X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fssl_cert.c;h=967f004bb068185330ec872801afb0ba4788537c;hp=04a4a36d7713b67e0d47ba4ad30525737a6f4fd1;hb=HEAD;hpb=f0e0fd51fd8307f6eae64862ad9aaea113f1177a diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c index 04a4a36d77..f11eb75827 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c @@ -1,173 +1,88 @@ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). +/* + * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by - * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include +#include -#include "e_os.h" -#ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H -# include -#endif - +#include "internal/nelem.h" #include "internal/o_dir.h" -#include #include #include +#include #include #include #include -#include "internal/threads.h" -#include "ssl_locl.h" +#include +#include "internal/refcount.h" +#include "ssl_local.h" +#include "ssl_cert_table.h" +#include "internal/thread_once.h" +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO +# include +# ifdef _WIN32 +# define stat _stat +# endif +# ifndef S_ISDIR +# define S_ISDIR(a) (((a) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR) +# endif +#endif + -static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, - int bits, int nid, void *other, +static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, + int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex); static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_x509_store_ctx_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1; -static void ssl_x509_store_ctx_init(void) +DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ssl_x509_store_ctx_init) { ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, - "SSL for verify callback", - NULL, NULL, NULL); + "SSL for verify callback", + NULL, NULL, NULL); + return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx >= 0; } int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) { - CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(&ssl_x509_store_ctx_once, ssl_x509_store_ctx_init); + if (!RUN_ONCE(&ssl_x509_store_ctx_once, ssl_x509_store_ctx_init)) + return -1; return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx; } -CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) +CERT *ssl_cert_new(size_t ssl_pkey_num) { - CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); + CERT *ret = NULL; - if (ret == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + /* Should never happen */ + if (!ossl_assert(ssl_pkey_num >= SSL_PKEY_NUM)) + return NULL; + + ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); + if (ret == NULL) + return NULL; + + ret->ssl_pkey_num = ssl_pkey_num; + ret->pkeys = OPENSSL_zalloc(ret->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(CERT_PKEY)); + if (ret->pkeys == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } - ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); - ret->references = 1; + ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA]); ret->sec_cb = ssl_security_default_callback; ret->sec_level = OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL; ret->sec_ex = NULL; - ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); - if (ret->lock == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + if (!CRYPTO_NEW_REF(&ret->references, 1)) { + OPENSSL_free(ret->pkeys); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } @@ -178,34 +93,40 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) { CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); - int i; + size_t i; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG + int j; +#endif - if (ret == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + if (ret == NULL) + return NULL; + + ret->ssl_pkey_num = cert->ssl_pkey_num; + ret->pkeys = OPENSSL_zalloc(ret->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(CERT_PKEY)); + if (ret->pkeys == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } - ret->references = 1; ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - cert->pkeys]; - ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); - if (ret->lock == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + if (!CRYPTO_NEW_REF(&ret->references, 1)) { + OPENSSL_free(ret->pkeys); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) { ret->dh_tmp = cert->dh_tmp; EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ret->dh_tmp); } + ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb; ret->dh_tmp_auto = cert->dh_tmp_auto; -#endif - for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < ret->ssl_pkey_num; i++) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i; CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i; + if (cpk->x509 != NULL) { rpk->x509 = cpk->x509; X509_up_ref(rpk->x509); @@ -219,54 +140,56 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) if (cpk->chain) { rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain); if (!rpk->chain) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB); goto err; } } - if (cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo != NULL) { + if (cpk->serverinfo != NULL) { /* Just copy everything. */ - ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo = - OPENSSL_malloc(cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length); - if (ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rpk->serverinfo = OPENSSL_memdup(cpk->serverinfo, cpk->serverinfo_length); + if (rpk->serverinfo == NULL) goto err; + rpk->serverinfo_length = cpk->serverinfo_length; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG + for (j = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; j < TLSEXT_comp_cert_limit; j++) { + if (cpk->comp_cert[j] != NULL) { + if (!OSSL_COMP_CERT_up_ref(cpk->comp_cert[j])) + goto err; + rpk->comp_cert[j] = cpk->comp_cert[j]; } - ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length = - cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length; - memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo, - cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo, - cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length); } +#endif } /* Configured sigalgs copied across */ if (cert->conf_sigalgs) { - ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen); + ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen + * sizeof(*cert->conf_sigalgs)); if (ret->conf_sigalgs == NULL) goto err; - memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgslen); + memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs, + cert->conf_sigalgslen * sizeof(*cert->conf_sigalgs)); ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen; } else ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL; if (cert->client_sigalgs) { - ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen); + ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen + * sizeof(*cert->client_sigalgs)); if (ret->client_sigalgs == NULL) goto err; memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs, - cert->client_sigalgslen); + cert->client_sigalgslen * sizeof(*cert->client_sigalgs)); ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen; } else ret->client_sigalgs = NULL; - /* Shared sigalgs also NULL */ - ret->shared_sigalgs = NULL; /* Copy any custom client certificate types */ - if (cert->ctypes) { - ret->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->ctype_num); - if (ret->ctypes == NULL) + if (cert->ctype) { + ret->ctype = OPENSSL_memdup(cert->ctype, cert->ctype_len); + if (ret->ctype == NULL) goto err; - memcpy(ret->ctypes, cert->ctypes, cert->ctype_num); - ret->ctype_num = cert->ctype_num; + ret->ctype_len = cert->ctype_len; } ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags; @@ -288,9 +211,7 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) ret->sec_level = cert->sec_level; ret->sec_ex = cert->sec_ex; - if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->cli_ext, &cert->cli_ext)) - goto err; - if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->srv_ext, &cert->srv_ext)) + if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->custext, &cert->custext)) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (cert->psk_identity_hint) { @@ -311,20 +232,31 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c) { - int i; + size_t i; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG + int j; +#endif + if (c == NULL) return; - for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < c->ssl_pkey_num; i++) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; X509_free(cpk->x509); cpk->x509 = NULL; EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey); cpk->privatekey = NULL; - sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); + OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(cpk->chain); cpk->chain = NULL; OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo); cpk->serverinfo = NULL; cpk->serverinfo_length = 0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG + for (j = 0; j < TLSEXT_comp_cert_limit; j++) { + OSSL_COMP_CERT_free(cpk->comp_cert[j]); + cpk->comp_cert[j] = NULL; + cpk->cert_comp_used = 0; + } +#endif } } @@ -334,75 +266,76 @@ void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) if (c == NULL) return; - - CRYPTO_atomic_add(&c->references, -1, &i, c->lock); + CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&c->references, &i); REF_PRINT_COUNT("CERT", c); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY_free(c->dh_tmp); -#endif ssl_cert_clear_certs(c); OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); - OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); - OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes); + OPENSSL_free(c->ctype); X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store); X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store); - custom_exts_free(&c->cli_ext); - custom_exts_free(&c->srv_ext); + custom_exts_free(&c->custext); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPENSSL_free(c->psk_identity_hint); #endif - CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(c->lock); + OPENSSL_free(c->pkeys); + CRYPTO_FREE_REF(&c->references); OPENSSL_free(c); } -int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) +int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { int i, r; - CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key; + CERT_PKEY *cpk = s != NULL ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key; + if (!cpk) return 0; - sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { - r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, sk_X509_value(chain, i), 0, 0); + X509 *x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); + + r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0); if (r != 1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_SET0_CHAIN, r); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, r); return 0; } } + OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(cpk->chain); cpk->chain = chain; return 1; } -int ssl_cert_set1_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) +int ssl_cert_set1_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { STACK_OF(X509) *dchain; + if (!chain) return ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, NULL); dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain); if (!dchain) return 0; if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, dchain)) { - sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free); + OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(dchain); return 0; } return 1; } -int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) +int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { int r; CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key; + if (!cpk) return 0; r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0); if (r != 1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_ADD0_CHAIN_CERT, r); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, r); return 0; } if (!cpk->chain) @@ -412,7 +345,7 @@ int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) return 1; } -int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) +int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(s, ctx, x)) return 0; @@ -422,10 +355,11 @@ int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x) { - int i; + size_t i; + if (x == NULL) return 0; - for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < c->ssl_pkey_num; i++) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; if (cpk->x509 == x && cpk->privatekey) { c->key = cpk; @@ -433,7 +367,7 @@ int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x) } } - for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < c->ssl_pkey_num; i++) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; if (cpk->privatekey && cpk->x509 && !X509_cmp(cpk->x509, x)) { c->key = cpk; @@ -445,18 +379,19 @@ int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x) int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long op) { - int i, idx; + size_t i, idx; + if (!c) return 0; if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST) idx = 0; else if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT) { - idx = (int)(c->key - c->pkeys + 1); - if (idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM) + idx = (size_t)(c->key - c->pkeys + 1); + if (idx >= c->ssl_pkey_num) return 0; } else return 0; - for (i = idx; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { + for (i = idx; i < c->ssl_pkey_num; i++) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; if (cpk->x509 && cpk->privatekey) { c->key = cpk; @@ -472,32 +407,53 @@ void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) c->cert_cb_arg = arg; } -int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) +/* + * Verify a certificate chain/raw public key + * Return codes: + * 1: Verify success + * 0: Verify failure or error + * -1: Retry required + */ +static int ssl_verify_internal(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, EVP_PKEY *rpk) { X509 *x; int i = 0; X509_STORE *verify_store; X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; + SSL_CTX *sctx; - if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0)) + /* Something must be passed in */ + if ((sk == NULL || sk_X509_num(sk) == 0) && rpk == NULL) return 0; + /* Only one can be set */ + if (sk != NULL && rpk != NULL) + return 0; + + sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); if (s->cert->verify_store) verify_store = s->cert->verify_store; else - verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store; + verify_store = sctx->cert_store; - ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq); if (ctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB); return 0; } - x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); - if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); - goto end; + if (sk != NULL) { + x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB); + goto end; + } + } else { + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init_rpk(ctx, verify_store, rpk)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB); + goto end; + } } param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx); /* @@ -505,11 +461,15 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) * point, for now a single @SECLEVEL sets the same policy for TLS crypto * and PKI authentication. */ - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, SSL_get_security_level(s)); + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, + SSL_get_security_level(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s))); /* Set suite B flags if needed */ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s)); - X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s); + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, + SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s)) { + goto end; + } /* Verify via DANE if enabled */ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(&s->dane)) @@ -530,18 +490,23 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) if (s->verify_callback) X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, s->verify_callback); - if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) - i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg); - else + if (sctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) { + i = sctx->app_verify_callback(ctx, sctx->app_verify_arg); + } else { i = X509_verify_cert(ctx); + /* We treat an error in the same way as a failure to verify */ + if (i < 0) + i = 0; + } s->verify_result = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); - sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free); + OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->verified_chain); s->verified_chain = NULL; - if (X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) != NULL) { + + if (sk != NULL && X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) != NULL) { s->verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx); if (s->verified_chain == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB); i = 0; } } @@ -549,141 +514,264 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) /* Move peername from the store context params to the SSL handle's */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, param); -end: + end: X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); return i; } -static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list, - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) +/* + * Verify a raw public key + * Return codes: + * 1: Verify success + * 0: Verify failure or error + * -1: Retry required + */ +int ssl_verify_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, EVP_PKEY *rpk) +{ + return ssl_verify_internal(s, NULL, rpk); +} + +/* + * Verify a certificate chain + * Return codes: + * 1: Verify success + * 0: Verify failure or error + * -1: Retry required + */ +int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) +{ + return ssl_verify_internal(s, sk, NULL); +} + +static void set0_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list, + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free); *ca_list = name_list; } -STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk) +STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk) { int i; + const int num = sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret; X509_NAME *name; - ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { + ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_reserve(NULL, num); + if (ret == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); + return NULL; + } + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i)); - if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) { + if (name == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); - return (NULL); + return NULL; } + sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name); /* Cannot fail