X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fstatem.c;h=f76c0e48034b8fca23d7493722fe46d84178cce4;hp=ac795ab052f265460991d21908fc3b2c1bcf3c21;hb=6839a7a7f4973a3fc2f87b12664c26d524bef1f4;hpb=a71a4966a31b31df72db42c130544462fd6ad624 diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem.c b/ssl/statem/statem.c index ac795ab052..f76c0e4803 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem.c @@ -1,64 +1,17 @@ -/* ssl/statem/statem.c */ /* - * Written by Matt Caswell for the OpenSSL project. - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" +#include /* * This file implements the SSL/TLS/DTLS state machines. @@ -95,46 +48,37 @@ */ /* Sub state machine return values */ -enum SUB_STATE_RETURN { +typedef enum { /* Something bad happened or NBIO */ SUB_STATE_ERROR, /* Sub state finished go to the next sub state */ SUB_STATE_FINISHED, /* Sub state finished and handshake was completed */ SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE -}; +} SUB_STATE_RETURN; static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server); static void init_read_state_machine(SSL *s); -static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s); +static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s); static void init_write_state_machine(SSL *s); -static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s); +static SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s); -OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) +OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE SSL_get_state(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->statem.hand_state; } -void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE state) -{ - /* - * This function seems like a really bad idea. Should we remove it - * completely? - */ - ssl->statem.hand_state = state; -} - -int SSL_in_init(SSL *s) +int SSL_in_init(const SSL *s) { return s->statem.in_init; } -int SSL_is_init_finished(SSL *s) +int SSL_is_init_finished(const SSL *s) { return !(s->statem.in_init) && (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_OK); } -int SSL_in_before(SSL *s) +int SSL_in_before(const SSL *s) { /* * Historically being "in before" meant before anything had happened. In the @@ -163,19 +107,41 @@ void ossl_statem_clear(SSL *s) */ void ossl_statem_set_renegotiate(SSL *s) { - s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE; s->statem.in_init = 1; + s->statem.request_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; } /* - * Put the state machine into an error state. This is a permanent error for - * the current connection. + * Put the state machine into an error state and send an alert if appropriate. + * This is a permanent error for the current connection. */ -void ossl_statem_set_error(SSL *s) +void ossl_statem_fatal(SSL *s, int al, int func, int reason, const char *file, + int line) { + ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SSL, func, reason, file, line); + /* We shouldn't call SSLfatal() twice. Once is enough */ + if (s->statem.in_init && s->statem.state == MSG_FLOW_ERROR) + return; + s->statem.in_init = 1; s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_ERROR; + if (al != SSL_AD_NO_ALERT + && s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID) + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); } +/* + * This macro should only be called if we are already expecting to be in + * a fatal error state. We verify that we are, and set it if not (this would + * indicate a bug). + */ +#define check_fatal(s, f) \ + do { \ + if (!ossl_assert((s)->statem.in_init \ + && (s)->statem.state == MSG_FLOW_ERROR)) \ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, (f), \ + SSL_R_MISSING_FATAL); \ + } while (0) + /* * Discover whether the current connection is in the error state. * @@ -196,7 +162,91 @@ void ossl_statem_set_in_init(SSL *s, int init) s->statem.in_init = init; } -int ossl_statem_connect(SSL *s) { +int ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(SSL *s) +{ + return s->statem.in_handshake; +} + +void ossl_statem_set_in_handshake(SSL *s, int inhand) +{ + if (inhand) + s->statem.in_handshake++; + else + s->statem.in_handshake--; +} + +/* Are we in a sensible state to skip over unreadable early data? */ +int ossl_statem_skip_early_data(SSL *s) +{ + if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED) + return 0; + + if (!s->server + || s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA + || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_COMPLETE) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Called when we are in SSL_read*(), SSL_write*(), or SSL_accept() + * /SSL_connect()/SSL_do_handshake(). Used to test whether we are in an early + * data state and whether we should attempt to move the handshake on if so. + * |sending| is 1 if we are attempting to send data (SSL_write*()), 0 if we are + * attempting to read data (SSL_read*()), or -1 if we are in SSL_do_handshake() + * or similar. + */ +void ossl_statem_check_finish_init(SSL *s, int sending) +{ + if (sending == -1) { + if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END + || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA) { + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY) { + /* + * SSL_connect() or SSL_do_handshake() has been called directly. + * We don't allow any more writing of early data. + */ + s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING; + } + } + } else if (!s->server) { + if ((sending && (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END + || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA) + && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING) + || (!sending && s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA)) { + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + /* + * SSL_write() has been called directly. We don't allow any more + * writing of early data. + */ + if (sending && s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY) + s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING; + } + } else { + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING + && s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA) + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + } +} + +void ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(SSL *s) +{ + s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_UNINITED; + s->statem.in_init = 1; + /* + * This will get reset (briefly) back to TLS_ST_BEFORE when we enter + * state_machine() because |state| is MSG_FLOW_UNINITED, but until then any + * calls to SSL_in_before() will return false. Also calls to + * SSL_state_string() and SSL_state_string_long() will return something + * sensible. + */ + s->statem.hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; +} + +int ossl_statem_connect(SSL *s) +{ return state_machine(s, 0); } @@ -205,12 +255,24 @@ int ossl_statem_accept(SSL *s) return state_machine(s, 1); } +typedef void (*info_cb) (const SSL *, int, int); + +static info_cb get_callback(SSL *s) +{ + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + return s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + return s->ctx->info_callback; + + return NULL; +} + /* * The main message flow state machine. We start in the MSG_FLOW_UNINITED or - * MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE state and finish in MSG_FLOW_FINISHED. Valid states and + * MSG_FLOW_FINISHED state and finish in MSG_FLOW_FINISHED. Valid states and * transitions are as follows: * - * MSG_FLOW_UNINITED MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE + * MSG_FLOW_UNINITED MSG_FLOW_FINISHED * | | * +-----------------------+ * v @@ -233,11 +295,11 @@ int ossl_statem_accept(SSL *s) * 1: Success * <=0: NBIO or error */ -static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) { +static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) +{ BUF_MEM *buf = NULL; - unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; - STATEM *st = &s->statem; + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; int ret = -1; int ssret; @@ -246,91 +308,79 @@ static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) { return -1; } - RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); ERR_clear_error(); clear_sys_error(); - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->ctx->info_callback; + cb = get_callback(s); - s->in_handshake++; + st->in_handshake++; if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) { - if (!SSL_clear(s)) + /* + * If we are stateless then we already called SSL_clear() - don't do + * it again and clear the STATELESS flag itself. + */ + if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0 && !SSL_clear(s)) return -1; } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { /* * Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake mode and prevent stream - * identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used. + * identifier other than 0. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, - s->in_handshake, NULL); - } -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - /* - * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and - * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during - * handshakes anyway. - */ - if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - dtls1_stop_timer(s); - s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; - s->tlsext_hb_seq++; + st->in_handshake, NULL); } #endif /* Initialise state machine */ - - if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) { - s->renegotiate = 1; - if (!server) - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; - } - - if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED || st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) { + if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED + || st->state == MSG_FLOW_FINISHED) { if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; + st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; } s->server = server; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); + /* + * Fatal errors in this block don't send an alert because we have + * failed to even initialise properly. Sending an alert is probably + * doomed to failure. + */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) && - (server - || (s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + (server || (s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; } } else { - if ((s->version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR - && s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + if ((s->version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; } } - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION && - !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW); - goto end; - } + if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto end; } if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; } s->init_buf = buf; @@ -338,6 +388,8 @@ static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) { } if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; } s->init_num = 0; @@ -347,64 +399,36 @@ static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) { */ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; - if (!server || st->state != MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) { - /* - * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO ...but not with - * SCTP - */ + /* + * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO ...but not with + * SCTP + */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) #endif - if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, server ? 