X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fssl_lib.c;h=b7b2e4086a250fc65da73476600035d14c92e6a0;hp=c72f0ee402cae397b55c5fe2bace17148556d7af;hb=5fdf06666c863cd62d53173d1d2011cdec71200c;hpb=b1c4fe36258dde2950f59fec5d5f86743e495d9d diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c index c72f0ee402..b7b2e4086a 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -57,31 +57,89 @@ * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. + */ +#ifdef REF_CHECK +# include +#endif #include +#include "ssl_locl.h" +#include "kssl_lcl.h" #include #include -#include "ssl_locl.h" - -char *SSL_version_str=OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT; +#include -static STACK *ssl_meth=NULL; -static STACK *ssl_ctx_meth=NULL; -static int ssl_meth_num=0; -static int ssl_ctx_meth_num=0; +const char *SSL_version_str=OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT; OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={ + /* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */ + (int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function, + (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, ssl_undefined_function, - ssl_undefined_function, - ssl_undefined_function, - ssl_undefined_function, - ssl_undefined_function, - ssl_undefined_function, + (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, + (int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function, + (int (*)(SSL *, EVP_MD_CTX *, EVP_MD_CTX *, const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function }; int SSL_clear(SSL *s) { - int state; if (s->method == NULL) { @@ -89,17 +147,29 @@ int SSL_clear(SSL *s) return(0); } + if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) + { + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session=NULL; + } + s->error=0; s->hit=0; s->shutdown=0; -#if 0 +#if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not + * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */ /* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep * the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */ if (s->new_session) return(1); +#else + if (s->new_session) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } #endif - state=s->state; /* Keep to check if we throw away the session-id */ s->type=0; s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT); @@ -108,7 +178,9 @@ int SSL_clear(SSL *s) s->client_version=s->version; s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; +#if 0 s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead; +#endif if (s->init_buf != NULL) { @@ -118,18 +190,12 @@ int SSL_clear(SSL *s) ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); - if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) - { - SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); - s->session=NULL; - } - s->first_packet=0; #if 1 /* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if * so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */ - if ((s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) + if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) { s->method->ssl_free(s); s->method=s->ctx->method; @@ -174,10 +240,18 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) return(NULL); } - s=(SSL *)Malloc(sizeof(SSL)); + s=(SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL)); if (s == NULL) goto err; memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL)); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + + s->options=ctx->options; + s->mode=ctx->mode; + s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list; + if (ctx->cert != NULL) { /* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to @@ -196,11 +270,21 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) } else s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */ - s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length; - memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); + + s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead; + s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback; + s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg; s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode; s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth; + s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length; + OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx); + memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback; + s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id; + s->purpose = ctx->purpose; + s->trust = ctx->trust; + s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown; + CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); s->ctx=ctx; @@ -211,13 +295,12 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) goto err; - s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown; s->references=1; s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1; - s->options=ctx->options; + SSL_clear(s); - CRYPTO_new_ex_data(ssl_meth,(char *)s,&s->ex_data); + CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); return(s); err: @@ -227,7 +310,7 @@ err: ssl_cert_free(s->cert); if (s->ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ - Free(s); + OPENSSL_free(s); } SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return(NULL); @@ -236,7 +319,7 @@ err: int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { - if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) + if(sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; @@ -261,6 +344,76 @@ int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, return 1; } +int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) + { + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + ctx->generate_session_id = cb; + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + return 1; + } + +int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) + { + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); + ssl->generate_session_id = cb; + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); + return 1; + } + +int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, + unsigned int id_len) + { + /* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how + * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to + * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with + * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in + * use by this SSL. */ + SSL_SESSION r, *p; + + if(id_len > sizeof r.session_id) + return 0; + + r.ssl_version = ssl->version; + r.session_id_length = id_len; + memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); + /* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a + * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it + * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be + * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */ + if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) && + (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) + { + memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0, + SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len); + r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } + + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + p = (SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r); + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + return (p != NULL); + } + +int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) + { + return X509_PURPOSE_set(&s->purpose, purpose); + } + +int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose) + { + return X509_PURPOSE_set(&s->purpose, purpose); + } + +int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust) + { + return X509_TRUST_set(&s->trust, trust); + } + +int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust) + { + return X509_TRUST_set(&s->trust, trust); + } + void SSL_free(SSL *s) { int i; @@ -281,7 +434,7 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s) } #endif - CRYPTO_free_ex_data(ssl_meth,(char *)s,&s->ex_data); + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); if (s->bbio != NULL) { @@ -323,7 +476,12 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s) if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s); - Free((char *)s); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL) + kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + + OPENSSL_free(s); } void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio) @@ -353,6 +511,11 @@ BIO *SSL_get_wbio(SSL *s) { return(s->wbio); } int SSL_get_fd(SSL *s) + { + return(SSL_get_rfd(s)); + } + +int SSL_get_rfd(SSL *s) { int ret= -1; BIO *b,*r; @@ -364,7 +527,19 @@ int SSL_get_fd(SSL *s) return(ret); } -#ifndef NO_SOCK +int SSL_get_wfd(SSL *s) + { + int ret= -1; + BIO *b,*r; + + b=SSL_get_wbio(s); + r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); + if (r != NULL) + BIO_get_fd(r,&ret); + return(ret); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd) { int ret=0; @@ -432,6 +607,38 @@ err: } #endif + +/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */ +size_t SSL_get_finished(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) + { + size_t ret = 0; + + if (s->s3 != NULL) + { + ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len; + if (count > ret) + count = ret; + memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count); + } + return ret; + } + +/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */ +size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) + { + size_t ret = 0; + + if (s->s3 != NULL) + { + ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; + if (count > ret) + count = ret; + memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count); + } + return ret; + } + + int SSL_get_verify_mode(SSL *s) { return(s->verify_mode); @@ -487,6 +694,13 @@ int SSL_get_read_ahead(SSL *s) int SSL_pending(SSL *s) { + /* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled + * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), + * and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report + * errors that may be observed while scanning the new data. + * (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value, + * so we'd better not return -1.) + */ return(s->method->ssl_pending(s)); } @@ -515,6 +729,9 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(SSL *s) else r=s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain; + /* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own + * certificate; if we are a server, it does not. */ + return(r); } @@ -575,7 +792,10 @@ int SSL_check_private_key(SSL *ssl) return(0); } if (ssl->cert == NULL) - return(SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ssl->ctx)); + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); + return 0; + } if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); @@ -613,7 +833,7 @@ long SSL_get_default_timeout(SSL *s) return(s->method->get_timeout()); } -int SSL_read(SSL *s,char *buf,int num) +int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { @@ -629,8 +849,14 @@ int SSL_read(SSL *s,char *buf,int num) return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num)); } -int SSL_peek(SSL *s,char *buf,int num) +int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num) { + if (s->handshake_func == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); + return -1; + } + if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { return(0); @@ -638,7 +864,7 @@ int SSL_peek(SSL *s,char *buf,int num) return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num)); } -int SSL_write(SSL *s,const char *buf,int num) +int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { @@ -677,11 +903,21 @@ int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s) { - s->new_session=1; + if (s->new_session == 0) + { + s->new_session=1; + } return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); } -long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,char *parg) +int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s) + { + /* becomes true when negotiation is requested; + * false again once a handshake has finished */ + return (s->new_session != 0); + } + +long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg) { long l; @@ -693,14 +929,45 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,char *parg) l=s->read_ahead; s->read_ahead=larg; return(l); + + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: + s->msg_callback_arg = parg; + return 1; + case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: return(s->options|=larg); + case SSL_CTRL_MODE: + return(s->mode|=larg); + case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: + return(s->max_cert_list); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: + l=s->max_cert_list; + s->max_cert_list=larg; + return(l); default: return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg)); } } -long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,char *parg) +long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)()) + { + switch(cmd) + { + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: + s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); + return 1; + + default: + return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp)); + } + } + +struct lhash_st *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) + { + return ctx->sessions; + } + +long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg) { long l; @@ -712,6 +979,17 @@ long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,char *parg) l=ctx->read_ahead; ctx->read_ahead=larg; return(l); + + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: + ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg; + return 1; + + case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: + return(ctx->max_cert_list); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: + l=ctx->max_cert_list; + ctx->max_cert_list=larg; + return(l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: l=ctx->session_cache_size; @@ -752,12 +1030,27 @@ long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,char *parg) return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full); case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: return(ctx->options|=larg); + case SSL_CTRL_MODE: + return(ctx->mode|=larg); default: return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg)); } } -int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(SSL_CIPHER *a,SSL_CIPHER *b) +long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)()) + { + switch(cmd) + { + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: + ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); + return 1; + + default: + return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp)); + } + } + +int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b) { long l; @@ -768,7 +1061,8 @@ int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(SSL_CIPHER *a,SSL_CIPHER *b) return((l > 0)?1:-1); } -int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(SSL_CIPHER **ap,SSL_CIPHER **bp) +int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER * const *ap, + const SSL_CIPHER * const *bp) { long l; @@ -783,14 +1077,17 @@ int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(SSL_CIPHER **ap,SSL_CIPHER **bp) * preference */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(SSL *s) { - if ((s != NULL) && (s->cipher_list != NULL)) - { - return(s->cipher_list); - } - else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && - (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) + if (s != NULL) { - return(s->ctx->cipher_list); + if (s->cipher_list != NULL) + { + return(s->cipher_list); + } + else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && + (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) + { + return(s->ctx->cipher_list); + } } return(NULL); } @@ -799,14 +1096,17 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(SSL *s) * algorithm id */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s) { - if ((s != NULL) && (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) - { - return(s->cipher_list_by_id); - } - else if ((s != NULL) && (s->ctx != NULL) && - (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) + if (s != NULL) { - return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id); + if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) + { + return(s->cipher_list_by_id); + } + else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && + (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) + { + return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id); + } } return(NULL); } @@ -826,8 +1126,8 @@ const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(SSL *s,int n) return(c->name); } -/** specify the ciphers to be used by defaut by the SSL_CTX */ -int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,char *str) +/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */ +int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; @@ -838,7 +1138,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,char *str) } /** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */ -int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,char *str) +int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; @@ -889,6 +1189,9 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p) int i,j=0; SSL_CIPHER *c; unsigned char *q; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ if (sk == NULL) return(0); q=p; @@ -896,6 +1199,10 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p) for (i=0; ialgorithms & SSL_KRB5) && nokrb5) + continue; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ j=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p); p+=j; } @@ -916,7 +1223,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num, return(NULL); } if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) - sk=sk_SSL_CIPHER_new(NULL); /* change perhaps later */ + sk=sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */ else { sk= *skp; @@ -958,6 +1265,11 @@ unsigned long SSL_SESSION_hash(SSL_SESSION *a) return(l); } +/* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of + * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure + * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being + * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session + * with a matching session ID. */ int SSL_SESSION_cmp(SSL_SESSION *a,SSL_SESSION *b) { if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) @@ -967,6 +1279,13 @@ int SSL_SESSION_cmp(SSL_SESSION *a,SSL_SESSION *b) return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length)); } +/* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring + * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each + * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via + * ssl.h. */ +static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash, SSL_SESSION *) +static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp, SSL_SESSION *) + SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) { SSL_CTX *ret=NULL; @@ -982,7 +1301,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); goto err; } - ret=(SSL_CTX *)Malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX)); + ret=(SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX)); if (ret == NULL) goto err; @@ -999,9 +1318,10 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) /* We take the system default */ ret->session_timeout=meth->get_timeout(); - ret->new_session_cb=NULL; - ret->remove_session_cb=NULL; - ret->get_session_cb=NULL; + ret->new_session_cb=0; + ret->remove_session_cb=0; + ret->get_session_cb=0; + ret->generate_session_id=0; memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats)); @@ -1016,20 +1336,26 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) ret->info_callback=NULL; - ret->app_verify_callback=NULL; + ret->app_verify_callback=0; ret->app_verify_arg=NULL; + ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; ret->read_ahead=0; + ret->msg_callback=0; + ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL; ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE; ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */ + ret->sid_ctx_length=0; ret->default_verify_callback=NULL; if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) goto err; - ret->default_passwd_callback=NULL; - ret->client_cert_cb=NULL; + ret->default_passwd_callback=0; + ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL; + ret->client_cert_cb=0; - ret->sessions=lh_new(SSL_SESSION_hash,SSL_SESSION_cmp); + ret->sessions=lh_new(LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash), + LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp)); if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err; ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new(); if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err; @@ -1063,7 +1389,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; - CRYPTO_new_ex_data(ssl_ctx_meth,(char *)ret,&ret->ex_data); + CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data); ret->extra_certs=NULL; ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); @@ -1076,8 +1402,10 @@ err2: return(NULL); } +#if 0 static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp) - { Free(comp); } + { OPENSSL_free(comp); } +#endif void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) { @@ -1097,13 +1425,24 @@ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) abort(); /* ok */ } #endif - CRYPTO_free_ex_data(ssl_ctx_meth,(char *)a,&a->ex_data); + /* + * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference + * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed + * after the sessions were flushed. + * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache, + * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then + * free ex_data, then finally free the cache. + * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].) + */ if (a->sessions != NULL) - { SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0); + + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data); + + if (a->sessions != NULL) lh_free(a->sessions); - } + if (a->cert_store != NULL) X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store); if (a->cipher_list != NULL) @@ -1116,9 +1455,13 @@ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free); if (a->extra_certs != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free); +#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it removes a global database */ if (a->comp_methods != NULL) sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods,SSL_COMP_free); - Free((char *)a); +#else + a->comp_methods = NULL; +#endif + OPENSSL_free(a); } void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb) @@ -1126,7 +1469,12 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb) ctx->default_passwd_callback=cb; } -void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,int (*cb)(),char *arg) +void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx,void *u) + { + ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u; + } + +void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg) { ctx->app_verify_callback=cb; ctx->app_verify_arg=arg; @@ -1136,8 +1484,6 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) { ctx->verify_mode=mode; ctx->default_verify_callback=cb; - /* This needs cleaning up EAY EAY EAY */ - X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(ctx->cert_store,cb); } void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth) @@ -1152,19 +1498,23 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher) int rsa_enc_export,dh_rsa_export,dh_dsa_export; int rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp_export,kl; unsigned long mask,emask; + int have_ecc_cert, have_ecdh_tmp, ecdh_ok, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size; + X509 *x = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL; + int signature_nid = 0; if (c == NULL) return; kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher); -#ifndef NO_RSA +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA rsa_tmp=(c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL); rsa_tmp_export=(c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL || (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp)*8 <= kl)); #else rsa_tmp=rsa_tmp_export=0; #endif -#ifndef NO_DH +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL); dh_tmp_export=(c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL || (dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp)*8 <= kl)); @@ -1172,6 +1522,9 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher) dh_tmp=dh_tmp_export=0; #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + have_ecdh_tmp=(c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL); +#endif cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); rsa_enc= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); rsa_enc_export=(rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl); @@ -1186,7 +1539,8 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher) /* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */ dh_dsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); dh_dsa_export=(dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl); - + cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]); + have_ecc_cert= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); mask=0; emask=0; @@ -1226,7 +1580,7 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher) if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) { mask|=SSL_aRSA; - emask|=SSL_aRSA; + mask|=SSL_aRSA; } if (dsa_sign) @@ -1235,31 +1589,169 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher) emask|=SSL_aDSS; } -#ifdef SSL_ALLOW_ADH mask|=SSL_aNULL; emask|=SSL_aNULL; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + mask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5; + emask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5; #endif + /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or + * ECDSA cipher suites depending on the key usage extension. + */ + if (have_ecc_cert) + { + /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */ + x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509; + X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); + ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? + (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1; + ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? + (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1; + ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? + EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0; + EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey); + if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) + signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (ecdh_ok) + { + if ((signature_nid == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption) || + (signature_nid == NID_md4WithRSAEncryption) || + (signature_nid == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption)) + { + mask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aRSA; + if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) + emask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aRSA; + } + if (signature_nid == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1) + { + mask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aECDSA; + if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) + emask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aECDSA; + } + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA + if (ecdsa_ok) + { + mask|=SSL_aECDSA; + emask|=SSL_aECDSA; + } +#endif + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (have_ecdh_tmp) + { + mask|=SSL_kECDHE; + emask|=SSL_kECDHE; + } +#endif c->mask=mask; c->export_mask=emask; c->valid=1; } +/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */ +#define ku_reject(x, usage) \ + (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) + +int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHER *cs) + { + unsigned long alg = cs->algorithms; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + int keysize = 0; + int signature_nid = 0; + + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs)) + { + /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */ + pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + if (pkey == NULL) return 0; + keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + if (keysize > 163) return 