X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fssl_lib.c;h=36d53ee329b32acc57a960c12c8a30bfd723c6e5;hp=ed2b820984e44ca55049628bb3d5817f5271170e;hb=076944d9204222458eac5d90b9743a296ff9d0c5;hpb=924046ce75ae5d5ee763f7cff77854bb493814c0 diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c index ed2b820984..36d53ee329 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -57,35 +57,125 @@ * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. + * + * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by + * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license. + * + * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of + * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites + * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. + * + * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in + * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received + * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. + * + * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not + * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third + * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights + * to make use of the Contribution. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN + * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA + * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY + * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR + * OTHERWISE. + */ - -#include +#ifdef REF_CHECK +# include +#endif #include +#include "ssl_locl.h" +#include "kssl_lcl.h" #include #include #include -#include "ssl_locl.h" +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +#include +#endif const char *SSL_version_str=OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT; -static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *ssl_meth=NULL; -static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *ssl_ctx_meth=NULL; -static int ssl_meth_num=0; -static int ssl_ctx_meth_num=0; - -OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={ +SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={ /* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */ (int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function, - (int (*)(SSL *, EVP_MD_CTX *, EVP_MD_CTX *, const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function + (int (*)(SSL *, EVP_MD_CTX *, EVP_MD_CTX *, const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function, + 0, /* finish_mac_length */ + (int (*)(SSL *, EVP_MD_CTX *, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function, + NULL, /* client_finished_label */ + 0, /* client_finished_label_len */ + NULL, /* server_finished_label */ + 0, /* server_finished_label_len */ + (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function }; int SSL_clear(SSL *s) { - int state; if (s->method == NULL) { @@ -93,6 +183,12 @@ int SSL_clear(SSL *s) return(0); } + if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) + { + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session=NULL; + } + s->error=0; s->hit=0; s->shutdown=0; @@ -105,12 +201,11 @@ int SSL_clear(SSL *s) #else if (s->new_session) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } #endif - state=s->state; /* Keep to check if we throw away the session-id */ s->type=0; s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT); @@ -131,18 +226,12 @@ int SSL_clear(SSL *s) ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); - if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) - { - SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); - s->session=NULL; - } - s->first_packet=0; #if 1 /* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if * so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */ - if ((s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) + if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) { s->method->ssl_free(s); s->method=s->ctx->method; @@ -156,7 +245,7 @@ int SSL_clear(SSL *s) } /** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */ -int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_METHOD *meth) +int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,const SSL_METHOD *meth) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; @@ -191,6 +280,14 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) if (s == NULL) goto err; memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL)); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + + s->options=ctx->options; + s->mode=ctx->mode; + s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list; + if (ctx->cert != NULL) { /* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to @@ -209,15 +306,37 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) } else s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */ - s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length; - memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); + + s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead; + s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback; + s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg; s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode; +#if 0 s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth; +#endif + s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length; + OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx); + memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback; + s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id; + + s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); + if (!s->param) + goto err; + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param); +#if 0 s->purpose = ctx->purpose; s->trust = ctx->trust; +#endif + s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown; + s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; + CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); s->ctx=ctx; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + s->initial_ctx=ctx; +#endif s->verify_result=X509_V_OK; @@ -226,15 +345,17 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) goto err; - s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown; s->references=1; s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1; - s->options=ctx->options; - s->mode=ctx->mode; - s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead; /* used to happen in SSL_clear */ + SSL_clear(s); - CRYPTO_new_ex_data(ssl_meth,s,&s->ex_data); + CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + s->psk_client_callback=ctx->psk_client_callback; + s->psk_server_callback=ctx->psk_server_callback; +#endif return(s); err: @@ -253,7 +374,7 @@ err: int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { - if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) + if(sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; @@ -278,45 +399,75 @@ int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, return 1; } -int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) -{ - if(X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_PURPOSE, SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE); - return 0; +int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) + { + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + ctx->generate_session_id = cb; + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + return 1; } - s->purpose = purpose; + +int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) + { + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); + ssl->generate_session_id = cb; + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); return 1; -} + } -int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose) -{ - if(X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PURPOSE, SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE); +int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, + unsigned int id_len) + { + /* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how + * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to + * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with + * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in + * use by this SSL. */ + SSL_SESSION r, *p; + + if(id_len > sizeof r.session_id) return 0; + + r.ssl_version = ssl->version; + r.session_id_length = id_len; + memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); + /* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a + * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it + * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be + * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */ + if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) && + (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) + { + memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0, + SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len); + r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } + + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + p = (SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r); + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + return (p != NULL); } - s->purpose = purpose; - return 1; -} - + +int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) + { + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); + } + +int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose) + { + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); + } + int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust) -{ - if(X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust) == -1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TRUST, SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST); - return 0; + { + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); } - s->trust = trust; - return 1; -} int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust) -{ - if(X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust) == -1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TRUST, SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST); - return 0; + { + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); } - s->trust = trust; - return 1; -} void SSL_free(SSL *s) { @@ -338,7 +489,10 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s) } #endif - CRYPTO_free_ex_data(ssl_meth,(char *)s,&s->ex_data); + if (s->param) + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param); + + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); if (s->bbio != NULL) { @@ -374,12 +528,24 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s) /* Free up if allocated */ if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); + if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif if (s->client_CA != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free); if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL) + kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + OPENSSL_free(s); } @@ -403,13 +569,18 @@ void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio) s->wbio=wbio; } -BIO *SSL_get_rbio(SSL *s) +BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s) { return(s->rbio); } -BIO *SSL_get_wbio(SSL *s) +BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s) { return(s->wbio); } -int SSL_get_fd(SSL *s) +int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s) + { + return(SSL_get_rfd(s)); + } + +int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s) { int ret= -1; BIO *b,*r; @@ -421,7 +592,19 @@ int SSL_get_fd(SSL *s) return(ret); } -#ifndef NO_SOCK +int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s) + { + int ret= -1; + BIO *b,*r; + + b=SSL_get_wbio(s); + r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); + if (r != NULL) + BIO_get_fd(r,&ret); + return(ret); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd) { int ret=0; @@ -491,7 +674,7 @@ err: /* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */ -size_t SSL_get_finished(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) +size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { size_t ret = 0; @@ -506,7 +689,7 @@ size_t SSL_get_finished(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) } /* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */ -size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) +size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { size_t ret = 0; @@ -521,32 +704,32 @@ size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) } -int SSL_get_verify_mode(SSL *s) +int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s) { return(s->verify_mode); } -int SSL_get_verify_depth(SSL *s) +int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s) { - return(s->verify_depth); + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param); } -int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *) +int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *) { return(s->verify_callback); } -int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx) +int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(ctx->verify_mode); } -int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx) +int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { - return(ctx->verify_depth); + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param); } -int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *) +int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *) { return(ctx->default_verify_callback); } @@ -561,7 +744,7 @@ void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s,int mode, void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s,int depth) { - s->verify_depth=depth; + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth); } void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s,int yes) @@ -569,17 +752,24 @@ void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s,int yes) s->read_ahead=yes; } -int SSL_get_read_ahead(SSL *s) +int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s) { return(s->read_ahead); } -int SSL_pending(SSL *s) +int SSL_pending(const SSL *s) { + /* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled + * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), + * and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report + * errors that may be observed while scanning the new data. + * (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value, + * so we'd better not return -1.) + */ return(s->method->ssl_pending(s)); } -X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(SSL *s) +X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s) { X509 *r; @@ -595,7 +785,7 @@ X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(SSL *s) return(r); } -STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(SSL *s) +STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s) { STACK_OF(X509) *r; @@ -612,7 +802,7 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(SSL *s) /* Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to * modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled */ -void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t,SSL *f) +void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t,const SSL *f) { CERT *tmp; @@ -641,7 +831,7 @@ void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t,SSL *f) } /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ -int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(SSL_CTX *ctx) +int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if ( (ctx == NULL) || (ctx->cert == NULL) || @@ -659,7 +849,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(SSL_CTX *ctx) } /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ -int SSL_check_private_key(SSL *ssl) +int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) { if (ssl == NULL) { @@ -703,12 +893,12 @@ int SSL_connect(SSL *s) return(s->method->ssl_connect(s)); } -long SSL_get_default_timeout(SSL *s) +long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s) { return(s->method->get_timeout()); } -int SSL_read(SSL *s,char *buf,int num) +int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { @@ -724,8 +914,14 @@ int SSL_read(SSL *s,char *buf,int num) return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num)); } -int SSL_peek(SSL *s,char *buf,int num) +int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num) { + if (s->handshake_func == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); + return -1; + } + if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { return(0); @@ -733,7 +929,7 @@ int SSL_peek(SSL *s,char *buf,int num) return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num)); } -int SSL_write(SSL *s,const char *buf,int num) +int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { @@ -772,11 +968,21 @@ int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s) { - s->new_session=1; + if (s->new_session == 0) + { + s->new_session=1; + } return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); } -long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,char *parg) +int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s) + { + /* becomes true when negotiation is requested; + * false again once a handshake has finished */ + return (s->new_session != 0); + } + +long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg) { long l; @@ -788,19 +994,46 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,char *parg) l=s->read_ahead; s->read_ahead=larg; return(l); + + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: + s->msg_callback_arg = parg; + return 1; + case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: return(s->options|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return(s->mode|=larg); + case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: + return(s->max_cert_list); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: + l=s->max_cert_list; + s->max_cert_list=larg; + return(l); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU: + if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) + { + s->d1->mtu = larg; + return larg; + } + return 0; + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: + if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) + return 0; + s->max_send_fragment = larg; + return 1; default: return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg)); } } -long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)()) +long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) { switch(cmd) { + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: + s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); + return 1; + default: return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp)); } @@ -811,7 +1044,7 @@ struct lhash_st *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) return ctx->sessions; } -long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,char *parg) +long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg) { long l; @@ -823,6 +1056,17 @@ long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,char *parg) l=ctx->read_ahead; ctx->read_ahead=larg; return(l); + + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: + ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg; + return 1; + + case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: + return(ctx->max_cert_list); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: + l=ctx->max_cert_list; + ctx->max_cert_list=larg; + return(l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: l=ctx->session_cache_size; @@ -865,15 +1109,24 @@ long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,char *parg) return(ctx->options|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return(ctx->mode|=larg); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: + if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) + return 0; + ctx->max_send_fragment = larg; + return 1; default: return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg)); } } -long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)()) +long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) { switch(cmd) { + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: + ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); + return 1; + default: return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp)); } @@ -904,16 +1157,19 @@ int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER * const *ap, /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * preference */ -STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(SSL *s) +STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s) { - if ((s != NULL) && (s->cipher_list != NULL)) - { - return(s->cipher_list); - } - else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && - (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) + if (s != NULL) { - return(s->ctx->cipher_list); + if (s->cipher_list != NULL) + { + return(s->cipher_list); + } + else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && + (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) + { + return(s->ctx->cipher_list); + } } return(NULL); } @@ -922,20 +1178,23 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(SSL *s) * algorithm id */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s) { - if ((s != NULL) && (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) - { - return(s->cipher_list_by_id); - } - else if ((s != NULL) && (s->ctx != NULL) && - (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) + if (s != NULL) { - return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id); + if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) + { + return(s->cipher_list_by_id); + } + else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && + (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) + { + return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id); + } } return(NULL); } /** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */ -const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(SSL *s,int n) +const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s,int n) { SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; @@ -956,8 +1215,21 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str); -/* XXXX */ - return((sk == NULL)?0:1); + /* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it + * was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string + * (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which + * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as + * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence + * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been + * updated. */ + if (sk == NULL) + return 0; + else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); + return 0; + } + return 1; } /** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */ @@ -967,12 +1239,19 @@ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str) sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list, &s->cipher_list_by_id,str); -/* XXXX */ - return((sk == NULL)?0:1); + /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */ + if (sk == NULL) + return 0; + else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); + return 0; + } + return 1; } /* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */ -char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(SSL *s,char *buf,int len) +char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len) { char *p; const char *cp; @@ -1007,11 +1286,15 @@ char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(SSL *s,char *buf,int len) return(buf); } -int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p) +int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p, + int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *)) { int i,j=0; SSL_CIPHER *c; unsigned char *q; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ if (sk == NULL) return(0); q=p; @@ -1019,7 +1302,16 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p) for (i=0; ialgorithms & SSL_KRB5) && nokrb5) + continue; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ + if ((c->algorithms & SSL_PSK) && s->psk_client_callback == NULL) + continue; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ + j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p); p+=j; } return(p-q); @@ -1069,7 +1361,31 @@ err: return(NULL); } -unsigned long SSL_SESSION_hash(SSL_SESSION *a) + +#ifndef OPENSSL_TLSEXT +/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL. + * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546). + */ + +const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) + { + if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) + return NULL; + + return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ? + s->session->tlsext_hostname : + s->tlsext_hostname; + } + +int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) + { + if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname)) + return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; + return -1; + } +#endif + +unsigned long SSL_SESSION_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) { unsigned long l; @@ -1081,7 +1397,12 @@ unsigned long SSL_SESSION_hash(SSL_SESSION *a) return(l); } -int SSL_SESSION_cmp(SSL_SESSION *a,SSL_SESSION *b) +/* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of + * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure + * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being + * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session + * with a matching session ID. */ +int SSL_SESSION_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b) { if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) return(1); @@ -1090,7 +1411,14 @@ int SSL_SESSION_cmp(SSL_SESSION *a,SSL_SESSION *b) return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length)); } -SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) +/* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring + * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each + * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via + * ssl.h. */ +static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash, SSL_SESSION *) +static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp, SSL_SESSION *) + +SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) { SSL_CTX *ret=NULL; @@ -1122,9 +1450,10 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) /* We take the system default */ ret->session_timeout=meth->get_timeout(); - ret->new_session_cb=NULL; - ret->remove_session_cb=NULL; - ret->get_session_cb=NULL; + ret->new_session_cb=0; + ret->remove_session_cb=0; + ret->get_session_cb=0; + ret->generate_session_id=0; memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats)); @@ -1139,21 +1468,30 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) ret->info_callback=NULL; - ret->app_verify_callback=NULL; + ret->app_verify_callback=0; ret->app_verify_arg=NULL; + ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; ret->read_ahead=0; + ret->msg_callback=0; + ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL; ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE; +#if 0 ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */ +#endif + ret->sid_ctx_length=0; ret->default_verify_callback=NULL; if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) goto err; - ret->default_passwd_callback=NULL; + ret->default_passwd_callback=0; ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL; - ret->client_cert_cb=NULL; + ret->client_cert_cb=0; + ret->app_gen_cookie_cb=0; + ret->app_verify_cookie_cb=0; - ret->sessions=lh_new(SSL_SESSION_hash,SSL_SESSION_cmp); + ret->sessions=lh_new(LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash), + LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp)); if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err; ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new(); if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err; @@ -1168,6 +1506,10 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) goto err2; } + ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); + if (!ret->param) + goto err; + if ((ret->rsa_md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES); @@ -1187,11 +1529,22 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; - CRYPTO_new_ex_data(ssl_ctx_meth,(char *)ret,&ret->ex_data); + CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data); ret->extra_certs=NULL; ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); + ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0; + ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL; + ret->psk_client_callback=NULL; + ret->psk_server_callback=NULL; +#endif return(ret); err: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); @@ -1200,8 +1553,10 @@ err2: return(NULL); } +#if 0 static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp) { OPENSSL_free(comp); } +#endif void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) { @@ -1221,13 +1576,27 @@ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) abort(); /* ok */ } #endif - CRYPTO_free_ex_data(ssl_ctx_meth,(char *)a,&a->ex_data); + if (a->param) + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param); + + /* + * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference + * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed + * after the sessions were flushed. + * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache, + * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then + * free ex_data, then finally free the cache. + * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].) + */ if (a->sessions != NULL) - { SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0); + + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data); + + if (a->sessions != NULL) lh_free(a->sessions); - } + if (a->cert_store != NULL) X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store); if (a->cipher_list != NULL) @@ -1240,8 +1609,17 @@ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free); if (a->extra_certs != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free); +#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it removes a global database */ if (a->comp_methods != NULL) sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods,SSL_COMP_free); +#else + a->comp_methods = NULL; +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if (a->psk_identity_hint) + OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint); +#endif OPENSSL_free(a); } @@ -1255,28 +1633,21 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx,void *u) ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u; } -void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,int (*cb)(),char *arg) +void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg) { - /* now - * int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *), - * but should be - * int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *, void *arg) - */ ctx->app_verify_callback=cb; - ctx->app_verify_arg=arg; /* never used */ + ctx->app_verify_arg=arg; } void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) { ctx->verify_mode=mode; ctx->default_verify_callback=cb; - /* This needs cleaning up EAY EAY EAY */ - X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(ctx->cert_store,cb); } void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth) { - ctx->verify_depth=depth; + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); } void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher) @@ -1286,19 +1657,26 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher) int rsa_enc_export,dh_rsa_export,dh_dsa_export; int rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp_export,kl; unsigned long mask,emask; + int have_ecc_cert, ecdh_ok, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + int have_ecdh_tmp; +#endif + X509 *x = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL; + int signature_nid = 0; if (c == NULL) return; kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher); -#ifndef NO_RSA +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA rsa_tmp=(c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL); rsa_tmp_export=(c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL || (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp)*8 <= kl)); #else rsa_tmp=rsa_tmp_export=0; #endif -#ifndef NO_DH +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL); dh_tmp_export=(c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL || (dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp)*8 <= kl)); @@ -1306,6 +1684,9 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher) dh_tmp=dh_tmp_export=0; #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + have_ecdh_tmp=(c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL); +#endif cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); rsa_enc= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); rsa_enc_export=(rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl); @@ -1320,13 +1701,14 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher) /* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */ dh_dsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); dh_dsa_export=(dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl); - + cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]); + have_ecc_cert= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); mask=0; emask=0; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG - printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n", - rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp, + printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n", + rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,ecdh_tmp, rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa); #endif @@ -1372,11 +1754,147 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher) mask|=SSL_aNULL; emask|=SSL_aNULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + mask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5; + emask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5; +#endif + + /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or + * ECDSA cipher suites depending on the key usage extension. + */ + if (have_ecc_cert) + { + /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */ + x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509; + X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); + ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? + (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1; + ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? + (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1; + ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? + EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0; + EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey); + if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) + signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (ecdh_ok) + { + const char *sig = OBJ_nid2ln(signature_nid); + if (sig == NULL) + { + ERR_clear_error(); + sig = "unknown"; + } + + if (strstr(sig, "WithRSA")) + { + mask|=SSL_kECDHr|SSL_aECDH; + if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) + emask|=SSL_kECDHr|SSL_aECDH; + } + + if (signature_nid == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1) + { + mask|=SSL_kECDHe|SSL_aECDH; + if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) + emask|=SSL_kECDHe|SSL_aECDH; + } + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA + if (ecdsa_ok) + { + mask|=SSL_aECDSA; + emask|=SSL_aECDSA; + } +#endif + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (have_ecdh_tmp) + { + mask|=SSL_kEECDH; + emask|=SSL_kEECDH; + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + mask |= SSL_kPSK | SSL_aPSK; + emask |= SSL_kPSK | SSL_aPSK; +#endif + c->mask=mask; c->export_mask=emask; c->valid=1; } +/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */ +#define ku_reject(x, usage) \ + (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) + +int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHER *cs) + { + unsigned long alg = cs->algorithms; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + int keysize = 0; + int signature_nid = 0; + + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs)) + { + /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */ + pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + if (pkey == NULL) return 0; + keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + if (keysize > 163) return 0; + } + + /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ + X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); + if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) + signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); + if (alg & SSL_kECDHe || alg & SSL_kECDHr) + { + /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */ + if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) + { + return 0; + } + if (alg & SSL_kECDHe) + { + /* signature alg must be ECDSA */ + if (signature_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1) + { + return 0; + } + } + if (alg & SSL_kECDHr) + { + /* signature alg must be RSA */ + + const char *sig = OBJ_nid2ln(signature_nid); + if (sig == NULL) + { + ERR_clear_error(); + sig = "unknown"; + } + if (strstr(sig, "WithRSA") == NULL) + return 0; + } + } + if (alg & SSL_aECDSA) + { + /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */ + if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) + { + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; /* all checks are ok */ + } + /* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */ X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s) { @@ -1391,7 +1909,26 @@ X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s) mask=is_export?c->export_mask:c->mask; kalg=alg&(SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK); - if (kalg & SSL_kDHr) + if (kalg & SSL_kECDH) + { + /* we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH + * since no certificate is needed for + * anon ECDH and for authenticated + * EECDH, the check for the auth + * algorithm will set i correctly + * NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC + * not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA + * we need an RSA cert. Placing the + * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA + * checks ensures the correct cert is chosen. + */ + i=SSL_PKEY_ECC; + } + else if (kalg & SSL_aECDSA) + { + i=SSL_PKEY_ECC; + } + else if (kalg & SSL_kDHr) i=SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; else if (kalg & SSL_kDHd) i=SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; @@ -1404,12 +1941,18 @@ X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s) else i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; } + else if (kalg & SSL_aKRB5) + { + /* VRS something else here? */ + return(NULL); + } else /* if (kalg & SSL_aNULL) */ { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(NULL); } if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == NULL) return(NULL); + return(c->pkeys[i].x509); } @@ -1433,9 +1976,12 @@ EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,SSL_CIPHER *cipher) else return(NULL); } + else if ((alg & SSL_aECDSA) && + (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL)) + return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); else /* if (alg & SSL_aNULL) */ { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(NULL); } } @@ -1448,36 +1994,36 @@ void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode) * and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return; - if ((s->ctx->session_cache_mode & mode) - && (!s->hit) - && SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,s->session) - && (s->ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) + i=s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; + if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit) + && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) + || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,s->session)) + && (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) { CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); - if (!s->ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session)) + if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session)) SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); } /* auto flush every 255 connections */ - i=s->ctx->session_cache_mode; if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) { if ( (((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) - ?s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good - :s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) + ?s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good + :s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) { - SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->ctx,time(NULL)); + SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL)); } } } -SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s) +const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s) { return(s->method); } -int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s,SSL_METHOD *meth) +int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth) { int conn= -1; int ret=1; @@ -1504,7 +2050,7 @@ int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s,SSL_METHOD *meth) return(ret); } -int SSL_get_error(SSL *s,int i) +int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int i) { int reason; unsigned long l; @@ -1638,13 +2184,25 @@ int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s) return(0); } +int ssl_undefined_void_function(void) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return(0); + } + +int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return(0); + } + SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return(NULL); } -const char *SSL_get_version(SSL *s) +const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) { if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) return("TLSv1"); @@ -1665,7 +2223,11 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) if ((ret=SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL) return(NULL); - + + ret->version = s->version; + ret->type = s->type; + ret->method = s->method; + if (s->session != NULL) { /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */ @@ -1678,11 +2240,16 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) * they should not both point to the same object, * and thus we can't use SSL_copy_session_id. */ + ret->method->ssl_free(ret); ret->method = s->method; ret->method->ssl_new(ret); if (s->cert != NULL) { + if (ret->cert != NULL) + { + ssl_cert_free(ret->cert); + } ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert); if (ret->cert == NULL) goto err; @@ -1692,18 +2259,23 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); } + ret->options=s->options; + ret->mode=s->mode; + SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret,SSL_get_max_cert_list(s)); SSL_set_read_ahead(ret,SSL_get_read_ahead(s)); + ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback; + ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg; SSL_set_verify(ret,SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s)); SSL_set_verify_depth(ret,SSL_get_verify_depth(s)); + ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id; SSL_set_info_callback(ret,SSL_get_info_callback(s)); ret->debug=s->debug; - ret->options=s->options; /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */ - if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(ssl_meth,&ret->ex_data,&s->ex_data)) + if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data)) goto err; /* setup rbio, and wbio */ @@ -1722,6 +2294,19 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) else ret->wbio=ret->rbio; } + ret->rwstate = s->rwstate; + ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake; + ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func; + ret->server = s->server; + ret->new_session = s->new_session; + ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown; + ret->shutdown=s->shutdown; + ret->state=s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, though */ + ret->rstate=s->rstate; + ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, ret->init_off */ + ret->hit=s->hit; + + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param); /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) @@ -1750,11 +2335,6 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) } } - ret->shutdown=s->shutdown; - ret->state=s->state; - ret->handshake_func=s->handshake_func; - ret->server=s->server; - if (0) { err: @@ -1778,6 +2358,7 @@ void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s) OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx); s->enc_write_ctx=NULL; } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (s->expand != NULL) { COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); @@ -1788,10 +2369,11 @@ void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s) COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); s->compress=NULL; } +#endif } /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ -X509 *SSL_get_certificate(SSL *s) +X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) return(s->cert->key->x509); @@ -1808,12 +2390,37 @@ EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *s) return(NULL); } -SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(SSL *s) +SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s) { if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) return(s->session->cipher); return(NULL); } +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP +const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) + { + return NULL; + } +const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) + { + return NULL; + } +#else + +const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) + { + if (s->compress != NULL) + return(s->compress->meth); + return(NULL); + } + +const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) + { + if (s->expand != NULL) + return(s->expand->meth); + return(NULL); + } +#endif int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push) { @@ -1872,7 +2479,7 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode) ctx->quiet_shutdown=mode; } -int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx) +int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(ctx->quiet_shutdown); } @@ -1882,7 +2489,7 @@ void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode) s->quiet_shutdown=mode; } -int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s) +int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return(s->quiet_shutdown); } @@ -1892,22 +2499,38 @@ void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode) s->shutdown=mode; } -int SSL_get_shutdown(SSL *s) +int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return(s->shutdown); } -int SSL_version(SSL *s) +int SSL_version(const SSL *s) { return(s->version); } -SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl) +SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) { return(ssl->ctx); } -#ifndef NO_STDIO +SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx) + { + if (ssl->ctx == ctx) + return ssl->ctx; + if (ctx == NULL) + ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; + if (ssl->cert != NULL) + ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert); + ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); + CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + if (ssl->ctx != NULL) + SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ + ssl->ctx = ctx; + return(ssl->ctx); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store)); @@ -1920,17 +2543,20 @@ int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, } #endif -void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,void (*cb)()) +void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, + void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)) { ssl->info_callback=cb; } -void (*SSL_get_info_callback(SSL *ssl))(void) +/* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned + function pointer. */ +void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/) { - return((void (*)())ssl->info_callback); + return ssl->info_callback; } -int SSL_state(SSL *ssl) +int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) { return(ssl->state); } @@ -1940,7 +2566,7 @@ void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long arg) ssl->verify_result=arg; } -long SSL_get_verify_result(SSL *ssl) +long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) { return(ssl->verify_result); } @@ -1948,9 +2574,8 @@ long SSL_get_verify_result(SSL *ssl) int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { - ssl_meth_num++; - return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(ssl_meth_num-1, - &ssl_meth,argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func)); + return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp, + new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg) @@ -1958,7 +2583,7 @@ int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg) return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg)); } -void *SSL_get_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx) +void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s,int idx) { return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); } @@ -1966,9 +2591,8 @@ void *SSL_get_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx) int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { - ssl_ctx_meth_num++; - return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(ssl_ctx_meth_num-1, - &ssl_ctx_meth,argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func)); + return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp, + new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg) @@ -1976,7 +2600,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg) return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg)); } -void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx) +void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s,int idx) { return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); } @@ -1986,7 +2610,7 @@ int ssl_ok(SSL *s) return(1); } -X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx) +X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(ctx->cert_store); } @@ -1998,7 +2622,7 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509_STORE *store) ctx->cert_store=store; } -int SSL_want(SSL *s) +int SSL_want(const SSL *s) { return(s->rwstate); } @@ -2009,19 +2633,19 @@ int SSL_want(SSL *s) * \param cb the callback */ -#ifndef NO_RSA +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { - SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)())cb); + SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { - SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)())cb); + SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb); } #endif @@ -2046,21 +2670,108 @@ RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keylength) * \param dh the callback */ -#ifndef NO_DH +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)) - { - SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)())dh); - } + { + SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh); + } void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)) - { - SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)())dh); - } + { + SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh); + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH +void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, + int keylength)) + { + SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh); + } + +void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, + int keylength)) + { + SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh); + } #endif -#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(WIN16) +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK +int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) + { + if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + return 0; + } + if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint); + if (identity_hint != NULL) + { + ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); + if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) + return 0; + } + else + ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL; + return 1; + } + +int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint) + { + if (s == NULL) + return 0; + + if (s->session == NULL) + return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */ + + if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + return 0; + } + if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); + if (identity_hint != NULL) + { + s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); + if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) + return 0; + } + else + s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; + return 1; + } + +const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s) + { + if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) + return NULL; + return(s->session->psk_identity_hint); + } + +const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s) + { + if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) + return NULL; + return(s->session->psk_identity); + } +#endif + +void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) + { + SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); + } +void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) + { + SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); + } + + + +#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) #include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c" #endif