X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fssl_sess.c;h=85581d43ca40ba11fb75aac1ffb7abb23f0258e9;hp=849908141d76e43a01ef53d10d81b7ad290338d4;hb=5fdf06666c863cd62d53173d1d2011cdec71200c;hpb=dd9d233e2aa493fa1398b527afbf6aa5cdb23f23 diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c index 849908141d..85581d43ca 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c @@ -64,43 +64,33 @@ static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s); static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *s); static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck); -static int ssl_session_num=0; -static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *ssl_session_meth=NULL; -#if 1 /* traditional SSLeay behaviour */ SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(SSL *ssl) +/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */ { return(ssl->session); } -#else /* suggested change: increase reference counter so that a session - * can later be set in a new SSL object. - * Objections: - * -- the modified function should have a new name (or old - * applications, including s_client, leak memory); - * -- the locking seems unnecessary given that SSL structures - * usually cannot be safely shared between threads anyway. */ -SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(SSL *ssl) + +SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) +/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */ { SSL_SESSION *sess; /* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's * non-null and when we up the reference count. */ - CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); sess = ssl->session; if(sess) sess->references++; - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); return(sess); } -#endif int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { - ssl_session_num++; - return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(ssl_session_num-1, - &ssl_session_meth, - argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func)); + return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp, + new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg) @@ -117,7 +107,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) { SSL_SESSION *ss; - ss=(SSL_SESSION *)Malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); + ss=(SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); if (ss == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); @@ -132,15 +122,56 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) ss->prev=NULL; ss->next=NULL; ss->compress_meth=0; - CRYPTO_new_ex_data(ssl_session_meth,ss,&ss->ex_data); + CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data); return(ss); } +const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) + { + if(len) + *len = s->session_id_length; + return s->session_id; + } + +/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. SSLv3/TLSv1 + * has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random gunk repeatedly + * until we have no conflict is going to complete in one iteration pretty much + * "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations + * and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call + * it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly + * very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our server. How you might + * store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting question ... */ + +#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10 +static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, + unsigned int *id_len) +{ + unsigned int retry = 0; + do + RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len); + while(SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && + (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)); + if(retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS) + return 1; + /* else - woops a session_id match */ + /* XXX We should also check the external cache -- + * but the probability of a collision is negligible, and + * we could not prevent the concurrent creation of sessions + * with identical IDs since we currently don't have means + * to atomically check whether a session ID already exists + * and make a reservation for it if it does not + * (this problem applies to the internal cache as well). + */ + return 0; +} + int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) { /* This gets used by clients and servers. */ + unsigned int tmp; SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL; + GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id; if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0); @@ -179,26 +210,46 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) SSL_SESSION_free(ss); return(0); } - - for (;;) + /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */ + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + if(s->generate_session_id) + cb = s->generate_session_id; + else if(s->ctx->generate_session_id) + cb = s->ctx->generate_session_id; + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + /* Choose a session ID */ + tmp = ss->session_id_length; + if(!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) + { + /* The callback failed */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return(0); + } + /* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. + * nor set it higher than it was. */ + if(!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length)) + { + /* The callback set an illegal length */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return(0); + } + /* If the session length was shrunk and we're SSLv2, pad it */ + if((tmp < ss->session_id_length) && (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)) + memset(ss->session_id + tmp, 0, ss->session_id_length - tmp); + else + ss->session_id_length = tmp; + /* Finally, check for a conflict */ + if(SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id, + ss->session_id_length)) { - SSL_SESSION *r; - - RAND_pseudo_bytes(ss->session_id,ss->session_id_length); - CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->ctx->sessions, - (char *)ss); - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - if (r == NULL) break; - /* else - woops a session_id match */ - /* XXX We should also check the external cache -- - * but the probability of a collision is negligible, and - * we could not prevent the concurrent creation of sessions - * with identical IDs since we currently don't have means - * to atomically check whether a session ID already exists - * and make a reservation for it if it does not - * (this problem applies to the internal cache as well). - */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return(0); } } else @@ -206,6 +257,12 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) ss->session_id_length=0; } + if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return 0; + } memcpy(ss->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length); ss->sid_ctx_length=s->sid_ctx_length; s->session=ss; @@ -231,7 +288,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len) if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) { CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - ret=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->ctx->sessions,(char *)&data); + ret=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->ctx->sessions,&data); if (ret != NULL) /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */ CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); @@ -258,9 +315,12 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len) if (copy) CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); - /* The following should not return 1, otherwise, - * things are very strange */ - SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,ret); + /* Add the externally cached session to the internal + * cache as well if and only if we are supposed to. */ + if(!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) + /* The following should not return 1, otherwise, + * things are very strange */ + SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,ret); } if (ret == NULL) goto err; @@ -317,7 +377,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len) #if 0 /* This is way too late. */ /* If a thread got the session, then 'swaped', and another got - * it and then due to a time-out decided to 'Free' it we could + * it and then due to a time-out decided to 'OPENSSL_free' it we could * be in trouble. So I'll increment it now, then double decrement * later - am I speaking rubbish?. */ CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); @@ -364,7 +424,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) /* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - s=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_insert(ctx->sessions,(char *)c); + s=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_insert(ctx->sessions,c); /* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. * In this case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify @@ -430,10 +490,10 @@ static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck) if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) { if(lck) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_delete(ctx->sessions,(char *)c); - if (r != NULL) + if ((r = (SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(ctx->sessions,c)) == c) { ret=1; + r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_delete(ctx->sessions,c); SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,c); } @@ -472,16 +532,16 @@ void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss) } #endif - CRYPTO_free_ex_data(ssl_session_meth,ss,&ss->ex_data); + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data); - memset(ss->key_arg,0,SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH); - memset(ss->master_key,0,SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); - memset(ss->session_id,0,SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH); + OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->key_arg,sizeof ss->key_arg); + OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key,sizeof ss->master_key); + OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id,sizeof ss->session_id); if (ss->sess_cert != NULL) ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert); if (ss->peer != NULL) X509_free(ss->peer); if (ss->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers); - memset(ss,0,sizeof(*ss)); - Free(ss); + OPENSSL_cleanse(ss,sizeof(*ss)); + OPENSSL_free(ss); } int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session) @@ -510,11 +570,23 @@ int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session) session->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout; } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ && + session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0) + { + s->kssl_ctx->client_princ = (char *)malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1); + memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ,session->krb5_client_princ, + session->krb5_client_princ_len); + s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0'; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + /* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/ CRYPTO_add(&session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); if (s->session != NULL) SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session=session; + s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result; /* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/ ret=1; } @@ -591,7 +663,7 @@ static void timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p) { /* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to * save on locking overhead */ - lh_delete(p->cache,(char *)s); + lh_delete(p->cache,s); SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx,s); s->not_resumable=1; if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) @@ -600,6 +672,8 @@ static void timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p) } } +static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout, SSL_SESSION *, TIMEOUT_PARAM *) + void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t) { unsigned long i; @@ -612,7 +686,7 @@ void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); i=tp.cache->down_load; tp.cache->down_load=0; - lh_doall_arg(tp.cache,(void (*)())timeout,(char *)&tp); + lh_doall_arg(tp.cache, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout), &tp); tp.cache->down_load=i; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); }