X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Frsa%2Frsa_gen.c;h=484468da05e333d5f0403a3aa42a5d70ac5d9214;hp=aed2351cfbfdd94689267254713cc2a325a88703;hb=8c7096835b48d773463cee4fe97fbc334e911cc9;hpb=7dfb0b774e6592dcbfe47015168a0ac8b44e2a17

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
index aed2351cfb..484468da05 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -56,67 +56,184 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 
+
+/* NB: these functions have been "upgraded", the deprecated versions (which are
+ * compatibility wrappers using these functions) are in rsa_depr.c.
+ * - Geoff
+ */
+
+#define OPENSSL_FIPSAPI
+
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <time.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
-#include "bn.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-
-RSA *RSA_generate_key(bits, e_value, callback,cb_arg)
-int bits;
-unsigned long e_value;
-void (*callback)(P_I_I_P);
-char *cb_arg;
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+
+
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+int fips_check_rsa(RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	const unsigned char tbs[] = "RSA Pairwise Check Data";
+	unsigned char *ctbuf = NULL, *ptbuf = NULL;
+	int len, ret = 0;
+	EVP_PKEY pk;
+    	pk.type = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+    	pk.pkey.rsa = rsa;
+
+	/* Perform pairwise consistency signature test */
+	if (!fips_pkey_signature_test(FIPS_TEST_PAIRWISE, &pk, tbs, 0,
+			NULL, 0, NULL, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, NULL)
+		|| !fips_pkey_signature_test(FIPS_TEST_PAIRWISE, &pk, tbs, 0,
+			NULL, 0, NULL, RSA_X931_PADDING, NULL)
+		|| !fips_pkey_signature_test(FIPS_TEST_PAIRWISE, &pk, tbs, 0,
+			NULL, 0, NULL, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, NULL))
+		goto err;
+	/* Now perform pairwise consistency encrypt/decrypt test */
+	ctbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
+	if (!ctbuf)
+		goto err;
+
+	len = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof(tbs) - 1, tbs, ctbuf, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+	if (len <= 0)
+		goto err;
+	/* Check ciphertext doesn't match plaintext */
+	if ((len == (sizeof(tbs) - 1)) && !memcmp(tbs, ctbuf, len))
+		goto err;
+	ptbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
+
+	if (!ptbuf)
+		goto err;
+	len = RSA_private_decrypt(len, ctbuf, ptbuf, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+	if (len != (sizeof(tbs) - 1))
+		goto err;
+	if (memcmp(ptbuf, tbs, len))
+		goto err;
+
+	ret = 1;
+
+	if (!ptbuf)
+		goto err;
+	
+	err:
+	if (ret == 0)
+		{
+		fips_set_selftest_fail();
+		FIPSerr(FIPS_F_FIPS_CHECK_RSA,FIPS_R_PAIRWISE_TEST_FAILED);
+		}
+
+	if (ctbuf)
+		OPENSSL_free(ctbuf);
+	if (ptbuf)
+		OPENSSL_free(ptbuf);
+
+	return ret;
+	}
+#endif
+
+static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+/* NB: this wrapper would normally be placed in rsa_lib.c and the static
+ * implementation would probably be in rsa_eay.c. Nonetheless, is kept here so
+ * that we don't introduce a new linker dependency. Eg. any application that
+ * wasn't previously linking object code related to key-generation won't have to
+ * now just because key-generation is part of RSA_METHOD. */
+int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
+	{
+	if(rsa->meth->rsa_keygen)
+		return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+	return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+	}
+
+static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
 	{
-	RSA *rsa=NULL;
 	BIGNUM *r0=NULL,*r1=NULL,*r2=NULL,*r3=NULL,*tmp;
+	BIGNUM local_r0,local_d,local_p;
+	BIGNUM *pr0,*d,*p;
 	int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0;
-	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL,*ctx2=NULL;
+	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
+	    {
+	    FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
+	    return 0;
+	    }
+
+	if (FIPS_mode() && (bits < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
+	    {
+	    FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN,FIPS_R_KEY_TOO_SHORT);
+	    return 0;
+	    }
+#endif
 
 	ctx=BN_CTX_new();
 	if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
-	ctx2=BN_CTX_new();
-	if (ctx2 == NULL) goto err;
-	r0=ctx->bn[0];
-	r1=ctx->bn[1];
-	r2=ctx->bn[2];
-	r3=ctx->bn[3];
-	ctx->tos+=4;
+	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+	r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+	r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+	r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+	r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+	if (r3 == NULL) goto err;
 
 	bitsp=(bits+1)/2;
 	bitsq=bits-bitsp;
-	rsa=RSA_new();
-	if (rsa == NULL) goto err;
 
