X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Fx509%2Fx509_vfy.c;h=79dae3d3bf23702b009864bf9d37f03a95eba9e5;hp=4d9b53e997aa592dd5172853f58dbdffaa1b460b;hb=0b0a60d861e7b13e8a3c1198fbe02585adac023e;hpb=5d7c222db8f26a53c00646cc1dde2bdded38027e

diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 4d9b53e997..79dae3d3bf 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@
 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
-static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 	X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
 	int depth,i,ok=0;
 	int num;
-	int (*cb)();
+	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 	STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
 	if (ctx->cert == NULL)
 		{
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 		}
 
 	/* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
-	if (param->purpose > 0) ok = check_chain_purpose(ctx);
+	ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
 
 	if (!ok) goto end;
 
@@ -381,15 +381,34 @@ static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
  * with the supplied purpose
  */
 
-static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 {
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
 	return 1;
 #else
-	int i, ok=0;
+	int i, ok=0, must_be_ca;
 	X509 *x;
-	int (*cb)();
+	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+	int proxy_path_length = 0;
+	int allow_proxy_certs =
+		!!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
+
+	/* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
+	   -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
+	       use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
+	   0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
+	       used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
+	   1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
+	       all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
+	*/
+	must_be_ca = -1;
+
+	/* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
+	   happy */
+	if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
+		allow_proxy_certs = 1;
+
 	/* Check all untrusted certificates */
 	for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
 		{
@@ -404,23 +423,73 @@ static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 			ok=cb(0,ctx);
 			if (!ok) goto end;
 			}
-		ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose, i);
-		if ((ret == 0)
-			 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
-				&& (ret != 1)))
+		if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
 			{
-			if (i)
+			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
+			ctx->error_depth = i;
+			ctx->current_cert = x;
+			ok=cb(0,ctx);
+			if (!ok) goto end;
+			}
+		ret = X509_check_ca(x);
+		switch(must_be_ca)
+			{
+		case -1:
+			if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+				&& (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
+				{
+				ret = 0;
 				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+				}
 			else
-				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
+				ret = 1;
+			break;
+		case 0:
+			if (ret != 0)
+				{
+				ret = 0;
+				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
+				}
+			else
+				ret = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			if ((ret == 0)
+				|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+					&& (ret != 1)))
+				{
+				ret = 0;
+				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+				}
+			else
+				ret = 1;
+			break;
+			}
+		if (ret == 0)
+			{
 			ctx->error_depth = i;
 			ctx->current_cert = x;
 			ok=cb(0,ctx);
 			if (!ok) goto end;
 			}
+		if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
+			{
+			ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose,
+				must_be_ca > 0);
+			if ((ret == 0)
+				|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+					&& (ret != 1)))
+				{
+				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
+				ctx->error_depth = i;
+				ctx->current_cert = x;
+				ok=cb(0,ctx);
+				if (!ok) goto end;
+				}
+			}
 		/* Check pathlen */
 		if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
-			   && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + 1)))
+			   && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
 			{
 			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
 			ctx->error_depth = i;
@@ -428,6 +497,26 @@ static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 			ok=cb(0,ctx);
 			if (!ok) goto end;
 			}
+		/* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
+		   certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
+		   certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
+		   CA certificate.  */
+		if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
+			{
+			if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
+				{
+				ctx->error =
+					X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
+				ctx->error_depth = i;
+				ctx->current_cert = x;
+				ok=cb(0,ctx);
+				if (!ok) goto end;
+				}
+			proxy_path_length++;
+			must_be_ca = 0;
+			}
+		else
+			must_be_ca = 1;
 		}
 	ok = 1;
  end:
@@ -442,7 +531,7 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 #else
 	int i, ok;
 	X509 *x;
-	int (*cb)();
+	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
 	i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
@@ -687,7 +776,8 @@ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
 			}
 		}
 
-	if (!check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
+	ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
+	if (!ok)
 		goto err;
 
 	ok = 1;
@@ -706,6 +796,15 @@ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
 	X509_EXTENSION *ext;
 	/* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
 	rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
+	/* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted.
+	 * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition.
+ 	 */
+	if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked))
+		{
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+		sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked);
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+		}
 	idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
 	/* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
 	 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
@@ -747,11 +846,11 @@ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 	{
 	int ret;
-	ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit, ctx->chain,
+	ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
 				ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
 	if (ret == 0)
 		{
-		X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 		return 0;
 		}
 	/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
@@ -843,7 +942,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 	int ok=0,n;
 	X509 *xs,*xi;
 	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-	int (*cb)();
+	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 
 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
 
@@ -908,10 +1007,12 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 
 		xs->valid = 1;
 
-		if (!check_cert_time(ctx, xs))
+		ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
+		if (!ok)
 			goto end;
 
 		/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
+		ctx->current_issuer=xi;
 		ctx->current_cert=xs;
 		ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
 		if (!ok) goto end;
@@ -980,7 +1081,7 @@ int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
 		offset=0;
 	else
 		{
-		if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-'))
+		if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
 			return 0;
 		offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
 		offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
@@ -991,7 +1092,8 @@ int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
 	atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
 	atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
 
-	X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time);
+	if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
+		return 0;
 
 	if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
 		{
@@ -1246,7 +1348,7 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
 	ctx->valid=0;
 	ctx->chain=NULL;
 	ctx->error=0;
-	ctx->explicit=0;
+	ctx->explicit_policy=0;
 	ctx->error_depth=0;
 	ctx->current_cert=NULL;
 	ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
@@ -1398,7 +1500,7 @@ X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 
 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 	{
-	return ctx->explicit;
+	return ctx->explicit_policy;
 	}
 
 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)