after reserve call */ } - return (ret); + return ret; } -void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) +void SSL_set0_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { - set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA), name_list); + SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); + + if (sc == NULL) + return; + + set0_CA_list(&sc->ca_names, name_list); +} + +void SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) +{ + set0_CA_list(&ctx->ca_names, name_list); +} + +const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get0_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) +{ + return ctx->ca_names; +} + +const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get0_CA_list(const SSL *s) +{ + const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); + + if (sc == NULL) + return NULL; + + return sc->ca_names != NULL ? sc->ca_names : s->ctx->ca_names; } void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { - set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA), name_list); + set0_CA_list(&ctx->client_ca_names, name_list); } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { - return (ctx->client_CA); + return ctx->client_ca_names; +} + +void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) +{ + SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); + + if (sc == NULL) + return; + + set0_CA_list(&sc->client_ca_names, name_list); +} + +const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get0_peer_CA_list(const SSL *s) +{ + const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); + + if (sc == NULL) + return NULL; + + return sc->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names; } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s) { - if (!s->server) { /* we are in the client */ - if (((s->version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) && (s->s3 != NULL)) - return (s->s3->tmp.ca_names); - else - return (NULL); - } else { - if (s->client_CA != NULL) - return (s->client_CA); - else - return (s->ctx->client_CA); - } + const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); + + if (sc == NULL) + return NULL; + + if (!sc->server) + return sc->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names; + return sc->client_ca_names != NULL ? sc->client_ca_names + : s->ctx->client_ca_names; } -static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, X509 *x) +static int add_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, const X509 *x) { X509_NAME *name; if (x == NULL) - return (0); - if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)) - return (0); + return 0; + if (*sk == NULL && ((*sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)) + return 0; if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL) - return (0); + return 0; if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) { X509_NAME_free(name); - return (0); + return 0; } - return (1); + return 1; } +int SSL_add1_to_CA_list(SSL *ssl, const X509 *x) +{ + SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl); + + if (sc == NULL) + return 0; + + return add_ca_name(&sc->ca_names, x); +} + +int SSL_CTX_add1_to_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const X509 *x) +{ + return add_ca_name(&ctx->ca_names, x); +} + +/* + * The following two are older names are to be replaced with + * SSL(_CTX)_add1_to_CA_list + */ int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x) { - return (add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA), x)); + SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl); + + if (sc == NULL) + return 0; + + return add_ca_name(&sc->client_ca_names, x); } int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { - return (add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA), x)); + return add_ca_name(&ctx->client_ca_names, x); } -static int xname_sk_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) +static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) { - return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b)); + unsigned char *abuf = NULL, *bbuf = NULL; + int alen, blen, ret; + + /* X509_NAME_cmp() itself casts away constness in this way, so + * assume it's safe: + */ + alen = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, &abuf); + blen = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, &bbuf); + + if (alen < 0 || blen < 0) + ret = -2; + else if (alen != blen) + ret = alen - blen; + else /* alen == blen */ + ret = memcmp(abuf, bbuf, alen); + + OPENSSL_free(abuf); + OPENSSL_free(bbuf); + + return ret; } -static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) +static int xname_sk_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) { - return X509_NAME_cmp(a, b); + return xname_cmp(*a, *b); } static unsigned long xname_hash(const X509_NAME *a) { - return X509_NAME_hash((X509_NAME *)a); + /* This returns 0 also if SHA1 is not available */ + return X509_NAME_hash_ex((X509_NAME *)a, NULL, NULL, NULL); } -/** - * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed; - * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use - * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have - * much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert. - * \param file the file containing one or more certs. - * \return a ::STACK containing the certs. - */ -STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) +STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file_ex(const char *file, + OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, + const char *propq) { BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); X509 *x = NULL; X509_NAME *xn = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL; - LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash = - lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp); + LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash = lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp); + OSSL_LIB_CTX *prev_libctx = NULL; - if ((name_hash == NULL) || (in == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + if (name_hash == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (in == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_BIO_LIB); goto err; } - if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file)) + x = X509_new_ex(libctx, propq); + if (x == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) goto err; + /* Internally lh_X509_NAME_retrieve() needs the libctx to retrieve SHA1 */ + prev_libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_set0_default(libctx); for (;;) { if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL) break; if (ret == NULL) { ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); if (ret == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); goto err; } } @@ -696,33 +784,34 @@ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) if (lh_X509_NAME_retrieve(name_hash, xn) != NULL) { /* Duplicate. */ X509_NAME_free(xn); + xn = NULL; } else { lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn); - sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn); + if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn)) + goto err; } } goto done; err: + X509_NAME_free(xn); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); ret = NULL; done: + /* restore the old libctx */ + OSSL_LIB_CTX_set0_default(prev_libctx); BIO_free(in); X509_free(x); lh_X509_NAME_free(name_hash); if (ret != NULL) ERR_clear_error(); - return (ret); + return ret; } -/** - * Add a file of certs to a stack. - * \param stack the stack to add to. - * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not - * already in the stack will be added. - * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some - * certs may have been added to \c stack. - */ +STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) +{ + return SSL_load_client_CA_file_ex(file, NULL, NULL); +} int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, const char *file) @@ -738,12 +827,11 @@ int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (in == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_BIO_LIB); goto err; } - if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file)) + if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) goto err; for (;;) { @@ -754,17 +842,20 @@ int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn); if (xn == NULL) goto err; - if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0) + if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0) { + /* Duplicate. */ X509_NAME_free(xn); - else - sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn); + } else if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn)) { + X509_NAME_free(xn); + goto err; + } } ERR_clear_error(); goto done; err: - ret = 0; + ret = 0; done: BIO_free(in); X509_free(x); @@ -772,17 +863,6 @@ int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, return ret; } -/** - * Add a directory of certs to a stack. - * \param stack the stack to append to. - * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be - * examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to - * SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be - * included. - * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some - * certs may have been added to \c stack. - */ - int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, const char *dir) { @@ -795,16 +875,27 @@ int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) { char buf[1024]; int r; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO + struct stat st; - if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof buf) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, - SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG); +#else + /* Cannot use stat so just skip current and parent directories */ + if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) + continue; +#endif + if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof(buf)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS - r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s", dir, filename); + r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s%s", dir, filename); #else - r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", dir, filename); + r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", dir, filename); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO + /* Skip subdirectories */ + if (!stat(buf, &st) && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) + continue; #endif if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf)) goto err; @@ -813,9 +904,9 @@ int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, } if (errno) { - SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error()); - ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')"); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); + ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SYS, get_last_sys_error(), + "calling OPENSSL_dir_read(%s)", dir); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); goto err; } @@ -828,137 +919,85 @@ int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, return ret; } -/* Add a certificate to a BUF_MEM structure */ - -static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x) +static int add_uris_recursive(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, + const char *uri, int depth) { - int n; - unsigned char *p; - - n = i2d_X509(x, NULL); - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - return 0; - } - p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]); - l2n3(n, p); - i2d_X509(x, &p); - *l += n + 3; + int ok = 1; + OSSL_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL; + X509 *x = NULL; + X509_NAME *xn = NULL; - return 1; -} + if ((ctx = OSSL_STORE_open(uri, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) + goto err; -/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM strcuture */ -int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l) -{ - BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf; - int i, chain_count; - X509 *x; - STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; - STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; - X509_STORE *chain_store; + while (!OSSL_STORE_eof(ctx) && !OSSL_STORE_error(ctx)) { + OSSL_STORE_INFO *info = OSSL_STORE_load(ctx); + int infotype = info == 0 ? 