X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fextensions_clnt.c;h=329a8007eea6284185105bf8466b141ab3caab60;hp=f51a2de04122026bc6979d80aeaf8afade91eebb;hb=ae8d7d994afb38c8309770f68212bf51380b8941;hpb=6dd083fd6804a3ee6ac3adc019f81910f1c63f21 diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c index f51a2de041..329a8007ee 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -7,14 +7,1059 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ -#include +#include #include "../ssl_locl.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "statem_locl.h" +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + /* Add RI if renegotiating */ + if (!s->renegotiate) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished, + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) + /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname, + strlen(s->ext.hostname)) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + /* Add SRP username if there is one */ + if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) + /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) + /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */ + || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login, + strlen(s->srp_ctx.login)) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +static int use_ecc(SSL *s) +{ + int i, end; + unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL; + + /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) + return 0; + + cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); + end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); + for (i = 0; i < end; i++) { + const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); + + alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; + alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; + if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) + || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) + || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + const unsigned char *pformats; + size_t num_formats; + + if (!use_ecc(s)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ + tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) + /* Sub-packet for formats extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL, *pcurvestmp; + size_t num_curves = 0, i; + + if (!use_ecc(s)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* + * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message + */ + /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */ + if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + pcurvestmp = pcurves; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) + /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + /* Copy curve ID if supported */ + for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) { + if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurvestmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0]) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + } + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} +#endif + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + size_t ticklen; + + if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL + && s->session->ext.tick != NULL + && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { + ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen; + } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL + && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) { + ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length; + s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); + if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + memcpy(s->session->ext.tick, + s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen); + s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen; + } else { + ticklen = 0; + } + + if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL && + s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + size_t salglen; + const uint16_t *salg; + + if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg); + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) + /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + /* Sub-packet for the actual list */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + int i; + + /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */ + if (x != NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) + /* Sub-packet for status request extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) + /* Sub-packet for the ids */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) { + unsigned char *idbytes; + OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i); + int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); + + if (idlen <= 0 + /* Sub-packet for an individual id */ + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes) + || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) { + unsigned char *extbytes; + int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL); + + if (extlen < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes) + || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes) + != extlen) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* + * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support + * for Next Protocol Negotiation + */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} +#endif + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + s->s3->alpn_sent = 0; + + if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, + TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) + /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + s->s3->alpn_sent = 1; + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); + int i, end; + + if (clnt == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) + /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); + for (i = 0; i < end; i++) { + const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof = + sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i); + + if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) + /* Add an empty use_mki value */ + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} +#endif + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* Not defined for client Certificates */ + if (x != NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} +#endif + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + int currv, min_version, max_version, reason; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version); + if (reason != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* + * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to whether + * we should include versions = min_version; currv--) { + /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */ + if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +/* + * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension. + */ +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE) + || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE)) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE; + if (nodhe) + s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE; +#endif + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 +static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id) +{ + unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL; + size_t encodedlen; + + if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { + if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + /* + * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share + */ + key_share_key = s->s3->tmp.pkey; + } else { + key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id); + if (key_share_key == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + return 0; + } + } + + /* Encode the public key. */ + encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key, + &encoded_point); + if (encodedlen == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + + /* Create KeyShareEntry */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* + * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're + * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now + * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey + */ + s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key; + s->s3->group_id = curve_id; + OPENSSL_free(encoded_point); + + return 1; + err: + if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key); + OPENSSL_free(encoded_point); + return 0; +} +#endif + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + size_t i, num_curves = 0; + const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL; + unsigned int curve_id = 0; + + /* key_share extension */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) + /* Extension data sub-packet */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + /* KeyShare list sub-packet */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* + * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For + * now, just send one + */ + if (s->s3->group_id != 0) { + curve_id = s->s3->group_id; + } else { + for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { + + if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) + continue; + + curve_id = bytestogroup(pcurves); + break; + } + } + + if (curve_id == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } +#endif + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + + /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */ + if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) + /* Extension data sub-packet */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie, + s->ext.tls13_cookie_len) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto end; + } + + ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT; + end: + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie); + s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL; + s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0; + + return ret; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + const unsigned char *id; + size_t idlen; + SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL; + SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL; + const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL; + + if (s->hello_retry_request) + handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s); + + if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL + && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(s, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess) + || (psksess != NULL + && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) { + SSL_SESSION_free(psksess); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_PSK); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession); + s->psksession = psksess; + if (psksess != NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id); + s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen); + if (s->psksession_id == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + s->psksession_id_len = idlen; + } + + if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING + || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0 + && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) { + s->max_early_data = 0; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + } + edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess; + s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data; + + if ((s->ext.hostname == NULL && edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) + || (s->ext.hostname != NULL + && (edsess->ext.hostname == NULL + || strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* + * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early + * data. + */ + if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) { + PACKET prots, alpnpkt; + int found = 0; + + if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) { + if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected, + edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + if (!found) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* + * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the + * extension, we set it to accepted. + */ + s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED; + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +#define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff +#define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200 + +/* + * PSK pre binder overhead = + * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk + * 2 bytes for extension length + * 2 bytes for identities list length + * 2 bytes for identity length + * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age + * 2 bytes for binder list length + * 1 byte for binder length + * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the + * subsequent binder bytes + */ +#define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1) + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + unsigned char *padbytes; + size_t hlen; + + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* + * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685. + * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but + * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore + * this extension MUST always appear second to last. + */ + if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* + * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this + * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be. + */ + if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION + && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0 + && s->session->cipher != NULL) { + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2); + + if (md != NULL) { + /* + * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder + * length. + */ + hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen + + EVP_MD_size(md); + } + } + + if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) { + /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */ + hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen; + + /* + * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and + * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least + * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x, + * 8.x are intolerant of that condition) + */ + if (hlen >= 4) + hlen -= 4; + else + hlen = 1; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding) + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + memset(padbytes, 0, hlen); + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +/* + * Construct the pre_shared_key extension + */ +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + uint32_t now, agesec, agems = 0; + size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen; + unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL; + const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL; + EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + int dores = 0; + + s->session->ext.tick_identity = TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY; + + /* + * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single + * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length + * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted. + */ + + /* + * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume + * so don't add this extension. + */ + if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION + || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (s->hello_retry_request) + handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s); + + if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) { + /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */ + if (s->session->cipher == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + mdres = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2); + if (mdres == NULL) { + /* + * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. + * Ignore it + */ + goto dopsksess; + } + + if (s->hello_retry_request && mdres != handmd) { + /* + * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session + * so we can't use it. + */ + goto dopsksess; + } + + /* + * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says + * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most + * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in + * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do + * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an + * issue. + */ + now = (uint32_t)time(NULL); + agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time; + + if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) { + /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */ + goto dopsksess; + } + + /* + * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be + * good enough. + */ + agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000; + + if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) { + /* + * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session. + * If so we just ignore it. + */ + goto dopsksess; + } + + /* + * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed + * to be mod 2^32. + */ + agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add; + + reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres); + dores = 1; + } + + dopsksess: + if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (s->psksession != NULL) { + mdpsk = ssl_md(s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2); + if (mdpsk == NULL) { + /* + * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. + * If this happens it's an application bug. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK); + goto err; + } + + if (s->hello_retry_request && mdpsk != handmd) { + /* + * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK + * session. This is an application bug. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK); + goto err; + } + + pskhashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdpsk); + } + + /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (dores) { + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, + s->session->ext.ticklen) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + if (s->psksession != NULL) { + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id, + s->psksession_id_len) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || (dores + && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder)) + || (s->psksession != NULL + && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder)) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen) + /* + * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can + * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders + */ + || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen; + + if (dores + && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, + resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (s->psksession != NULL + && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, + pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (dores) + s->session->ext.tick_identity = 0; + if (s->psksession != NULL) + s->psksession->ext.tick_identity = (dores ? 1 : 0); + + ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT; + err: + return ret; +#else + return 1; +#endif +} + /* * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right */ -int tls_parse_server_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len; @@ -22,46 +1067,51 @@ int tls_parse_server_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) const unsigned char *data; /* Check for logic errors */ - assert(expected_len == 0 || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0); - assert(expected_len == 0 || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0); + if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0 + || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0) + || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0 + || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0)) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } /* Parse the length byte */ if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } /* Consistency check */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } /* Check that the extension matches */ if (ilen != expected_len) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; @@ -71,20 +1121,26 @@ int tls_parse_server_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 1; } -int tls_parse_server_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { - if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (!s->hit) { - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { + if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { + s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname); + if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -94,9 +1150,10 @@ int tls_parse_server_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -int tls_parse_server_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { - unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length; + unsigned int ecpointformats_len; PACKET ecptformatlist; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) { @@ -104,22 +1161,21 @@ int tls_parse_server_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 0; } if (!s->hit) { - ecpointformatlist_length = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist); - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; + ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist); + s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = 0; - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = - OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length); - if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.ecpointformats); + s->session->ext.ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len); + if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; + s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len; if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist, - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, - ecpointformatlist_length)) { + s->session->ext.ecpointformats, + ecpointformats_len)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -129,43 +1185,68 @@ int tls_parse_server_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } #endif -int tls_parse_server_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { - if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && - !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), - PACKET_remaining(pkt), - s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { + if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL && + !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), + PACKET_remaining(pkt), + s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + + if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) { *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; return 1; } -int tls_parse_server_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP +int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* - * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status - * request message. + * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status + * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty. */ - if (s->tlsext_status_type == -1 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in + * the chain. We ignore any other responses. + */ + if (chainidx != 0) + return 1; + return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, al); + } + /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; + s->ext.status_expected = 1; return 1; } +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT -int tls_parse_server_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation @@ -176,22 +1257,37 @@ int tls_parse_server_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt); /* Simply copy it off for later processing */ - if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) { - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts); - s->tlsext_scts = NULL; - } - s->tlsext_scts_len = size; + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts); + s->ext.scts = NULL; + + s->ext.scts_len = size; if (size > 0) { - s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size); - if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL - || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_scts, size)) { + s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size); + if (s->ext.scts == NULL + || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } } else { - if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, - PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), al) <= 0) + ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0 + ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH; + + /* + * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension, + * otherwise this is unsolicited. + */ + if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role, + TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, + NULL) == NULL) { + *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + return 0; + } + + if (custom_ext_parse(s, context, + TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, + PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), + x, chainidx, al) <= 0) return 0; } @@ -219,54 +1315,59 @@ static int ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt) return 1; } -int tls_parse_server_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { unsigned char *selected; unsigned char selected_len; PACKET tmppkt; - if (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0) + /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */ + if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) return 1; /* We must have requested it. */ - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { + if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } + /* The data must be valid */ tmppkt = *pkt; if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&tmppkt)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, - PACKET_data(pkt), - PACKET_remaining(pkt), - s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != + if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, + PACKET_data(pkt), + PACKET_remaining(pkt), + s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } + /* * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in * a single Serverhello */ - OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); - s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); - if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn); + s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); + if (s->ext.npn == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); - s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; + memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len); + s->ext.npn_len = selected_len; + s->s3->npn_seen = 1; return 1; } #endif -int tls_parse_server_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { size_t len; @@ -299,22 +1400,34 @@ int tls_parse_server_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; + /* We also put a copy in the session */ + OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected); + s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, + s->s3->alpn_selected_len); + s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; + + if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP -int tls_parse_server_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { unsigned int id, ct, mki; int i; STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt; SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof; - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) - || ct != 2 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id) - || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_USE_SRTP, + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2 + || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id) + || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; @@ -322,16 +1435,15 @@ int tls_parse_server_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (mki != 0) { /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; } - clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); - /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */ + clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); if (clnt == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -350,25 +1462,27 @@ int tls_parse_server_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } } - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_USE_SRTP, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } #endif -int tls_parse_server_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4) - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; + s->ext.use_etm = 1; return 1; } -int tls_parse_server_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; if (!s->hit) @@ -377,232 +1491,210 @@ int tls_parse_server_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 1; } -int tls_parse_server_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned int group_id; PACKET encoded_pt; EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL; /* Sanity check */ - if (ckey == NULL) { + if (ckey == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } + if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) { + unsigned const char *pcurves = NULL; + size_t i, num_curves; + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + /* + * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we + * already sent in the first ClientHello + */ + if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) { + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + + /* Validate the selected group is one we support */ + if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { + if (group_id == bytestogroup(pcurves)) + break; + } + if (i >= num_curves + || !tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + + s->s3->group_id = group_id; + EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); + s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; + return 1; + } + if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) { /* * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original * key_share! */ - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); return 0; } if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt) || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey); if (skey == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); + EVP_PKEY_free(skey); return 0; } if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); EVP_PKEY_free(skey); return 0; } - EVP_PKEY_free(skey); + s->s3->peer_tmp = skey; +#endif return 1; } -static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { - size_t num_extensions = 0; - RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; - PACKET extpkt; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; -#endif - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; + PACKET cookie; - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); - s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie) + || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie, + &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } - s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; + return 1; +} - s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; +int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { + unsigned long max_early_data; - if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) { - /* Extensions block may be completely absent in SSLv3 */ - if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); return 0; } - PACKET_null_init(&extpkt); - } - /* - * TODO(TLS1.3): We give multiple contexts for now until we're ready to - * give something more specific - */ + s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data; - if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO - | EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO - | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS - | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, - &extensions, &num_extensions, al)) - return 0; - - /* - * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid - * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello - * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. - * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which - * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence - */ - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) - && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) - && tls_get_extension_by_type(extensions, num_extensions, - TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - return 0; + return 1; } - if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO - | EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO - | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS - | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, - extensions, num_extensions, al)) + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; + } - if (s->hit) { + if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED + || !s->hit + || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0) { /* - * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with - * original session. + * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume + * using the first identity so the server should not be accepting it. */ - if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) != - !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS); - return 0; - } + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + return 0; } + s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED; + return 1; } -static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) +int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { - int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; - int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + unsigned int identity; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - /* - * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher - * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it - * must contain uncompressed. - */ - unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) - && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) - && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) - && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) - && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { - /* we are using an ECC cipher */ - size_t i; - unsigned char *list; - int found_uncompressed = 0; - list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { - if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { - found_uncompressed = 1; - break; - } - } - if (!found_uncompressed) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, - SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); - return -1; - } + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; } - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = - s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, - s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL - && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = - s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, - s-> - initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - - /* - * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event - * that we don't receive a status message - */ - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0; - switch (ret) { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return -1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); - return 1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->servername_done = 0; - default: + if (s->session->ext.tick_identity == (int)identity) { + s->hit = 1; + SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession); + s->psksession = NULL; return 1; } -} -int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) -{ - int al = -1; - if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION) - return 1; - if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + if (s->psksession == NULL + || s->psksession->ext.tick_identity != (int)identity) { + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY); return 0; } - if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); - return 0; - } + /* + * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret + * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the + * early_secret across that we generated earlier. + */ + if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY + && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) + || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0 + || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0) + memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = s->psksession; + s->psksession = NULL; + s->hit = 1; +#endif + return 1; }