X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Frecord%2Fssl3_record.c;h=4b36f49b6d5f34982abc4152b9efa5bc7fe876d3;hp=240355bba143b878534362363c9ea78280ce6ab6;hb=3c544acc385ac39b77873c9cfa77c4ae5df956b5;hpb=a14aa99be8fe169bba7afc6355b6b6d750b2ba1d diff --git a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c index 240355bba1..4b36f49b6d 100644 --- a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c +++ b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ +#include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" #include @@ -100,6 +101,40 @@ static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s) return 1; } +int early_data_count_ok(SSL *s, size_t length, size_t overhead, int *al) +{ + uint32_t max_early_data = s->max_early_data; + + /* + * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the + * session. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early data set in + * the session and the configured max_early_data. + */ + if (!s->server || (s->hit + && s->session->ext.max_early_data < s->max_early_data)) + max_early_data = s->session->ext.max_early_data; + + if (max_early_data == 0) { + if (al != NULL) + *al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); + return 0; + } + + /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */ + max_early_data += overhead; + + if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) { + if (al != NULL) + *al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); + return 0; + } + s->early_data_count += length; + + return 1; +} + /* * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an @@ -124,19 +159,21 @@ static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s) /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) { - int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al; + int al; int enc_err, rret, ret = -1; int i; size_t more, n; - SSL3_RECORD *rr; + SSL3_RECORD *rr, *thisrr; SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned char *p; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - short version; + unsigned int version; size_t mac_size; int imac_size; size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j; + PACKET pkt, sslv2pkt; + size_t first_rec_len; rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); @@ -146,10 +183,15 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) sess = s->session; do { + thisrr = &rr[num_recs]; + /* check if we have the header */ if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + size_t sslv2len; + unsigned int type; + rret = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0, num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0, &n); @@ -158,12 +200,25 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); - + if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer), + RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer))) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + sslv2pkt = pkt; + if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(&sslv2pkt, &sslv2len) + || !PACKET_get_1(&sslv2pkt, &type)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } /* * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello. */ if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer) - && (p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { + && (sslv2len & 0x8000) != 0 + && (type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { /* * SSLv2 style record * @@ -173,19 +228,19 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency */ - rr[num_recs].type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; - rr[num_recs].rec_version = SSL2_VERSION; + thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; + thisrr->rec_version = SSL2_VERSION; - rr[num_recs].length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1]; + thisrr->length = sslv2len & 0x7fff; - if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) + if (thisrr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } - if (rr[num_recs].length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) { + if (thisrr->length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; @@ -197,19 +252,23 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) s->msg_callback_arg); /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ - rr[num_recs].type = *(p++); - ssl_major = *(p++); - ssl_minor = *(p++); - version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; - rr[num_recs].rec_version = version; - n2s(p, rr[num_recs].length); - - /* Lets check version */ - if (!s->first_packet && version != s->version) { + if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &type) + || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version) + || !PACKET_get_net_2_len(&pkt, &thisrr->length)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + thisrr->type = type; + thisrr->rec_version = version; + + /* Lets check version. In TLSv1.3 we ignore this field */ + if (!s->first_packet && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && version != (unsigned int)s->version) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { - if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { + if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { /* * The record is using an incorrect version number, * but what we've got appears to be an alert. We @@ -258,7 +317,14 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) } } - if (rr[num_recs].length > + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL + && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto f_err; + } + + if (thisrr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); @@ -269,16 +335,41 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ } + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_TLS13_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + } else { + size_t len = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + /* + * If OPENSSL_NO_COMP is defined then SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + * does not include the compression overhead anyway. + */ + if (s->expand == NULL) + len -= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; +#endif + + if (thisrr->length > len) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + } + /* * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data. * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the * record */ - if (rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { - more = rr[num_recs].length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { + more = thisrr->length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; } else { - more = rr[num_recs].length; + more = thisrr->length; } if (more > 0) { /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ @@ -292,43 +383,37 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); /* - * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length, - * or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length - * and we have that many bytes in s->packet + * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + * + thisrr->length, or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + * + thisrr->length and we have that many bytes in s->packet */ - if (rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { - rr[num_recs].input = + if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { + thisrr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); } else { - rr[num_recs].input = + thisrr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); } /* - * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points - * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either - * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into - * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer + * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'thisrr' thisrr->input + * points at thisrr->length bytes, which need to be copied into + * thisrr->data by either the decryption or by the decompression When + * the data is 'copied' into the thisrr->data buffer, thisrr->input will + * be pointed at the new buffer */ /* - * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length - * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. + * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] + * thisrr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ - /* check is not needed I believe */ - if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - - /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ - rr[num_recs].data = rr[num_recs].input; - rr[num_recs].orig_len = rr[num_recs].length; + /* decrypt in place in 'thisrr->input' */ + thisrr->data = thisrr->input; + thisrr->orig_len = thisrr->length; /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */ - rr[num_recs].read = 0; + thisrr->read = 0; num_recs++; @@ -336,7 +421,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer); } while (num_recs < max_recs - && rr[num_recs - 1].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA + && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) @@ -347,26 +432,28 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All * the details below are public so no timing details can leak. */ - if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { + if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { unsigned char *mac; /* TODO(size_t): convert this to do size_t properly */ imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); - if (imac_size < 0) { + assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + if (imac_size < 0 || imac_size > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP); goto f_err; } mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; - OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { - if (rr[j].length < mac_size) { + thisrr = &rr[j]; + + if (thisrr->length < mac_size) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } - rr[j].length -= mac_size; - mac = rr[j].data + rr[j].length; - i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ ); + thisrr->length -= mac_size; + mac = thisrr->data + thisrr->length; + i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, @@ -376,24 +463,45 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) } } + first_rec_len = rr[0].length; + enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, num_recs, 0); + /*- * enc_err is: - * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. + * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. * 1: if the padding is valid * -1: if the padding is invalid */ if (enc_err == 0) { + if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { + /* + * Valid early_data that we cannot decrypt might fail here as + * publicly invalid. We treat it like an empty record. + */ + + thisrr = &rr[0]; + + if (!early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, + EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, &al)) + goto f_err; + + thisrr->length = 0; + thisrr->read = 1; + RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1); + RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); + return 1; + } al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG - printf("dec %ld\n", rr->length); + printf("dec %"OSSLzu"\n", rr[0].length); { size_t z; - for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) - printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); + for (z = 0; z < rr[0].length; z++) + printf("%02X%c", rr[0].data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("\n"); #endif @@ -401,7 +509,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && - (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s)) { + (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ unsigned char *mac = NULL; unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; @@ -410,16 +518,17 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { + thisrr = &rr[j]; /* * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. */ - if (rr[j].orig_len < mac_size || + if (thisrr->orig_len < mac_size || /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && - rr[j].orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { + thisrr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; @@ -433,28 +542,49 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) * contents of the padding bytes. */ mac = mac_tmp; - ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, &rr[j], mac_size); - rr[j].length -= mac_size; + ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, thisrr, mac_size); + thisrr->length -= mac_size; } else { /* * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for * |mac_size| above. */ - rr[j].length -= mac_size; - mac = &rr[j].data[rr[j].length]; + thisrr->length -= mac_size; + mac = &thisrr->data[thisrr->length]; } - i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ ); + i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); if (i == 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) enc_err = -1; - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) + if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) enc_err = -1; } } if (enc_err < 0) { + if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { + /* + * We assume this is unreadable early_data - we treat it like an + * empty record + */ + + /* + * The record length may have been modified by the mac check above + * so we use the previously saved value + */ + if (!early_data_count_ok(s, first_rec_len, + EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, &al)) + goto f_err; + + thisrr = &rr[0]; + thisrr->length = 0; + thisrr->read = 1; + RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1); + RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); + return 1; + } /* * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption @@ -469,37 +599,68 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) } for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { - /* rr[j].length is now just compressed */ + thisrr = &rr[j]; + + /* thisrr->length is now just compressed */ if (s->expand != NULL) { - if (rr[j].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { + if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } - if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, &rr[j])) { + if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, thisrr)) { al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); goto f_err; } } - if (rr[j].