X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fextensions_clnt.c;h=f357396d81a4eb8a8e761d60112a74e16ab6dc91;hp=0af4d1b5888ac839761f908ce8db558440c86964;hb=426dfc9ff7c1afaf1ed5981a9c7846e310c7ae3e;hpb=38df5a452777b612f75796531c0b2629da6aa550 diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c index 0af4d1b588..f357396d81 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -7,35 +7,38 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ -#include #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "statem_locl.h" -int tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, - X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { /* Add RI if renegotiating */ if (!s->renegotiate) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } -int tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, - X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) @@ -48,20 +51,47 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, strlen(s->ext.hostname)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +/* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */ +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + if (s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */ + /*- + * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length + * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value. + */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length) + /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP -int tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { /* Add SRP username if there is one */ if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */ @@ -73,11 +103,12 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, strlen(s->srp_ctx.login)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif @@ -102,20 +133,21 @@ static int use_ecc(SSL *s) if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) - break; + return 1; } - return i < end; + return 0; } -int tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, - X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { const unsigned char *pformats; size_t num_formats; if (!use_ecc(s)) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); @@ -125,72 +157,71 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } -int tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, - unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { - const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL, *pcurvestmp; - size_t num_curves = 0, i; + const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL; + size_t num_groups = 0, i; if (!use_ecc(s)) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message */ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */ - pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups; - if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - pcurvestmp = pcurves; + tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* Copy curve ID if supported */ - for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) { - if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurvestmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { - if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0]) - || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { + uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i]; + + if (tls_curve_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif -int tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, - unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { size_t ticklen; if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL && s->session->ext.tick != NULL @@ -201,9 +232,10 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length; s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } memcpy(s->session->ext.tick, s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen); @@ -214,25 +246,27 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL && s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } -int tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, - X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { size_t salglen; const uint16_t *salg; if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg); if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) @@ -243,26 +277,27 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP -int tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, - unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { int i; /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */ if (x != NULL) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) /* Sub-packet for status request extension */ @@ -270,8 +305,9 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) /* Sub-packet for the ids */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) { unsigned char *idbytes; @@ -282,48 +318,53 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, /* Sub-packet for an individual id */ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes) || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) { unsigned char *extbytes; int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL); if (extlen < 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes) || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes) != extlen) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -int tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support @@ -331,21 +372,22 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif -int tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { s->s3->alpn_sent = 0; if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) @@ -353,32 +395,35 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } s->s3->alpn_sent = 1; - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP -int tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, - X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); int i, end; if (clnt == NULL) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); @@ -387,92 +432,106 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i); if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) /* Add an empty use_mki value */ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif -int tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT -int tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* Not defined for client Certificates */ if (x != NULL) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif -int tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } -int tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, - unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { int currv, min_version, max_version, reason; + reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version); + if (reason != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* + * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight + * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS. + */ + if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - - reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version); - if (reason != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* - * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter + * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to whether * we should include versions options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE) - || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE) + || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE; + s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE; + if (nodhe) + s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE; #endif - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id) { - unsigned char *encoded_point; - EVP_PKEY *key_share_key; + unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL; size_t encodedlen; - key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id); - if (key_share_key == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - return 0; + if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { + if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + /* + * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share + */ + key_share_key = s->s3->tmp.pkey; + } else { + key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id); + if (key_share_key == NULL) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } } /* Encode the public key. */ encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key, &encoded_point); if (encodedlen == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; } /* Create KeyShareEntry */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key); - OPENSSL_free(encoded_point); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } /* @@ -569,16 +642,22 @@ static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id) OPENSSL_free(encoded_point); return 1; + err: + if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key); + OPENSSL_free(encoded_point); + return 0; } #endif -int tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, - X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 - size_t i, num_curves = 0; - const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL; - unsigned int curve_id = 0; + size_t i, num_groups = 0; + const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL; + uint16_t curve_id = 0; /* key_share extension */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) @@ -586,21 +665,12 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) /* KeyShare list sub-packet */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - - pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups; - if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { - /* Shouldn't happen! */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } + tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); /* * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For @@ -609,48 +679,162 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, if (s->s3->group_id != 0) { curve_id = s->s3->group_id; } else { - for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { + for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { - if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) + if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) continue; - curve_id = bytestogroup(pcurves); + curve_id = pgroups[i]; break; } } if (curve_id == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) - return 0; + if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } #endif - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } -int tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, - X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { + EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + + /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */ + if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) + /* Extension data sub-packet */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie, + s->ext.tls13_cookie_len) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto end; + } + + ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT; + end: + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie); + s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL; + s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0; + + return ret; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + const unsigned char *id = NULL; + size_t idlen = 0; + SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL; + SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL; + const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL; + + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) + handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s); + + if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL + && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(s, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess) + || (psksess != NULL + && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) { + SSL_SESSION_free(psksess); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_BAD_PSK); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession); + s->psksession = psksess; + if (psksess != NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id); + s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen); + if (s->psksession_id == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + s->psksession_id_len = idlen; + } + if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING - || s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) { + || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0 + && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) { s->max_early_data = 0; - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + } + edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess; + s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data; + + if (edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) { + if (s->ext.hostname == NULL + || (s->ext.hostname != NULL + && strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + + if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* + * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early + * data. + */ + if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) { + PACKET prots, alpnpkt; + int found = 0; + + if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) { + if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected, + edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + if (!found) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } } - s->max_early_data = s->session->ext.max_early_data; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* @@ -658,139 +842,257 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, * extension, we set it to accepted. */ s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED; + s->ext.early_data_ok = 1; - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200 -int tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, - X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +/* + * PSK pre binder overhead = + * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk + * 2 bytes for extension length + * 2 bytes for identities list length + * 2 bytes for identity length + * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age + * 2 bytes for binder list length + * 1 byte for binder length + * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the + * subsequent binder bytes + */ +#define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1) + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) { unsigned char *padbytes; size_t hlen; if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* - * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this - * code calculates the length of all existing extensions it MUST always - * appear last. + * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685. + * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but + * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore + * this extension MUST always appear second to last. */ if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* + * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this + * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be. + */ + if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION + && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0 + && s->session->cipher != NULL) { + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2); + + if (md != NULL) { + /* + * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder + * length. + */ + hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen + + EVP_MD_size(md); + } } if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) { - /* Calculate the amond of padding we need to add */ + /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */ hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen; /* * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and - * 2 bytes for length bytes) + * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least + * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x, + * 8.x are intolerant of that condition) */ - if (hlen >= 4) + if (hlen > 4) hlen -= 4; else - hlen = 0; + hlen = 1; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding) || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } memset(padbytes, 0, hlen); } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } /* * Construct the pre_shared_key extension */ -int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 - uint32_t now, agesec, agems; - size_t hashsize, binderoffset, msglen; - unsigned char *binder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL; - const EVP_MD *md; - int ret = 0; + uint32_t now, agesec, agems = 0; + size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen; + unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL; + const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL; + int dores = 0; s->session->ext.tick_identity = TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY; + /* + * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single + * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length + * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted. + */ + /* * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume * so don't add this extension. */ if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION - || s->session->ext.ticklen == 0) - return 1; - - if (s->session->cipher == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } + || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) + handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s); + + if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) { + /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */ + if (s->session->cipher == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + mdres = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2); + if (mdres == NULL) { + /* + * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. + * Ignore it + */ + goto dopsksess; + } - md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2); - if (md == NULL) { - /* Don't recognise this cipher so we can't use the session. Ignore it */ - return 1; - } + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdres != handmd) { + /* + * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session + * so we can't use it. + */ + goto dopsksess; + } - /* - * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says - * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most implementations - * follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in seconds since epoch. - * We've already made the assumption that we can do this in multiple places - * in the code, so portability shouldn't be an issue. - */ - now = (uint32_t)time(NULL); - agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time; + /* + * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says + * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most + * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in + * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do + * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an + * issue. + */ + now = (uint32_t)time(NULL); + agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time; - if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) { - /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */ - return 1; - } + if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) { + /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */ + goto dopsksess; + } - /* - * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be - * good enough. - */ - agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000; + /* + * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be + * good enough. + */ + agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000; + + if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) { + /* + * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session. + * If so we just ignore it. + */ + goto dopsksess; + } - if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) { /* - * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session. If - * so we just ignore it. + * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed + * to be mod 2^32. */ - return 1; - } + agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add; + + reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres); + dores = 1; + } + + dopsksess: + if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (s->psksession != NULL) { + mdpsk = ssl_md(s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2); + if (mdpsk == NULL) { + /* + * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. + * If this happens it's an application bug. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, + SSL_R_BAD_PSK); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } - /* - * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed to - * be mod 2^32. - */ - agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add; + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdpsk != handmd) { + /* + * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK + * session. This is an application bug. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, + SSL_R_BAD_PSK); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } - hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); + pskhashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdpsk); + } /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) - || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) - || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, - s->session->ext.ticklen) - || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems) - || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (dores) { + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, + s->session->ext.ticklen) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + + if (s->psksession != NULL) { + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id, + s->psksession_id_len) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) - || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, hashsize, &binder) + || (dores + && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder)) + || (s->psksession != NULL + && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen) @@ -799,25 +1101,35 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders */ || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen; - if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, binder, - s->session, 1) != 1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + if (dores + && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, + resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - s->session->ext.tick_identity = 0; + if (s->psksession != NULL + && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, + pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } - ret = 1; - err: - return ret; + if (dores) + s->session->ext.tick_identity = 0; + if (s->psksession != NULL) + s->psksession->ext.tick_identity = (dores ? 1 : 0); + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; #else - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; #endif } @@ -825,7 +1137,7 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right */ int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, - X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len; @@ -833,48 +1145,49 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, const unsigned char *data; /* Check for logic errors */ - assert(expected_len == 0 || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0); - assert(expected_len == 0 || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0); + if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0 + || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0) + || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0 + || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } /* Parse the length byte */ if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, - SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); return 0; } /* Consistency check */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, - SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); return 0; } /* Check that the extension matches */ if (ilen != expected_len) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, - SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, - SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, - SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); return 0; } s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; @@ -882,56 +1195,90 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, return 1; } -int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, - X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +/* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */ +int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { - if (s->ext.hostname == NULL || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + unsigned int value; + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } - if (!s->hit) { - if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname); - if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } + /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */ + if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, + SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + return 0; } + /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */ + /*- + * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation + * response that differs from the length it requested, ... + * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert + */ + if (value != s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, + SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded. + * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now. + */ + s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value; + return 1; } -int tls_parse_stoc_early_data_info(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, - X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { - unsigned long max_early_data; + if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } - if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA_INFO, - SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } - s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data; + if (!s->hit) { + if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname); + if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, - X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { unsigned int ecpointformats_len; PACKET ecptformatlist; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!s->hit) { @@ -941,7 +1288,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.ecpointformats); s->session->ext.ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len); if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -950,7 +1298,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist, s->session->ext.ecpointformats, ecpointformats_len)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } @@ -960,18 +1309,25 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, #endif int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, - X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL && !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } - if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } @@ -982,25 +1338,32 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, - X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { /* * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty. */ - if (s->ext.status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing - || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0)) { - *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in - * the chain. We ignore any other repsonses. + * the chain. We ignore any other responses. */ if (chainidx != 0) return 1; - return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, al); + + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt); } /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ @@ -1013,7 +1376,7 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) + size_t chainidx) { /* * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation @@ -1027,19 +1390,39 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts); s->ext.scts = NULL; - s->ext.scts_len = size; + s->ext.scts_len = (uint16_t)size; if (size > 0) { s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size); if (s->ext.scts == NULL || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } } else { - if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, - PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), al) <= 0) + ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0 + ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH; + + /* + * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension, + * otherwise