0 : OSSL_STORE_INFO_get_type(info); + + if (info == NULL) + continue; + + if (infotype == OSSL_STORE_INFO_NAME) { + /* + * This is an entry in the "directory" represented by the current + * uri. if |depth| allows, dive into it. + */ + if (depth > 0) + ok = add_uris_recursive(stack, OSSL_STORE_INFO_get0_NAME(info), + depth - 1); + } else if (infotype == OSSL_STORE_INFO_CERT) { + if ((x = OSSL_STORE_INFO_get0_CERT(info)) == NULL + || (xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL + || (xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL) + goto err; + if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0) { + /* Duplicate. */ + X509_NAME_free(xn); + } else if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn)) { + X509_NAME_free(xn); + goto err; + } + } - /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */ - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 10)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - return 0; + OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(info); } - if (!cpk || !cpk->x509) - return 1; - - x = cpk->x509; - - /* - * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. - */ - if (cpk->chain) - extra_certs = cpk->chain; - else - extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; + ERR_clear_error(); + goto done; - if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) - chain_store = NULL; - else if (s->cert->chain_store) - chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; - else - chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; + err: + ok = 0; + done: + OSSL_STORE_close(ctx); - if (chain_store) { - X509_STORE_CTX* xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + return ok; +} - if (xs_ctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return (0); - } - if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { - X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); - return (0); - } - /* - * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we - * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately - * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying - * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can - */ - (void) X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); - /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ - ERR_clear_error(); - chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); - i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); - if (i != 1) { -#if 0 - /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); -#endif - X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); - return 0; - } - chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); - for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { - x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); +int SSL_add_store_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, + const char *store) +{ + int (*oldcmp) (const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) + = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_sk_cmp); + int ret = add_uris_recursive(stack, store, 1); - if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) { - X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); - return 0; - } - } - X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); - } else { - i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); - if (i != 1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); - return 0; - } - if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) - return 0; - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { - x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); - if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) - return 0; - } - } - return 1; + (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp); + return ret; } /* Build a certificate chain for current certificate */ -int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) +int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) { - CERT *c = s ? s->cert : ctx->cert; + CERT *c = s != NULL ? s->cert : ctx->cert; CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key; X509_STORE *chain_store = NULL; X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL; X509 *x; + SSL_CTX *real_ctx = (s == NULL) ? ctx : SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); int i, rv = 0; - unsigned long error; - if (!cpk->x509) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); + if (cpk->x509 == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); goto err; } /* Rearranging and check the chain: add everything to a store */ @@ -968,42 +1007,29 @@ int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cpk->chain); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, i); - if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x)) { - error = ERR_peek_last_error(); - if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 || - ERR_GET_REASON(error) != - X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE) - goto err; - ERR_clear_error(); - } - } - /* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */ - if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509)) { - error = ERR_peek_last_error(); - if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 || - ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE) + if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x)) goto err; - ERR_clear_error(); } + /* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */ + if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509)) + goto err; } else { - if (c->chain_store) + if (c->chain_store != NULL) chain_store = c->chain_store; - else if (s) - chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; else - chain_store = ctx->cert_store; + chain_store = real_ctx->cert_store; if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED) untrusted = cpk->chain; } - xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(real_ctx->libctx, real_ctx->propq); if (xs_ctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB); goto err; } if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB); goto err; } /* Set suite B flags if needed */ @@ -1020,10 +1046,9 @@ int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) if (i > 0) chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(xs_ctx); if (i <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(xs_ctx); - ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", - X509_verify_cert_error_string(i)); + ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED, + "Verify error:%s", X509_verify_cert_error_string(i)); goto err; } @@ -1048,13 +1073,13 @@ int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); rv = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0); if (rv != 1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, rv); - sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, rv); + OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(chain); rv = 0; goto err; } } - sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); + OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(cpk->chain); cpk->chain = chain; if (rv == 0) rv = 1; @@ -1080,18 +1105,48 @@ int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref) return 1; } -static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, - int bits, int nid, void *other, - void *ex) +int ssl_cert_get_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE **pstore, int chain) { - int level, minbits; - static const int minbits_table[5] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 }; - if (ctx) + *pstore = (chain ? c->chain_store : c->verify_store); + return 1; +} + +int ssl_get_security_level_bits(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int *levelp) +{ + int level; + /* + * note that there's a corresponding minbits_table + * in crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c that's used for checking the security level + * of RSA and DSA keys + */ + static const int minbits_table[5 + 1] = { 0, 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 }; + + if (ctx != NULL) level = SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx); else level = SSL_get_security_level(s); - if (level <= 0) { + if (level > 5) + level = 5; + else if (level < 0) + level = 0; + + if (levelp != NULL) + *levelp = level; + + return minbits_table[level]; +} + +static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, + int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, + void *ex) +{ + int level, minbits, pfs_mask; + const SSL_CONNECTION *sc; + + minbits = ssl_get_security_level_bits(s, ctx, &level); + + if (level == 0) { /* * No EDH keys weaker than 1024-bits even at level 0, otherwise, * anything goes. @@ -1100,9 +1155,6 @@ static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int o return 0; return 1; } - if (level > 5) - level = 5; - minbits = minbits_table[level - 1]; switch (op) { case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED: case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED: @@ -1121,28 +1173,23 @@ static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int o /* SHA1 HMAC is 160 bits of security */ if (minbits > 160 && c->algorithm_mac & SSL_SHA1) return 0; - /* Level 2: no RC4 */ - if (level >= 2 && c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) - return 0; /* Level 3: forward secure ciphersuites only */ - if (level >= 3 && !(c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH))) + pfs_mask = SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK; + if (level >= 3 && c->min_tls != TLS1_3_VERSION && + !(c->algorithm_mkey & pfs_mask)) return 0; break; } case SSL_SECOP_VERSION: - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - /* SSLv3 not allowed at level 2 */ - if (nid <= SSL3_VERSION && level >= 2) - return 0; - /* TLS v1.1 and above only for level 3 */ - if (nid <= TLS1_VERSION && level >= 3) - return 0; - /* TLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */ - if (nid <= TLS1_1_VERSION && level >= 4) + if ((sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s)) == NULL) + return 0; + if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc)) { + /* SSLv3, TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 only allowed at level 0 */ + if (nid <= TLS1_1_VERSION && level > 0) return 0; } else { - /* DTLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */ - if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(nid, DTLS1_2_VERSION) && level >= 4) + /* DTLS v1.0 only allowed at level 0 */ + if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(nid, DTLS1_2_VERSION) && level > 0) return 0; } break; @@ -1162,9 +1209,10 @@ static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int o return 1; } -int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) +int ssl_security(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) { - return s->cert->sec_cb(s, NULL, op, bits, nid, other, s->cert->sec_ex); + return s->cert->sec_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), NULL, op, bits, nid, + other, s->cert->sec_ex); } int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) @@ -1172,3 +1220,61 @@ int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) return ctx->cert->sec_cb(NULL, ctx, op, bits, nid, other, ctx->cert->sec_ex); } + +int ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(int nid, size_t *pidx, SSL_CTX *ctx) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(ssl_cert_info); i++) { + if (ssl_cert_info[i].nid == nid) { + *pidx = i; + return 1; + } + } + for (i = 0; i < ctx->sigalg_list_len; i++) { + if (ctx->ssl_cert_info[i].nid == nid) { + *pidx = SSL_PKEY_NUM + i; + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(const EVP_PKEY *pk, size_t *pidx, SSL_CTX *ctx) +{ + size_t i; + + /* check classic pk types */ + for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(ssl_cert_info); i++) { + const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *tmp_lu = &ssl_cert_info[i]; + + if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, OBJ_nid2sn(tmp_lu->nid)) + || EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, OBJ_nid2ln(tmp_lu->nid))) { + if (pidx != NULL) + *pidx = i; + return tmp_lu; + } + } + /* check provider-loaded pk types */ + for (i = 0; ctx->sigalg_list_len; i++) { + SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *tmp_lu = &(ctx->ssl_cert_info[i]); + + if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, OBJ_nid2sn(tmp_lu->nid)) + || EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, OBJ_nid2ln(tmp_lu->nid))) { + if (pidx != NULL) + *pidx = SSL_PKEY_NUM + i; + return &ctx->ssl_cert_info[i]; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(size_t idx, SSL_CTX *ctx) +{ + if (idx >= (OSSL_NELEM(ssl_cert_info) + ctx->sigalg_list_len)) + return NULL; + else if (idx >= (OSSL_NELEM(ssl_cert_info))) + return &(ctx->ssl_cert_info[idx - SSL_PKEY_NUM]); + return &ssl_cert_info[idx]; +}