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) { + size_t end; + + if (thisrr->length == 0 + || thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + + /* Strip trailing padding */ + for (end = thisrr->length - 1; end > 0 && thisrr->data[end] == 0; + end--) + continue; + + thisrr->length = end; + thisrr->type = thisrr->data[end]; + if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA + && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT + && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE, + &thisrr->data[end], 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + } + + if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } - rr[j].off = 0; + thisrr->off = 0; /*- * So at this point the following is true - * rr[j].type is the type of record - * rr[j].length == number of bytes in record - * rr[j].off == offset to first valid byte - * rr[j].data == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-). + * thisrr->type is the type of record + * thisrr->length == number of bytes in record + * thisrr->off == offset to first valid byte + * thisrr->data == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-). */ /* just read a 0 length packet */ - if (rr[j].length == 0) { + if (thisrr->length == 0) { RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer) > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { @@ -512,6 +673,13 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) } } + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) { + thisrr = &rr[0]; + if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA + && !early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, 0, &al)) + goto f_err; + } + RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs); return 1; @@ -552,7 +720,7 @@ int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr) /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, - SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, + (int)(wr->length + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD), wr->input, (int)wr->length); if (i < 0) return (0); @@ -574,7 +742,7 @@ int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr) * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error * occurred. */ -int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int send) +int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int sending) { SSL3_RECORD *rec; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; @@ -589,7 +757,7 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int send) */ if (n_recs != 1) return 0; - if (send) { + if (sending) { ds = s->enc_write_ctx; if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) enc = NULL; @@ -613,7 +781,7 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int send) /* COMPRESS */ - if ((bs != 1) && send) { + if ((bs != 1) && sending) { i = bs - (l % bs); /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */ @@ -627,7 +795,7 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int send) rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1); } - if (!send) { + if (!sending) { if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) return 0; /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */ @@ -644,7 +812,7 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int send) return -1; mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; } - if ((bs != 1) && !send) + if ((bs != 1) && !sending) return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(rec, bs, mac_size); } return (1); @@ -661,7 +829,7 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int send) * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, * an internal error occurred. */ -int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int send) +int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; @@ -672,7 +840,10 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int send) int imac_size; const EVP_CIPHER *enc; - if (send) { + if (n_recs == 0) + return 0; + + if (sending) { if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) { int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); @@ -744,14 +915,14 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int send) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { unsigned char *seq; - seq = send ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer) + seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer) : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* DTLS does not support pipelining */ unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq; - s2n(send ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) : + s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) : DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p); memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8); @@ -774,12 +945,12 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int send) if (pad <= 0) return -1; - if (send) { + if (sending) { reclen[ctr] += pad; recs[ctr].length += pad; } - } else if ((bs != 1) && send) { + } else if ((bs != 1) && sending) { padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs); /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ @@ -794,7 +965,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int send) recs[ctr].length += padnum; } - if (!send) { + if (!sending) { if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) return 0; } @@ -831,7 +1002,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int send) ? (tmpr < 0) : (tmpr == 0)) return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ - if (send == 0) { + if (sending == 0) { if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; @@ -848,13 +1019,13 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int send) } ret = 1; - if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) { + if (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) { imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); if (imac_size < 0) return -1; mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; } - if ((bs != 1) && !send) { + if ((bs != 1) && !sending) { int tmpret; for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { tmpret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, &recs[ctr], bs, mac_size); @@ -869,7 +1040,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int send) ret, -1); } } - if (pad && !send) { + if (pad && !sending) { for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { recs[ctr].length -= pad; } @@ -878,7 +1049,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int send) return ret; } -int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) +int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) { unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq; const EVP_MD_CTX *hash; @@ -887,7 +1058,7 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) size_t npad; int t; - if (send) { + if (sending) { mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); hash = ssl->write_hash; @@ -903,7 +1074,7 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) md_size = t; npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size; - if (!send && + if (!sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) { /* @@ -974,7 +1145,7 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) return 1; } -int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) +int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) { unsigned char *seq; EVP_MD_CTX *hash; @@ -982,11 +1153,11 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) int i; EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx; unsigned char header[13]; - int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) + int stream_mac = (sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); int t; - if (send) { + if (sending) { seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); hash = ssl->write_hash; } else { @@ -1011,7 +1182,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq; - s2n(send ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) : + s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) : DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p); memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); @@ -1022,10 +1193,10 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) header[8] = rec->type; header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); - header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8; - header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff; + header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8); + header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff); - if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && + if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { /* @@ -1034,7 +1205,6 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. */ /* Final param == not SSLv3 */ - /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, md, &md_size, header, rec->input, @@ -1052,13 +1222,6 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); return 0; } - if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode()) - if (!tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx, - mac_ctx, rec->input, - rec->length, rec->orig_len)) { - EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); - return 0; - } } EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); @@ -1112,7 +1275,7 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t block_size, size_t mac_size) { size_t padding_length; - unsigned good; + size_t good; const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; /* @@ -1122,11 +1285,11 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec, return 0; padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; - good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length + overhead); + good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, padding_length + overhead); /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ - good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length + 1); + good &= constant_time_ge_s(block_size, padding_length + 1); rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); - return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1); + return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1); } /*- @@ -1146,7 +1309,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t block_size, size_t mac_size) { - unsigned good; + size_t good; size_t padding_length, to_check, i; const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; /* Check if version requires explicit IV */ @@ -1174,7 +1337,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, return 1; } - good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead + padding_length); + good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, overhead + padding_length); /* * The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length @@ -1189,7 +1352,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, to_check = rec->length; for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) { - unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i); + unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8_s(padding_length, i); unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i]; /* * The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value @@ -1202,10 +1365,10 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, * If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, one * or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. */ - good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff); + good = constant_time_eq_s(0xff, good & 0xff); rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); - return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1); + return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1); } /*- @@ -1243,14 +1406,14 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, */ size_t mac_end = rec->length; size_t mac_start = mac_end - md_size; + size_t in_mac; /* * scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the * MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */ size_t scan_start = 0; - unsigned i, j; - unsigned div_spoiler; - unsigned rotate_offset; + size_t i, j; + size_t rotate_offset; OPENSSL_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size); OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); @@ -1262,25 +1425,20 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */ if (rec->orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) scan_start = rec->orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1); - /* - * div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the - * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies - * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least. - * The aim of right-shifting md_size is so that the compiler doesn't - * figure out that it can remove div_spoiler as that would require it to - * prove that md_size is always even, which I hope is beyond it. - */ - div_spoiler = md_size >> 1; - div_spoiler <<= (sizeof(div_spoiler) - 1) * 8; - rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size; + in_mac = 0; + rotate_offset = 0; memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size); for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < rec->orig_len; i++) { - unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_start); - unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end); + size_t mac_started = constant_time_eq_s(i, mac_start); + size_t mac_ended = constant_time_lt_s(i, mac_end); unsigned char b = rec->data[i]; - rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended; - j &= constant_time_lt(j, md_size); + + in_mac |= mac_started; + in_mac &= mac_ended; + rotate_offset |= j & mac_started; + rotated_mac[j++] |= b & in_mac; + j &= constant_time_lt_s(j, md_size); } /* Now rotate the MAC */ @@ -1290,17 +1448,17 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */ ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset ^ 32]; out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++]; - rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size); + rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); } #else memset(out, 0, md_size); rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset; - rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size); + rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) - out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset); + out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8_s(j, rotate_offset); rotate_offset++; - rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size); + rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); } #endif } @@ -1347,7 +1505,7 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) rr->data = rr->input; rr->orig_len = rr->length; - if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { + if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { unsigned char *mac; mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); @@ -1391,7 +1549,7 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) #endif /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ - if ((sess != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && + if ((sess != NULL) && !SSL_READ_ETM(s) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ unsigned char *mac = NULL; @@ -1503,8 +1661,7 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) } /* - * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, - * processed + * Retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, i.e. processed */ #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \