NULL - || (rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&exp), PACKET_remaining(&exp), - rsa->e)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - - /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */ - if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); - else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa; - rsa = NULL; + pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); } -#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ - if (0) ; -#endif +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { PACKET prime, generator, pub_key; + EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL; + + DH *dh = NULL; + BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) @@ -1752,52 +1539,80 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) goto f_err; } - if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; + peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new(); + dh = DH_new(); + + if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto dherr; } - if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), - PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL - || (dh->g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), - PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL - || (dh->pub_key = - BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), - PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL)) == NULL) { + p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL); + g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator), + NULL); + bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), + NULL); + if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; + goto dherr; } - if (BN_is_zero(dh->p) || BN_is_zero(dh->g) || BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) { + if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); - goto f_err; + goto dherr; + } + + if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto dherr; + } + + if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto dherr; } if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); - goto f_err; + goto dherr; + } + + if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto dherr; } + + s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp; + + goto dhend; + dherr: + BN_free(p); + BN_free(g); + BN_free(bnpub_key); + DH_free(dh); + EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp); + goto f_err; + dhend: + /* + * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with + * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this + */ if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS)) - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); + pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ - - s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = dh; - dh = NULL; } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { - EC_GROUP *ngroup; - const EC_GROUP *group; PACKET encoded_pt; - unsigned char *ecparams; - - if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } + const unsigned char *ecparams; + int curve_nid; /* * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH @@ -1817,48 +1632,35 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) goto f_err; } - if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2))) == 0) { + curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2)); + if (curve_nid == 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; } - ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid); - if (ngroup == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - EC_GROUP_free(ngroup); - - group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh); - - if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && - (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { - al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); + /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */ + pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL); + if (pctx == NULL + || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto f_err; } - - /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */ - if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) || - ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + pctx = NULL; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } - if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), - PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), bn_ctx) == 0) { + if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->peer_tmp), + PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), + PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), NULL) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); goto f_err; } @@ -1871,20 +1673,13 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (0) ; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); + pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); + pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); # endif /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ - EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint); - s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh; - ecdh = NULL; - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - bn_ctx = NULL; - EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); - srvr_ecpoint = NULL; } else if (alg_k) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); @@ -1908,7 +1703,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - unsigned char *sigalgs; + const unsigned char *sigalgs; int rv; if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); @@ -1923,7 +1718,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif - } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { + } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { md = EVP_md5_sha1(); } else { md = EVP_sha1(); @@ -1948,18 +1743,18 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); goto f_err; } - if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms), + || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms), PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto f_err; } - if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), + if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; @@ -1981,25 +1776,18 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) goto f_err; } } - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA_free(rsa); #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - DH_free(dh); -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); - EC_KEY_free(ecdh); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); #endif - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } @@ -2009,8 +1797,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len; X509_NAME *xn = NULL; - unsigned char *data; - unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; + const unsigned char *data; + const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) { @@ -2106,6 +1894,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } + xn = NULL; } /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ @@ -2120,6 +1909,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); done: + X509_NAME_free(xn); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); return ret; } @@ -2234,7 +2024,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; @@ -2247,20 +2036,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) goto f_err; } s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen; - if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { - int ret; - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - if (ret == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); - goto f_err; - } - if (ret < 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } - } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); @@ -2299,6 +2074,38 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } + /* + * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and + * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status + * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise + */ + if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) { + int ret; + ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); + if (ret == 0) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, + SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, + SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + if (ret < 0) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT + if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { + /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */ + if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } +#endif + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Only applies to renegotiation */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) @@ -2320,14 +2127,14 @@ int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; +#endif +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) + EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL; - const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; int encoded_pt_len = 0; - BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #endif unsigned char *pms = NULL; size_t pmslen = 0; @@ -2370,9 +2177,8 @@ int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); goto psk_err; } - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); - s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen); + s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { @@ -2381,7 +2187,6 @@ int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) } s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; - identitylen = strlen(identity); if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, @@ -2389,7 +2194,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) goto psk_err; } OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); - s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); + s->session->psk_identity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity); if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); goto memerr; @@ -2417,7 +2222,7 @@ psk_err: } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { - RSA *rsa; + size_t enclen; pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); if (pms == NULL) @@ -2432,19 +2237,11 @@ psk_err: goto err; } - if (s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) - rsa = s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp; - else { - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); - if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) - || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - goto err; - } - rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); + if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; @@ -2456,18 +2253,27 @@ psk_err: /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) p += 2; - n = RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen, pms, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); + pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); + if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); + goto err; + } + n = enclen; + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + pctx = NULL; # ifdef PKCS1_CHECK if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++; if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0] = 0x70; # endif - if (n <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); - goto err; - } /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { @@ -2477,244 +2283,81 @@ psk_err: } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { - DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt; - if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) - dh_srvr = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp; - else { - /* we get them from the cert */ - EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL; - dh_srvr = NULL; - spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); - if (spkey) { - dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey); - EVP_PKEY_free(spkey); - } - if (dh_srvr == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { - /* Use client certificate key */ - EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; - dh_clnt = NULL; - if (clkey) - dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey); - if (dh_clnt == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } else { - /* generate a new random key */ - if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - DH_free(dh_clnt); - goto err; - } + else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { + DH *dh_clnt = NULL; + BIGNUM *pub_key; + skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; + if (skey == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } + ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef); + dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); - pmslen = DH_size(dh_clnt); - pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); - if (pms == NULL) - goto memerr; - - /* - * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to - * clear it out afterwards - */ - - n = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt); - if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp == NULL) - DH_free(dh_srvr); - - if (n <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - DH_free(dh_clnt); + if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } - pmslen = n; - if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) - n = 0; - else { - /* send off the data */ - n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key); - s2n(n, p); - BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p); - n += 2; - } - DH_free(dh_clnt); + /* send off the data */ + DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL); + n = BN_num_bytes(pub_key); + s2n(n, p); + BN_bn2bin(pub_key, p); + n += 2; + EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); + ckey = NULL; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { - const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL; - EC_KEY *tkey; - int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0; - int field_size = 0; - /* - * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster - * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set - * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. - */ - if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) { - /*- - * XXX: For now, we do not support client - * authentication using ECDH certificates. - * To add such support, one needs to add - * code that checks for appropriate - * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. - * For example, the cert have an ECC - * key on the same curve as the server's - * and the key should be authorized for - * key agreement. - * - * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect - * to skip sending the certificate verify - * message. - * - * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) && - * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type == - * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...) - * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1; - */ - } + else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { - if (s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) { - tkey = s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp; - } else { - /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */ - srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); - if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) - || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) - || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; + if ((skey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(skey) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + goto err; } - tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec; - } - - srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); - srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey); + ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef); - if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } - if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } + /* Generate encoding of client key */ + encoded_pt_len = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey), + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, + &encodedPoint, NULL); - if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) { + if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } - if (ecdh_clnt_cert) { - /* - * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our - * private key to perform the ECDH computation. - */ - const BIGNUM *priv_key; - tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec; - priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); - if (priv_key == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - } else { - /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */ - if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - } - /* - * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to - * clear it out afterwards - */ + EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); + ckey = NULL; - field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group); - if (field_size <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - pmslen = (field_size + 7) / 8; - pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); - if (pms == NULL) - goto memerr; - n = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pmslen, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL); - if (n <= 0 || pmslen != (size_t)n) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } + n = encoded_pt_len; - if (ecdh_clnt_cert) { - /* Send empty client key exch message */ - n = 0; - } else { - /* - * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory - * accordingly. - */ - encoded_pt_len = - EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), - POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, - NULL, 0, NULL); - - encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) - OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); - bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); - if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* Encode the public key */ - n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), - POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, - encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx); - - *p = n; /* length of encoded point */ - /* Encoded point will be copied here */ - p += 1; - /* copy the point */ - memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n); - /* increment n to account for length field */ - n += 1; - } + *p = n; /* length of encoded point */ + /* Encoded point will be copied here */ + p += 1; + /* copy the point */ + memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n); + /* increment n to account for length field */ + n += 1; /* Free allocated memory */ - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); - EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); - EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { /* GOST key exchange message creation */ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; @@ -2723,7 +2366,6 @@ psk_err: unsigned int md_len; unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash; - EVP_PKEY *pub_key; int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94; if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0) dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256; @@ -2744,8 +2386,7 @@ psk_err: goto err; } - pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key = - X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL); + pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL); if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); @@ -2785,7 +2426,7 @@ psk_err: * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context * data */ - ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); + ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, @@ -2793,12 +2434,12 @@ psk_err: || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { - EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } - EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) { @@ -2833,9 +2474,9 @@ psk_err: s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); - EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key); } +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) { @@ -2850,7 +2491,7 @@ psk_err: goto err; } OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); - s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); + s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); @@ -2874,8 +2515,10 @@ psk_err: goto err; } - s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; - s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; + if (pms != NULL) { + s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; + s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; + } return 1; memerr: @@ -2884,11 +2527,14 @@ psk_err: err: OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); - EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); - EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); +#endif +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) + EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); @@ -2903,6 +2549,9 @@ int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) unsigned char *pms = NULL; size_t pmslen = 0; + pms = s->s3->tmp.pms; + pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen; + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* Check for SRP */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { @@ -2914,8 +2563,6 @@ int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) return 1; } #endif - pms = s->s3->tmp.pms; - pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen; if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); @@ -2925,8 +2572,13 @@ int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */ + pms = NULL; + pmslen = 0; goto err; } + pms = NULL; + pmslen = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { @@ -2962,13 +2614,17 @@ int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s) unsigned char *p; EVP_PKEY *pkey; const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys]; - EVP_MD_CTX mctx; + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx; unsigned u = 0; - unsigned long n; + unsigned long n = 0; long hdatalen = 0; void *hdata; - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); + mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (mctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } p = ssl_handshake_start(s); pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; @@ -2984,35 +2640,33 @@ int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s) goto err; } p += 2; + n = 2; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif - if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) - || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) + if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) + || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION - && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(&mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, + && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, s->session->master_key_length, s->session->master_key)) - || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) { + || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } - if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 - || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 - || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { - unsigned int i, k; - for (i = u - 1, k = 0; k < u/2; k++, i--) { - char c = p[2 + k]; - p[2 + k] = p[2 + i]; - p[2 + i] = c; - } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + { + int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); + if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) + BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u); } +#endif s2n(u, p); - n = u + 2; - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - n += 2; + n += u + 2; /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) goto err; @@ -3021,10 +2675,10 @@ int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s) goto err; } - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return 1; err: - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return 0; } @@ -3035,7 +2689,6 @@ int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s) */ static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s) { - unsigned long alg_k; if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey) return 0; /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ @@ -3048,26 +2701,6 @@ static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s) if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT && !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2)) return 0; - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */ - if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { - int i = s->session->peer_type; - EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL; - clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; - /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */ - if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH) - return 1; - if (i >= 0) - spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); - if (spkey) { - /* Compare server and client parameters */ - i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey); - EVP_PKEY_free(spkey); - if (i != 1) - return 0; - } - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; - } return 1; } @@ -3164,16 +2797,12 @@ int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s) int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) { - int i, idx; + int i; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + int idx; +#endif long alg_k, alg_a; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - int pkey_bits; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - RSA *rsa; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - DH *dh; -#endif int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; @@ -3182,17 +2811,11 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) /* we don't have a certificate */ if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) return (1); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - rsa = s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - dh = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp; -#endif /* This is the passed certificate */ - idx = s->session->peer_type; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + idx = s->session->peer_type; if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) { if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) { /* check failed */ @@ -3205,15 +2828,10 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT); goto f_err; - } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT); - goto f_err; } #endif - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); - pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); + pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */ if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { @@ -3229,92 +2847,21 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { - if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && - !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); - goto f_err; - } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { - if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { - if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); - goto f_err; - } - if (rsa != NULL) { - /* server key exchange is not allowed. */ - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - } - } + if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && + !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); + goto f_err; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (dh == NULL)) { + if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; - } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && - !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT); - goto f_err; - } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && - !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT); - goto f_err; } -# endif #endif - if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && - pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { - if (rsa == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY); - goto f_err; - } else if (RSA_bits(rsa) > - SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { - /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */ - al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - } else -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { - if (DH_bits(dh) > - SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { - /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */ - al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { - /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */ - al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } else -#endif - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - } return (1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); @@ -3364,7 +2911,7 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p) { int i, j = 0; - SSL_CIPHER *c; + const SSL_CIPHER *c; unsigned char *q; int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate; /* Set disabled masks for this session */ @@ -3379,14 +2926,6 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, /* Skip disabled ciphers */ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED)) continue; -#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL - if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { - if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv) - continue; - else - empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0; - } -#endif j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p); p += j; } @@ -3401,10 +2940,6 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, }; j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p); p += j; -#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, - "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n"); -#endif } if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {