X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fextensions.c;h=722943fa69df5fd78572b520654cf1f860cb01dd;hp=a68dd4883514cf5c18ce4b561c628a13afdf00d6;hb=c471521243c729d344c2ab641feed7cfb7b8a36d;hpb=8cbfcc70bf37886064ef852dda9e1bf40e904756 diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions.c b/ssl/statem/extensions.c index a68dd48835..722943fa69 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/extensions.c +++ b/ssl/statem/extensions.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -7,17 +7,18 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ +#include +#include "internal/nelem.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" -static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, - int *al); +static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); static int init_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context); -static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, - int *al); +static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, - int *al); +static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); #endif static int init_session_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned int context); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP @@ -27,17 +28,34 @@ static int init_status_request(SSL *s, unsigned int context); static int init_npn(SSL *s, unsigned int context); #endif static int init_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context); -static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al); +static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); +static int init_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, unsigned int context); static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context); +static int init_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, unsigned int context); +static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, + X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +static int tls_parse_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int context); #endif static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context); static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context); -static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al); +static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); +static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, unsigned int context); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP static int init_srtp(SSL *s, unsigned int context); #endif +static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); +static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); +static int final_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); +static int init_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, unsigned int context); /* Structure to define a built-in extension */ typedef struct extensions_definition_st { @@ -54,27 +72,29 @@ typedef struct extensions_definition_st { */ int (*init)(SSL *s, unsigned int context); /* Parse extension sent from client to server */ - int (*parse_ctos)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al); + int (*parse_ctos)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); /* Parse extension send from server to client */ - int (*parse_stoc)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al); + int (*parse_stoc)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); /* Construct extension sent from server to client */ - int (*construct_stoc)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al); + EXT_RETURN (*construct_stoc)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); /* Construct extension sent from client to server */ - int (*construct_ctos)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al); + EXT_RETURN (*construct_ctos)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); /* * Finalise extension after parsing. Always called where an extensions was * initialised even if the extension was not present. |sent| is set to 1 if * the extension was seen, or 0 otherwise. */ - int (*final)(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al); + int (*final)(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); } EXTENSION_DEFINITION; /* * Definitions of all built-in extensions. NOTE: Changes in the number or order - * of these extensions should be mirrored with equivalent changes to the indexes - * defined in statem_locl.h. + * of these extensions should be mirrored with equivalent changes to the + * indexes ( TLSEXT_IDX_* ) defined in ssl_locl.h. * Each extension has an initialiser, a client and * server side parser and a finaliser. The initialiser is called (if the * extension is relevant to the given context) even if we did not see the @@ -90,33 +110,44 @@ typedef struct extensions_definition_st { * significant. * The extension context is defined by a series of flags which specify which * messages the extension is relevant to. These flags also specify whether the - * extension is relevant to a paricular protocol or protocol version. + * extension is relevant to a particular protocol or protocol version. * * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we have a test to check the consistency of these + * + * NOTE: WebSphere Application Server 7+ cannot handle empty extensions at + * the end, keep these extensions before signature_algorithm. */ #define INVALID_EXTENSION { 0x10000, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL } static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = { { TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, - EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED - | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, NULL, tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate, tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate, tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate, tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate, final_renegotiate }, { TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, - EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO - | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, init_server_name, tls_parse_ctos_server_name, tls_parse_stoc_server_name, tls_construct_stoc_server_name, tls_construct_ctos_server_name, final_server_name }, + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + NULL, tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen, tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen, + tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen, tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen, + final_maxfragmentlen + }, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP { TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, - EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, init_srp, tls_parse_ctos_srp, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_srp, NULL }, #else @@ -125,16 +156,43 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC { TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, - EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, NULL, tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats, tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats, tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats, tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats, final_ec_pt_formats }, { + /* + * "supported_groups" is spread across several specifications. + * It was originally specified as "elliptic_curves" in RFC 4492, + * and broadened to include named FFDH groups by RFC 7919. + * Both RFCs 4492 and 7919 do not include a provision for the server + * to indicate to the client the complete list of groups supported + * by the server, with the server instead just indicating the + * selected group for this connection in the ServerKeyExchange + * message. TLS 1.3 adds a scheme for the server to indicate + * to the client its list of supported groups in the + * EncryptedExtensions message, but none of the relevant + * specifications permit sending supported_groups in the ServerHello. + * Nonetheless (possibly due to the close proximity to the + * "ec_point_formats" extension, which is allowed in the ServerHello), + * there are several servers that send this extension in the + * ServerHello anyway. Up to and including the 1.1.0 release, + * we did not check for the presence of nonpermitted extensions, + * so to avoid a regression, we must permit this extension in the + * TLS 1.2 ServerHello as well. + * + * Note that there is no tls_parse_stoc_supported_groups function, + * so we do not perform any additional parsing, validation, or + * processing on the server's group list -- this is just a minimal + * change to preserve compatibility with these misbehaving servers. + */ TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups, - EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO, NULL, tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups, NULL, - NULL /* TODO(TLS1.3): Need to add this */, + tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups, tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups, NULL }, #else @@ -143,22 +201,17 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = { #endif { TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, - EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, init_session_ticket, tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket, tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket, tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket, tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket, NULL }, - { - TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, - EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, - init_sig_algs, tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs, NULL, NULL, - tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs, NULL - }, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP { TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, - EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO - | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, init_status_request, tls_parse_ctos_status_request, tls_parse_stoc_status_request, tls_construct_stoc_status_request, tls_construct_ctos_status_request, NULL @@ -169,7 +222,8 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG { TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, - EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, init_npn, tls_parse_ctos_npn, tls_parse_stoc_npn, tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg, tls_construct_ctos_npn, NULL }, @@ -182,16 +236,16 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = { * happens after server_name callbacks */ TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, - EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO - | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, init_alpn, tls_parse_ctos_alpn, tls_parse_stoc_alpn, tls_construct_stoc_alpn, tls_construct_ctos_alpn, final_alpn }, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP { TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, - EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO - | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS | EXT_DTLS_ONLY, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS | SSL_EXT_DTLS_ONLY, init_srtp, tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp, tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp, tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp, tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp, NULL }, @@ -200,15 +254,16 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = { #endif { TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, - EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, init_etm, tls_parse_ctos_etm, tls_parse_stoc_etm, tls_construct_stoc_etm, tls_construct_ctos_etm, NULL }, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT { TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, - EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO - | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, NULL, /* * No server side support for this, but can be provided by a custom @@ -222,28 +277,74 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = { #endif { TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, - EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, init_ems, tls_parse_ctos_ems, tls_parse_stoc_ems, tls_construct_stoc_ems, tls_construct_ctos_ems, final_ems }, + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms_cert, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + init_sig_algs_cert, tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert, + tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert, + /* We do not generate signature_algorithms_cert at present. */ + NULL, NULL, NULL + }, + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY, + init_post_handshake_auth, + tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth, NULL, + NULL, tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth, + NULL, + }, + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + init_sig_algs, tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs, + tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs, tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs, + tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs, final_sig_algs + }, { TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions, - EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST + | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY, NULL, /* Processed inline as part of version selection */ - NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions, NULL + NULL, tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions, + tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions, + tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions, NULL }, + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY, + init_psk_kex_modes, tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes, NULL, NULL, + tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes, NULL + }, +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC { /* * Must be in this list after supported_groups. We need that to have * been parsed before we do this one. */ TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share, - EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO - | EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY - | EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY, NULL, tls_parse_ctos_key_share, tls_parse_stoc_key_share, - tls_construct_stoc_key_share, tls_construct_ctos_key_share, NULL + tls_construct_stoc_key_share, tls_construct_ctos_key_share, + final_key_share + }, +#endif + { + /* Must be after key_share */ + TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST + | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY, + NULL, tls_parse_ctos_cookie, tls_parse_stoc_cookie, + tls_construct_stoc_cookie, tls_construct_ctos_cookie, NULL }, { /* @@ -251,24 +352,104 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = { * SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG is set */ TLSEXT_TYPE_cryptopro_bug, - EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug, NULL, NULL }, { - /* Last in the list because it must be added as the last extension */ + TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY, + NULL, tls_parse_ctos_early_data, tls_parse_stoc_early_data, + tls_construct_stoc_early_data, tls_construct_ctos_early_data, + final_early_data + }, + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY, + init_certificate_authorities, + tls_parse_certificate_authorities, tls_parse_certificate_authorities, + tls_construct_certificate_authorities, + tls_construct_certificate_authorities, NULL, + }, + { + /* Must be immediately before pre_shared_key */ TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, - EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, /* We send this, but don't read it */ NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_padding, NULL + }, + { + /* Required by the TLSv1.3 spec to always be the last extension */ + TLSEXT_TYPE_psk, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY, + NULL, tls_parse_ctos_psk, tls_parse_stoc_psk, tls_construct_stoc_psk, + tls_construct_ctos_psk, NULL } }; +/* Check whether an extension's context matches the current context */ +static int validate_context(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx, unsigned int thisctx) +{ + /* Check we're allowed to use this extension in this context */ + if ((thisctx & extctx) == 0) + return 0; + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if ((extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS_ONLY) != 0) + return 0; + } else if ((extctx & SSL_EXT_DTLS_ONLY) != 0) { + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_validate_all_contexts(SSL *s, unsigned int thisctx, RAW_EXTENSION *exts) +{ + size_t i, num_exts, builtin_num = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs), offset; + RAW_EXTENSION *thisext; + unsigned int context; + ENDPOINT role = ENDPOINT_BOTH; + + if ((thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) + role = ENDPOINT_SERVER; + else if ((thisctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0) + role = ENDPOINT_CLIENT; + + /* Calculate the number of extensions in the extensions list */ + num_exts = builtin_num + s->cert->custext.meths_count; + + for (thisext = exts, i = 0; i < num_exts; i++, thisext++) { + if (!thisext->present) + continue; + + if (i < builtin_num) { + context = ext_defs[i].context; + } else { + custom_ext_method *meth = NULL; + + meth = custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role, thisext->type, + &offset); + if (!ossl_assert(meth != NULL)) + return 0; + context = meth->context; + } + + if (!validate_context(s, context, thisctx)) + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + /* * Verify whether we are allowed to use the extension |type| in the current * |context|. Returns 1 to indicate the extension is allowed or unknown or 0 to * indicate the extension is not allowed. If returning 1 then |*found| is set to - * 1 if we found a definition for the extension, and |*idx| is set to its index + * the definition for the extension we found. */ static int verify_extension(SSL *s, unsigned int context, unsigned int type, custom_ext_methods *meths, RAW_EXTENSION *rawexlist, @@ -280,38 +461,31 @@ static int verify_extension(SSL *s, unsigned int context, unsigned int type, for (i = 0, thisext = ext_defs; i < builtin_num; i++, thisext++) { if (type == thisext->type) { - /* Check we're allowed to use this extension in this context */ - if ((context & thisext->context) == 0) + if (!validate_context(s, thisext->context, context)) return 0; - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - if ((thisext->context & EXT_TLS_ONLY) != 0) - return 0; - } else if ((thisext->context & EXT_DTLS_ONLY) != 0) { - return 0; - } - *found = &rawexlist[i]; return 1; } } - if ((context & (EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO)) == 0) { - /* - * Custom extensions only apply to <=TLS1.2. This extension is unknown - * in this context - we allow it - */ - *found = NULL; - return 1; - } - /* Check the custom extensions */ if (meths != NULL) { - for (i = builtin_num; i < builtin_num + meths->meths_count; i++) { - if (meths->meths[i - builtin_num].ext_type == type) { - *found = &rawexlist[i]; - return 1; - } + size_t offset = 0; + ENDPOINT role = ENDPOINT_BOTH; + custom_ext_method *meth = NULL; + + if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) + role = ENDPOINT_SERVER; + else if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0) + role = ENDPOINT_CLIENT; + + meth = custom_ext_find(meths, role, type, &offset); + if (meth != NULL) { + if (!validate_context(s, meth->context, context)) + return 0; + *found = &rawexlist[offset + builtin_num]; + return 1; } } @@ -325,16 +499,26 @@ static int verify_extension(SSL *s, unsigned int context, unsigned int type, * the extension is relevant for the current context |thisctx| or not. Returns * 1 if the extension is relevant for this context, and 0 otherwise */ -static int extension_is_relevant(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx, - unsigned int thisctx) +int extension_is_relevant(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx, unsigned int thisctx) { + int is_tls13; + + /* + * For HRR we haven't selected the version yet but we know it will be + * TLSv1.3 + */ + if ((thisctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) + is_tls13 = 1; + else + is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s); + if ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s) - && (extctx & EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY) != 0) + && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY) != 0) || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION - && (extctx & EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED) == 0) - || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) - && (extctx & EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY) != 0) - || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (extctx & EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0)) + && (extctx & SSL_EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED) == 0) + || (is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY) != 0) + || (!is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0) + || (s->hit && (extctx & SSL_EXT_IGNORE_ON_RESUMPTION) != 0)) return 0; return 1; @@ -343,11 +527,11 @@ static int extension_is_relevant(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx, /* * Gather a list of all the extensions from the data in |packet]. |context| * tells us which message this extension is for. The raw extension data is - * stored in |*res| on success. In the event of an error the alert type to use - * is stored in |*al|. We don't actually process the content of the extensions - * yet, except to check their types. This function also runs the initialiser - * functions for all known extensions (whether we have collected them or not). - * If successful the caller is responsible for freeing the contents of |*res|. + * stored in |*res| on success. We don't actually process the content of the + * extensions yet, except to check their types. This function also runs the + * initialiser functions for all known extensions if |init| is nonzero (whether + * we have collected them or not). If successful the caller is responsible for + * freeing the contents of |*res|. * * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello. @@ -357,11 +541,12 @@ static int extension_is_relevant(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx, * extensions that we know about. We ignore others. */ int tls_collect_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *packet, unsigned int context, - RAW_EXTENSION **res, int *al) + RAW_EXTENSION **res, size_t *len, int init) { PACKET extensions = *packet; size_t i = 0; - custom_ext_methods *exts = NULL; + size_t num_exts; + custom_ext_methods *exts = &s->cert->custext; RAW_EXTENSION *raw_extensions = NULL; const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd; @@ -371,64 +556,102 @@ int tls_collect_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *packet, unsigned int context, * Initialise server side custom extensions. Client side is done during * construction of extensions for the ClientHello. */ - if ((context & EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) { - exts = &s->cert->srv_ext; - custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext); - } else if ((context & EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0) { - exts = &s->cert->cli_ext; - } + if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) + custom_ext_init(&s->cert->custext); - raw_extensions = OPENSSL_zalloc((OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs) - + (exts != NULL ? exts->meths_count : 0)) - * sizeof(*raw_extensions)); + num_exts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs) + (exts != NULL ? exts->meths_count : 0); + raw_extensions = OPENSSL_zalloc(num_exts * sizeof(*raw_extensions)); if (raw_extensions == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } + i = 0; while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) { - unsigned int type; + unsigned int type, idx; PACKET extension; RAW_EXTENSION *thisex; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); goto err; } /* * Verify this extension is allowed. We only check duplicates for - * extensions that we recognise. + * extensions that we recognise. We also have a special case for the + * PSK extension, which must be the last one in the ClientHello. */ if (!verify_extension(s, context, type, exts, raw_extensions, &thisex) - || (thisex != NULL && thisex->present == 1)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + || (thisex != NULL && thisex->present == 1) + || (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_psk + && (context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0 + && PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + goto err; + } + idx = thisex - raw_extensions; + /*- + * Check that we requested this extension (if appropriate). Requests can + * be sent in the ClientHello and CertificateRequest. Unsolicited + * extensions can be sent in the NewSessionTicket. We only do this for + * the built-in extensions. Custom extensions have a different but + * similar check elsewhere. + * Special cases: + * - The HRR cookie extension is unsolicited + * - The renegotiate extension is unsolicited (the client signals + * support via an SCSV) + * - The signed_certificate_timestamp extension can be provided by a + * custom extension or by the built-in version. We let the extension + * itself handle unsolicited response checks. + */ + if (idx < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs) + && (context & (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET)) == 0 + && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie + && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate + && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp + && (s->ext.extflags[idx] & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, + SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_UNSOLICITED_EXTENSION); goto err; } if (thisex != NULL) { thisex->data = extension; thisex->present = 1; thisex->type = type; + thisex->received_order = i++; + if (s->ext.debug_cb) + s->ext.debug_cb(s, !s->server, thisex->type, + PACKET_data(&thisex->data), + PACKET_remaining(&thisex->data), + s->ext.debug_arg); } } - /* - * Initialise all known extensions relevant to this context, whether we have - * found them or not - */ - for (thisexd = ext_defs, i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); i++, thisexd++) { - if(thisexd->init != NULL && (thisexd->context & context) != 0 + if (init) { + /* + * Initialise all known extensions relevant to this context, + * whether we have found them or not + */ + for (thisexd = ext_defs, i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); + i++, thisexd++) { + if (thisexd->init != NULL && (thisexd->context & context) != 0 && extension_is_relevant(s, thisexd->context, context) && !thisexd->init(s, context)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } } } *res = raw_extensions; + if (len != NULL) + *len = num_exts; return 1; err: @@ -443,26 +666,20 @@ int tls_collect_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *packet, unsigned int context, * given |context| and the parser has not already been run. If this is for a * Certificate message, then we also provide the parser with the relevant * Certificate |x| and its position in the |chainidx| with 0 being the first - * Certificate. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. In the event of a failure - * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code. If an extension is not present - * this counted as success. + * Certificate. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. If an extension is not + * present this counted as success. */ int tls_parse_extension(SSL *s, TLSEXT_INDEX idx, int context, - RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) + RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &exts[idx]; - int (*parser)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) = NULL; + int (*parser)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) = NULL; /* Skip if the extension is not present */ if (!currext->present) return 1; - if (s->ext.debug_cb) - s->ext.debug_cb(s, !s->server, currext->type, - PACKET_data(&currext->data), - PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), - s->ext.debug_arg); - /* Skip if we've already parsed this extension */ if (currext->parsed) return 1; @@ -480,7 +697,7 @@ int tls_parse_extension(SSL *s, TLSEXT_INDEX idx, int context, parser = s->server ? extdef->parse_ctos : extdef->parse_stoc; if (parser != NULL) - return parser(s, &currext->data, x, chainidx, al); + return parser(s, &currext->data, context, x, chainidx); /* * If the parser is NULL we fall through to the custom extension @@ -488,186 +705,172 @@ int tls_parse_extension(SSL *s, TLSEXT_INDEX idx, int context, */ } - /* - * This is a custom extension. We only allow this if it is a non - * resumed session on the server side. - *chain - * TODO(TLS1.3): We only allow old style <=TLS1.2 custom extensions. - * We're going to need a new mechanism for TLS1.3 to specify which - * messages to add the custom extensions to. - */ - if ((!s->hit || !s->server) - && (context - & (EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO)) != 0 - && custom_ext_parse(s, s->server, currext->type, - PACKET_data(&currext->data), - PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), - al) <= 0) - return 0; - - return 1; + /* Parse custom extensions */ + return custom_ext_parse(s, context, currext->type, + PACKET_data(&currext->data), + PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), + x, chainidx); } /* * Parse all remaining extensions that have not yet been parsed. Also calls the - * finalisation for all extensions at the end, whether we collected them or not. - * Returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. If we are working on a Certificate - * message then we also pass the Certificate |x| and its position in the - * |chainidx|, with 0 being the first certificate. On failure, |*al| is - * populated with a suitable alert code. + * finalisation for all extensions at the end if |fin| is nonzero, whether we + * collected them or not. Returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. If we are + * working on a Certificate message then we also pass the Certificate |x| and + * its position in the |chainidx|, with 0 being the first certificate. */ int tls_parse_all_extensions(SSL *s, int context, RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x, - size_t chainidx, int *al) + size_t chainidx, int fin) { size_t i, numexts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd; /* Calculate the number of extensions in the extensions list */ - if ((context & EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) { - numexts += s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count; - } else if ((context & EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0) { - numexts += s->cert->cli_ext.meths_count; - } + numexts += s->cert->custext.meths_count; /* Parse each extension in turn */ for (i = 0; i < numexts; i++) { - if (!tls_parse_extension(s, i, context, exts, x, chainidx, al)) + if (!tls_parse_extension(s, i, context, exts, x, chainidx)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; + } } - /* - * Finalise all known extensions relevant to this context, whether we have - * found them or not - */ - for (i = 0, thisexd = ext_defs; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); i++, thisexd++) { - if(thisexd->final != NULL - && (thisexd->context & context) != 0 - && !thisexd->final(s, context, exts[i].present, al)) - return 0; + if (fin) { + /* + * Finalise all known extensions relevant to this context, + * whether we have found them or not + */ + for (i = 0, thisexd = ext_defs; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); + i++, thisexd++) { + if (thisexd->final != NULL && (thisexd->context & context) != 0 + && !thisexd->final(s, context, exts[i].present)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } } return 1; } +int should_add_extension(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx, unsigned int thisctx, + int max_version) +{ + /* Skip if not relevant for our context */ + if ((extctx & thisctx) == 0) + return 0; + + /* Check if this extension is defined for our protocol. If not, skip */ + if ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY) != 0) + || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION + && (extctx & SSL_EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED) == 0) + || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY) != 0) + || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0 + && (thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) == 0) + || ((extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0 + && (thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0 + && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION))) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + /* * Construct all the extensions relevant to the current |context| and write * them to |pkt|. If this is an extension for a Certificate in a Certificate * message, then |x| will be set to the Certificate we are handling, and * |chainidx| will indicate the position in the chainidx we are processing (with - * 0 being the first in the chain). Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. If a - * failure occurs then |al| is populated with a suitable alert code. On a + * 0 being the first in the chain). Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On a * failure construction stops at the first extension to fail to construct. */ int tls_construct_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, - X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { size_t i; - int addcustom = 0, min_version, max_version = 0, reason, tmpal; + int min_version, max_version = 0, reason; const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd; - /* - * Normally if something goes wrong during construction it's an internal - * error. We can always override this later. - */ - tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) /* * If extensions are of zero length then we don't even add the - * extensions length bytes to a ClientHello/ServerHello in SSLv3 + * extensions length bytes to a ClientHello/ServerHello + * (for non-TLSv1.3). */ - || ((context & (EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO)) != 0 - && s->version == SSL3_VERSION - && !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, + || ((context & + (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO)) != 0 + && !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } - if ((context & EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) { - reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version); + if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) { + reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version); if (reason != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, reason); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, + reason); + return 0; } } /* Add custom extensions first */ - if ((context & EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) { - custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext); - addcustom = 1; - } else if ((context & EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0) { - /* - * We already initialised the custom extensions during ClientHello - * parsing. - * - * TODO(TLS1.3): We're going to need a new custom extension mechanism - * for TLS1.3, so that custom extensions can specify which of the - * multiple message they wish to add themselves to. - */ - addcustom = 1; + if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) { + /* On the server side with initialise during ClientHello parsing */ + custom_ext_init(&s->cert->custext); } - - if (addcustom && !custom_ext_add(s, s->server, pkt, &tmpal)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + if (!custom_ext_add(s, context, pkt, x, chainidx, max_version)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; } for (i = 0, thisexd = ext_defs; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); i++, thisexd++) { - int (*construct)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, - int *al); + EXT_RETURN (*construct)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); + EXT_RETURN ret; /* Skip if not relevant for our context */ - if ((thisexd->context & context) == 0) + if (!should_add_extension(s, thisexd->context, context, max_version)) continue; construct = s->server ? thisexd->construct_stoc : thisexd->construct_ctos; - /* Check if this extension is defined for our protocol. If not, skip */ - if ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s) - && (thisexd->context & EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY) - != 0) - || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION - && (thisexd->context & EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED) == 0) - || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) - && (thisexd->context & EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY) - != 0) - || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) - && (thisexd->context & EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0 - && (context & EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) == 0) - || ((thisexd->context & EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0 - && (context & EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0 - && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)) - || construct == NULL) + if (construct == NULL) continue; - if (!construct(s, pkt, x, chainidx, &tmpal)) - goto err; + ret = construct(s, pkt, context, x, chainidx); + if (ret == EXT_RETURN_FAIL) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + if (ret == EXT_RETURN_SENT + && (context & (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET)) != 0) + s->ext.extflags[i] |= SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT; } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } return 1; - - err: - *al = tmpal; - return 0; } /* * Built in extension finalisation and initialisation functions. All initialise * or finalise the associated extension type for the given |context|. For * finalisers |sent| is set to 1 if we saw the extension during parsing, and 0 - * otherwise. These functions return 1 on success or 0 on failure. In the event - * of a failure then |*al| is populated with a suitable error code. + * otherwise. These functions return 1 on success or 0 on failure. */ -static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, - int *al) +static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) { if (!s->server) { /* @@ -677,9 +880,8 @@ static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && !sent) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); return 0; } @@ -690,9 +892,8 @@ static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, if (s->renegotiate && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && !sent) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); return 0; } @@ -708,27 +909,81 @@ static int init_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context) return 1; } -static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, - int *al) +static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) { - int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; + int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK, discard; int altmp = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + int was_ticket = (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0; - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != 0) + if (!ossl_assert(s->ctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if (s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL) ret = s->ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp, s->ctx->ext.servername_arg); - else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL - && s->initial_ctx->ext.servername_cb != 0) - ret = s->initial_ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp, - s->initial_ctx->ext.servername_arg); + else if (s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL) + ret = s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp, + s->session_ctx->ext.servername_arg); + + if (!sent) { + OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname); + s->session->ext.hostname = NULL; + } + + /* + * If we switched contexts (whether here or in the client_hello callback), + * move the sess_accept increment from the session_ctx to the new + * context, to avoid the confusing situation of having sess_accept_good + * exceed sess_accept (zero) for the new context. + */ + if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ctx != s->session_ctx) { + CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &discard, + s->ctx->lock); + CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept, -1, &discard, + s->session_ctx->lock); + } + + /* + * If we're expecting to send a ticket, and tickets were previously enabled, + * and now tickets are disabled, then turn off expected ticket. + * Also, if this is not a resumption, create a new session ID + */ + if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK && s->ext.ticket_expected + && was_ticket && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0) { + s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; + if (!s->hit) { + SSL_SESSION* ss = SSL_get_session(s); + + if (ss != NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(ss->ext.tick); + ss->ext.tick = NULL; + ss->ext.ticklen = 0; + ss->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = 0; + ss->ext.tick_age_add = 0; + ss->ext.tick_identity = 0; + if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, ss)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } else { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + } switch (ret) { case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - *al = altmp; + SSLfatal(s, altmp, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); return 0; case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - *al = altmp; + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, altmp); return 1; case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: @@ -741,8 +996,7 @@ static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, - int *al) +static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) { unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; @@ -771,8 +1025,8 @@ static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, break; } if (i == s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_EC_PT_FORMATS, - SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_FINAL_EC_PT_FORMATS, + SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); return 0; } } @@ -821,8 +1075,8 @@ static int init_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context) { OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; + s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0; if (s->server) { - s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0; OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed); s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL; s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0; @@ -830,39 +1084,24 @@ static int init_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context) return 1; } -static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al) +static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) { - const unsigned char *selected = NULL; - unsigned char selected_len = 0; + if (!s->server && !sent && s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) + s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; - if (!s->server) + if (!s->server || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) return 1; - if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) { - int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, - s->s3->alpn_proposed, - (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len, - s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg); - - if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); - s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len); - if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ - s->s3->npn_seen = 0; -#endif - } else { - *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL; - return 0; - } - } - - return 1; + /* + * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and + * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3 + * we also have to do this before we decide whether to accept early_data. + * In TLSv1.3 we've already negotiated our cipher so we do this call now. + * For < TLSv1.3 we defer it until after cipher negotiation. + * + * On failure SSLfatal() already called. + */ + return tls_handle_alpn(s); } static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context) @@ -874,6 +1113,15 @@ static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context) return 1; } +static int init_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, unsigned int context) +{ + /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs); + s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs = NULL; + + return 1; +} + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int context) { @@ -886,7 +1134,7 @@ static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int context) static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context) { - s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; + s->ext.use_etm = 0; return 1; } @@ -899,7 +1147,7 @@ static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context) return 1; } -static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al) +static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) { if (!s->server && s->hit) { /* @@ -908,8 +1156,8 @@ static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al) */ if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) != !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_EMS, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_EMS, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS); return 0; } } @@ -917,6 +1165,60 @@ static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al) return 1; } +static int init_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, unsigned int context) +{ + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); + s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = NULL; + return 1; +} + +static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, + X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); + + if (ca_sk == NULL || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +static int tls_parse_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) + return 0; + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP static int init_srtp(SSL *s, unsigned int context) { @@ -926,3 +1228,449 @@ static int init_srtp(SSL *s, unsigned int context) return 1; } #endif + +static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) +{ + if (!sent && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit) { + SSLfatal(s, TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_FINAL_SIG_ALGS, + SSL_R_MISSING_SIGALGS_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) +{ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + return 1; + + /* Nothing to do for key_share in an HRR */ + if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) + return 1; + + /* + * If + * we are a client + * AND + * we have no key_share + * AND + * (we are not resuming + * OR the kex_mode doesn't allow non key_share resumes) + * THEN + * fail; + */ + if (!s->server + && !sent + && (!s->hit + || (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0)) { + /* Nothing left we can do - just fail */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + /* + * IF + * we are a server + * THEN + * IF + * we have a suitable key_share + * THEN + * IF + * we are stateless AND we have no cookie + * THEN + * send a HelloRetryRequest + * ELSE + * IF + * we didn't already send a HelloRetryRequest + * AND + * the client sent a key_share extension + * AND + * (we are not resuming + * OR the kex_mode allows key_share resumes) + * AND + * a shared group exists + * THEN + * send a HelloRetryRequest + * ELSE IF + * we are not resuming + * OR + * the kex_mode doesn't allow non key_share resumes + * THEN + * fail + * ELSE IF + * we are stateless AND we have no cookie + * THEN + * send a HelloRetryRequest + */ + if (s->server) { + if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) { + /* We have a suitable key_share */ + if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0 + && !s->ext.cookieok) { + if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)) { + /* + * If we are stateless then we wouldn't know about any + * previously sent HRR - so how can this be anything other + * than 0? + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING; + return 1; + } + } else { + /* No suitable key_share */ + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE && sent + && (!s->hit + || (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) + != 0)) { + const uint16_t *pgroups, *clntgroups; + size_t num_groups, clnt_num_groups, i; + unsigned int group_id = 0; + + /* Check if a shared group exists */ + + /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */ + tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups); + tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); + + /* + * Find the first group we allow that is also in client's list + */ + for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { + group_id = pgroups[i]; + + if (check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, + 1)) + break; + } + + if (i < num_groups) { + /* A shared group exists so send a HelloRetryRequest */ + s->s3->group_id = group_id; + s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING; + return 1; + } + } + if (!s->hit + || (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0) { + /* Nothing left we can do - just fail */ + SSLfatal(s, sent ? SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE + : SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, + SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + + if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0 + && !s->ext.cookieok) { + if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)) { + /* + * If we are stateless then we wouldn't know about any + * previously sent HRR - so how can this be anything other + * than 0? + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING; + return 1; + } + } + + /* + * We have a key_share so don't send any more HelloRetryRequest + * messages + */ + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) + s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_COMPLETE; + } else { + /* + * For a client side resumption with no key_share we need to generate + * the handshake secret (otherwise this is done during key_share + * processing). + */ + if (!sent && !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} +#endif + +static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, unsigned int context) +{ + s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_NONE; + return 1; +} + +int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *msgstart, + size_t binderoffset, const unsigned char *binderin, + unsigned char *binderout, SSL_SESSION *sess, int sign, + int external) +{ + EVP_PKEY *mackey = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; + unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], binderkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char finishedkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmpbinder[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char tmppsk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char *early_secret, *psk; + const char resumption_label[] = "res binder"; + const char external_label[] = "ext binder"; + const char nonce_label[] = "resumption"; + const char *label; + size_t bindersize, labelsize, hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); + int ret = -1; + int usepskfored = 0; + + if (external + && s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING + && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0 + && sess->ext.max_early_data > 0) + usepskfored = 1; + + if (external) { + label = external_label; + labelsize = sizeof(external_label) - 1; + } else { + label = resumption_label; + labelsize = sizeof(resumption_label) - 1; + } + + if (sess->master_key_length != hashsize) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + SSL_R_BAD_PSK); + goto err; + } + + if (external) { + psk = sess->master_key; + } else { + psk = tmppsk; + if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, sess->master_key, + (const unsigned char *)nonce_label, + sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, sess->ext.tick_nonce, + sess->ext.tick_nonce_len, psk, hashsize)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } + + /* + * Generate the early_secret. On the server side we've selected a PSK to + * resume with (internal or external) so we always do this. On the client + * side we do this for a non-external (i.e. resumption) PSK or external PSK + * that will be used for early_data so that it is in place for sending early + * data. For client side external PSK not being used for early_data we + * generate it but store it away for later use. + */ + if (s->server || !external || usepskfored) + early_secret = (unsigned char *)s->early_secret; + else + early_secret = (unsigned char *)sess->early_secret; + if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, psk, hashsize, early_secret)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + /* + * Create the handshake hash for the binder key...the messages so far are + * empty! + */ + mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (mctx == NULL + || EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* Generate the binder key */ + if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, early_secret, (unsigned char *)label, + labelsize, hash, hashsize, binderkey, hashsize)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + /* Generate the finished key */ + if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, md, binderkey, finishedkey, hashsize)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Get a hash of the ClientHello up to the start of the binders. If we are + * following a HelloRetryRequest then this includes the hash of the first + * ClientHello and the HelloRetryRequest itself. + */ + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { + size_t hdatalen; + void *hdata; + + hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); + if (hdatalen <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + + /* + * For servers the handshake buffer data will include the second + * ClientHello - which we don't want - so we need to take that bit off. + */ + if (s->server) { + PACKET hashprefix, msg; + + /* Find how many bytes are left after the first two messages */ + if (!PACKET_buf_init(&hashprefix, hdata, hdatalen) + || !PACKET_forward(&hashprefix, 1) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&hashprefix, &msg) + || !PACKET_forward(&hashprefix, 1) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&hashprefix, &msg)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + hdatalen -= PACKET_remaining(&hashprefix); + } + + if (EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + if (EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, msgstart, binderoffset) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + mackey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, finishedkey, hashsize); + if (mackey == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (!sign) + binderout = tmpbinder; + + bindersize = hashsize; + if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, NULL, md, NULL, mackey) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hash, hashsize) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, binderout, &bindersize) <= 0 + || bindersize != hashsize) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (sign) { + ret = 1; + } else { + /* HMAC keys can't do EVP_DigestVerify* - use CRYPTO_memcmp instead */ + ret = (CRYPTO_memcmp(binderin, binderout, hashsize) == 0); + if (!ret) + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + SSL_R_BINDER_DOES_NOT_VERIFY); + } + + err: + OPENSSL_cleanse(binderkey, sizeof(binderkey)); + OPENSSL_cleanse(finishedkey, sizeof(finishedkey)); + EVP_PKEY_free(mackey); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); + + return ret; +} + +static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) +{ + if (!sent) + return 1; + + if (!s->server) { + if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS + && sent + && !s->ext.early_data_ok) { + /* + * If we get here then the server accepted our early_data but we + * later realised that it shouldn't have done (e.g. inconsistent + * ALPN) + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_FINAL_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_BAD_EARLY_DATA); + return 0; + } + + return 1; + } + + if (s->max_early_data == 0 + || !s->hit + || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0 + || s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING + || !s->ext.early_data_ok + || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { + s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED; + } else { + s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED; + + if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} + +static int final_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) +{ + /* + * Session resumption on server-side with MFL extension active + * BUT MFL extension packet was not resent (i.e. sent == 0) + */ + if (s->server && s->hit && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session) + && !sent ) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_FINAL_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + /* Current SSL buffer is lower than requested MFL */ + if (s->session && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session) + && s->max_send_fragment < GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)) + /* trigger a larger buffer reallocation */ + if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int init_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, unsigned int context) +{ + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_NONE; + + return 1; +}