X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fs3_clnt.c;h=9e5165c53bf83ce0a5d0c05b0ba173eee72342a4;hp=9fbe15e80c00a33147de922702d9efcddb69bf6f;hb=4e3458a565da5bccf30fe598e87ad7da1ee9daa7;hpb=9e72d496d4f9880ec98f0ed9168246e35c1c3059 diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c index 9fbe15e80c..9e5165c53b 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -5,21 +5,21 @@ * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * + * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * + * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * + * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: @@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * + * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. - * + * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * - * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by + * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source @@ -150,3484 +150,2708 @@ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" -#include "kssl_lcl.h" #include #include #include #include #include -#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -#include -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -#include +# include #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE -#include +# include #endif -static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver); -static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b); - -static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver) - { - if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) - return(SSLv3_client_method()); - else - return(NULL); - } - -IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method, - ssl_undefined_function, - ssl3_connect, - ssl3_get_client_method) - -int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) - { - BUF_MEM *buf=NULL; - unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); - void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; - int ret= -1; - int new_state,state,skip=0; - - RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); - ERR_clear_error(); - clear_sys_error(); - - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb=s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb=s->ctx->info_callback; - - s->in_handshake++; - if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we - * already got and don't await it anymore, because - * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway. - */ - if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) - { - s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; - s->tlsext_hb_seq++; - } -#endif +static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s); +static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b); +static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, + unsigned char *p); - for (;;) - { - state=s->state; - - switch(s->state) - { - case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: - s->renegotiate=1; - s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT; - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; - /* break */ - case SSL_ST_BEFORE: - case SSL_ST_CONNECT: - case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT: - case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT: - - s->server=0; - if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); - - if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, - s->version, NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW); - return -1; - } - - /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */ - s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT; - - if (s->init_buf == NULL) - { - if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - s->init_buf=buf; - buf=NULL; - } - - if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } - - /* setup buffing BIO */ - if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; } - - /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */ - - ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); - - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: - - s->shutdown=0; - ret=ssl3_client_hello(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; - s->init_num=0; - - /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */ - if (s->bbio != s->wbio) - s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio); - - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: - ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - - if (s->hit) - { - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) - { - /* receive renewed session ticket */ - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; - } -#endif - } - else - { - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; - } - s->init_num=0; - break; - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - ret=ssl3_check_finished(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - if (ret == 2) - { - s->hit = 1; - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; - } -#endif - /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */ - /* or PSK */ - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) && - !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) - { - ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (s->tlsext_status_expected) - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; - } - else - { - skip = 1; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; - } -#else - } - else - skip=1; - - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; -#endif - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B: - ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; - s->init_num=0; - - /* at this point we check that we have the - * required stuff from the server */ - if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B: - ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B: - ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) - { - if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s))<=0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto end; - } - } -#endif - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; - s->init_num=0; - - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: - ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: - ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - /* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert - * sent back */ - /* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain - * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */ - /* XXX: For now, we do not support client - * authentication in ECDH cipher suites with - * ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. - * We need to skip the certificate verify - * message when client's ECDH public key is sent - * inside the client certificate. - */ - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) - { - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; - } - else - { - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; - s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; - } - if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) - { - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; - s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; - } - - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: - ret=ssl3_send_client_verify(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; - s->init_num=0; - s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B: - ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, - SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - -#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; -#else - if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; -#endif - s->init_num=0; - - s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - s->session->compress_meth=0; +/* + * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if + * the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. + * Returns 1 on success + * Returns 0 on error + */ +static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned long mask, options = s->options; + + if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) { + /* + * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are + * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order + * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So + * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of + * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the + * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3. + */ + mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) + | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 +#endif + ; +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT) + if (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) { + if ((options & mask) != mask) { + s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION; + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); + return 0; + } + } else { + s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION; + } #else - if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) - s->session->compress_meth=0; - else - s->session->compress_meth= - s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; -#endif - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, - SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - - break; - -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B: - ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; - break; -#endif - - case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: - ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, - SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B, - s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label, - s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; - - /* clear flags */ - s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; - if (s->hit) - { - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; - if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) - { - s->state=SSL_ST_OK; - s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; - s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0; - } - } - else - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; - else -#endif - - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; - } - s->init_num=0; - break; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: - ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B: - ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; -#endif + if ((options & mask) == mask) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); + return 0; + } + s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION; +#endif + + mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; + if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask) + s->version = TLS1_VERSION; + mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) + if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask) + s->version = SSL3_VERSION; +#endif + + if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, + SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); + return 0; + } + + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && FIPS_mode()) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); + return 0; + } + + } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { + /* Determine which DTLS version to use */ + /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */ + if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) { + if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, + SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); + return 0; + } + /* + * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error. + */ + if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); + return 0; + } + /* + * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features. + */ + s->method = DTLSv1_client_method(); + s->version = DTLS1_VERSION; + } else { + /* + * We only support one version: update method + */ + if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) + s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method(); + s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; + } + } + + s->client_version = s->version; + + return 1; +} - case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: - - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - - if (s->hit) - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; - else - s->state=SSL_ST_OK; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: - s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; - if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; - break; - - case SSL_ST_OK: - /* clean a few things up */ - ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); - - if (s->init_buf != NULL) - { - BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); - s->init_buf=NULL; - } - - /* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, - * remove the buffering now */ - if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER)) - ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); - /* else do it later in ssl3_write */ - - s->init_num=0; - s->renegotiate=0; - s->new_session=0; - - ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); - if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; - - ret=1; - /* s->server=0; */ - s->handshake_func=ssl3_connect; - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; - - if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); - - goto end; - /* break; */ - - default: - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); - ret= -1; - goto end; - /* break; */ - } - - /* did we do anything */ - if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) - { - if (s->debug) - { - if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) - goto end; - } - - if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) - { - new_state=s->state; - s->state=state; - cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1); - s->state=new_state; - } - } - skip=0; - } -end: - s->in_handshake--; - if (buf != NULL) - BUF_MEM_free(buf); - if (cb != NULL) - cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret); - return(ret); - } - - -int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s) - { - unsigned char *buf; - unsigned char *p,*d; - int i; - unsigned long l; - int al = 0; +int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char *p, *d; + int i; + unsigned long l; + int al = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - int j; - SSL_COMP *comp; -#endif - - buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) - { - SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; - if ((sess == NULL) || - (sess->ssl_version != s->version) || -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - !sess->session_id_length || -#else - (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || -#endif - (sess->not_resumable)) - { - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0)) - goto err; - } - if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) - { - /* Determine which DTLS version to use */ - int options = s->options; - /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */ - if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) - { - if (tls1_suiteb(s)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); - goto err; - } - /* Disabling all versions is silly: return an - * error. - */ - if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); - goto err; - } - /* Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 - * features. - */ - s->method = DTLSv1_client_method(); - s->version = DTLS1_VERSION; - } - else - { - /* We only support one version: update method */ - if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) - s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method(); - s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; - } - s->client_version = s->version; - } - /* else use the pre-loaded session */ - - p=s->s3->client_random; - - /* for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are - * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - { - size_t idx; - i = 1; - for (idx=0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) - { - if (p[idx]) - { - i = 0; - break; - } - } - } - else - i = 1; - - if (i) - ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, - sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); - - /* Do the message type and length last */ - d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s); - - /* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from - * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version - * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also - * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can - * choke if we initially report a higher version then - * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This - * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it - * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports - * 1.0. - * - * Possible scenario with previous logic: - * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 - * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 - * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. - * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. - * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. - * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now - * know that is maximum server supports. - * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret - * containing version 1.0. - * - * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the - * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely - * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't - * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with - * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using - * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to - * the negotiated version. - */ -#if 0 - *(p++)=s->version>>8; - *(p++)=s->version&0xff; - s->client_version=s->version; -#else - *(p++)=s->client_version>>8; - *(p++)=s->client_version&0xff; -#endif - - /* Random stuff */ - memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; - - /* Session ID */ - if (s->new_session) - i=0; - else - i=s->session->session_id_length; - *(p++)=i; - if (i != 0) - { - if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i); - p+=i; - } - - /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - { - if ( s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len; - memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); - p += s->d1->cookie_len; - } - - /* Ciphers supported */ - i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0); - if (i == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); - goto err; - } + int j; + SSL_COMP *comp; +#endif + SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; + + buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + + /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */ + if (ssl_set_version(s) == 0) + goto err; + + if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) || + /* + * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared + * "ticket" without a session ID. + */ + (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || + (sess->not_resumable)) { + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) + goto err; + } + /* else use the pre-loaded session */ + + p = s->s3->client_random; + + /* + * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are + * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify + */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + size_t idx; + i = 1; + for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) { + if (p[idx]) { + i = 0; + break; + } + } + } else + i = 1; + + if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, + sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0) + goto err; + + /* Do the message type and length last */ + d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + + /*- + * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from + * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version + * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also + * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can + * choke if we initially report a higher version then + * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This + * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it + * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports + * 1.0. + * + * Possible scenario with previous logic: + * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 + * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 + * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. + * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. + * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. + * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now + * know that is maximum server supports. + * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret + * containing version 1.0. + * + * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the + * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely + * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't + * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with + * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using + * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to + * the negotiated version. + */ + *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8; + *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff; + + /* Random stuff */ + memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + + /* Session ID */ + if (s->new_session) + i = 0; + else + i = s->session->session_id_length; + *(p++) = i; + if (i != 0) { + if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i); + p += i; + } + + /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len; + memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); + p += s->d1->cookie_len; + } + + /* Ciphers supported */ + i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2])); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); + goto err; + } #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH - /* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes - * as hack workaround chop number of supported ciphers - * to keep it well below this if we use TLS v1.2 - */ - if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION - && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH) - i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; -#endif - s2n(i,p); - p+=i; - - /* COMPRESSION */ + /* + * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround + * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we + * use TLS v1.2 + */ + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION + && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH) + i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; +#endif + s2n(i, p); + p += i; + + /* COMPRESSION */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - *(p++)=1; + *(p++) = 1; #else - if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods) - j=0; - else - j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); - *(p++)=1+j; - for (i=0; ictx->comp_methods,i); - *(p++)=comp->id; - } -#endif - *(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - /* TLS extensions*/ - if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } - if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } -#endif - - l= p-d; - ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l); - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ - return ssl_do_write(s); -err: - return(-1); - } - -int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) - { - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; - const SSL_CIPHER *c; - CERT *ct = s->cert; - unsigned char *p,*d; - int i,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ok; - unsigned int j; - long n; + if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods) + j = 0; + else + j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); + *(p++) = 1 + j; + for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { + comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); + *(p++) = comp->id; + } +#endif + *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */ + + /* TLS extensions */ + if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + goto err; + } + if ((p = + ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, + &al)) == NULL) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + l = p - d; + if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + return 1; + err: + statem_set_error(s); + return 0; +} + +enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, unsigned long n) +{ + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + PACKET pkt, session_id; + size_t session_id_len; + unsigned char *cipherchars; + int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + unsigned int compression; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - SSL_COMP *comp; -#endif - /* Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not - * match so set first packet if we're negotiating version. - */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - s->first_packet = 1; - - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, - -1, - 20000, /* ?? */ - &ok); - - if (!ok) return((int)n); - - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - { - s->first_packet = 0; - if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) - { - if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0) - { - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; - return 1; - } - else /* already sent a cookie */ - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - } - } - - if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) - { - /* Work out correct protocol version to use */ - int hversion = (p[0] << 8)|p[1]; - int options = s->options; - if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION - && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) - s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method(); - else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); - s->version = hversion; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION - && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) - s->method = DTLSv1_client_method(); - else - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); - s->version = hversion; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - s->version = s->client_version = s->method->version; - } - - if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); - s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|p[1]; - al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - p+=2; - - /* load the server hello data */ - /* load the server random */ - memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; - - /* get the session-id */ - j= *(p++); - - if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - /* check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared secret */ - if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) - { - SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; - s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); - if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, - &s->session->master_key_length, - NULL, &pref_cipher, - s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) - { - s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? - pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j); - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - } - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ - - if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length - && memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0) - { - if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length - || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length)) - { - /* actually a client application bug */ - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); - goto f_err; - } - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - s->hit=1; - } - else /* a miss or crap from the other end */ - { - /* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new - * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */ - s->hit=0; - if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) - { - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0)) - { - goto f_err; - } - } - s->session->session_id_length=j; - memcpy(s->session->session_id,p,j); /* j could be 0 */ - } - p+=j; - c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p); - if (c == NULL) - { - /* unknown cipher */ - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */ - if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) - ct->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; - else - ct->mask_ssl = 0; - /* If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, - * so return an error. - */ - if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL); - - sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); - i=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk,c); - if (i < 0) - { - /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - - /* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher - and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that - cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */ - if (s->session->cipher) - s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; - if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) - { -/* Workaround is now obsolete */ -#if 0 - if (!(s->options & - SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)) -#endif - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - } - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; - /* Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for - * client authentication. - */ - if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) - goto f_err; - /* lets get the compression algorithm */ - /* COMPRESSION */ + SSL_COMP *comp; +#endif + + if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + + if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) { + unsigned int sversion; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &sversion)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + +#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION +#error Code needs updating for new TLS version +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 + if ((sversion == SSL3_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) { + if (FIPS_mode()) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto f_err; + } + s->method = SSLv3_client_method(); + } else +#endif + if ((sversion == TLS1_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) { + s->method = TLSv1_client_method(); + } else if ((sversion == TLS1_1_VERSION) && + !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) { + s->method = TLSv1_1_client_method(); + } else if ((sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION) && + !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) { + s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method(); + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto f_err; + } + s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version; + + if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW); + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto f_err; + } + } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { + /* Work out correct protocol version to use */ + unsigned int hversion; + int options; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &hversion)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + options = s->options; + if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) + s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method(); + else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); + s->version = hversion; + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto f_err; + } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) + s->method = DTLSv1_client_method(); + else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); + s->version = hversion; + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto f_err; + } + s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version; + } else { + unsigned char *vers; + + if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &vers, 2)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + if ((vers[0] != (s->version >> 8)) + || (vers[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); + s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | vers[1]; + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto f_err; + } + } + + /* load the server hello data */ + /* load the server random */ + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + s->hit = 0; + + /* Get the session-id. */ + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &session_id)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id); + if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id + || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret. + * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. + * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. + * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) + * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application + * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST + * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone + * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if + * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the + * server wants to resume. + */ + if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb && + s->session->tlsext_tick) { + SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; + s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); + if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, + &s->session->master_key_length, + NULL, &pref_cipher, + s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { + s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? + pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars); + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + } + + if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length + && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id, + session_id_len) == 0) { + if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length + || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { + /* actually a client application bug */ + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); + goto f_err; + } + s->hit = 1; + } else { + /* + * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server + * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION. + * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID, + * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be + * overwritten if the server refuses resumption. + */ + if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { + goto f_err; + } + } + + s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len; + /* session_id_len could be 0 */ + memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), + session_id_len); + } + + c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars); + if (c == NULL) { + /* unknown cipher */ + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */ + if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) + s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; + else + s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0; + /* + * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so + * return an error. + */ + if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + + sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); + i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); + if (i < 0) { + /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher + * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is + * set and use it for comparison. + */ + if (s->session->cipher) + s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; + if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; + /* + * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client + * authentication. + */ + if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) + goto f_err; + /* lets get the compression algorithm */ + /* COMPRESSION */ + if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &compression)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - if (*(p++) != 0) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); - goto f_err; - } - /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session - * using compression. - */ - if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); - goto f_err; - } + if (compression != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto f_err; + } + /* + * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session + * using compression. + */ + if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); + goto f_err; + } #else - j= *(p++); - if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - if (j == 0) - comp=NULL; - else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); - goto f_err; - } - else - comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j); - - if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); - goto f_err; - } - else - { - s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; - } -#endif + if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + if (compression == 0) + comp = NULL; + else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); + goto f_err; + } else { + comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression); + } + + if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto f_err; + } else { + s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; + } +#endif + + /* TLS extensions */ + if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); + goto err; + } + + if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) { + /* wrong packet length */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { + unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; + char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; + + /* + * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if + * no SCTP used. + */ + snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, + sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), + DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); + + if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, + sizeof(sctpauthkey), + labelbuffer, + sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, + 0) <= 0) + goto err; + + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), + BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, + sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); + } +#endif + + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + err: + statem_set_error(s); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; +} -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - /* TLS extensions*/ - if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } -#endif +enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, unsigned long n) +{ + int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx; + unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len; + X509 *x = NULL; + unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; + STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + PACKET pkt; + + if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + + if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &cert_list_len) + || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != cert_list_len) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt)) { + if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &cert_len) + || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + certstart = certbytes; + x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len); + if (x == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto f_err; + } + if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + x = NULL; + } + + i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); + if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { + al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); + goto f_err; + } + ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ + if (i > 1) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i); + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + goto f_err; + } + + s->session->peer_chain = sk; + /* + * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate, + * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c + */ + x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); + sk = NULL; + /* + * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end + */ + + pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + + if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { + x = NULL; + al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); + goto f_err; + } + + i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey); + if (i < 0) { + x = NULL; + al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + + exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); + if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) { + x = NULL; + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + s->session->peer_type = i; + + X509_free(s->session->peer); + X509_up_ref(x); + s->session->peer = x; + s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; + + x = NULL; + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + goto done; + + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + err: + statem_set_error(s); + done: + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + X509_free(x); + sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); + return ret; +} - if (p != (d+n)) - { - /* wrong packet length */ - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - - return(1); -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); -err: - return(-1); - } - -int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) - { - int al,i,ok,ret= -1; - unsigned long n,nc,llen,l; - X509 *x=NULL; - const unsigned char *q,*p; - unsigned char *d; - STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; - SESS_CERT *sc; - EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; - int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ - - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, - -1, - s->max_cert_list, - &ok); - - if (!ok) return((int)n); - - if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) || - ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) && - (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) - { - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; - return(1); - } - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - - if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - n2l3(p,llen); - if (llen+3 != n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - for (nc=0; nc llen) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - q=p; - x=d2i_X509(NULL,&q,l); - if (x == NULL) - { - al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); - goto f_err; - } - if (q != (p+l)) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - x=NULL; - nc+=l+3; - p=q; - } - - i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); - if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0) -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) && - (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ - ) - { - al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); - goto f_err; - } - ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ - if (i > 1) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i); - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto f_err; - } - - sc=ssl_sess_cert_new(); - if (sc == NULL) goto err; - - if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert); - s->session->sess_cert=sc; - - sc->cert_chain=sk; - /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's - * certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */ - x=sk_X509_value(sk,0); - sk=NULL; - /* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/ - - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x); - - /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ - need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) && - (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) - ? 0 : 1; - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x); - printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey)); - printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name, - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) - { - x=NULL; - al=SSL3_AL_FATAL; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); - goto f_err; - } - - i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey); - if (need_cert && i < 0) - { - x=NULL; - al=SSL3_AL_FATAL; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - if (need_cert) - { - int exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); - if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) - { - x=NULL; - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - sc->peer_cert_type=i; - CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - /* Why would the following ever happen? - * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */ - if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) - X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509); - sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x; - sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]); - - if (s->session->peer != NULL) - X509_free(s->session->peer); - CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - s->session->peer=x; - } - else - { - sc->peer_cert_type=i; - sc->peer_key= NULL; - - if (s->session->peer != NULL) - X509_free(s->session->peer); - s->session->peer=NULL; - } - s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; - - x=NULL; - ret=1; - if (0) - { -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - } -err: - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - X509_free(x); - sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); - return(ret); - } - -int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) - { +enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, unsigned long n) +{ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; + unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; #endif - EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; - unsigned char *param,*p; - int al,i,j,param_len,ok; - long n,alg_k,alg_a; - EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; - const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; + int al, j, verify_ret; + long alg_k, alg_a; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - RSA *rsa=NULL; + RSA *rsa = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - DH *dh=NULL; + DH *dh = NULL; #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; - BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; - EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; - int curve_nid = 0; - int encoded_pt_len = 0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; + BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; + EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; + int curve_nid = 0; #endif + PACKET pkt, save_param_start, signature; - /* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() - * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */ - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, - -1, - s->max_cert_list, - &ok); - if (!ok) return((int)n); - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - /* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be - omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set - session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems - later.*/ - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) - { - s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new(); - if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) - OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); - s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL; - } -#endif - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; - return(1); - } + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); + + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + + if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + save_param_start = pkt; - param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) - { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) - { - RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp); - s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL; - } + RSA_free(s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp); + s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) - { - DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp); - s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL; - } + DH_free(s->s3->peer_dh_tmp); + s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = NULL; #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) - { - EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp); - s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL; - } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + EC_KEY_free(s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp); + s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL; #endif - } - else - { - s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new(); - } - param_len=0; - alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); + alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; + + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) - { - char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; - - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - n2s(p,i); - param_len=i+2; - /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used - * in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the - * maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as - * long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */ - if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - /* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL - * characters, the hint is truncated from the first - * NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a - * NULL-terminated string. */ - memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i); - memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i); - if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); - s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint); - if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } - - p+=i; - n-=param_len; - } - else -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ + /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */ + if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { + PACKET psk_identity_hint; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in + * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of + * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK + * identity. + */ + if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + + if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint, + &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + } + + /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */ + if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { + } else +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) - { - n2s(p,i); - param_len=i+2; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p+=i; - - n2s(p,i); - param_len+=i+2; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p+=i; - - i = (unsigned int)(p[0]); - p++; - param_len+=i+1; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p+=i; - - n2s(p,i); - param_len+=i+2; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p+=i; - n-=param_len; - - if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); - goto