X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fextensions_srvr.c;h=68fb0863c3b22c45e5a4006d51306ed87d27c556;hp=357b3b710555ae57a56f89c21746d4526b29406e;hb=45436e611b3e11c948ea9f3273df971c9bb4c122;hpb=c7f47786a5e5f68dc33091ffb2a42e51a73de3a1 diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c index 357b3b7105..68fb0863c3 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * - * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html @@ -10,12 +10,36 @@ #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" + +#define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 0 + +/* + * 2 bytes for packet length, 2 bytes for format version, 2 bytes for + * protocol version, 2 bytes for group id, 2 bytes for cipher id, 1 byte for + * key_share present flag, 4 bytes for timestamp, 2 bytes for the hashlen, + * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE for transcript hash, 1 byte for app cookie length, app cookie + * length bytes, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes for the HMAC of the whole thing. + */ +#define MAX_COOKIE_SIZE (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 4 + 2 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1 \ + + SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) + +/* + * Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes + + * + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id + * + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression + * + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension + * + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie + */ +#define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \ + + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \ + + MAX_COOKIE_SIZE) /* * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right */ -int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { unsigned int ilen; const unsigned char *data; @@ -23,29 +47,26 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, /* Parse the length byte */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, - SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); return 0; } /* Check that the extension matches */ - if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, - SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + if (ilen != s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); return 0; } - if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, - s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, - SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + if (memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_client_finished, + s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); return 0; } - s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; + s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1; return 1; } @@ -73,8 +94,8 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, * extension. * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. */ -int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { unsigned int servname_type; PACKET sni, hostname; @@ -82,15 +103,15 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni) /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */ || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } /* - * Although the server_name extension was intended to be - * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the - * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as - * such. + * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366 + * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations, + * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types. * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing. @@ -101,48 +122,106 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type) || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } - if (!s->hit) { + if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } - if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->ext.hostname)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + /* + * Store the requested SNI in the SSL as temporary storage. + * If we accept it, it will get stored in the SSL_SESSION as well. + */ + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname); + s->ext.hostname = NULL; + if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->ext.hostname)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->servername_done = 1; - } else { + } + if (s->hit) { /* * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST * fall back to a full handshake. */ - s->servername_done = s->session->ext.hostname + s->servername_done = (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname, strlen(s->session->ext.hostname)); + + if (!s->servername_done && s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) + s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; } return 1; } +int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + unsigned int value; + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + /* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */ + if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, + SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + + /* + * RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session + * including session resumptions. + * We should receive the same code as in resumed session ! + */ + if (s->hit && s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode != value) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, + SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us + * and we'll include it in a next Server Hello. + */ + s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value; + return 1; +} + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP -int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { PACKET srp_I; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I) || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } @@ -151,7 +230,8 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login. */ if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -160,14 +240,15 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { PACKET ec_point_format_list; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list) || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } @@ -175,7 +256,8 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list, &s->session->ext.ecpointformats, &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } @@ -184,33 +266,57 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ -int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb && !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + PACKET supported_sig_algs; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs) + || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } return 1; } -int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { PACKET supported_sig_algs; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs) || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } - if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } @@ -218,17 +324,22 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP -int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { PACKET responder_id_list, exts; + /* We ignore this in a resumption handshake */ + if (s->hit) + return 1; + /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */ if (x != NULL) return 1; if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } @@ -241,7 +352,8 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, } if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } @@ -253,7 +365,8 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } else { @@ -267,7 +380,8 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id) || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } @@ -276,26 +390,32 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id)); if (id == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; } if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } } /* Read in request_extensions */ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } @@ -307,7 +427,8 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, s->ext.ocsp.exts = d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts)); if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } } @@ -317,14 +438,15 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { /* * We shouldn't accept this extension on a * renegotiation. */ if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) - s->s3->npn_seen = 1; + s->s3.npn_seen = 1; return 1; } @@ -332,10 +454,10 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) /* * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN - * extension, not including type and length. |al| is a pointer to the alert - * value to send in the event of a failure. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error. + * extension, not including type and length. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error. */ -int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol; @@ -344,7 +466,8 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list) || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } @@ -353,14 +476,19 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) /* Protocol names can't be empty. */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol) || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0); + OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_proposed); + s->s3.alpn_proposed = NULL; + s->s3.alpn_proposed_len = 0; if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list, - &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + &s->s3.alpn_proposed, &s->s3.alpn_proposed_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -368,8 +496,8 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP -int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr; unsigned int ct, mki_len, id; @@ -383,9 +511,8 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -396,9 +523,8 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, - SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, + SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); return 0; } @@ -422,16 +548,15 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, - SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, + SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); return 0; } if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len) || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, + SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); return 0; } @@ -439,92 +564,98 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, } #endif -int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; + s->ext.use_etm = 1; return 1; } /* - * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is - * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be - * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is - * 1) or 0 otherwise. + * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains + * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 -static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, - const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups, - int checkallow) +int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { - size_t i; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + PACKET psk_kex_modes; + unsigned int mode; - if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes) + || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; + } - for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) { - unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]); - - if (group_id == share_id - && (!checkallow - || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { - break; - } + while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) { + if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE) + s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE; + else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE + && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0) + s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE; } +#endif - /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */ - return i < num_groups; + return 1; } -#endif /* * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. - * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value. */ -int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned int group_id; PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt; - const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves; - size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves; - int group_nid, found = 0; - unsigned int curve_flags; + const uint16_t *clntgroups, *srvrgroups; + size_t clnt_num_groups, srvr_num_groups; + int found = 0; - if (s->hit) + if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0) return 1; /* Sanity check */ - if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + if (s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } - /* Get our list of supported curves */ - if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* Get our list of supported groups */ + tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &srvrgroups, &srvr_num_groups); + /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */ + tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups); + if (clnt_num_groups == 0) { + /* + * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent, + * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that + * extension. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION); return 0; } - /* - * Get the clients list of supported curves. - * TODO(TLS1.3): We should validate that we actually received - * supported_groups! - */ - if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + if (s->s3.group_id != 0 && PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) == 0) { + /* + * If we set a group_id already, then we must have sent an HRR + * requesting a new key_share. If we haven't got one then that is an + * error + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); return 0; } @@ -532,9 +663,8 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt) || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, - SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } @@ -545,63 +675,44 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, if (found) continue; + /* + * If we sent an HRR then the key_share sent back MUST be for the group + * we requested, and must be the only key_share sent. + */ + if (s->s3.group_id != 0 + && (group_id != s->s3.group_id + || PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) != 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */ - if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); return 0; } /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */ - if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) { + if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups, 1)) { /* Share not suitable */ continue; } - group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags); - - if (group_nid == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, + if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(group_id)) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); return 0; } - if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) { - /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */ - EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new(); - - if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - EVP_PKEY_free(key); - return 0; - } - s->s3->peer_tmp = key; - } else { - /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */ - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL); - - if (pctx == NULL - || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0 - || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, - group_nid) <= 0 - || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); - return 0; - } - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); - pctx = NULL; - } - s->s3->group_id = group_id; + s->s3.group_id = group_id; - if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, + if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.peer_tmp, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); return 0; } @@ -612,9 +723,232 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, return 1; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + unsigned int format, version, key_share, group_id; + EVP_MD_CTX *hctx; + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + PACKET cookie, raw, chhash, appcookie; + WPACKET hrrpkt; + const unsigned char *data, *mdin, *ciphdata; + unsigned char hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + unsigned char hrr[MAX_HRR_SIZE]; + size_t rawlen, hmaclen, hrrlen, ciphlen; + unsigned long tm, now; + + /* Ignore any cookie if we're not set up to verify it */ + if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL + || (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) + return 1; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + raw = cookie; + data = PACKET_data(&raw); + rawlen = PACKET_remaining(&raw); + if (rawlen < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + || !PACKET_forward(&raw, rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + mdin = PACKET_data(&raw); + + /* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */ + hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); + pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, + s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key, + sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext + .cookie_hmac_key)); + if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) { + EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + + hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; + if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, data, + rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0 + || hmaclen != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) { + EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + + if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac, mdin, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &format)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + /* Check the cookie format is something we recognise. Ignore it if not */ + if (format != COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION) + return 1; + + /* + * The rest of these checks really shouldn't fail since we have verified the + * HMAC above. + */ + + /* Check the version number is sane */ + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &version)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); + return 0; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &group_id)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + ciphdata = PACKET_data(&cookie); + if (!PACKET_forward(&cookie, 2)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + if (group_id != s->s3.group_id + || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher + != ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, ciphdata, 0)) { + /* + * We chose a different cipher or group id this time around to what is + * in the cookie. Something must have changed. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER); + return 0; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_1(&cookie, &key_share) + || !PACKET_get_net_4(&cookie, &tm) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&cookie, &chhash) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cookie, &appcookie) + || PACKET_remaining(&cookie) != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + /* We tolerate a cookie age of up to 10 minutes (= 60 * 10 seconds) */ + now = (unsigned long)time(NULL); + if (tm > now || (now - tm) > 600) { + /* Cookie is stale. Ignore it */ + return 1; + } + + /* Verify the app cookie */ + if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&appcookie), + PACKET_remaining(&appcookie)) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Reconstruct the HRR that we would have sent in response to the original + * ClientHello so we can add it to the transcript hash. + * Note: This won't work with custom HRR extensions + */ + if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&hrrpkt, hrr, sizeof(hrr), 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&hrrpkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLS1_2_VERSION) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(&hrrpkt, hrrrandom, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&hrrpkt, s->tmp_session_id, + s->tmp_session_id_len) + || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, &hrrpkt, + &ciphlen) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, 0) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)) { + WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->version) + || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) { + WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (key_share) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->s3.group_id) + || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) { + WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&hrrpkt, data, rawlen) + || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* cookie extension */ + || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* extension block */ + || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* message */ + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&hrrpkt, &hrrlen) + || !WPACKET_finish(&hrrpkt)) { + WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* Reconstruct the transcript hash */ + if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, PACKET_data(&chhash), + PACKET_remaining(&chhash), hrr, + hrrlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + /* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */ + s->hello_retry_request = 1; + + s->ext.cookieok = 1; +#endif + + return 1; +} + +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) +int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { PACKET supported_groups_list; @@ -622,31 +956,347 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list) || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } - if (!s->hit - && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list, - &s->session->ext.supportedgroups, - &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; + if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_supportedgroups); + s->ext.peer_supportedgroups = NULL; + s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len = 0; + if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list, + &s->ext.peer_supportedgroups, + &s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } return 1; } #endif -int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { /* The extension must always be empty */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EMS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + return 1; + + s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; + + return 1; +} + + +int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; + if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *tick, + SSL_SESSION **sess) +{ + SSL_SESSION *tmpsess = NULL; + + s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; + + switch (PACKET_remaining(tick)) { + case 0: + return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY; + + case SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH: + break; + + default: + return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; + } + + tmpsess = lookup_sess_in_cache(s, PACKET_data(tick), + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH); + + if (tmpsess == NULL) + return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; + + *sess = tmpsess; + return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS; +} + +int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + PACKET identities, binders, binder; + size_t binderoffset, hashsize; + SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL; + unsigned int id, i, ext = 0; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + + /* + * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so + * ignore this extension + */ + if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode + & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0) + return 1; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; + for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) { + PACKET identity; + unsigned long ticket_agel; + size_t idlen; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity) + || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + idlen = PACKET_remaining(&identity); + if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL + && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity), idlen, + &sess)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if(sess == NULL + && s->psk_server_callback != NULL + && idlen <= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { + char *pskid = NULL; + unsigned char pskdata[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; + unsigned int pskdatalen; + + if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity, &pskid)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + pskdatalen = s->psk_server_callback(s, pskid, pskdata, + sizeof(pskdata)); + OPENSSL_free(pskid); + if (pskdatalen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } else if (pskdatalen > 0) { + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; + const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 }; + + /* + * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know + * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec + */ + cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id); + if (cipher == NULL) { + OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + sess = SSL_SESSION_new(); + if (sess == NULL + || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess, pskdata, + pskdatalen) + || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher) + || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess, + TLS1_3_VERSION)) { + OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen); + } + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ + + if (sess != NULL) { + /* We found a PSK */ + SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0); + + if (sesstmp == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + sess = sesstmp; + + /* + * We've just been told to use this session for this context so + * make sure the sid_ctx matches up. + */ + memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); + sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length; + ext = 1; + if (id == 0) + s->ext.early_data_ok = 1; + s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; + } else { + uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems; + int ret; + + /* + * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if + * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there + * is no point in using full stateless tickets. + */ + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0 + || (s->max_early_data > 0 + && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0)) + ret = tls_get_stateful_ticket(s, &identity, &sess); + else + ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity), + PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0, + &sess); + + if (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC + || ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (ret == SSL_TICKET_NONE || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT) + continue; + + /* Check for replay */ + if (s->max_early_data > 0 + && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0 + && !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, sess)) { + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + sess = NULL; + continue; + } + + ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel; + now = (uint32_t)time(NULL); + agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time; + agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000; + ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add; + + /* + * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the + * client does it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age + * is longer than ours (our ticket age calculation should always be + * slightly longer than the client's due to the network latency). + * Therefore we add 1000ms to our age calculation to adjust for + * rounding errors. + */ + if (id == 0 + && sess->timeout >= (long)agesec + && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec + && ticket_age <= agems + 1000 + && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) { + /* + * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it + * for early data + */ + s->ext.early_data_ok = 1; + } + } + + md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2); + if (md != ssl_md(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)) { + /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */ + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + sess = NULL; + s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; + s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; + continue; + } + break; + } + + if (sess == NULL) + return 1; + + binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + goto err; + } + + for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) { + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + goto err; + } + } + + if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + goto err; + } + if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, sess, 0, + ext) != 1) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + s->ext.tick_identity = id; + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = sess; + return 1; +err: + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + return 0; +} + +int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH, + SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR); + return 0; + } + + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED; return 1; } @@ -654,102 +1304,204 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) /* * Add the server's renegotiation binding */ -int tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t - chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { - if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding) - return 1; + if (!s->s3.send_connection_binding) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) - || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished, - s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) - || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished, - s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.previous_client_finished, + s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.previous_server_finished, + s->s3.previous_server_finished_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } -int tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1 - || s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) - return 1; + || s->ext.hostname == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +/* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */ +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /*- + * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length + * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value. + */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -int tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { - unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; + unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + unsigned long alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL); const unsigned char *plist; size_t plistlen; if (!using_ecc) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} +#endif + +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + const uint16_t *groups; + size_t numgroups, i, first = 1; + + /* s->s3.group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */ + if (s->s3.group_id == 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* Get our list of supported groups */ + tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &numgroups); + if (numgroups == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* Copy group ID if supported */ + for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++) { + uint16_t group = groups[i]; + + if (tls_valid_group(s, group, SSL_version(s)) + && tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { + if (first) { + /* + * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If + * so we don't need to add this extension + */ + if (s->s3.group_id == group) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* Add extension header */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) + /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + first = 0; + } + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + } + + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif -int tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) { s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP -int tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { if (!s->ext.status_expected) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* @@ -757,72 +1509,80 @@ int tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a * separate message */ - if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) - || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -int tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { const unsigned char *npa; unsigned int npalen; int ret; - int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen; + int npn_seen = s->s3.npn_seen; - s->s3->npn_seen = 0; + s->s3.npn_seen = 0; if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg); if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - s->s3->npn_seen = 1; + s->s3.npn_seen = 1; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif -int tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { - if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) - return 1; + if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) - || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, - s->s3->alpn_selected_len) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3.alpn_selected, + s->s3.alpn_selected_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP -int tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { if (s->srtp_profile == NULL) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) @@ -830,115 +1590,302 @@ int tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif -int tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { - if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) == 0) - return 1; + if (!s->ext.use_etm) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable * for other cases too. */ - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD - || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 - || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT - || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) { - s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; - return 1; + if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD + || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 + || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT + || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) { + s->ext.use_etm = 0; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } -int tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { - if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0) - return 1; + if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + if (!ossl_assert(SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } -int tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned char *encodedPoint; size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; - EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3.peer_tmp, *skey = NULL; - if (s->hit) - return 1; + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { + if (ckey != NULL) { + /* Original key_share was acceptable so don't ask for another one */ + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + } + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; + } if (ckey == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + /* No key_share received from client - must be resuming */ + if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) - || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey); if (skey == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* Generate encoding of server key */ encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint); if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_EC_LIB); EVP_PKEY_free(skey); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); EVP_PKEY_free(skey); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */ - s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey; + s->s3.tmp.pkey = skey; if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +#else + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; #endif +} - return 1; +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + unsigned char *hashval1, *hashval2, *appcookie1, *appcookie2, *cookie; + unsigned char *hmac, *hmac2; + size_t startlen, ciphlen, totcookielen, hashlen, hmaclen, appcookielen; + EVP_MD_CTX *hctx; + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + int ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + + if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &startlen) + || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, MAX_COOKIE_SIZE, &cookie) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id) + || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt, + &ciphlen) + /* Is there a key_share extension present in this HRR? */ + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, (unsigned int)time(NULL)) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashval1)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* + * Get the hash of the initial ClientHello. ssl_handshake_hash() operates + * on raw buffers, so we first reserve sufficient bytes (above) and then + * subsequently allocate them (below) + */ + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) + || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval1, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hashlen, &hashval2) + || !ossl_assert(hashval1 == hashval2) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) + || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH, &appcookie1)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* Generate the application cookie */ + if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb(s, appcookie1, &appcookielen) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, appcookielen, &appcookie2) + || !ossl_assert(appcookie1 == appcookie2) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &totcookielen) + || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &hmac)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; + + totcookielen -= startlen; + if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* HMAC the cookie */ + hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); + pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, + s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key, + sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext + .cookie_hmac_key)); + if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, cookie, + totcookielen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen + hmaclen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hmaclen, &hmac2) + || !ossl_assert(hmac == hmac2) + || !ossl_assert(cookie == hmac - totcookielen) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT; + + err: + EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + return ret; +#else + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; +#endif } -int tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ @@ -949,15 +1896,68 @@ int tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 }; - if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80 - && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81) + if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80 + && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81) || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { + if (s->max_early_data == 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; + } + + if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + if (!s->hit) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->ext.tick_identity) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; }