X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fextensions_clnt.c;h=23dc8d3363b719f653fb3caf0509c5cd0a5b7a9a;hp=09780a949548136ff58ac861cbcaf676a20aa6b5;hb=cfef5027bf27a74098588e48829f0d058b4b0aea;hpb=28a31a0a10f41ef855cabab4e18c994c44225125

diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
index 09780a9495..23dc8d3363 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -636,6 +636,59 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
     return 1;
 }
 
+int tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+                              X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
+    if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
+               /* Extension data sub-packet */
+            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+            || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie,
+                                       s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)
+            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+ end:
+    OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
+    s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0;
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+                                  X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+    if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
+            || s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
+        s->max_early_data = 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    s->max_early_data = s->session->ext.max_early_data;
+
+    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
+            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+            || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
+     * extension, we set it to accepted.
+     */
+    s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN   0xff
 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN   0x200
 
@@ -879,6 +932,24 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
     return 1;
 }
 
+int tls_parse_stoc_early_data_info(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+                                   X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+    unsigned long max_early_data;
+
+    if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data)
+            || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA_INFO,
+               SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
                                  X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
@@ -1294,6 +1365,46 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
     return 1;
 }
 
+int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+                       size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+    PACKET cookie;
+
+    if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)
+            || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie,
+                              &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+                              X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED
+            || !s->hit
+            || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0) {
+        /*
+         * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
+         * using the first identity so the server should not be accepting it.
+         */
+        *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
 int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
                        size_t chainidx, int *al)
 {