f_err; - } + if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { + PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &prime) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &generator) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &salt) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &server_pub)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + if ((s->srp_ctx.N = + BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), + PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL + || (s->srp_ctx.g = + BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), + PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL + || (s->srp_ctx.s = + BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt), + PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL + || (s->srp_ctx.B = + BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub), + PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); + goto f_err; + } /* We must check if there is a certificate */ + if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS)) + pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); + } else +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); -#else - if (0) - ; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509); -#endif - } - else -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) - { - if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - n2s(p,i); - param_len=i+2; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p+=i; - - n2s(p,i); - param_len+=i+2; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p+=i; - n-=param_len; - - /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */ - if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); - else - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa; - rsa=NULL; - } -#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ - if (0) - ; + if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { + PACKET mod, exp; + /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */ + if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &mod) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &exp)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if ((rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&mod), PACKET_remaining(&mod), + rsa->n)) == NULL + || (rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&exp), PACKET_remaining(&exp), + rsa->e)) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + + /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */ + if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) + pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); + else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } + + s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa; + rsa = NULL; + } +#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + if (0) ; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) - { - if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - n2s(p,i); - param_len=i+2; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p+=i; - - n2s(p,i); - param_len+=i+2; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p+=i; - - n2s(p,i); - param_len+=i+2; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p+=i; - n-=param_len; - - if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, - DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) - { - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); - goto f_err; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); -#else - if (0) - ; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509); -#endif - /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ - - s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh; - dh=NULL; - } - else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); - goto f_err; - } -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) - { - EC_GROUP *ngroup; - const EC_GROUP *group; - - if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the - * server's ephemeral ECDH public key. - * Keep accumulating lengths of various components in - * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n. - */ - - /* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves - * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. - */ - param_len=3; - /* Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has - * sent an invalid curve. - */ - if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, param_len)) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); - goto f_err; - } - - if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0) - { - al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); - goto f_err; - } - - ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid); - if (ngroup == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - EC_GROUP_free(ngroup); - - group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh); - - if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && - (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) - { - al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); - goto f_err; - } - - p+=3; - - /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */ - if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) || - ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */ - p+=1; - param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len); - if ((param_len > n) || - (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, - p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); - goto f_err; - } - - n-=param_len; - p+=encoded_pt_len; - - /* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention - * the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server - * key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA. - */ - if (0) ; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA - else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); -#endif - /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ - EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint); - s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh; - ecdh=NULL; - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - bn_ctx = NULL; - EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); - srvr_ecpoint = NULL; - } - else if (alg_k) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; - } -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ - - - /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */ - - /* if it was signed, check the signature */ - if (pkey != NULL) - { - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - { - int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey); - if (rv == -1) - goto err; - else if (rv == 0) - { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } + else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { + PACKET prime, generator, pub_key; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &prime) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &generator) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &pub_key)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), + PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL + || (dh->g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), + PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL + || (dh->pub_key = + BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), + PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL)) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (BN_is_zero(dh->p) || BN_is_zero(dh->g) || BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); + goto f_err; + } + + if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + goto f_err; + } + if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS)) + pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); + /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ + + s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = dh; + dh = NULL; + } +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { + EC_GROUP *ngroup; + const EC_GROUP *group; + PACKET encoded_pt; + unsigned char *ecparams; + + if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH + * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and + * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. + */ + if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &ecparams, 3)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + /* + * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an + * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes. + */ + if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); + goto f_err; + } + + if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2))) == 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); + goto f_err; + } + + ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid); + if (ngroup == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + EC_GROUP_free(ngroup); + + group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh); + + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && + (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { + al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); + goto f_err; + } + + /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */ + if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) || + ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &encoded_pt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), + PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), bn_ctx) == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign + * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA + * and ECDSA. + */ + if (0) ; +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) + pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); +# endif +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) + pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); +# endif + /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ + EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint); + s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh; + ecdh = NULL; + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + bn_ctx = NULL; + EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); + srvr_ecpoint = NULL; + } else if (alg_k) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ + + /* if it was signed, check the signature */ + if (pkey != NULL) { + PACKET params; + /* + * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference + * equals the length of the parameters. + */ + if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms, + PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) - + PACKET_remaining(&pkt))) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + unsigned char *sigalgs; + int rv; + if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey); + if (rv == -1) + goto err; + else if (rv == 0) { + goto f_err; + } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG -fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif - p += 2; - n -= 2; - } - else - md = EVP_sha1(); - - n2s(p,i); - n-=2; - j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); - - if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) - { - /* wrong packet length */ - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - + fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + } else { + md = EVP_sha1(); + } + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &signature) + || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + if (j < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * Check signature length + */ + if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)j) { + /* wrong packet length */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - { - int num; - - j=0; - q=md_buf; - for (num=2; num > 0; num--) - { - EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, - EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); - EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) - ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i); - q+=i; - j+=i; - } - i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, - pkey->pkey.rsa); - if (i < 0) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); - goto f_err; - } - if (i == 0) - { - /* bad signature */ - al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - } - else -#endif - { - EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); - EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len); - if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0) - { - /* bad signature */ - al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - } - } - else - { - /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */ - if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) - { - /* Might be wrong key type, check it */ - if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) - /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - /* still data left over */ - if (n != 0) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; - } - } - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); - return(1); -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); -err: - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + int num; + unsigned int size; + + j = 0; + q = md_buf; + for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { + EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); + EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2) + ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms), + PACKET_remaining(¶ms)); + EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size); + q += size; + j += size; + } + verify_ret = + RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, PACKET_data(&signature), + PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey->pkey.rsa); + if (verify_ret < 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); + goto f_err; + } + if (verify_ret == 0) { + /* bad signature */ + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } else +#endif + { + EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms), + PACKET_remaining(¶ms)); + if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), + PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) { + /* bad signature */ + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } + } else { + /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */ + if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) { + /* Might be wrong key type, check it */ + if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) + /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + /* still data left over */ + if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } + } + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + err: + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (rsa != NULL) - RSA_free(rsa); + RSA_free(rsa); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (dh != NULL) - DH_free(dh); + DH_free(dh); #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); - if (ecdh != NULL) - EC_KEY_free(ecdh); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); + EC_KEY_free(ecdh); #endif - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); - return(-1); - } - -int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) - { - int ok,ret=0; - unsigned long n,nc,l; - unsigned int llen, ctype_num,i; - X509_NAME *xn=NULL; - const unsigned char *p,*q; - unsigned char *d; - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL; - - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B, - -1, - s->max_cert_list, - &ok); - - if (!ok) return((int)n); - - s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0; - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) - { - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; - /* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records - * as we wont be doing client auth. - */ - if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) - { - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) - goto err; - } - return(1); - } - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto err; - } - - /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) - { - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER); - goto err; - } - } - - p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - - if ((ca_sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* get the certificate types */ - ctype_num= *(p++); - if (s->cert->ctypes) - { - OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes); - s->cert->ctypes = NULL; - } - if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) - { - /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */ - s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num); - memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, p, ctype_num); - s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num; - ctype_num=SSL3_CT_NUMBER; - } - for (i=0; is3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i]; - p+=p[-1]; - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - { - n2s(p, llen); - /* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and - * following length value. - */ - if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ - for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) - { - s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL; - s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0; - } - if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_process_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); - goto err; - } - p += llen; - } - - /* get the CA RDNs */ - n2s(p,llen); -#if 0 + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + statem_set_error(s); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; +} + +enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, unsigned long n) { -FILE *out; -out=fopen("/tmp/vsign.der","w"); -fwrite(p,1,llen,out); -fclose(out); + int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len; + X509_NAME *xn = NULL; + unsigned char *data; + unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; + PACKET pkt; + + if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* get the certificate types */ + if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &ctype_num) + || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, ctype_num)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes); + s->cert->ctypes = NULL; + if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) { + /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */ + s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num); + if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num); + s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num; + ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER; + } + for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++) + s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i]; + + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &list_len) + || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, list_len)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { + s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL; + s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; + } + if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + + /* get the CA RDNs */ + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &list_len) + || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != list_len) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt)) { + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &name_len) + || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + namestart = namebytes; + + if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes, + name_len)) == NULL) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + + /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ + s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1; + s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num; + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); + s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk; + ca_sk = NULL; + + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + goto done; + err: + statem_set_error(s); + done: + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); + return ret; } -#endif - if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; - } - - for (nc=0; nc llen) - { - if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) - goto cont; /* netscape bugs */ - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - q=p; - - if ((xn=d2i_X509_NAME(NULL,&q,l)) == NULL) - { - /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */ - if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG) - goto cont; - else - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); - goto err; - } - } - - if (q != (p+l)) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; - } - if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk,xn)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - p+=l; - nc+=l+2; - } - - if (0) - { -cont: - ERR_clear_error(); - } - - /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ - s->s3->tmp.cert_req=1; - s->s3->tmp.ctype_num=ctype_num; - if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL) - sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free); - s->s3->tmp.ca_names=ca_sk; - ca_sk=NULL; - - ret=1; -err: - if (ca_sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk,X509_NAME_free); - return(ret); - } - -static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b) - { - return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b)); - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT -int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) - { - int ok,al,ret=0, ticklen; - long n; - const unsigned char *p; - unsigned char *d; - - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, - -1, - 16384, - &ok); - - if (!ok) - return((int)n); - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) - { - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; - return(1); - } - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - if (n < 6) - { - /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint); - n2s(p, ticklen); - /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */ - if (ticklen + 6 != n) - { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if (s->session->tlsext_tick) - { - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick); - s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); - if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen); - s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; - /* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion. - * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server - * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal - * client session ID matching to work and we know much - * earlier that the ticket has been accepted. - * - * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the - * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine - * session resumption. - * - * We choose the former approach because this fits in with - * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set - * to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the - * ticket. - */ - EVP_Digest(p, ticklen, - s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 - EVP_sha256(), NULL); -#else - EVP_sha1(), NULL); -#endif - ret=1; - return(ret); -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); -err: - return(-1); - } - -int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s) - { - int ok, al; - unsigned long resplen,n; - const unsigned char *p; - - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, - SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, - 16384, - &ok); - - if (!ok) return((int)n); - if (n < 4) - { - /* need at least status type + length */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) - { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - n2l3(p, resplen); - if (resplen + 4 != n) - { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen); - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) - { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen; - if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) - { - int ret; - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - if (ret == 0) - { - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); - goto f_err; - } - if (ret < 0) - { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } - } - return 1; -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - return(-1); - } -#endif +static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) +{ + return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b)); +} + +enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned long n) +{ + int al; + unsigned int ticklen; + unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint; + PACKET pkt; + + if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_net_4(&pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint) + || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &ticklen) + || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != ticklen) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */ + if (ticklen == 0) + return 1; + + if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { + int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; + SSL_SESSION *new_sess; + /* + * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new + * one + */ + if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) { + /* + * Remove the old session from the cache + */ + if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) { + if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) + s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx, + s->session); + } else { + /* We carry on if this fails */ + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); + } + } + + if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = new_sess; + } + + OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick); + s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0; + + s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); + if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; + s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; + /* + * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set + * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in + * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work + * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The + * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is + * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption. + * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions + * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is + * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket. + */ + EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen, + s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, + EVP_sha256(), NULL); + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + err: + statem_set_error(s); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; +} -int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s) - { - int ok,ret=0; - long n; - - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B, - SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, - 30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */ - &ok); - - if (!ok) return((int)n); - if (n > 0) - { - /* should contain no data */ - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - return -1; - } - ret=1; - return(ret); - } - - -int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) - { - unsigned char *p; - int n; - unsigned long alg_k; +enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, unsigned long n) +{ + int al; + unsigned long resplen; + unsigned int type; + PACKET pkt; + + if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &type) + || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &resplen) + || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != resplen) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); + s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); + if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen; + if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { + int ret; + ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); + if (ret == 0) { + al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); + goto f_err; + } + if (ret < 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + } + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + statem_set_error(s); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; +} + +enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, unsigned long n) +{ + if (n > 0) { + /* should contain no data */ + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + statem_set_error(s); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { + if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + statem_set_error(s); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* Only applies to renegotiation */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + && s->renegotiate != 0) + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + else +#endif + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; +} + +int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned char *p; + int n; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + size_t pskhdrlen = 0; +#endif + unsigned long alg_k; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - unsigned char *q; - EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; + unsigned char *q; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - KSSL_ERR kssl_err; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL; - const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; - unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; - int encoded_pt_len = 0; - BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL; + const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; + unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; + int encoded_pt_len = 0; + BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #endif + unsigned char *pms = NULL; + size_t pmslen = 0; + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) - { - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - /* Fool emacs indentation */ - if (0) {} +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { + int psk_err = 1; + /* + * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a + * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating + * strnlen. + */ + char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; + size_t identitylen; + unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; + size_t psklen; + + if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); + goto err; + } + + memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); + + psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint, + identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, + psk, sizeof(psk)); + + if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto psk_err; + } else if (psklen == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); + goto psk_err; + } + + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); + s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen); + OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); + + if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { + OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); + goto memerr; + } + + s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; + + identitylen = strlen(identity); + if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto psk_err; + } + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); + s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); + if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { + OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); + goto memerr; + } + + s2n(identitylen, p); + memcpy(p, identity, identitylen); + pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen; + p += identitylen; + psk_err = 0; +psk_err: + OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); + if (psk_err != 0) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { + n = 0; + } else +#endif + + /* Fool emacs indentation */ + if (0) { + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) - { - RSA *rsa; - unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; - - if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) - { - /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) - rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; - else - { - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); - if ((pkey == NULL) || - (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || - (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - } - - tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8; - tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff; - if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0) - goto err; - - s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf; - - q=p; - /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) - p+=2; - n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf, - tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); -#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK - if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++; - if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70; -#endif - if (n <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); - goto err; - } - - /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) - { - s2n(n,q); - n+=2; - } - - s->session->master_key_length= - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, - tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf); - OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf); - } -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) - { - krb5_error_code krb5rc; - KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; - /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */ - krb5_data *enc_ticket; - krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; - const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; - unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; - unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - int padl, outl = sizeof(epms); - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n", - alg_k, SSL_kKRB5); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - authp = NULL; -#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH - if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator; -#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */ - - krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, - &kssl_err); - enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); - if (enc == NULL) - goto err; -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - { - printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc); - if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text) - printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text); - } -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - if (krb5rc) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL, - SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - kssl_err.reason); - goto err; - } - - /* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ - ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in: - ** - ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length) - ** n = krb5_ap_req.length; - ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length); - ** if (krb5_ap_req.data) - ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req); - ** - ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper - ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson ) - ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced - ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value. - ** Example: - ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms - ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with - ** optional authenticator omitted. - */ - - /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */ - s2n(enc_ticket->length,p); - memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length); - p+= enc_ticket->length; - n = enc_ticket->length + 2; - - /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */ - if (authp && authp->length) - { - s2n(authp->length,p); - memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length); - p+= authp->length; - n+= authp->length + 2; - - free(authp->data); - authp->data = NULL; - authp->length = 0; - } - else - { - s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */ - n+=2; - } - - tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8; - tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff; - if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0) - goto err; - - /* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed. - ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL); - ** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx, - ** kssl_ctx->length); - ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv); - */ - - memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL, - kssl_ctx->key,iv); - EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf, - sizeof tmp_buf); - EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl); - outl += padl; - if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); - - /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */ - s2n(outl,p); - memcpy(p, epms, outl); - p+=outl; - n+=outl + 2; - - s->session->master_key_length= - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, - tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); - - OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); - OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl); - } + else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { + RSA *rsa; + pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; + pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); + if (!pms) + goto memerr; + + if (s->session->peer == NULL) { + /* + * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) + rsa = s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp; + else { + pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); + if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) + || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + goto err; + } + rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + } + + pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; + pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; + if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0) + goto err; + + q = p; + /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) + p += 2; + n = RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen, pms, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); +# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK + if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) + p[1]++; + if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) + tmp_buf[0] = 0x70; +# endif + if (n <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); + goto err; + } + + /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { + s2n(n, q); + n += 2; + } + } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) - { - DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt; - SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert; - - if (scert == NULL) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - goto err; - } - - if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) - dh_srvr=scert->peer_dh_tmp; - else - { - /* we get them from the cert */ - int idx = scert->peer_cert_type; - EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL; - dh_srvr = NULL; - if (idx >= 0) - spkey = X509_get_pubkey( - scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509); - if (spkey) - { - dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey); - EVP_PKEY_free(spkey); - } - if (dh_srvr == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) - { - /* Use client certificate key */ - EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; - dh_clnt = NULL; - if (clkey) - dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey); - if (dh_clnt == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - else - { - /* generate a new random key */ - if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); - DH_free(dh_clnt); - goto err; - } - } - - /* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but - * make sure to clear it out afterwards */ - - n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt); - if (scert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL) - DH_free(dh_srvr); - - if (n <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); - DH_free(dh_clnt); - goto err; - } - - /* generate master key from the result */ - s->session->master_key_length= - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key,p,n); - /* clean up */ - memset(p,0,n); - - if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) - n = 0; - else - { - /* send off the data */ - n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key); - s2n(n,p); - BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p); - n+=2; - } - - DH_free(dh_clnt); - - /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/ - } -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) - { - const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL; - EC_KEY *tkey; - int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0; - int field_size = 0; - - if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - goto err; - } - - /* Did we send out the client's - * ECDH share for use in premaster - * computation as part of client certificate? - * If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. - */ - if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) - { - /* XXX: For now, we do not support client - * authentication using ECDH certificates. - * To add such support, one needs to add - * code that checks for appropriate - * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. - * For example, the cert have an ECC - * key on the same curve as the server's - * and the key should be authorized for - * key agreement. - * - * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect - * to skip sending the certificate verify - * message. - * - * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) && - * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type == - * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...) - * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1; - */ - } - - if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) - { - tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp; - } - else - { - /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */ - srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \ - sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); - if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) || - (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) || - (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec; - } - - srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); - srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey); - - if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (ecdh_clnt_cert) - { - /* Reuse key info from our certificate - * We only need our private key to perform - * the ECDH computation. - */ - const BIGNUM *priv_key; - tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec; - priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); - if (priv_key == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - } - else - { - /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */ - if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - } - - /* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but - * make sure to clear it out afterwards - */ - - field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group); - if (field_size <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL); - if (n <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - - /* generate master key from the result */ - s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \ - -> generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, - p, n); - - memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */ - - if (ecdh_clnt_cert) - { - /* Send empty client key exch message */ - n = 0; - } - else - { - /* First check the size of encoding and - * allocate memory accordingly. - */ - encoded_pt_len = - EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), - POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, - NULL, 0, NULL); - - encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) - OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * - sizeof(unsigned char)); - bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); - if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || - (bn_ctx == NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* Encode the public key */ - n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), - POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, - encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx); - - *p = n; /* length of encoded point */ - /* Encoded point will be copied here */ - p += 1; - /* copy the point */ - memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n); - /* increment n to account for length field */ - n += 1; - } - - /* Free allocated memory */ - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); - if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) - EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); - EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); - } -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ - else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) - { - /* GOST key exchange message creation */ - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; - X509 *peer_cert; - size_t msglen; - unsigned int md_len; - int keytype; - unsigned char premaster_secret[32],shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; - EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash; - EVP_PKEY *pub_key; - - /* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */ - peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509; - if (!peer_cert) - peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509; - if (!peer_cert) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); - goto err; - } - - pkey_ctx=EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key=X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert),NULL); - /* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key - - * parameters match those of server certificate, use - * certificate key for key exchange - */ - - /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ - - EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx); - /* Generate session key */ - RAND_bytes(premaster_secret,32); - /* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key */ - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) { - if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) { - /* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key - * would be used - */ - ERR_clear_error(); - } - } - /* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific - * context data */ - ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); - EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94)); - EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len); - EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash); - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx,-1,EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, - 8,shared_ukm)<0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); - goto err; - } - /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ - /*Encapsulate it into sequence */ - *(p++)=V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; - msglen=255; - if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx,tmp,&msglen,premaster_secret,32)<0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); - goto err; - } - if (msglen >= 0x80) - { - *(p++)=0x81; - *(p++)= msglen & 0xff; - n=msglen+3; - } - else - { - *(p++)= msglen & 0xff; - n=msglen+2; - } - memcpy(p, tmp, msglen); - /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) - { - /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */ - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; - } - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); - s->session->master_key_length= - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32); - EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key); - - } + else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { + DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt; + if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) + dh_srvr = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp; + else { + /* we get them from the cert */ + EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL; + dh_srvr = NULL; + spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); + if (spkey) { + dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey); + EVP_PKEY_free(spkey); + } + if (dh_srvr == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { + /* Use client certificate key */ + EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; + dh_clnt = NULL; + if (clkey) + dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey); + if (dh_clnt == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } else { + /* generate a new random key */ + if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); + DH_free(dh_clnt); + goto err; + } + } + + pmslen = DH_size(dh_clnt); + pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); + if (!pms) + goto memerr; + + /* + * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to + * clear it out afterwards + */ + + n = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt); + if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp == NULL) + DH_free(dh_srvr); + + if (n <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); + DH_free(dh_clnt); + goto err; + } + pmslen = n; + + if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) + n = 0; + else { + /* send off the data */ + n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key); + s2n(n, p); + BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p); + n += 2; + } + + DH_free(dh_clnt); + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { + const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL; + EC_KEY *tkey; + int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0; + int field_size = 0; + /* + * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster + * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set + * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. + */ + if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) { + /*- + * XXX: For now, we do not support client + * authentication using ECDH certificates. + * To add such support, one needs to add + * code that checks for appropriate + * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. + * For example, the cert have an ECC + * key on the same curve as the server's + * and the key should be authorized for + * key agreement. + * + * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect + * to skip sending the certificate verify + * message. + * + * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) && + * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type == + * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...) + * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1; + */ + } + + if (s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) { + tkey = s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp; + } else { + /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */ + srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); + if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) + || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) + || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec; + } + + srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); + srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey); + + if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (ecdh_clnt_cert) { + /* + * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our + * private key to perform the ECDH computation. + */ + const BIGNUM *priv_key; + tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec; + priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); + if (priv_key == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + } else { + /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */ + if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + + /* + * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to + * clear it out afterwards + */ + + field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group); + if (field_size <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + pmslen = (field_size + 7) / 8; + pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); + if (!pms) + goto memerr; + n = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pmslen, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL); + if (n <= 0 || pmslen != (size_t)n) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (ecdh_clnt_cert) { + /* Send empty client key exch message */ + n = 0; + } else { + /* + * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory + * accordingly. + */ + encoded_pt_len = + EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, + NULL, 0, NULL); + + encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) + OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); + bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Encode the public key */ + n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, + encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx); + + *p = n; /* length of encoded point */ + /* Encoded point will be copied here */ + p += 1; + /* copy the point */ + memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n); + /* increment n to account for length field */ + n += 1; + } + + /* Free allocated memory */ + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); + EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); + } +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ + else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { + /* GOST key exchange message creation */ + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; + X509 *peer_cert; + size_t msglen; + unsigned int md_len; + unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; + EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash; + EVP_PKEY *pub_key; + + pmslen = 32; + pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); + if (!pms) + goto memerr; + + /* + * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it + */ + peer_cert = s->session->peer; + if (!peer_cert) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); + goto err; + } + + pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key = + X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL); + /* + * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key + * + * * parameters match those of server certificate, use + * certificate key for key exchange + */ + + /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ + + EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx); + /* Generate session key */ + if (RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) { + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + }; + /* + * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key + */ + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) { + if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer + (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) { + /* + * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key + * * would be used + */ + ERR_clear_error(); + } + } + /* + * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context + * data + */ + ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); + EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, + EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94)); + EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len); + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash); + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl + (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, + shared_ukm) < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); + goto err; + } + /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ + /* + * Encapsulate it into sequence + */ + *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; + msglen = 255; + if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); + goto err; + } + if (msglen >= 0x80) { + *(p++) = 0x81; + *(p++) = msglen & 0xff; + n = msglen + 3; + } else { + *(p++) = msglen & 0xff; + n = msglen + 2; + } + memcpy(p, tmp, msglen); + /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl + (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) { + /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */ + s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; + } + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); + EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key); + + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) - { - if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) - { - /* send off the data */ - n=BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A); - s2n(n,p); - BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A,p); - n+=2; - } - else - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); - s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); - if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } -#endif + else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { + if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) { + /* send off the data */ + n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A); + s2n(n, p); + BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p); + n += 2; + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); + s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); + if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } +#endif + else { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) - { - char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN]; - unsigned char *t = NULL; - unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; - unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; - int psk_err = 1; - - n = 0; - if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); - goto err; - } - - psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, - identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN, - psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); - if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto psk_err; - } - else if (psk_len == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); - goto psk_err; - } - - /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ - pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len; - t = psk_or_pre_ms; - memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); - s2n(psk_len, t); - memset(t, 0, psk_len); - t+=psk_len; - s2n(psk_len, t); - - if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); - s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); - if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && - s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto psk_err; - } - - if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); - s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); - if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto psk_err; - } - - s->session->master_key_length = - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, - psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); - n = strlen(identity); - s2n(n, p); - memcpy(p, identity, n); - n+=2; - psk_err = 0; - psk_err: - OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN); - OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); - if (psk_err != 0) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - } + n += pskhdrlen; +#endif + + if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; + s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; + + return 1; + memerr: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + err: + OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); + s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); + EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); #endif - else - { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, - SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n); - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */ - return ssl_do_write(s); -err: -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); - if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) - EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); - EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); + s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; #endif - return(-1); - } - -int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s) - { - unsigned char *p; - unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; - EVP_PKEY *pkey; - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx=NULL; - EVP_MD_CTX mctx; - unsigned u=0; - unsigned long n; - int j; - - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) - { - p= ssl_handshake_start(s); - pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey; + statem_set_error(s); + return 0; +} + +int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned char *pms = NULL; + size_t pmslen = 0; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + /* Check for SRP */ + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { + if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + return 1; + } +#endif + pms = s->s3->tmp.pms; + pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen; + + if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; + char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; + + /* + * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP + * used. + */ + snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), + DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); + + if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, + sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, + sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) + goto err; + + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, + sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); + } +#endif + + return 1; + err: + OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); + s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; + return 0; +} + +int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX mctx; + unsigned u = 0; + unsigned long n; + int j; + + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); + + p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */ - pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL); - EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx); - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1())>0) - { - if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, - NID_sha1, - &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); - } - else - { - ERR_clear_error(); - } - /* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature - * using agreed digest and cached handshake records. - */ - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - { - long hdatalen = 0; - void *hdata; - const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest; - hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, - &hdata); - if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - p += 2; + pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); + EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx); + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) { + if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, + NID_sha1, + &(data + [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); + } else { + ERR_clear_error(); + } + /* + * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed + * digest and cached handshake records. + */ + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + long hdatalen = 0; + void *hdata; + const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys]; + hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); + if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + p += 2; #ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n", - EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif - if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) - || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) - || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, - ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto err; - } - s2n(u,p); - n = u + 4; - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) - goto err; - } - else + fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n", + EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) + || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) + || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + s2n(u, p); + n = u + 4; + /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) + goto err; + } else #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) - { - s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, - NID_md5, - &(data[0])); - if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data, - MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, - &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 ) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB); - goto err; - } - s2n(u,p); - n=u+2; - } - else + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0])); + if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data, + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, + &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); + goto err; + } + s2n(u, p); + n = u + 2; + } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) - { - if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type, - &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]), - (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB); - goto err; - } - s2n(j,p); - n=j+2; - } - else -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) - { - if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type, - &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]), - (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, - ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB); - goto err; - } - s2n(j,p); - n=j+2; - } - else -#endif - if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) - { - unsigned char signbuf[64]; - int i; - size_t sigsize=64; - s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, - NID_id_GostR3411_94, - data); - if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - for (i=63,j=0; i>=0; j++, i--) { - p[2+j]=signbuf[i]; - } - s2n(j,p); - n=j+2; - } - else - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n); - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; - } - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); - return ssl_do_write(s); -err: - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); - return(-1); - } - -/* Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently - * check cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if - * static DH client certificates can be used and optionally checks - * suitability for Suite B. + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { + if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type, + &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]), + (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB); + goto err; + } + s2n(j, p); + n = j + 2; + } else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { + if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type, + &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]), + (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB); + goto err; + } + s2n(j, p); + n = j + 2; + } else +#endif + if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { + unsigned char signbuf[64]; + int i; + size_t sigsize = 64; + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, + NID_id_GostR3411_94, data); + if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) { + p[2 + j] = signbuf[i]; + } + s2n(j, p); + n = j + 2; + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + return 1; + err: + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check + * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client + * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B. */ static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s) - { - unsigned long alg_k; - if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey) - return 0; - /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->cert->key->digest) - return 0; - /* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. - * This also adjusts suite B digest if necessary. - */ - if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT && - !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2)) - return 0; - alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */ - if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) - { - SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert; - int i = scert->peer_cert_type; - EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL; - clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; - /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */ - if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH) - return 1; - if (i >= 0) - spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[i].x509); - if (spkey) - { - /* Compare server and client parameters */ - i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey); - EVP_PKEY_free(spkey); - if (i != 1) - return 0; - } - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; - } - return 1; - } - -int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) - { - X509 *x509=NULL; - EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; - int i; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) - { - /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ - if (s->cert->cert_cb) - { - i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); - if (i < 0) - { - s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; - return -1; - } - if (i == 0) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - } - if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; - } - - /* We need to get a client cert */ - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) - { - /* If we get an error, we need to - * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1); - * We then get retied later */ - i=0; - i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); - if (i < 0) - { - s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; - return(-1); - } - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) - { - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; - if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) || - !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey)) - i=0; - } - else if (i == 1) - { - i=0; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); - } - - if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509); - if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) - i = 0; - if (i == 0) - { - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) - { - s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0; - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); - return(1); - } - else - { - s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2; - } - } - - /* Ok, we have a cert */ - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; - } - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) - { - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D; - if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, - (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - } - /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */ - return ssl_do_write(s); - } - -#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m)) +{ + unsigned long alg_k; + if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey) + return 0; + /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys]) + return 0; + /* + * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also + * adjusts suite B digest if necessary. + */ + if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT && + !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2)) + return 0; + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */ + if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { + int i = s->session->peer_type; + EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL; + clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; + /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */ + if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH) + return 1; + if (i >= 0) + spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); + if (spkey) { + /* Compare server and client parameters */ + i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey); + EVP_PKEY_free(spkey); + if (i != 1) + return 0; + } + s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; + } + return 1; +} + +enum WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst) +{ + X509 *x509 = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + int i; + + if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { + /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ + if (s->cert->cert_cb) { + i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); + if (i < 0) { + s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; + return WORK_MORE_A; + } + if (i == 0) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + statem_set_error(s); + return 0; + } + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + } + if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + + /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */ + wst = WORK_MORE_B; + } + + /* We need to get a client cert */ + if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { + /* + * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; + * return(-1); We then get retied later + */ + i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); + if (i < 0) { + s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; + return WORK_MORE_B; + } + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { + if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) + i = 0; + } else if (i == 1) { + i = 0; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); + } + + X509_free(x509); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) + i = 0; + if (i == 0) { + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + } else { + s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2; + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + statem_set_error(s); + return 0; + } + } + } + + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + } + + /* Shouldn't ever get here */ + return WORK_ERROR; +} + +int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s) +{ + if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, + (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == + 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + statem_set_error(s); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m)) int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) - { - int i,idx; - long alg_k,alg_a; - EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; - SESS_CERT *sc; +{ + int i, idx; + long alg_k, alg_a; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + int pkey_bits; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - RSA *rsa; + RSA *rsa; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - DH *dh; + DH *dh; #endif + int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - - /* we don't have a certificate */ - if ((alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) - return(1); - - sc=s->session->sess_cert; - if (sc == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; + /* we don't have a certificate */ + if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) + return (1); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; + rsa = s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; -#endif - - /* This is the passed certificate */ - - idx=sc->peer_cert_type; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) - { - if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, - s) == 0) - { /* check failed */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); - goto f_err; - } - else - { - return 1; - } - } - else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT); - goto f_err; - } - else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT); - goto f_err; - } -#endif - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509); - i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - - - /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */ - if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT); - goto f_err; - } + dh = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp; +#endif + + /* This is the passed certificate */ + + idx = s->session->peer_type; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) { + if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) { + /* check failed */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); + goto f_err; + } else { + return 1; + } + } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT); + goto f_err; + } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT); + goto f_err; + } +#endif + pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); + pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); + i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + + /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */ + if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT); + goto f_err; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT); - goto f_err; - } + else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT); + goto f_err; + } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && - !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); - goto f_err; - } + if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { + if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && + !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); + goto f_err; + } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { + if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { + if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); + goto f_err; + } + if (rsa != NULL) { + /* server key exchange is not allowed. */ + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + } + } + } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && - !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && - !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT); - goto f_err; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && - !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT); - goto f_err; - } -#endif + if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (dh == NULL)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && + !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT); + goto f_err; + } +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && + !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT); + goto f_err; + } +# endif #endif - if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP)) - { + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && + pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) - { - if (rsa == NULL - || RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - } - else + if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { + if (rsa == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY); + goto f_err; + } else if (RSA_bits(rsa) > + SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { + /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */ + al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY); + goto f_err; + } + } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) - { - if (dh == NULL - || DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - } - else -#endif - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - } - return(1); -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); -err: - return(0); - } - -/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a - * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of - * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure. - */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s) - { - unsigned int len, padding_len; - unsigned char *d; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) - { - len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; - padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); - d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - d[4] = len; - memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); - d[5 + len] = padding_len; - memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len); - *(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; - l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d); - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B; - s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len; - s->init_off = 0; - } - - return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); - } -# endif + if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { + if (DH_bits(dh) > + SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { + /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */ + al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY); + goto f_err; + } + } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { + /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */ + al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY); + goto f_err; + } else +#endif + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + } + return (1); + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + return (0); +} -int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s) - { - int ok; - long n; - - /* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */ - if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) - return 1; - /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate - * message, so permit appropriate message length */ - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, - -1, - s->max_cert_list, - &ok); - if (!ok) return((int)n); - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; - - if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) - || (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)) - return 2; - - return 1; - } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned int len, padding_len; + unsigned char *d; + + len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; + padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); + d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + d[4] = len; + memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); + d[5 + len] = padding_len; + memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len); + *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; + l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d); + s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len; + s->init_off = 0; + + return 1; +} #endif int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) - { - int i = 0; +{ + int i = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE - if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) - { - i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s, - SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), - px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); - if (i != 0) - return i; - } -#endif - if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) - i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,px509,ppkey); - return i; - } + if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) { + i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s, + SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), + px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (i != 0) + return i; + } +#endif + if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) + i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey); + return i; +} + +int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, + unsigned char *p) +{ + int i, j = 0; + SSL_CIPHER *c; + unsigned char *q; + int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate; + /* Set disabled masks for this session */ + ssl_set_client_disabled(s); + + if (sk == NULL) + return (0); + q = p; + + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { + c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); + /* Skip disabled ciphers */ + if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED)) + continue; +#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL + if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { + if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv) + continue; + else + empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0; + } +#endif + j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p); + p += j; + } + /* + * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add + * applicable SCSVs. + */ + if (p != q) { + if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) { + static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { + 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 + }; + j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p); + p += j; +#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, + "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n"); +#endif + } + if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { + static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { + 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 + }; + j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p); + p += j; + } + } + + return (p - q); +}