X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fextensions_clnt.c;h=0af4d1b5888ac839761f908ce8db558440c86964;hp=93d4178ed95fbf4a9d19eab2a38cff3180e24a5f;hb=38df5a452777b612f75796531c0b2629da6aa550;hpb=70af3d8ed7e2497e8d0f34eb43a4404c493ba1cd diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c index 93d4178ed9..0af4d1b588 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c @@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" -int tls_construct_client_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* Add RI if renegotiating */ if (!s->renegotiate) @@ -23,16 +24,17 @@ int tls_construct_client_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } -int tls_construct_client_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { - if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL) + if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) return 1; /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ @@ -42,11 +44,11 @@ int tls_construct_client_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) - || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname, - strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname, + strlen(s->ext.hostname)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -54,7 +56,8 @@ int tls_construct_client_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP -int tls_construct_client_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* Add SRP username if there is one */ if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) @@ -70,7 +73,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) strlen(s->srp_ctx.login)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -81,8 +84,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static int use_ecc(SSL *s) { - int using_ecc = 0; - int i; + int i, end; unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL; @@ -90,26 +92,24 @@ static int use_ecc(SSL *s) if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) return 0; - cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); - - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { + end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); + for (i = 0; i < end; i++) { const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) - || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) - || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { - using_ecc = 1; + || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) + || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) break; - } } - return using_ecc; + return i < end; } -int tls_construct_client_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { const unsigned char *pformats; size_t num_formats; @@ -118,7 +118,6 @@ int tls_construct_client_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) return 1; /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ - tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) @@ -126,15 +125,16 @@ int tls_construct_client_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } - -int tls_construct_client_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL, *pcurvestmp; size_t num_curves = 0, i; @@ -146,9 +146,9 @@ int tls_construct_client_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message */ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */ - pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist; + pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups; if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -158,23 +158,23 @@ int tls_construct_client_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* Copy curve ID if supported */ for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) { - if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { + if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurvestmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0]) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -183,7 +183,9 @@ int tls_construct_client_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) } #endif -int tls_construct_client_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { size_t ticklen; @@ -191,47 +193,48 @@ int tls_construct_client_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) return 1; if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL - && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL) { - ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; - } else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket != NULL - && s->tlsext_session_ticket->data != NULL) { - ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; - s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); - if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_SESSION_TICKET, + && s->session->ext.tick != NULL + && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { + ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen; + } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL + && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) { + ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length; + s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); + if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); - s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; + memcpy(s->session->ext.tick, + s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen); + s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen; } else { ticklen = 0; } - if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket != NULL && - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) + if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL && + s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL) return 1; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) - || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } -int tls_construct_client_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { size_t salglen; - const unsigned char *salg; + const uint16_t *salg; if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) return 1; - salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg); - + salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg); if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) @@ -240,7 +243,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_SIG_ALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -248,11 +251,17 @@ int tls_construct_client_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP -int tls_construct_client_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { int i; - if (s->tlsext_status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) + /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */ + if (x != NULL) + return 1; + + if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) return 1; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) @@ -261,49 +270,47 @@ int tls_construct_client_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) /* Sub-packet for the ids */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { + for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) { unsigned char *idbytes; - int idlen; - OCSP_RESPID *id; + OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i); + int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); - id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); - idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); if (idlen <= 0 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes) || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_STATUS_REQUEST, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { + if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) { unsigned char *extbytes; - int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); + int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL); if (extlen < 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_STATUS_REQUEST, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes) - || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes) + || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes) != extlen) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_STATUS_REQUEST, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -312,9 +319,10 @@ int tls_construct_client_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -int tls_construct_client_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL || s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0) + if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) return 1; /* @@ -323,7 +331,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_NPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -331,25 +339,21 @@ int tls_construct_client_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) } #endif -int tls_construct_client_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { s->s3->alpn_sent = 0; - /* - * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so - * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation - */ - if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL || s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0) + if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) return 1; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) - || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list, - s->alpn_client_proto_list_len) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->s3->alpn_sent = 1; @@ -359,11 +363,11 @@ int tls_construct_client_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP -int tls_construct_client_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); - SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof; - int i, ct; + int i, end; if (clnt == NULL) return 1; @@ -373,14 +377,17 @@ int tls_construct_client_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } - ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); - for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) { - prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i); + + end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); + for (i = 0; i < end; i++) { + const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof = + sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i); + if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } @@ -388,7 +395,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) /* Add an empty use_mki value */ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -396,14 +403,15 @@ int tls_construct_client_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) } #endif -int tls_construct_client_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) return 1; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -411,14 +419,19 @@ int tls_construct_client_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT -int tls_construct_client_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL) return 1; + /* Not defined for client Certificates */ + if (x != NULL) + return 1; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_SCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -426,32 +439,35 @@ int tls_construct_client_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) } #endif -int tls_construct_client_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } -int tls_construct_client_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { int currv, min_version, max_version, reason; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version); if (reason != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason); return 0; } @@ -464,18 +480,18 @@ int tls_construct_client_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */ if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -483,11 +499,86 @@ int tls_construct_client_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) return 1; } +/* + * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension. We only have two modes we know about + * at this stage, so we send both. + */ +int tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + /* + * TODO(TLS1.3): Do we want this list to be configurable? For now we always + * just send both supported modes + */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE; +#endif + + return 1; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 +static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id) +{ + unsigned char *encoded_point; + EVP_PKEY *key_share_key; + size_t encodedlen; + + key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id); + if (key_share_key == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + return 0; + } + + /* Encode the public key. */ + encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key, + &encoded_point); + if (encodedlen == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key); + return 0; + } + + /* Create KeyShareEntry */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key); + OPENSSL_free(encoded_point); + return 0; + } + + /* + * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're + * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now + * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey + */ + s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key; + s->s3->group_id = curve_id; + OPENSSL_free(encoded_point); + + return 1; +} +#endif -int tls_construct_client_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { - size_t i, sharessent = 0, num_curves = 0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + size_t i, num_curves = 0; const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL; + unsigned int curve_id = 0; /* key_share extension */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) @@ -495,13 +586,19 @@ int tls_construct_client_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) /* KeyShare list sub-packet */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } - pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist; + pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups; if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { + /* Shouldn't happen! */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -509,67 +606,67 @@ int tls_construct_client_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For * now, just send one */ - for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) { - unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; - unsigned int curve_id = 0; - EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL; - size_t encodedlen; - - if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) - continue; - - if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { - /* Shouldn't happen! */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - - /* Generate a key for this key_share */ - curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1]; - key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id); - if (key_share_key == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - return 0; - } + if (s->s3->group_id != 0) { + curve_id = s->s3->group_id; + } else { + for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { - /* Encode the public key. */ - encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key, - &encodedPoint); - if (encodedlen == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key); - return 0; - } + if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) + continue; - /* Create KeyShareEntry */ - if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id) - || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key); - OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); - return 0; + curve_id = bytestogroup(pcurves); + break; } + } - /* - * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're - * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now - * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey - */ - s->s3->group_id = curve_id; - s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key; - sharessent++; - OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + if (curve_id == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; } + if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) + return 0; + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } +#endif + + return 1; +} + +int tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING + || s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) { + s->max_early_data = 0; + return 1; + } + s->max_early_data = s->session->ext.max_early_data; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } + /* + * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the + * extension, we set it to accepted. + */ + s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED; + return 1; } -int tls_construct_client_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +#define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff +#define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200 + +int tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { unsigned char *padbytes; size_t hlen; @@ -580,16 +677,22 @@ int tls_construct_client_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) /* * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this - * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always + * code calculates the length of all existing extensions it MUST always * appear last. */ if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } - if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { - hlen = 0x200 - hlen; + if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) { + /* Calculate the amond of padding we need to add */ + hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen; + + /* + * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and + * 2 bytes for length bytes) + */ if (hlen >= 4) hlen -= 4; else @@ -597,7 +700,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding) || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } memset(padbytes, 0, hlen); @@ -606,10 +709,123 @@ int tls_construct_client_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) return 1; } +/* + * Construct the pre_shared_key extension + */ +int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + uint32_t now, agesec, agems; + size_t hashsize, binderoffset, msglen; + unsigned char *binder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL; + const EVP_MD *md; + int ret = 0; + + s->session->ext.tick_identity = TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY; + + /* + * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume + * so don't add this extension. + */ + if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION + || s->session->ext.ticklen == 0) + return 1; + + if (s->session->cipher == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2); + if (md == NULL) { + /* Don't recognise this cipher so we can't use the session. Ignore it */ + return 1; + } + + /* + * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says + * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most implementations + * follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in seconds since epoch. + * We've already made the assumption that we can do this in multiple places + * in the code, so portability shouldn't be an issue. + */ + now = (uint32_t)time(NULL); + agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time; + + if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) { + /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */ + return 1; + } + + /* + * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be + * good enough. + */ + agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000; + + if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) { + /* + * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session. If + * so we just ignore it. + */ + return 1; + } + + /* + * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed to + * be mod 2^32. + */ + agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add; + + hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); + + /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, + s->session->ext.ticklen) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, hashsize, &binder) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen) + /* + * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can + * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders + */ + || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen; + + if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, binder, + s->session, 1) != 1) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + s->session->ext.tick_identity = 0; + + ret = 1; + err: + return ret; +#else + return 1; +#endif +} + /* * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right */ -int tls_parse_server_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len; @@ -622,7 +838,7 @@ int tls_parse_server_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) /* Parse the length byte */ if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; @@ -630,7 +846,7 @@ int tls_parse_server_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) /* Consistency check */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; @@ -638,7 +854,7 @@ int tls_parse_server_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) /* Check that the extension matches */ if (ilen != expected_len) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; return 0; @@ -647,7 +863,7 @@ int tls_parse_server_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; return 0; @@ -656,7 +872,7 @@ int tls_parse_server_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; @@ -666,20 +882,21 @@ int tls_parse_server_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 1; } -int tls_parse_server_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { - if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + if (s->ext.hostname == NULL || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; } if (!s->hit) { - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { + if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { + s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname); + if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -688,10 +905,29 @@ int tls_parse_server_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 1; } +int tls_parse_stoc_early_data_info(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + unsigned long max_early_data; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA_INFO, + SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA); + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data; + + return 1; +} + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -int tls_parse_server_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { - unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length; + unsigned int ecpointformats_len; PACKET ecptformatlist; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) { @@ -699,22 +935,21 @@ int tls_parse_server_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 0; } if (!s->hit) { - ecpointformatlist_length = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist); - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; + ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist); + s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = 0; - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = - OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length); - if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.ecpointformats); + s->session->ext.ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len); + if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; + s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len; if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist, - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, - ecpointformatlist_length)) { + s->session->ext.ecpointformats, + ecpointformats_len)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -724,37 +959,52 @@ int tls_parse_server_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } #endif -int tls_parse_server_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { - if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && - !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), - PACKET_remaining(pkt), - s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { + if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL && + !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), + PACKET_remaining(pkt), + s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } + if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; + + s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP -int tls_parse_server_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* - * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status - * request message. + * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status + * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty. */ - if (s->tlsext_status_type == -1 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + if (s->ext.status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing + || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0)) { *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in + * the chain. We ignore any other repsonses. + */ + if (chainidx != 0) + return 1; + return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, al); + } + /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; + s->ext.status_expected = 1; return 1; } @@ -762,7 +1012,8 @@ int tls_parse_server_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT -int tls_parse_server_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation @@ -773,15 +1024,14 @@ int tls_parse_server_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt); /* Simply copy it off for later processing */ - if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) { - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts); - s->tlsext_scts = NULL; - } - s->tlsext_scts_len = size; + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts); + s->ext.scts = NULL; + + s->ext.scts_len = size; if (size > 0) { - s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size); - if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL - || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_scts, size)) { + s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size); + if (s->ext.scts == NULL + || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -816,54 +1066,59 @@ static int ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt) return 1; } -int tls_parse_server_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { unsigned char *selected; unsigned char selected_len; PACKET tmppkt; - if (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0) + /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */ + if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) return 1; /* We must have requested it. */ - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { + if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } + /* The data must be valid */ tmppkt = *pkt; if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&tmppkt)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, - PACKET_data(pkt), - PACKET_remaining(pkt), - s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != + if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, + PACKET_data(pkt), + PACKET_remaining(pkt), + s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } + /* * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in * a single Serverhello */ - OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); - s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); - if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn); + s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); + if (s->ext.npn == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); - s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; + memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len); + s->ext.npn_len = selected_len; + s->s3->npn_seen = 1; return 1; } #endif -int tls_parse_server_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { size_t len; @@ -900,18 +1155,19 @@ int tls_parse_server_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP -int tls_parse_server_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { unsigned int id, ct, mki; int i; STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt; SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof; - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) - || ct != 2 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id) - || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_USE_SRTP, + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2 + || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id) + || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; @@ -919,16 +1175,15 @@ int tls_parse_server_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (mki != 0) { /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; } - clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); - /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */ + clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); if (clnt == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -947,25 +1202,27 @@ int tls_parse_server_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } } - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_USE_SRTP, + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } #endif -int tls_parse_server_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4) - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; + s->ext.use_etm = 1; return 1; } -int tls_parse_server_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; if (!s->hit) @@ -974,8 +1231,10 @@ int tls_parse_server_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 1; } -int tls_parse_server_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned int group_id; PACKET encoded_pt; EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL; @@ -983,221 +1242,146 @@ int tls_parse_server_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) /* Sanity check */ if (ckey == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } + if ((context & EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) { + unsigned const char *pcurves = NULL; + size_t i, num_curves; + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + /* + * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we + * already sent in the first ClientHello + */ + if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) { + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + + /* Validate the selected group is one we support */ + pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups; + if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { + if (group_id == bytestogroup(pcurves)) + break; + } + if (i >= num_curves + || !tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + + s->s3->group_id = group_id; + EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); + s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; + return 1; + } + if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) { /* * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original * key_share! */ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); return 0; } if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt) || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey); if (skey == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); + EVP_PKEY_free(skey); return 0; } if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); EVP_PKEY_free(skey); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_free(skey); +#endif return 1; } -static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { - RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; - PACKET extpkt; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; -#endif - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; - - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); - s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; - - s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; - - s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; - - if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) { - /* Extensions block may be completely absent in SSLv3 */ - if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - PACKET_null_init(&extpkt); - } - - /* - * TODO(TLS1.3): We give multiple contexts for now until we're ready to - * give something more specific - */ - - if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO - | EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO - | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS - | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, - &extensions, al)) - return 0; - - /* - * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid - * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello - * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. - * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which - * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence - */ - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) - && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) - && !extensions[TLSEXT_IDX_renegotiate].present) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } - if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO - | EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO - | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS - | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, - extensions,al)) - return 0; - - if (s->hit) { + if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED + || !s->hit + || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0) { /* - * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with - * original session. + * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume + * using the first identity so the server should not be accepting it. */ - if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) != - !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS); - return 0; - } + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + return 0; } + s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED; + return 1; } -static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) +int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { - int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; - int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - /* - * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher - * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it - * must contain uncompressed. - */ - unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) - && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) - && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) - && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) - && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { - /* we are using an ECC cipher */ - size_t i; - unsigned char *list; - int found_uncompressed = 0; - list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { - if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { - found_uncompressed = 1; - break; - } - } - if (!found_uncompressed) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, - SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); - return -1; - } - } - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = - s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, - s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL - && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = - s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, - s-> - initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - - /* - * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event - * that we don't receive a status message - */ - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0; - - switch (ret) { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return -1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); - return 1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->servername_done = 0; - default: - return 1; - } -} +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + unsigned int identity; -int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) -{ - int al = -1; - if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION) - return 1; - if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } - if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); + if (s->session->ext.tick_identity != (int)identity) { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY); return 0; } + + s->hit = 1; +#endif + return 1; }