1 : 0)) { - goto end; - } - - ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); - } - - if (server) { - if (st->state != MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) { - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; - } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && - !(s->options & - SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { - /* - * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't - * support secure renegotiation. - */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; - } else { - /* - * st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a - * HelloRequest - */ - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; } - } else { - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; - /* mark client_random uninitialized */ - memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); - s->hit = 0; - - s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; - - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - st->use_timer = 1; + if ((SSL_in_before(s)) + || s->renegotiate) { + if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto end; } + + if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + st->read_state_first_init = 1; } st->state = MSG_FLOW_WRITING; init_write_state_machine(s); - st->read_state_first_init = 1; } - while(st->state != MSG_FLOW_FINISHED) { - if(st->state == MSG_FLOW_READING) { + while (st->state != MSG_FLOW_FINISHED) { + if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_READING) { ssret = read_state_machine(s); if (ssret == SUB_STATE_FINISHED) { st->state = MSG_FLOW_WRITING; @@ -426,25 +450,25 @@ static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) { } } else { /* Error */ - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + check_fatal(s, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); goto end; } } - st->state = MSG_FLOW_UNINITED; ret = 1; end: - s->in_handshake--; + st->in_handshake--; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { /* * Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake mode and allow stream - * identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used. + * identifier other than 0. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, - s->in_handshake, NULL); + st->in_handshake, NULL); } #endif @@ -463,11 +487,26 @@ static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) { */ static void init_read_state_machine(SSL *s) { - STATEM *st = &s->statem; + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER; } +static int grow_init_buf(SSL *s, size_t size) { + + size_t msg_offset = (char *)s->init_msg - s->init_buf->data; + + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)size)) + return 0; + + if (size < msg_offset) + return 0; + + s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + msg_offset; + + return 1; +} + /* * This function implements the sub-state machine when the message flow is in * MSG_FLOW_READING. The valid sub-states and transitions are: @@ -490,36 +529,34 @@ static void init_read_state_machine(SSL *s) * READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS is an optional step that may occur if some post * processing activity performed on the message may block. * - * Any of the above states could result in an NBIO event occuring in which case + * Any of the above states could result in an NBIO event occurring in which case * control returns to the calling application. When this function is recalled we * will resume in the same state where we left off. */ -static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) { - STATEM *st = &s->statem; +static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; int ret, mt; - unsigned long len; - int (*transition)(SSL *s, int mt); + size_t len = 0; + int (*transition) (SSL *s, int mt); PACKET pkt; - enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN (*process_message)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); - enum WORK_STATE (*post_process_message)(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst); - unsigned long (*max_message_size)(SSL *s); + MSG_PROCESS_RETURN(*process_message) (SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); + WORK_STATE(*post_process_message) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); + size_t (*max_message_size) (SSL *s); void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->ctx->info_callback; + cb = get_callback(s); - if(s->server) { - transition = server_read_transition; - process_message = server_process_message; - max_message_size = server_max_message_size; - post_process_message = server_post_process_message; + if (s->server) { + transition = ossl_statem_server_read_transition; + process_message = ossl_statem_server_process_message; + max_message_size = ossl_statem_server_max_message_size; + post_process_message = ossl_statem_server_post_process_message; } else { - transition = client_read_transition; - process_message = client_process_message; - max_message_size = client_max_message_size; - post_process_message = client_post_process_message; + transition = ossl_statem_client_read_transition; + process_message = ossl_statem_client_process_message; + max_message_size = ossl_statem_client_max_message_size; + post_process_message = ossl_statem_client_post_process_message; } if (st->read_state_first_init) { @@ -527,10 +564,9 @@ static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) { st->read_state_first_init = 0; } - while(1) { - switch(st->read_state) { + while (1) { + switch (st->read_state) { case READ_STATE_HEADER: - s->init_num = 0; /* Get the state the peer wants to move to */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* @@ -557,15 +593,22 @@ static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) { * Validate that we are allowed to move to the new state and move * to that state if so */ - if(!transition(s, mt)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + if (!transition(s, mt)) return SUB_STATE_ERROR; - } if (s->s3->tmp.message_size > max_message_size(s)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, + SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); + return SUB_STATE_ERROR; + } + + /* dtls_get_message already did this */ + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) + && s->s3->tmp.message_size > 0 + && !grow_init_buf(s, s->s3->tmp.message_size + + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } @@ -584,34 +627,46 @@ static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) { s->first_packet = 0; if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, len)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } ret = process_message(s, &pkt); - if (ret == MSG_PROCESS_ERROR) { + + /* Discard the packet data */ + s->init_num = 0; + + switch (ret) { + case MSG_PROCESS_ERROR: + check_fatal(s, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; - } - if (ret == MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING) { + case MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { dtls1_stop_timer(s); } return SUB_STATE_FINISHED; - } - if (ret == MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING) { + case MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING: st->read_state = READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS; st->read_state_work = WORK_MORE_A; - } else { + break; + + default: st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER; + break; } break; case READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS: st->read_state_work = post_process_message(s, st->read_state_work); - switch(st->read_state_work) { - default: + switch (st->read_state_work) { + case WORK_ERROR: + check_fatal(s, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE); + /* Fall through */ + case WORK_MORE_A: + case WORK_MORE_B: + case WORK_MORE_C: return SUB_STATE_ERROR; case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE: @@ -628,9 +683,8 @@ static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) { default: /* Shouldn't happen */ - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } } @@ -641,10 +695,10 @@ static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) { */ static int statem_do_write(SSL *s) { - STATEM *st = &s->statem; + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE - || st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE) { + || st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE) { if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); else @@ -659,7 +713,7 @@ static int statem_do_write(SSL *s) */ static void init_write_state_machine(SSL *s) { - STATEM *st = &s->statem; + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION; } @@ -684,7 +738,7 @@ static void init_write_state_machine(SSL *s) * WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION transitions the state of the handshake state machine * WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK performs any work necessary to prepare the later - * sending of the message. This could result in an NBIO event occuring in + * sending of the message. This could result in an NBIO event occurring in * which case control returns to the calling application. When this function * is recalled we will resume in the same state where we left off. * @@ -695,35 +749,37 @@ static void init_write_state_machine(SSL *s) * message has been completed. As for WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK this could also * result in an NBIO event. */ -static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s) +static SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s) { - STATEM *st = &s->statem; + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; int ret; - enum WRITE_TRAN (*transition)(SSL *s); - enum WORK_STATE (*pre_work)(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst); - enum WORK_STATE (*post_work)(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst); - int (*construct_message)(SSL *s); + WRITE_TRAN(*transition) (SSL *s); + WORK_STATE(*pre_work) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); + WORK_STATE(*post_work) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); + int (*get_construct_message_f) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + int (**confunc) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt), + int *mt); void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; + int (*confunc) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); + int mt; + WPACKET pkt; - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->ctx->info_callback; + cb = get_callback(s); - if(s->server) { - transition = server_write_transition; - pre_work = server_pre_work; - post_work = server_post_work; - construct_message = server_construct_message; + if (s->server) { + transition = ossl_statem_server_write_transition; + pre_work = ossl_statem_server_pre_work; + post_work = ossl_statem_server_post_work; + get_construct_message_f = ossl_statem_server_construct_message; } else { - transition = client_write_transition; - pre_work = client_pre_work; - post_work = client_post_work; - construct_message = client_construct_message; + transition = ossl_statem_client_write_transition; + pre_work = ossl_statem_client_pre_work; + post_work = ossl_statem_client_post_work; + get_construct_message_f = ossl_statem_client_construct_message; } - while(1) { - switch(st->write_state) { + while (1) { + switch (st->write_state) { case WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION: if (cb != NULL) { /* Notify callback of an impending state change */ @@ -732,7 +788,7 @@ static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s) else cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1); } - switch(transition(s)) { + switch (transition(s)) { case WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE: st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK; st->write_state_work = WORK_MORE_A; @@ -742,14 +798,20 @@ static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s) return SUB_STATE_FINISHED; break; - default: + case WRITE_TRAN_ERROR: + check_fatal(s, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } break; case WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK: - switch(st->write_state_work = pre_work(s, st->write_state_work)) { - default: + switch (st->write_state_work = pre_work(s, st->write_state_work)) { + case WORK_ERROR: + check_fatal(s, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE); + /* Fall through */ + case WORK_MORE_A: + case WORK_MORE_B: + case WORK_MORE_C: return SUB_STATE_ERROR; case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE: @@ -759,8 +821,35 @@ static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s) case WORK_FINISHED_STOP: return SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE; } - if(construct_message(s) == 0) + if (!get_construct_message_f(s, &pkt, &confunc, &mt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return SUB_STATE_ERROR; + } + if (mt == SSL3_MT_DUMMY) { + /* Skip construction and sending. This isn't a "real" state */ + st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK; + st->write_state_work = WORK_MORE_A; + break; + } + if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf) + || !ssl_set_handshake_header(s, &pkt, mt)) { + WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; + } + if (confunc != NULL && !confunc(s, &pkt)) { + WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); + check_fatal(s, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE); + return SUB_STATE_ERROR; + } + if (!ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt, mt) + || !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) { + WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return SUB_STATE_ERROR; + } /* Fall through */ @@ -777,8 +866,13 @@ static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s) /* Fall through */ case WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK: - switch(st->write_state_work = post_work(s, st->write_state_work)) { - default: + switch (st->write_state_work = post_work(s, st->write_state_work)) { + case WORK_ERROR: + check_fatal(s, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE); + /* Fall through */ + case WORK_MORE_A: + case WORK_MORE_B: + case WORK_MORE_C: return SUB_STATE_ERROR; case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE: @@ -791,6 +885,8 @@ static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s) break; default: + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } } @@ -812,7 +908,7 @@ int statem_flush(SSL *s) /* * Called by the record layer to determine whether application data is - * allowed to be sent in the current handshake state or not. + * allowed to be received in the current handshake state or not. * * Return values are: * 1: Yes (application data allowed) @@ -820,9 +916,9 @@ int statem_flush(SSL *s) */ int ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s) { - STATEM *st = &s->statem; + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED || st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) + if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED) return 0; if (!s->s3->in_read_app_data || (s->s3->total_renegotiations == 0)) @@ -834,7 +930,7 @@ int ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s) * ServerHello yet then we allow app data */ if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE - || st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO) + || st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO) return 1; } else { /* @@ -848,25 +944,27 @@ int ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s) return 0; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* - * Set flag used by SCTP to determine whether we are in the read sock state + * This function returns 1 if TLS exporter is ready to export keying + * material, or 0 if otherwise. */ -void ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(SSL *s, int read_sock) +int ossl_statem_export_allowed(SSL *s) { - s->statem.in_sctp_read_sock = read_sock; + return s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0 + && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; } /* - * Called by the record layer to determine whether we are in the read sock - * state or not. - * - * Return values are: - * 1: Yes (we are in the read sock state) - * 0: No (we are not in the read sock state) + * Return 1 if early TLS exporter is ready to export keying material, + * or 0 if otherwise. */ -int statem_in_sctp_read_sock(SSL *s) +int ossl_statem_export_early_allowed(SSL *s) { - return s->statem.in_sctp_read_sock; + /* + * The early exporter secret is only present on the server if we + * have accepted early_data. It is present on the client as long + * as we have sent early_data. + */ + return s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED + || (!s->server && s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NOT_SENT); } -#endif