X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Fx509%2Fx509_cmp.c;h=b8a61ffe2a9320c2f8515c2db137ce8a32aa5cf7;hp=c7b0fe1e2955c1baf590077b6928a2ddc2104c23;hb=47b4ccea9cb9b924d058fd5a8583f073b7a41656;hpb=c5ba2d990420e1778ca4a90bf882e0f806404af0 diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c index c7b0fe1e29..b8a61ffe2a 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c @@ -1,126 +1,78 @@ -/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. +/* + * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include -#include -#include "cryptlib.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include -#include "internal/x509_int.h" +#include +#include "crypto/x509.h" int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { int i; - X509_CINF *ai, *bi; + const X509_CINF *ai, *bi; - ai = a->cert_info; - bi = b->cert_info; - i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber); + ai = &a->cert_info; + bi = &b->cert_info; + i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber); if (i) - return (i); - return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer)); + return i; + return X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) { unsigned long ret = 0; - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); unsigned char md[16]; char *f; - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); - f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0); - if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) + if (ctx == NULL) + goto err; + f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0); + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) goto err; - if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) goto err; OPENSSL_free(f); if (!EVP_DigestUpdate - (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data, - (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length)) + (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data, + (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length)) goto err; - if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) goto err; ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) ) & 0xffffffffL; err: - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return (ret); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); + return ret; } #endif int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { - return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer)); + return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer); } int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { - return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject)); + return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject); } int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { - return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer)); + return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer); } int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) @@ -128,42 +80,47 @@ int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); } -X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a) +X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) { - return (a->cert_info->issuer); + return a->cert_info.issuer; } unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) { - return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer)); + return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { - return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); + return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer); } #endif -X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a) +X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) { - return (a->cert_info->subject); + return a->cert_info.subject; } ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) { - return (a->cert_info->serialNumber); + return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; +} + +const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a) +{ + return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; } unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) { - return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject)); + return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { - return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject)); + return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject); } #endif @@ -186,12 +143,13 @@ int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) if (rv) return rv; /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ - if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) { - rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len); - if (rv) - return rv; - return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc, - a->cert_info->enc.len); + if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) { + if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len) + return -1; + if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len) + return 1; + return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc, + a->cert_info.enc.len); } return rv; } @@ -216,7 +174,7 @@ int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; - if (ret) + if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0) return ret; return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); @@ -237,7 +195,7 @@ unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) ) & 0xffffffffL; - return (ret); + return ret; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 @@ -248,23 +206,28 @@ unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) { - EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; + EVP_MD *md5 = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5, "-fips"); + EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); unsigned long ret = 0; unsigned char md[16]; + if (md5 == NULL || md_ctx == NULL) + goto end; + /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); - EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); - if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) - && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) - && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL)) + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, md5, NULL) + && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) + && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL)) ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) ) & 0xffffffffL; - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); - return (ret); + end: + EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); + EVP_MD_free(md5); + + return ret; } #endif @@ -273,22 +236,20 @@ X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, ASN1_INTEGER *serial) { int i; - X509_CINF cinf; X509 x, *x509 = NULL; if (!sk) return NULL; - x.cert_info = &cinf; - cinf.serialNumber = serial; - cinf.issuer = name; + x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial; + x.cert_info.issuer = name; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) - return (x509); + return x509; } - return (NULL); + return NULL; } X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) @@ -299,31 +260,31 @@ X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) - return (x509); + return x509; } - return (NULL); + return NULL; } -EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) +EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x) { - if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL)) - return (NULL); - return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); + if (x == NULL) + return NULL; + return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key); } -ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) +EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) { - if (!x) + if (x == NULL) return NULL; - return x->cert_info->key->public_key; + return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key); } -int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) +int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) { - EVP_PKEY *xk; + const EVP_PKEY *xk; int ret; - xk = X509_get_pubkey(x); + xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (xk) ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); @@ -342,7 +303,6 @@ int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) case -2: X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); } - EVP_PKEY_free(xk); if (ret > 0) return 1; return 0; @@ -360,8 +320,8 @@ static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) { const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; int curve_nid; - if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) - grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec); + if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) + grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)); if (!grp) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); @@ -391,11 +351,12 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags) { int rv, i, sign_nid; - EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; - unsigned long tflags; + EVP_PKEY *pk; + unsigned long tflags = flags; + if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) return X509_V_OK; - tflags = flags; + /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ if (x == NULL) { x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); @@ -403,6 +364,17 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, } else i = 0; + pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); + + /* + * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build + * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report + * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain + * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm. + */ + if (chain == NULL) + return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); + if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; /* Correct error depth */ @@ -410,7 +382,6 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, goto end; } - pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); /* Check EE key only */ rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); if (rv != X509_V_OK) { @@ -425,8 +396,7 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; goto end; } - EVP_PKEY_free(pk); - pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); + pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); if (rv != X509_V_OK) goto end; @@ -435,7 +405,6 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, /* Final check: root CA signature */ rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); end: - EVP_PKEY_free(pk); if (rv != X509_V_OK) { /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM @@ -443,7 +412,7 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, i--; /* * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 - * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error. + * with P-256. Use more meaningful error. */ if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; @@ -458,7 +427,7 @@ int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) int sign_nid; if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) return X509_V_OK; - sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm); + sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm); return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); } @@ -485,9 +454,17 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) STACK_OF(X509) *ret; int i; ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); + if (ret == NULL) + return NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i); - CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + if (!X509_up_ref(x)) + goto err; } return ret; + err: + while (i-- > 0) + X509_free (sk_X509_value(ret, i)); + sk_X509_free(ret); + return NULL; }