X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fs3_srvr.c;h=8600d0602f2bc571fa7f5c2ba101686588e5493c;hp=4ffc2fcf39fcbac79a4246baebed35e1c3490279;hb=4f8f8bf3a4490fbee4bf67cce0fcdd57881a8073;hpb=305514000c7e404490951f4c14a65379098c7baf diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c index 4ffc2fcf39..8600d0602f 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG #include +#include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "kssl_lcl.h" #include @@ -179,6 +180,31 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) return(NULL); } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP +static int SSL_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s,int *ad) + { + int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; + + *ad = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + + if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && + (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) + { + if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) + { + /* There isn't any srp login extension !!! */ + ret = SSL3_AL_WARNING; + *ad = SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME; + } + else + { + ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,ad); + } + } + return ret; + } +#endif + IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, ssl3_accept, ssl_undefined_function, @@ -189,9 +215,11 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) BUF_MEM *buf; unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; - long num1; int ret= -1; int new_state,state,skip=0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + int srp_no_username =0; +#endif RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); ERR_clear_error(); @@ -219,7 +247,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) switch (s->state) { case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: - s->new_session=1; + s->renegotiate=1; /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ case SSL_ST_BEFORE: @@ -271,6 +299,18 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; } + else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && + !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) + { + /* Server attempting to renegotiate with + * client that doesn't support secure + * renegotiation. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + ret = -1; + goto end; + } else { /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, @@ -300,12 +340,39 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME: +#endif s->shutdown=0; ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + { + int extension_error = 0,al; + + if ((al = SSL_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&extension_error)) != SSL_ERROR_NONE) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,al,extension_error); + if (extension_error == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME) + { + if (srp_no_username) goto end; + ERR_clear_error(); + srp_no_username = 1; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME; + if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); + if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) goto end; + s->init_num=0; + break; + } + ret = -1; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + goto end; + } + } +#endif - s->new_session = 2; + s->renegotiate = 2; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; s->init_num=0; break; @@ -334,7 +401,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ - /* normal PSK or KRB5 */ + /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) @@ -398,6 +465,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) * hint if provided */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ + || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) #endif || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH)) || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) @@ -445,6 +516,9 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) skip=1; s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + return -1; } else { @@ -471,15 +545,24 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) break; case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: - /* number of bytes to be flushed */ - num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL); - if (num1 > 0) + + /* This code originally checked to see if + * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO + * and then flushed. This caused problems + * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed + * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue + * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING + * still exist. So instead we just flush + * unconditionally. + */ + + s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; + if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { - s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; - num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio); - if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; } - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; + ret= -1; + goto end; } + s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; break; @@ -514,14 +597,43 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) * the client sends its ECDH pub key in * a certificate, the CertificateVerify * message is not sent. + * Also for GOST ciphersuites when + * the client uses its key from the certificate + * for key exchange. */ +#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; +#else + if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; +#endif s->init_num = 0; } + else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) + { + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; + s->init_num=0; + if (!s->session->peer) + break; + /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer + * at this point and digest cached records. + */ + if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + return -1; + } else { int offset=0; int dgst_num; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; s->init_num=0; @@ -531,12 +643,21 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) * should be generalized. But it is next step */ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) - ssl3_digest_cached_records(s); + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + return -1; for (dgst_num=0; dgst_nums3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) { + int dgst_size; + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset])); - offset+=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); + dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); + if (dgst_size < 0) + { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + offset+=dgst_size; } } break; @@ -548,10 +669,27 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; +#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; +#else + if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; +#endif s->init_num=0; break; +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) + case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: + ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->init_num = 0; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + break; +#endif + case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, @@ -622,7 +760,16 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; if (s->hit) + { +#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; +#else + if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; + else + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; +#endif + } else s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; s->init_num=0; @@ -640,11 +787,12 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) s->init_num=0; - if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ + if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ { /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */ + s->renegotiate=0; s->new_session=0; ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); @@ -769,7 +917,11 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with * TLSv1. */ - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + || (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_SRP_USERNAME) +#endif + ) { s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; } @@ -803,6 +955,21 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) goto f_err; } + /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't + * contain one, just return since we do not want to + * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... + */ + if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) + { + unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; + + session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); + + if (cookie_length == 0) + return 1; + } + /* load the client random */ memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; @@ -842,23 +1009,11 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) p+=j; - if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) + if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { /* cookie stuff */ cookie_len = *(p++); - if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && - s->d1->send_cookie == 0) - { - /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */ - if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len) - { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - } - /* * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it @@ -873,7 +1028,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) } /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ - if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && + if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) { memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); @@ -898,6 +1053,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } + + ret = 2; } p += cookie_len; @@ -947,22 +1104,33 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) break; } } - if (j == 0) +/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade + * attack: CVE-2010-4180. + */ +#if 0 + if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) { - if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) - { - /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */ - s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); - } - else + /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may + * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to + * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server + * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not + * enabled, though. */ + c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); + if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) { - /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher - * list if we are asked to reuse it */ - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); - goto f_err; + s->session->cipher = c; + j = 1; } } +#endif + if (j == 0) + { + /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher + * list if we are asked to reuse it */ + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); + goto f_err; + } } /* compression */ @@ -991,7 +1159,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extensions*/ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) + if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) { @@ -1004,6 +1172,59 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } + + /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this + * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate + * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow + * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */ + { + unsigned long Time; + unsigned char *pos; + Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ + pos=s->s3->server_random; + l2n(Time,pos); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) + { + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + } + + if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) + { + SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; + + s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); + if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, + ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) + { + s->hit=1; + s->session->ciphers=ciphers; + s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK; + + ciphers=NULL; + + /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ + pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); + if (pref_cipher == NULL) + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); + goto f_err; + } + + s->session->cipher=pref_cipher; + + if (s->cipher_list) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); + + if (s->cipher_list_by_id) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); + + s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); + s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); + } + } #endif /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other @@ -1011,7 +1232,50 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) + /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ + if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) + { + int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; + /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ + /* Can't disable compression */ + if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) + { + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); + goto f_err; + } + /* Look for resumed compression method */ + for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) + { + comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); + if (comp_id == comp->id) + { + s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; + break; + } + } + if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) + { + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto f_err; + } + /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ + for (m = 0; m < i; m++) + { + if (q[m] == comp_id) + break; + } + if (m >= i) + { + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); + goto f_err; + } + } + else if (s->hit) + comp = NULL; + else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { /* See if we have a match */ int m,nn,o,v,done=0; @@ -1035,6 +1299,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) else comp=NULL; } +#else + /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session + * using compression. + */ + if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) + { + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); + goto f_err; + } #endif /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must @@ -1067,6 +1341,13 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; + /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ + if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) + s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, + ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) != 0)); + if (s->session->not_resumable) + /* do not send a session ticket */ + s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; } else { @@ -1099,7 +1380,11 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; } - ssl3_digest_cached_records(s); + if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) + { + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + goto f_err; + } /* we now have the following setup. * client_random @@ -1112,7 +1397,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. */ - ret=1; + if (ret < 0) ret=1; if (0) { f_err: @@ -1128,16 +1413,22 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p,*d; int i,sl; - unsigned long l,Time; + unsigned long l; +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + unsigned long Time; +#endif if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT p=s->s3->server_random; + /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */ Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ l2n(Time,p); if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) return -1; +#endif /* Do the message type and length last */ d=p= &(buf[4]); @@ -1163,8 +1454,9 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality * is unaffected. */ - if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) - && !s->hit) + if (s->session->not_resumable || + (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) + && !s->hit)) s->session->session_id_length=0; sl=s->session->session_id_length; @@ -1208,13 +1500,13 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; l2n3(l,d); - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=p-buf; s->init_off=0; } - /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ + /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } @@ -1238,7 +1530,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) s->init_off=0; } - /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ + /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } @@ -1262,6 +1554,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #endif EVP_PKEY *pkey; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; unsigned char *p,*d; int al,i; unsigned long type; @@ -1505,21 +1798,44 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if (type & SSL_kSRP) + { + if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || + (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || + (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || + (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); + goto err; + } + r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N; + r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g; + r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s; + r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B; + } + else +#endif { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } - for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) + for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++) { nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) + n+=1+nr[i]; + else +#endif n+=2+nr[i]; } if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { - if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) + if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md)) == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; @@ -1541,8 +1857,16 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p= &(d[4]); - for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) + for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++) { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) + { + *p = nr[i]; + p++; + } + else +#endif s2n(nr[i],p); BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); p+=nr[i]; @@ -1569,6 +1893,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + encodedPoint = NULL; p += encodedlen; } #endif @@ -1589,7 +1914,8 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) * and p points to the space at the end. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA + && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { q=md_buf; j=0; @@ -1597,6 +1923,8 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); + EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, + EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); @@ -1616,44 +1944,41 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) } else #endif -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) + if (md) { - /* lets do DSS */ - EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL); - EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); - if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), - (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) + /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature + * algorithm */ + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA); - goto err; + if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) + { + /* Should never happen */ + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + p+=2; } - s2n(i,p); - n+=i+2; - } - else +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", + EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA) - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) - { - /* let's do ECDSA */ - EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL); + EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP); goto err; } s2n(i,p); n+=i+2; + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) + n+= 2; } else -#endif { /* Is this error check actually needed? */ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; @@ -1706,6 +2031,14 @@ int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) p+=n; n++; + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) + { + nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2); + s2n(nl, p); + p += nl + 2; + n += nl + 2; + } + off=n; p+=2; n+=2; @@ -1844,7 +2177,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) } /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { n2s(p,i); if (n != i+2) @@ -1989,7 +2322,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) krb5_data enc_pms; KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; - EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; + const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; @@ -2004,7 +2337,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) n2s(p,i); enc_ticket.length = i; - if (n < enc_ticket.length + 6) + if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); @@ -2017,7 +2350,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) n2s(p,i); authenticator.length = i; - if (n < enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6) + if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); @@ -2129,7 +2462,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } - if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) + if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the @@ -2139,8 +2472,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher) */ - if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) && - (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); @@ -2310,9 +2642,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); - if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) - EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); + EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); + s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; /* Compute the master secret */ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \ @@ -2418,34 +2751,116 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) } else #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) + { + int param_len; + + n2s(p,i); + param_len=i+2; + if (param_len > n) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); + s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); + if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + p+=i; + } + else +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) - { + { + int ret = 0; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; - unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; - size_t outlen; - - /* Get our certificate privatec key*/ - pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(s->cert->key->privatekey,NULL); + EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; + unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; + size_t outlen=32, inlen; + unsigned long alg_a; + + /* Get our certificate private key*/ + alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; + if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) + pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; + else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) + pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; + + pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL); EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); + /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe + * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from + * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use + * a client certificate for authorization only. */ + client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); + if (client_pub_pkey) + { + if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) + ERR_clear_error(); + } /* Decrypt session key */ - if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) || p[1]!=0x81 ) + if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto err; - } - if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,p+3,p[2]) <0) + goto gerr; + } + if (p[1] == 0x81) + { + start = p+3; + inlen = p[2]; + } + else if (p[1] < 0x80) + { + start = p+2; + inlen = p[1]; + } + else + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + goto gerr; + } + if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto err; + goto gerr; } /* Generate master secret */ - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32); - - } + /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) + ret = 2; + else + ret = 1; + gerr: + EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); + if (ret) + return ret; + else + goto err; + } else { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; @@ -2457,7 +2872,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) return(1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) err: #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH @@ -2478,6 +2893,9 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) long n; int type=0,i,j; X509 *peer; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX mctx; + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, @@ -2546,6 +2964,36 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) } else { + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) + { + int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); + /* Should never happen */ + if (sigalg == -1) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ + if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); + if (md == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG +fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + p += 2; + n -= 2; + } n2s(p,i); n-=2; if (i > n) @@ -2563,6 +3011,37 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) goto f_err; } + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) + { + long hdatalen = 0; + void *hdata; + hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); + if (hdatalen <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", + EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) + || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + + if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } + else #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { @@ -2653,6 +3132,13 @@ f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); } end: + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) + { + BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); + s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; + s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; + } + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return(ret); } @@ -2765,11 +3251,17 @@ int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } + /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + { + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } } else { i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); - if (!i) + if (i <= 0) { al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); @@ -2851,6 +3343,7 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) unsigned int hlen; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; HMAC_CTX hctx; + SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_name[16]; @@ -2889,9 +3382,9 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) * it does all the work otherwise use generated values * from parent ctx. */ - if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) + if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { - if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, + if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) { OPENSSL_free(senc); @@ -2902,10 +3395,10 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) { RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); - HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, + tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); + HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); - memcpy(key_name, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); + memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); } l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p); /* Skip ticket length for now */ @@ -2982,4 +3475,72 @@ int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } + +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN +/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It + * sets the next_proto member in s if found */ +int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) + { + int ok; + int proto_len, padding_len; + long n; + const unsigned char *p; + + /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the + * extension in their ClientHello */ + if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); + return -1; + } + + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, + SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, + SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, + 514, /* See the payload format below */ + &ok); + + if (!ok) + return((int)n); + + /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received + * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset + * by ssl3_get_finished). */ + if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); + return -1; + } + + if (n < 2) + return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ + + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + + /* The payload looks like: + * uint8 proto_len; + * uint8 proto[proto_len]; + * uint8 padding_len; + * uint8 padding[padding_len]; + */ + proto_len = p[0]; + if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) + return 0; + padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; + if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) + return 0; + + s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); + if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); + s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; + + return 1; + } +# endif #endif