X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fssl_cert.c;h=2a07ee6910a6b9877c48ae3ed8cae94c0c88e138;hp=974259969f0585c489e89fa10774578b9b16cd12;hb=9d6daf99c286d260e50278f63ddb7d164462256e;hpb=9e9858d1cf28e39cfd214b5c508188d5016728fd diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c index 974259969f..2a07ee6910 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c @@ -1,115 +1,12 @@ /* - * ! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c - */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ + /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by @@ -123,167 +20,100 @@ # include #endif -#include "o_dir.h" -#include +#include "internal/o_dir.h" +#include #include #include #include -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -# include -#endif +#include #include +#include #include "ssl_locl.h" -static int ssl_security_default_callback(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, +static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex); -int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) -{ - static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1; - int got_write_lock = 0; - - CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - - if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) { - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - got_write_lock = 1; +static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_x509_store_ctx_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; +static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1; - if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) { - ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = - X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, "SSL for verify callback", +static void ssl_x509_store_ctx_init(void) +{ + ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, + "SSL for verify callback", NULL, NULL, NULL); - } - } - - if (got_write_lock) - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - else - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - - return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx; } -void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert) +int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) { - /* Set digest values to defaults */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); - cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA - cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); -#endif + + CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(&ssl_x509_store_ctx_once, ssl_x509_store_ctx_init); + return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx; } CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) { - CERT *ret; + CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); - ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT)); if (ret == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return (NULL); + return NULL; } - memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT)); ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); ret->references = 1; - ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret); ret->sec_cb = ssl_security_default_callback; ret->sec_level = OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL; ret->sec_ex = NULL; - return (ret); + ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); + if (ret->lock == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + OPENSSL_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + + return ret; } CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) { - CERT *ret; + CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); int i; - ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT)); if (ret == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return (NULL); + return NULL; } - memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT)); - - ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]]; - /* - * or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys), if you find that - * more readable - */ - - ret->valid = cert->valid; - ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k; - ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a; - ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k; - ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL) { - RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp); - ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp; + ret->references = 1; + ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - cert->pkeys]; + ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); + if (ret->lock == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + OPENSSL_free(ret); + return NULL; } - ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb; -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) { - ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp); - if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key) { - BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key); - if (!b) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b; - } - if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key) { - BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key); - if (!b) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b; - } + ret->dh_tmp = cert->dh_tmp; + EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ret->dh_tmp); } ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb; ret->dh_tmp_auto = cert->dh_tmp_auto; #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - if (cert->ecdh_tmp) { - ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp); - if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - } - ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb; - ret->ecdh_tmp_auto = cert->ecdh_tmp_auto; -#endif - for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i; CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i; if (cpk->x509 != NULL) { rpk->x509 = cpk->x509; - CRYPTO_add(&rpk->x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + X509_up_ref(rpk->x509); } if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) { rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey; - CRYPTO_add(&cpk->privatekey->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY); + EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cpk->privatekey); } if (cpk->chain) { @@ -293,8 +123,6 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) goto err; } } - rpk->valid_flags = 0; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo != NULL) { /* Just copy everything. */ ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo = @@ -309,23 +137,12 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo, cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length); } -#endif } - ret->references = 1; - /* - * Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they - * will be set during handshake. - */ - ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret); - /* Peer sigalgs set to NULL as we get these from handshake too */ - ret->peer_sigalgs = NULL; - ret->peer_sigalgslen = 0; - /* Configured sigalgs however we copy across */ - + /* Configured sigalgs copied across */ if (cert->conf_sigalgs) { ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen); - if (!ret->conf_sigalgs) + if (ret->conf_sigalgs == NULL) goto err; memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgslen); ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen; @@ -334,7 +151,7 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) if (cert->client_sigalgs) { ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen); - if (!ret->client_sigalgs) + if (ret->client_sigalgs == NULL) goto err; memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgslen); @@ -346,7 +163,7 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) /* Copy any custom client certificate types */ if (cert->ctypes) { ret->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->ctype_num); - if (!ret->ctypes) + if (ret->ctypes == NULL) goto err; memcpy(ret->ctypes, cert->ctypes, cert->ctype_num); ret->ctype_num = cert->ctype_num; @@ -358,30 +175,31 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg; if (cert->verify_store) { - CRYPTO_add(&cert->verify_store->references, 1, - CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); + X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->verify_store); ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store; } if (cert->chain_store) { - CRYPTO_add(&cert->chain_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); + X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->chain_store); ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store; } - ret->ciphers_raw = NULL; - ret->sec_cb = cert->sec_cb; ret->sec_level = cert->sec_level; ret->sec_ex = cert->sec_ex; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->cli_ext, &cert->cli_ext)) goto err; if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->srv_ext, &cert->srv_ext)) goto err; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if (cert->psk_identity_hint) { + ret->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(cert->psk_identity_hint); + if (ret->psk_identity_hint == NULL) + goto err; + } #endif - - return (ret); + return ret; err: ssl_cert_free(ret); @@ -398,27 +216,15 @@ void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c) return; for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; - if (cpk->x509) { - X509_free(cpk->x509); - cpk->x509 = NULL; - } - if (cpk->privatekey) { - EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey); - cpk->privatekey = NULL; - } - if (cpk->chain) { - sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); - cpk->chain = NULL; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (cpk->serverinfo) { - OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo); - cpk->serverinfo = NULL; - cpk->serverinfo_length = 0; - } -#endif - /* Clear all flags apart from explicit sign */ - cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; + X509_free(cpk->x509); + cpk->x509 = NULL; + EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey); + cpk->privatekey = NULL; + sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); + cpk->chain = NULL; + OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo); + cpk->serverinfo = NULL; + cpk->serverinfo_length = 0; } } @@ -429,94 +235,38 @@ void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) if (c == NULL) return; - i = CRYPTO_add(&c->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT); -#ifdef REF_PRINT - REF_PRINT("CERT", c); -#endif + CRYPTO_atomic_add(&c->references, -1, &i, c->lock); + REF_PRINT_COUNT("CERT", c); if (i > 0) return; -#ifdef REF_CHECK - if (i < 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n"); - abort(); /* ok */ - } -#endif + REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (c->rsa_tmp) - RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp); -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (c->dh_tmp) - DH_free(c->dh_tmp); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - if (c->ecdh_tmp) - EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp); + EVP_PKEY_free(c->dh_tmp); #endif ssl_cert_clear_certs(c); - if (c->peer_sigalgs) - OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs); - if (c->conf_sigalgs) - OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); - if (c->client_sigalgs) - OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); - if (c->shared_sigalgs) - OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); - if (c->ctypes) - OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes); - if (c->verify_store) - X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store); - if (c->chain_store) - X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store); - if (c->ciphers_raw) - OPENSSL_free(c->ciphers_raw); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); + OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); + OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); + OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes); + X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store); + X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store); custom_exts_free(&c->cli_ext); custom_exts_free(&c->srv_ext); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + OPENSSL_free(c->psk_identity_hint); #endif - if (c->pms) { - OPENSSL_cleanse(c->pms, c->pmslen); - OPENSSL_free(c->pms); - c->pms = NULL; - } + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(c->lock); OPENSSL_free(c); } -int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o) -{ - /* - * Create a CERT if there isn't already one (which cannot really happen, - * as it is initially created in SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code - * usually allows for that one being non-existant, so we follow that - * behaviour, as it might turn out that there actually is a reason for it - * -- but I'm not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with - * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the initialization - * in SSL_CTX_new). - */ - - if (o == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); - return (0); - } - if (*o == NULL) { - if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return (0); - } - } - return (1); -} - int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { int i, r; CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key; if (!cpk) return 0; - if (cpk->chain) - sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, sk_X509_value(chain, i), 0, 0); if (r != 1) { @@ -524,6 +274,7 @@ int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) return 0; } } + sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); cpk->chain = chain; return 1; } @@ -565,7 +316,7 @@ int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(s, ctx, x)) return 0; - CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + X509_up_ref(x); return 1; } @@ -621,105 +372,50 @@ void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) c->cert_cb_arg = arg; } -SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void) -{ - SESS_CERT *ret; - - ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret); - if (ret == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return NULL; - } - - memset(ret, 0, sizeof *ret); - ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); - ret->references = 1; - - return ret; -} - -void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc) -{ - int i; - - if (sc == NULL) - return; - - i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT); -#ifdef REF_PRINT - REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc); -#endif - if (i > 0) - return; -#ifdef REF_CHECK - if (i < 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n"); - abort(); /* ok */ - } -#endif - - /* i == 0 */ - if (sc->cert_chain != NULL) - sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free); - for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { - if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) - X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509); -#if 0 - /* - * We don't have the peer's private key. These lines are just - * here as a reminder that we're still using a not-quite-appropriate - * data structure. - */ - if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) - EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey); -#endif - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) - RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) - DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) - EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp); -#endif - - OPENSSL_free(sc); -} - -int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc, int type) -{ - sc->peer_cert_type = type; - return (1); -} - int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { X509 *x; - int i; + int i = 0; X509_STORE *verify_store; - X509_STORE_CTX ctx; + X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL; + X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; + + if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0)) + return 0; if (s->cert->verify_store) verify_store = s->cert->verify_store; else verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store; - if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0)) - return (0); + ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); - if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) { + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); - return (0); + goto end; } + param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx); + /* + * XXX: Separate @AUTHSECLEVEL and @TLSSECLEVEL would be useful at some + * point, for now a single @SECLEVEL sets the same policy for TLS crypto + * and PKI authentication. + */ + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, SSL_get_security_level(s)); + /* Set suite B flags if needed */ - X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s)); - X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s)); + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s)) { + goto end; + } + + /* Verify via DANE if enabled */ + if (DANETLS_ENABLED(&s->dane)) + X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(ctx, &s->dane); /* * We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by @@ -727,41 +423,43 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) * vice versa. */ - X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server"); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server"); /* - * Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the ctx. + * Anything non-default in "s->param" should overwrite anything in the ctx. */ - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param); + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(param, s->param); if (s->verify_callback) - X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, s->verify_callback); if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) - i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg); - else { - i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx); -# if 0 - /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); -# endif - if (i > 0) - i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, ctx.chain, NULL, 1); + i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg); + else + i = X509_verify_cert(ctx); + + s->verify_result = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); + sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free); + s->verified_chain = NULL; + if (X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) != NULL) { + s->verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx); + if (s->verified_chain == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + i = 0; + } } - s->verify_result = ctx.error; - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + /* Move peername from the store context params to the SSL handle's */ + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, param); - return (i); +end: + X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); + return i; } static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { - if (*ca_list != NULL) - sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free); - + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free); *ca_list = name_list; } @@ -772,11 +470,16 @@ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk) X509_NAME *name; ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); + if (ret == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DUP_CA_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i)); - if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) { + if (name == NULL || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) { sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); - return (NULL); + X509_NAME_free(name); + return NULL; } } return (ret); @@ -799,7 +502,7 @@ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s) { - if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) { /* we are in the client */ + if (!s->server) { /* we are in the client */ if (((s->version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) && (s->s3 != NULL)) return (s->s3->tmp.ca_names); else @@ -841,12 +544,21 @@ int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) return (add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA), x)); } -static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) +static int xname_sk_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b)); } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO +static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) +{ + return X509_NAME_cmp(a, b); +} + +static unsigned long xname_hash(const X509_NAME *a) +{ + return X509_NAME_hash((X509_NAME *)a); +} + /** * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed; * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use @@ -857,16 +569,14 @@ static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) { - BIO *in; + BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); X509 *x = NULL; X509_NAME *xn = NULL; - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL, *sk; - - sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp); - - in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal()); + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL; + LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash = + lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp); - if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL)) { + if ((name_hash == NULL) || (in == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } @@ -890,31 +600,30 @@ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn); if (xn == NULL) goto err; - if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk, xn) >= 0) + if (lh_X509_NAME_retrieve(name_hash, xn) != NULL) { + /* Duplicate. */ X509_NAME_free(xn); - else { - sk_X509_NAME_push(sk, xn); - sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn); + xn = NULL; + } else { + lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn); + if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn)) + goto err; } } + goto done; - if (0) { err: - if (ret != NULL) - sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); - ret = NULL; - } - if (sk != NULL) - sk_X509_NAME_free(sk); - if (in != NULL) - BIO_free(in); - if (x != NULL) - X509_free(x); + X509_NAME_free(xn); + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); + ret = NULL; + done: + BIO_free(in); + X509_free(x); + lh_X509_NAME_free(name_hash); if (ret != NULL) ERR_clear_error(); return (ret); } -#endif /** * Add a file of certs to a stack. @@ -934,9 +643,9 @@ int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, int ret = 1; int (*oldcmp) (const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b); - oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_cmp); + oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_sk_cmp); - in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal()); + in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (in == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, @@ -955,25 +664,24 @@ int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn); if (xn == NULL) goto err; - if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0) + if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0) { + /* Duplicate. */ X509_NAME_free(xn); - else - sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn); + } else if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn)) { + X509_NAME_free(xn); + goto err; + } } ERR_clear_error(); + goto done; - if (0) { err: - ret = 0; - } - if (in != NULL) - BIO_free(in); - if (x != NULL) - X509_free(x); - + ret = 0; + done: + BIO_free(in); + X509_free(x); (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp); - return ret; } @@ -995,8 +703,6 @@ int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, const char *filename; int ret = 0; - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR); - /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */ while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) { @@ -1031,7 +737,7 @@ int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, err: if (d) OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d); - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR); + return ret; } @@ -1043,26 +749,31 @@ static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x) unsigned char *p; n = i2d_X509(x, NULL); - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) { + if (n < 0 || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]); l2n3(n, p); - i2d_X509(x, &p); + n = i2d_X509(x, &p); + if (n < 0) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + return 0; + } *l += n + 3; return 1; } -/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM strcuture */ +/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM structure */ int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l) { BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf; - int i; - + int i, chain_count; X509 *x; STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; + STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; X509_STORE *chain_store; /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */ @@ -1092,30 +803,49 @@ int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l) chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; if (chain_store) { - X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx; + X509_STORE_CTX* xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); - if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { + if (xs_ctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); return (0); } - X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); + /* + * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we + * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately + * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying + * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can + */ + (void) X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ ERR_clear_error(); - i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, xs_ctx.chain, NULL, 0); + chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); + i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); if (i != 1) { - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); +#if 0 + /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); +#endif + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); return 0; } - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) { - x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i); + chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); + for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) { - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); return 0; } } - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); } else { i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); if (i != 1) { @@ -1139,7 +869,7 @@ int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) CERT *c = s ? s->cert : ctx->cert; CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key; X509_STORE *chain_store = NULL; - X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx; + X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL; X509 *x; int i, rv = 0; @@ -1152,7 +882,7 @@ int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) /* Rearranging and check the chain: add everything to a store */ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) { chain_store = X509_STORE_new(); - if (!chain_store) + if (chain_store == NULL) goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cpk->chain); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, i); @@ -1185,15 +915,20 @@ int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) untrusted = cpk->chain; } - if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) { + xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + if (xs_ctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); goto err; } /* Set suite B flags if needed */ - X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&xs_ctx, + X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(xs_ctx, c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS); - i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); + i = X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR) { if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR) ERR_clear_error(); @@ -1201,17 +936,15 @@ int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) rv = 2; } if (i > 0) - chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&xs_ctx); + chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(xs_ctx); if (i <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); - i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&xs_ctx); + i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(xs_ctx); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", X509_verify_cert_error_string(i)); - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); goto err; } - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); /* Remove EE certificate from chain */ x = sk_X509_shift(chain); X509_free(x); @@ -1219,8 +952,7 @@ int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) { /* See if last cert is self signed */ x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1); - X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) { + if (X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) { x = sk_X509_pop(chain); X509_free(x); } @@ -1240,14 +972,14 @@ int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) goto err; } } - if (cpk->chain) - sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); + sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); cpk->chain = chain; if (rv == 0) rv = 1; err: if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) X509_STORE_free(chain_store); + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); return rv; } @@ -1259,15 +991,14 @@ int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref) pstore = &c->chain_store; else pstore = &c->verify_store; - if (*pstore) - X509_STORE_free(*pstore); + X509_STORE_free(*pstore); *pstore = store; if (ref && store) - CRYPTO_add(&store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); + X509_STORE_up_ref(store); return 1; } -static int ssl_security_default_callback(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, +static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex) { @@ -1277,9 +1008,16 @@ static int ssl_security_default_callback(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, level = SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx); else level = SSL_get_security_level(s); - /* Level 0: anything goes */ - if (level <= 0) + + if (level <= 0) { + /* + * No EDH keys weaker than 1024-bits even at level 0, otherwise, + * anything goes. + */ + if (op == SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH && bits < 80) + return 0; return 1; + } if (level > 5) level = 5; minbits = minbits_table[level - 1]; @@ -1310,15 +1048,21 @@ static int ssl_security_default_callback(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, break; } case SSL_SECOP_VERSION: - /* SSLv3 not allowed on level 2 */ - if (nid <= SSL3_VERSION && level >= 2) - return 0; - /* TLS v1.1 and above only for level 3 */ - if (nid <= TLS1_VERSION && level >= 3) - return 0; - /* TLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */ - if (nid <= TLS1_1_VERSION && level >= 4) - return 0; + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* SSLv3 not allowed at level 2 */ + if (nid <= SSL3_VERSION && level >= 2) + return 0; + /* TLS v1.1 and above only for level 3 */ + if (nid <= TLS1_VERSION && level >= 3) + return 0; + /* TLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */ + if (nid <= TLS1_1_VERSION && level >= 4) + return 0; + } else { + /* DTLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */ + if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(nid, DTLS1_2_VERSION) && level >= 4) + return 0; + } break; case SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION: @@ -1336,12 +1080,12 @@ static int ssl_security_default_callback(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, return 1; } -int ssl_security(SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) +int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) { return s->cert->sec_cb(s, NULL, op, bits, nid, other, s->cert->sec_ex); } -int ssl_ctx_security(SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) +int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) { return ctx->cert->sec_cb(NULL, ctx, op, bits, nid, other, ctx->cert->sec_ex);