X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Frsa%2Frsa_gen.c;h=3d5a32a0a1224b80c1e8b0c5b8ef9e4ece4758d1;hp=f7f60754ade6d9a91a2c4f88bcd3fe133409c02e;hb=f844f9eb44186df2f8b0cfd3264b4eb003d8c61a;hpb=665d899fa6d3571da016925067ebcf1789d7d19c diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c index f7f60754ad..3d5a32a0a1 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * - * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html @@ -13,14 +13,22 @@ * Geoff */ +/* + * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for + * internal use. + */ +#include "internal/deprecated.h" + #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include -#include "rsa_locl.h" +#include +#include "rsa_local.h" -static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value, - BN_GENCB *cb); +static int rsa_keygen_pairwise_test(RSA *rsa, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb, void *cbarg); +static int rsa_keygen(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, + BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb, int pairwise_test); /* * NB: this wrapper would normally be placed in rsa_lib.c and the static @@ -41,47 +49,55 @@ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) int RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) { +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE /* multi-prime is only supported with the builtin key generation */ - if (rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen != NULL) + if (rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen != NULL) { return rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen(rsa, bits, primes, e_value, cb); - return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, primes, e_value, cb); + } else if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen != NULL) { + /* + * However, if rsa->meth implements only rsa_keygen, then we + * have to honour it in 2-prime case and assume that it wouldn't + * know what to do with multi-prime key generated by builtin + * subroutine... + */ + if (primes == 2) + return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); + else + return 0; + } +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */ + return rsa_keygen(NULL, rsa, bits, primes, e_value, cb, 0); } -static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value, - BN_GENCB *cb) +static int rsa_keygen(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, + BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb, int pairwise_test) { + int ok = -1; +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE + if (primes != 2) + return 0; + ok = rsa_sp800_56b_generate_key(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); + pairwise_test = 1; /* FIPS MODE needs to always run the pairwise test */ +#else BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *tmp, *prime; - int ok = -1, n = 0, bitsr[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM], bitse = 0; + int n = 0, bitsr[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM], bitse = 0; int i = 0, quo = 0, rmd = 0, adj = 0, retries = 0; RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL; STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BN_ULONG bitst = 0; + unsigned long error = 0; - /* - * From Github pull request #4241: - * - * We are in disagreement on how to handle security trade-off, in other - * words: - * - * mechanical-check-for-maximum-of-16-prime-factors vs. - * limiting-number-depending-on-length-less-factors-for-shorter-keys. - */ - - /* - * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck - * continually regenerating the same prime values. - */ - if (bits < 16) { + if (bits < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) { ok = 0; /* we set our own err */ - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); + RSAerr(0, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); goto err; } - if (primes < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM - || primes > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM || bits <= primes) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID); + if (primes < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || primes > rsa_multip_cap(bits)) { + ok = 0; /* we set our own err */ + RSAerr(0, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID); goto err; } @@ -99,23 +115,11 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value, quo = bits / primes; rmd = bits % primes; - if (primes > RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM && quo < RSA_MIN_PRIME_SIZE) { - /* - * this means primes are too many for the key bits. - * - * This only affects multi-prime keys. For normal RSA, - * it's limited above (bits >= 16, hence each prime >= 8). - * - * This is done in this way because the original normal - * RSA's behavior should not alter at least in OpenSSL 1.1.1. - */ - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID); - goto err; - } - for (i = 0; i < primes; i++) bitsr[i] = (i < rmd) ? quo + 1 : quo; + rsa->dirty_cnt++; + /* We need the RSA components non-NULL */ if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err; @@ -171,6 +175,7 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value, pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2); prime = pinfo->r; } + BN_set_flags(prime, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); for (;;) { redo: @@ -201,10 +206,20 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value, } if (!BN_sub(r2, prime, BN_value_one())) goto err; - if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) - goto err; - if (BN_is_one(r1)) + ERR_set_mark(); + BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) { + /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */ break; + } + error = ERR_peek_last_error(); + if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN + && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) { + /* GCD != 1 */ + ERR_pop_to_mark(); + } else { + goto err; + } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) goto err; } @@ -253,7 +268,7 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value, * * This strategy has the following goals: * - * 1. 1024-bit factors are effcient when using 3072 and 4096-bit key + * 1. 1024-bit factors are efficient when using 3072 and 4096-bit key * 2. stay the same logic with normal 2-prime key */ bitse -= bitsr[i]; @@ -387,11 +402,83 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value, ok = 1; err: if (ok == -1) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, ERR_LIB_BN); + RSAerr(0, ERR_LIB_BN); ok = 0; } - if (ctx != NULL) - BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */ + + if (pairwise_test && ok > 0) { + OSSL_CALLBACK *stcb = NULL; + void *stcbarg = NULL; + + OSSL_SELF_TEST_get_callback(libctx, &stcb, &stcbarg); + ok = rsa_keygen_pairwise_test(rsa, stcb, stcbarg); + if (!ok) { + /* Clear intermediate results */ + BN_clear_free(rsa->d); + BN_clear_free(rsa->p); + BN_clear_free(rsa->q); + BN_clear_free(rsa->dmp1); + BN_clear_free(rsa->dmq1); + BN_clear_free(rsa->iqmp); + } + } return ok; } + +/* + * For RSA key generation it is not known whether the key pair will be used + * for key transport or signatures. FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9 states that in this case + * either a signature verification OR an encryption operation may be used to + * perform the pairwise consistency check. The simpler encrypt/decrypt operation + * has been chosen for this case. + */ +static int rsa_keygen_pairwise_test(RSA *rsa, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb, void *cbarg) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned int ciphertxt_len; + unsigned char *ciphertxt = NULL; + const unsigned char plaintxt[16] = {0}; + unsigned char decoded[256]; + unsigned int decoded_len; + unsigned int plaintxt_len = (unsigned int)sizeof(plaintxt_len); + int padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; + OSSL_SELF_TEST *st = NULL; + + st = OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(cb, cbarg); + if (st == NULL) + goto err; + OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(st, OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_PCT, + OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_PCT_RSA_PKCS1); + + ciphertxt_len = RSA_size(rsa); + ciphertxt = OPENSSL_zalloc(ciphertxt_len); + if (ciphertxt == NULL) + goto err; + + ciphertxt_len = RSA_public_encrypt(plaintxt_len, plaintxt, ciphertxt, rsa, + padding); + if (ciphertxt_len <= 0) + goto err; + if (ciphertxt_len == plaintxt_len + && memcmp(decoded, plaintxt, plaintxt_len) == 0) + goto err; + + OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, ciphertxt); + + decoded_len = RSA_private_decrypt(ciphertxt_len, ciphertxt, decoded, rsa, + padding); + if (decoded_len != plaintxt_len + || memcmp(decoded, plaintxt, decoded_len) != 0) + goto err; + + ret = 1; +err: + OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(st, ret); + OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(st); + OPENSSL_free(ciphertxt); + + return ret; +}