X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fssl_cert.c;h=2a07ee6910a6b9877c48ae3ed8cae94c0c88e138;hp=7f01bcc641699a8acb59392ec4f765be54b81385;hb=a8c1c7040aabdb78f9bec21ba16be8f262de1444;hpb=919ba009429b3617e975933f37a23be996a33b8d diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c index 7f01bcc641..2a07ee6910 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c @@ -1,115 +1,12 @@ /* - * ! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c - */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ + /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by @@ -124,44 +21,33 @@ #endif #include "internal/o_dir.h" -#include +#include #include #include #include -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -# include -#endif +#include #include +#include #include "ssl_locl.h" -static int ssl_security_default_callback(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, +static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex); -int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) -{ - static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1; - int got_write_lock = 0; - - CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - - if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) { - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - got_write_lock = 1; +static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_x509_store_ctx_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; +static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1; - if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) { - ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = - X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, "SSL for verify callback", +static void ssl_x509_store_ctx_init(void) +{ + ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, + "SSL for verify callback", NULL, NULL, NULL); - } - } +} - if (got_write_lock) - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - else - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); +int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) +{ + CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(&ssl_x509_store_ctx_once, ssl_x509_store_ctx_init); return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx; } @@ -171,7 +57,7 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) if (ret == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return (NULL); + return NULL; } ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); @@ -179,7 +65,14 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) ret->sec_cb = ssl_security_default_callback; ret->sec_level = OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL; ret->sec_ex = NULL; - return (ret); + ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); + if (ret->lock == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + OPENSSL_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + + return ret; } CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) @@ -189,11 +82,17 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) if (ret == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return (NULL); + return NULL; } ret->references = 1; ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - cert->pkeys]; + ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); + if (ret->lock == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + OPENSSL_free(ret); + return NULL; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) { @@ -214,7 +113,7 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) { rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey; - CRYPTO_add(&cpk->privatekey->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY); + EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cpk->privatekey); } if (cpk->chain) { @@ -276,13 +175,12 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg; if (cert->verify_store) { - CRYPTO_add(&cert->verify_store->references, 1, - CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); + X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->verify_store); ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store; } if (cert->chain_store) { - CRYPTO_add(&cert->chain_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); + X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->chain_store); ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store; } @@ -301,7 +199,7 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) goto err; } #endif - return (ret); + return ret; err: ssl_cert_free(ret); @@ -337,18 +235,11 @@ void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) if (c == NULL) return; - i = CRYPTO_add(&c->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT); -#ifdef REF_PRINT - REF_PRINT("CERT", c); -#endif + CRYPTO_atomic_add(&c->references, -1, &i, c->lock); + REF_PRINT_COUNT("CERT", c); if (i > 0) return; -#ifdef REF_CHECK - if (i < 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n"); - abort(); /* ok */ - } -#endif + REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY_free(c->dh_tmp); @@ -366,6 +257,7 @@ void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPENSSL_free(c->psk_identity_hint); #endif + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(c->lock); OPENSSL_free(c); } @@ -375,7 +267,6 @@ int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key; if (!cpk) return 0; - sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, sk_X509_value(chain, i), 0, 0); if (r != 1) { @@ -383,6 +274,7 @@ int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) return 0; } } + sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); cpk->chain = chain; return 1; } @@ -483,33 +375,47 @@ void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { X509 *x; - int i; + int i = 0; X509_STORE *verify_store; - X509_STORE_CTX ctx; + X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; + if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0)) + return 0; + if (s->cert->verify_store) verify_store = s->cert->verify_store; else verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store; - if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0)) - return (0); + ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); - if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) { + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); - return (0); + goto end; } - param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx); + param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx); + /* + * XXX: Separate @AUTHSECLEVEL and @TLSSECLEVEL would be useful at some + * point, for now a single @SECLEVEL sets the same policy for TLS crypto + * and PKI authentication. + */ + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, SSL_get_security_level(s)); /* Set suite B flags if needed */ - X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s)); - X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s)); + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s)) { + goto end; + } /* Verify via DANE if enabled */ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(&s->dane)) - X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(&ctx, &s->dane); + X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(ctx, &s->dane); /* * We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by @@ -517,37 +423,37 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) * vice versa. */ - X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server"); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server"); /* * Anything non-default in "s->param" should overwrite anything in the ctx. */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(param, s->param); if (s->verify_callback) - X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, s->verify_callback); if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) - i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg); - else { - i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx); -# if 0 - /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); -# endif - if (i > 0) - i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, ctx.chain, NULL, 1); + i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg); + else + i = X509_verify_cert(ctx); + + s->verify_result = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); + sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free); + s->verified_chain = NULL; + if (X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) != NULL) { + s->verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx); + if (s->verified_chain == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + i = 0; + } } - s->verify_result = ctx.error; - /* Move peername from the store context params to the SSL handle's */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, param); - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - - return (i); +end: + X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); + return i; } static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list, @@ -564,11 +470,16 @@ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk) X509_NAME *name; ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); + if (ret == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DUP_CA_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i)); - if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) { + if (name == NULL || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) { sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); - return (NULL); + X509_NAME_free(name); + return NULL; } } return (ret); @@ -633,11 +544,21 @@ int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) return (add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA), x)); } -static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) +static int xname_sk_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b)); } +static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) +{ + return X509_NAME_cmp(a, b); +} + +static unsigned long xname_hash(const X509_NAME *a) +{ + return X509_NAME_hash((X509_NAME *)a); +} + /** * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed; * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use @@ -648,16 +569,14 @@ static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) { - BIO *in; + BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); X509 *x = NULL; X509_NAME *xn = NULL; - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL, *sk; - - sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp); + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL; + LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash = + lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp); - in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); - - if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL)) { + if ((name_hash == NULL) || (in == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } @@ -681,22 +600,26 @@ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn); if (xn == NULL) goto err; - if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk, xn) >= 0) + if (lh_X509_NAME_retrieve(name_hash, xn) != NULL) { + /* Duplicate. */ X509_NAME_free(xn); - else { - sk_X509_NAME_push(sk, xn); - sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn); + xn = NULL; + } else { + lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn); + if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn)) + goto err; } } goto done; err: + X509_NAME_free(xn); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); ret = NULL; done: - sk_X509_NAME_free(sk); BIO_free(in); X509_free(x); + lh_X509_NAME_free(name_hash); if (ret != NULL) ERR_clear_error(); return (ret); @@ -720,7 +643,7 @@ int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, int ret = 1; int (*oldcmp) (const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b); - oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_cmp); + oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_sk_cmp); in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); @@ -741,17 +664,20 @@ int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn); if (xn == NULL) goto err; - if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0) + if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0) { + /* Duplicate. */ X509_NAME_free(xn); - else - sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn); + } else if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn)) { + X509_NAME_free(xn); + goto err; + } } ERR_clear_error(); goto done; err: - ret = 0; + ret = 0; done: BIO_free(in); X509_free(x); @@ -777,8 +703,6 @@ int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, const char *filename; int ret = 0; - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR); - /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */ while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) { @@ -813,7 +737,7 @@ int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, err: if (d) OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d); - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR); + return ret; } @@ -825,26 +749,31 @@ static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x) unsigned char *p; n = i2d_X509(x, NULL); - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) { + if (n < 0 || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]); l2n3(n, p); - i2d_X509(x, &p); + n = i2d_X509(x, &p); + if (n < 0) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + return 0; + } *l += n + 3; return 1; } -/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM strcuture */ +/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM structure */ int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l) { BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf; - int i; - + int i, chain_count; X509 *x; STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; + STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; X509_STORE *chain_store; /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */ @@ -874,9 +803,14 @@ int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l) chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; if (chain_store) { - X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx; + X509_STORE_CTX* xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); - if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { + if (xs_ctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); return (0); } @@ -886,24 +820,32 @@ int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l) * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can */ - X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); + (void) X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ ERR_clear_error(); - i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, xs_ctx.chain, NULL, 0); + chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); + i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); if (i != 1) { - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); +#if 0 + /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); +#endif + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); return 0; } - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) { - x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i); + chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); + for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) { - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); return 0; } } - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); } else { i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); if (i != 1) { @@ -927,7 +869,7 @@ int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) CERT *c = s ? s->cert : ctx->cert; CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key; X509_STORE *chain_store = NULL; - X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx; + X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL; X509 *x; int i, rv = 0; @@ -973,15 +915,20 @@ int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) untrusted = cpk->chain; } - if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) { + xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + if (xs_ctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); goto err; } /* Set suite B flags if needed */ - X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&xs_ctx, + X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(xs_ctx, c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS); - i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); + i = X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR) { if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR) ERR_clear_error(); @@ -989,17 +936,15 @@ int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) rv = 2; } if (i > 0) - chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&xs_ctx); + chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(xs_ctx); if (i <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); - i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&xs_ctx); + i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(xs_ctx); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", X509_verify_cert_error_string(i)); - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); goto err; } - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); /* Remove EE certificate from chain */ x = sk_X509_shift(chain); X509_free(x); @@ -1034,6 +979,7 @@ int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) err: if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) X509_STORE_free(chain_store); + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); return rv; } @@ -1048,11 +994,11 @@ int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref) X509_STORE_free(*pstore); *pstore = store; if (ref && store) - CRYPTO_add(&store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); + X509_STORE_up_ref(store); return 1; } -static int ssl_security_default_callback(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, +static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex) { @@ -1062,9 +1008,16 @@ static int ssl_security_default_callback(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, level = SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx); else level = SSL_get_security_level(s); - /* Level 0: anything goes */ - if (level <= 0) + + if (level <= 0) { + /* + * No EDH keys weaker than 1024-bits even at level 0, otherwise, + * anything goes. + */ + if (op == SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH && bits < 80) + return 0; return 1; + } if (level > 5) level = 5; minbits = minbits_table[level - 1]; @@ -1127,12 +1080,12 @@ static int ssl_security_default_callback(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, return 1; } -int ssl_security(SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) +int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) { return s->cert->sec_cb(s, NULL, op, bits, nid, other, s->cert->sec_ex); } -int ssl_ctx_security(SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) +int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) { return ctx->cert->sec_cb(NULL, ctx, op, bits, nid, other, ctx->cert->sec_ex);