this is unsolicited. + */ + if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role, + TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, + NULL) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; + } + + if (!custom_ext_parse(s, context, + TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, + PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), + x, chainidx)) { + /* SSLfatal already called */ + return 0; + } } return 1; @@ -1053,21 +1436,24 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. */ -static int ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt) +static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { PACKET tmp_protocol; while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol) - || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) + || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTO_VALIDATE, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; + } } return 1; } int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) + size_t chainidx) { unsigned char *selected; unsigned char selected_len; @@ -1079,14 +1465,15 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, /* We must have requested it. */ if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } /* The data must be valid */ tmppkt = *pkt; - if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&tmppkt)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s, &tmppkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, @@ -1094,7 +1481,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, PACKET_remaining(pkt), s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } @@ -1105,7 +1493,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn); s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); if (s->ext.npn == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -1118,13 +1507,14 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, #endif int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) + size_t chainidx) { size_t len; /* We must have requested it. */ if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) { - *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } /*- @@ -1136,27 +1526,49 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; + if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL + || s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len + || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected, len) + != 0) { + /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */ + s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; + } + if (!s->hit) { + /* If a new session then update it with the selected ALPN */ + s->session->ext.alpn_selected = + OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len); + if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; + } + return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) + size_t chainidx) { unsigned int id, ct, mki; int i; @@ -1167,24 +1579,23 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id) || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, - SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, + SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); return 0; } if (mki != 0) { /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, + SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); return 0; } /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */ clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); if (clnt == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, + SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES); return 0; } @@ -1197,20 +1608,18 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, if (prof->id == id) { s->srtp_profile = prof; - *al = 0; return 1; } } - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, - SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, + SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); return 0; } #endif int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) + size_t chainidx) { /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) @@ -1222,7 +1631,7 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, } int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) + size_t chainidx) { s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; if (!s->hit) @@ -1231,8 +1640,46 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, return 1; } +int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + unsigned int version; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ + if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) + version = TLS1_3_VERSION; + + /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */ + if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) { + /* + * The only protocol version we support which has an HRR message is + * TLSv1.3, therefore we shouldn't be getting an HRR for anything else. + */ + if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { + *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + SSL_R_BAD_HRR_VERSION); + return 0; + } + return 1; + } + + /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */ + s->version = version; + + return 1; +} + int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) + size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned int group_id; @@ -1240,25 +1687,25 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL; /* Sanity check */ - if (ckey == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + if (ckey == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } - if ((context & EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) { - unsigned const char *pcurves = NULL; - size_t i, num_curves; + if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) { + const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL; + size_t i, num_groups; if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } @@ -1267,25 +1714,21 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, * already sent in the first ClientHello */ if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) { - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); return 0; } /* Validate the selected group is one we support */ - pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups; - if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { - if (group_id == bytestogroup(pcurves)) + tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); + for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { + if (group_id == pgroups[i]) break; } - if (i >= num_curves - || !tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + if (i >= num_groups + || !tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); return 0; } @@ -1300,60 +1743,93 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original * key_share! */ - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); return 0; } if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt) || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey); if (skey == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); EVP_PKEY_free(skey); return 0; } if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ EVP_PKEY_free(skey); return 0; } - EVP_PKEY_free(skey); + s->s3->peer_tmp = skey; #endif return 1; } +int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + PACKET cookie; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie) + || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie, + &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, - X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { + if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { + unsigned long max_early_data; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA); + return 0; + } + + s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data; + + return 1; + } + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } - if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED + if (!s->ext.early_data_ok || !s->hit || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0) { /* * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume - * using the first identity so the server should not be accepting it. + * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the + * server should not be accepting it. */ - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } @@ -1363,23 +1839,45 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, } int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) + size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned int identity; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } - if (s->session->ext.tick_identity != (int)identity) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY); + if (s->session->ext.tick_identity == (int)identity) { + s->hit = 1; + SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession); + s->psksession = NULL; + return 1; + } + + if (s->psksession == NULL + || s->psksession->ext.tick_identity != (int)identity) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, + SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY); return 0; } + /* + * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret + * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the + * early_secret across that we generated earlier. + */ + if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY + && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) + || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0 + || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0) + memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = s->psksession; + s->psksession = NULL; s->hit = 1; #endif