0; + } + + /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ + X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); + if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) + signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); + if (alg & SSL_kECDH) + { + /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */ + if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) + { + return 0; + } + if (alg & SSL_aECDSA) + { + /* signature alg must be ECDSA */ + if (signature_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1) + { + return 0; + } + } + if (alg & SSL_aRSA) + { + /* signature alg must be RSA */ + if ((signature_nid != NID_md5WithRSAEncryption) && + (signature_nid != NID_md4WithRSAEncryption) && + (signature_nid != NID_md2WithRSAEncryption)) + { + return 0; + } + } + } + else if (alg & SSL_aECDSA) + { + /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */ + if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) + { + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; /* all checks are ok */ + } + /* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */ X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s) { unsigned long alg,mask,kalg; CERT *c; - int i,export; + int i,is_export; c=s->cert; ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); alg=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; - export=SSL_IS_EXPORT(alg); - mask=export?c->export_mask:c->mask; + is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); + mask=is_export?c->export_mask:c->mask; kalg=alg&(SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK); - if (kalg & SSL_kDHr) + if (kalg & SSL_kECDH) + { + /* we don't need to look at SSL_kECDHE + * since no certificate is needed for + * anon ECDH and for authenticated + * ECDHE, the check for the auth + * algorithm will set i correctly + * NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC + * not an RSA cert but for ECDHE-RSA + * we need an RSA cert. Placing the + * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA + * checks ensures the correct cert is chosen. + */ + i=SSL_PKEY_ECC; + } + else if (kalg & SSL_aECDSA) + { + i=SSL_PKEY_ECC; + } + else if (kalg & SSL_kDHr) i=SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; else if (kalg & SSL_kDHd) i=SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; @@ -1272,12 +1764,18 @@ X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s) else i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; } + else if (kalg & SSL_aKRB5) + { + /* VRS something else here? */ + return(NULL); + } else /* if (kalg & SSL_aNULL) */ { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(NULL); } if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == NULL) return(NULL); + return(c->pkeys[i].x509); } @@ -1301,9 +1799,12 @@ EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,SSL_CIPHER *cipher) else return(NULL); } + else if ((alg & SSL_aECDSA) && + (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL)) + return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); else /* if (alg & SSL_aNULL) */ { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(NULL); } } @@ -1316,9 +1817,10 @@ void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode) * and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return; - if ((s->ctx->session_cache_mode & mode) - && (!s->hit) - && SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,s->session) + i=s->ctx->session_cache_mode; + if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit) + && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) + || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,s->session)) && (s->ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) { CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); @@ -1327,7 +1829,6 @@ void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode) } /* auto flush every 255 connections */ - i=s->ctx->session_cache_mode; if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) { @@ -1411,6 +1912,8 @@ int SSL_get_error(SSL *s,int i) reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); + else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) + return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); else return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */ } @@ -1429,6 +1932,8 @@ int SSL_get_error(SSL *s,int i) reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); + else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) + return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); else return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); } @@ -1508,7 +2013,7 @@ SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver) return(NULL); } -char *SSL_get_version(SSL *s) +const char *SSL_get_version(SSL *s) { if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) return("TLSv1"); @@ -1529,7 +2034,11 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) if ((ret=SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL) return(NULL); - + + ret->version = s->version; + ret->type = s->type; + ret->method = s->method; + if (s->session != NULL) { /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */ @@ -1542,11 +2051,16 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) * they should not both point to the same object, * and thus we can't use SSL_copy_session_id. */ + ret->method->ssl_free(ret); ret->method = s->method; ret->method->ssl_new(ret); if (s->cert != NULL) { + if (ret->cert != NULL) + { + ssl_cert_free(ret->cert); + } ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert); if (ret->cert == NULL) goto err; @@ -1556,18 +2070,23 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); } + ret->options=s->options; + ret->mode=s->mode; + SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret,SSL_get_max_cert_list(s)); SSL_set_read_ahead(ret,SSL_get_read_ahead(s)); + ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback; + ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg; SSL_set_verify(ret,SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s)); SSL_set_verify_depth(ret,SSL_get_verify_depth(s)); + ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id; SSL_set_info_callback(ret,SSL_get_info_callback(s)); ret->debug=s->debug; - ret->options=s->options; /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */ - if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(ssl_meth,&ret->ex_data,&s->ex_data)) + if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data)) goto err; /* setup rbio, and wbio */ @@ -1586,6 +2105,19 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) else ret->wbio=ret->rbio; } + ret->rwstate = s->rwstate; + ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake; + ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func; + ret->server = s->server; + ret->new_session = s->new_session; + ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown; + ret->shutdown=s->shutdown; + ret->state=s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, though */ + ret->rstate=s->rstate; + ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, ret->init_off */ + ret->hit=s->hit; + ret->purpose=s->purpose; + ret->trust=s->trust; /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) @@ -1614,11 +2146,6 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) } } - ret->shutdown=s->shutdown; - ret->state=s->state; - ret->handshake_func=s->handshake_func; - ret->server=s->server; - if (0) { err: @@ -1633,13 +2160,13 @@ void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s) if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx); - Free(s->enc_read_ctx); + OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx); s->enc_read_ctx=NULL; } if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx); - Free(s->enc_write_ctx); + OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx); s->enc_write_ctx=NULL; } if (s->expand != NULL) @@ -1679,6 +2206,20 @@ SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(SSL *s) return(NULL); } +const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) + { + if (s->compress != NULL) + return(s->compress->meth); + return(NULL); + } + +const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) + { + if (s->expand != NULL) + return(s->expand->meth); + return(NULL); + } + int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push) { BIO *bbio; @@ -1695,7 +2236,7 @@ int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push) if (s->bbio == s->wbio) s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); } - BIO_reset(bbio); + (void)BIO_reset(bbio); /* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */ if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio,1)) { @@ -1717,19 +2258,16 @@ int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push) void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) { - BIO *under; - if (s->bbio == NULL) return; if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { /* remove buffering */ - under=BIO_pop(s->wbio); - if (under != NULL) - s->wbio=under; - else - abort(); /* ok */ - } + s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); +#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */ + assert(s->wbio != NULL); +#endif + } BIO_free(s->bbio); s->bbio=NULL; } @@ -1774,7 +2312,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl) return(ssl->ctx); } -#ifndef NO_STDIO +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store)); @@ -1787,14 +2325,15 @@ int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, } #endif -void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,void (*cb)()) +void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, + void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)) { ssl->info_callback=cb; } -void (*SSL_get_info_callback(SSL *ssl))(void) +void (*SSL_get_info_callback(SSL *ssl))(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val) { - return((void (*)())ssl->info_callback); + return ssl->info_callback; } int SSL_state(SSL *ssl) @@ -1812,12 +2351,11 @@ long SSL_get_verify_result(SSL *ssl) return(ssl->verify_result); } -int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,char *argp,int (*new_func)(), - int (*dup_func)(),void (*free_func)()) +int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { - ssl_meth_num++; - return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(ssl_meth_num-1, - &ssl_meth,argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func)); + return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp, + new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg) @@ -1830,12 +2368,11 @@ void *SSL_get_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx) return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); } -int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,char *argp,int (*new_func)(), - int (*dup_func)(),void (*free_func)()) +int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { - ssl_ctx_meth_num++; - return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(ssl_ctx_meth_num-1, - &ssl_ctx_meth,argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func)); + return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp, + new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg) @@ -1876,30 +2413,34 @@ int SSL_want(SSL *s) * \param cb the callback */ -#ifndef NO_RSA -void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,int export, +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, + int is_export, int keylength)) - { SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,0,(char *)cb); } -#endif + { + SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)())cb); + } -#ifndef NO_RSA -void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,int export, - int keylength)) - { SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,0,(char *)cb); } +void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, + int is_export, + int keylength)) + { + SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)())cb); + } #endif #ifdef DOXYGEN /*! * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function. * \param ssl the SSL session. - * \param export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite. - * \param keylength if \c export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size of - * the required key in bits. + * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite. + * \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size + * of the required key in bits. * \return the temporary RSA key. * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback */ -RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int export,int keylength) +RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keylength) {} #endif @@ -1909,17 +2450,47 @@ RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int export,int keylength) * \param dh the callback */ -#ifndef NO_DH -void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int export, +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)) - { SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,0,(char *)dh); } + { + SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)())dh); + } -void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int export, +void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, + int keylength)) + { + SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)())dh); + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH +void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)) - { SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,0,(char *)dh); } + { + SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)())ecdh); + } + +void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, + int keylength)) + { + SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)())ecdh); + } #endif -#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(WIN16) + +void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) + { + SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)())cb); + } +void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) + { + SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)())cb); + } + + + +#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) #include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c" #endif