-	/* set e */ 
-	rsa->e=BN_new();
-	if (rsa->e == NULL) goto err;
-	if (!BN_set_word(rsa->e,e_value)) goto err;
+	/* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
+	if(!rsa->n && ((rsa->n=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
+	if(!rsa->d && ((rsa->d=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
+	if(!rsa->e && ((rsa->e=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
+	if(!rsa->p && ((rsa->p=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
+	if(!rsa->q && ((rsa->q=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
+	if(!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
+	if(!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
+	if(!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
+
+	BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value);
 
 	/* generate p and q */
 	for (;;)
 		{
-		rsa->p=BN_generate_prime(bitsp,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg);
-		if (rsa->p == NULL) goto err;
+		if(!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
+			goto err;
 		if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err;
 		if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
 		if (BN_is_one(r1)) break;
-		if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg);
-		BN_free(rsa->p);
+		if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
+			goto err;
 		}
-	if (callback != NULL) callback(3,0,cb_arg);
+	if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
+		goto err;
 	for (;;)
 		{
-		rsa->q=BN_generate_prime(bitsq,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg);
-		if (rsa->q == NULL) goto err;
+		/* When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
+		 * continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for
+		 * this and bail if it happens 3 times. */
+		unsigned int degenerate = 0;
+		do
+			{
+			if(!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
+				goto err;
+			} while((BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0) && (++degenerate < 3));
+		if(degenerate == 3)
+			{
+			ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
+			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN,RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+			goto err;
+			}
 		if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err;
 		if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
-		if (BN_is_one(r1) && (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) != 0))
+		if (BN_is_one(r1))
 			break;
-		if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg);
-		BN_free(rsa->q);
+		if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
+			goto err;
 		}
-	if (callback != NULL) callback(3,1,cb_arg);
+	if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
+		goto err;
 	if (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) < 0)
 		{
 		tmp=rsa->p;
@@ -125,63 +242,64 @@ char *cb_arg;
 		}
 
 	/* calculate n */
-	rsa->n=BN_new();
-	if (rsa->n == NULL) goto err;
-	if (!BN_mul(rsa->n,rsa->p,rsa->q)) goto err;
+	if (!BN_mul(rsa->n,rsa->p,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
 
 	/* calculate d */
 	if (!BN_sub(r1,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err;	/* p-1 */
 	if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err;	/* q-1 */
-	if (!BN_mul(r0,r1,r2)) goto err;	/* (p-1)(q-1) */
-
-/* should not be needed, since gcd(p-1,e) == 1 and gcd(q-1,e) == 1 */
-/*	for (;;)
+	if (!BN_mul(r0,r1,r2,ctx)) goto err;	/* (p-1)(q-1) */
+	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
 		{
-		if (!BN_gcd(r3,r0,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
-		if (BN_is_one(r3)) break;
+		  pr0 = &local_r0;
+		  BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+		}
+	else
+	  pr0 = r0;
+	if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d,rsa->e,pr0,ctx)) goto err;	/* d */
 
-		if (1)
-			{
-			if (!BN_add_word(rsa->e,2L)) goto err;
-			continue;
-			}
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY,RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-		goto err;
+	/* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
+	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+		{
+		d = &local_d;
+		BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
 		}
-*/
-	rsa->d=(BIGNUM *)BN_mod_inverse(rsa->e,r0,ctx2);	/* d */
-	if (rsa->d == NULL) goto err;
+	else
+		d = rsa->d;
 
 	/* calculate d mod (p-1) */
-	rsa->dmp1=BN_new();
-	if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL) goto err;
-	if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,rsa->d,r1,ctx)) goto err;
+	if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,d,r1,ctx)) goto err;
 
 	/* calculate d mod (q-1) */
-	rsa->dmq1=BN_new();
-	if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL) goto err;
-	if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,rsa->d,r2,ctx)) goto err;
+	if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,d,r2,ctx)) goto err;
 
 	/* calculate inverse of q mod p */
-	rsa->iqmp=BN_mod_inverse(rsa->q,rsa->p,ctx2);
-	if (rsa->iqmp == NULL) goto err;
+	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+		{
+		p = &local_p;
+		BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+		}
+	else
+		p = rsa->p;
+	if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp,rsa->q,p,ctx)) goto err;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if(!fips_check_rsa(rsa))
+	    goto err;
+#endif
 
 	ok=1;
 err:
 	if (ok == -1)
 		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY,ERR_LIB_BN);
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN,ERR_LIB_BN);
 		ok=0;
 		}
-	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-	BN_CTX_free(ctx2);
-	
-	if (!ok)
+	if (ctx != NULL)
 		{
-		if (rsa != NULL) RSA_free(rsa);
-		return(NULL);
+		BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+		BN_CTX_free(ctx);
 		}
-	else
-		return(rsa);
+
+	return ok;
 	}