X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Frand%2Frandfile.c;h=4723feecaf30ff7a3f60c4a24618d31c3f132aca;hp=468da4f874b28296938eb3644b8746915a4b8fac;hb=e527201f6be3c295358bcc8b6bafec598f02dc97;hpb=a224de3f5d017526c06bf869a5b8208c7768a80c diff --git a/crypto/rand/randfile.c b/crypto/rand/randfile.c index 468da4f874..4723feecaf 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/randfile.c +++ b/crypto/rand/randfile.c @@ -56,76 +56,192 @@ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ +/* We need to define this to get macros like S_IFBLK and S_IFCHR */ +#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 500 + +#include #include #include #include -#include -#include -#include -#include + #include "e_os.h" -#include "rand.h" +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS +#include +#endif +#ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H +# include +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO +# include +#endif + +#ifdef _WIN32 +#define stat _stat +#define chmod _chmod +#define open _open +#define fdopen _fdopen +#endif #undef BUFSIZE #define BUFSIZE 1024 #define RAND_DATA 1024 -/* #define RFILE ".rand" - defined in ../../e_os.h */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS +/* This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen + * for passing in sharing options being disabled by our /STANDARD=ANSI89 */ +static FILE *(*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) = + (FILE *(*)(const char *, const char *, ...))fopen; +#define VMS_OPEN_ATTRS "shr=get,put,upd,del","ctx=bin,stm","rfm=stm","rat=none","mrs=0" +#endif -int RAND_load_file(file,bytes) -const char *file; -long bytes; +/* #define RFILE ".rnd" - defined in ../../e_os.h */ + +/* Note that these functions are intended for seed files only. + * Entropy devices and EGD sockets are handled in rand_unix.c */ + +int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes) { + /* If bytes >= 0, read up to 'bytes' bytes. + * if bytes == -1, read complete file. */ + MS_STATIC unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE]; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO struct stat sb; +#endif int i,ret=0,n; FILE *in; if (file == NULL) return(0); - i=stat(file,&sb); - /* If the state fails, put some crap in anyway */ - RAND_seed((unsigned char *)&sb,sizeof(sb)); - ret+=sizeof(sb); - if (i < 0) return(0); - if (bytes <= 0) return(ret); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO + if (stat(file,&sb) < 0) return(0); + RAND_add(&sb,sizeof(sb),0.0); +#endif + if (bytes == 0) return(ret); +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS + in=vms_fopen(file,"rb",VMS_OPEN_ATTRS); +#else in=fopen(file,"rb"); +#endif if (in == NULL) goto err; +#if defined(S_IFBLK) && defined(S_IFCHR) && !defined(OPNESSL_NO_POSIX_IO) + if (sb.st_mode & (S_IFBLK | S_IFCHR)) { + /* this file is a device. we don't want read an infinite number + * of bytes from a random device, nor do we want to use buffered + * I/O because we will waste system entropy. + */ + bytes = (bytes == -1) ? 2048 : bytes; /* ok, is 2048 enough? */ + setvbuf(in, NULL, _IONBF, 0); /* don't do buffered reads */ + } +#endif for (;;) { - n=(bytes < BUFSIZE)?(int)bytes:BUFSIZE; + if (bytes > 0) + n = (bytes < BUFSIZE)?(int)bytes:BUFSIZE; + else + n = BUFSIZE; i=fread(buf,1,n,in); if (i <= 0) break; +#ifdef PURIFY + RAND_add(buf,i,(double)i); +#else /* even if n != i, use the full array */ - RAND_seed(buf,n); + RAND_add(buf,n,(double)i); +#endif ret+=i; - bytes-=n; - if (bytes <= 0) break; + if (bytes > 0) + { + bytes-=n; + if (bytes <= 0) break; + } } fclose(in); - memset(buf,0,BUFSIZE); + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,BUFSIZE); err: return(ret); } -int RAND_write_file(file) -const char *file; +int RAND_write_file(const char *file) { unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE]; - int i,ret=0; - FILE *out; + int i,ret=0,rand_err=0; + FILE *out = NULL; int n; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO + struct stat sb; + + i=stat(file,&sb); + if (i != -1) { +#if defined(S_IFBLK) && defined(S_IFCHR) + if (sb.st_mode & (S_IFBLK | S_IFCHR)) { + /* this file is a device. we don't write back to it. + * we "succeed" on the assumption this is some sort + * of random device. Otherwise attempting to write to + * and chmod the device causes problems. + */ + return(1); + } +#endif + } +#endif - out=fopen(file,"w"); +#if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) + { +#ifndef O_BINARY +#define O_BINARY 0 +#endif + /* chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file, + * permissions should be restrictive from the start */ + int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_BINARY, 0600); + if (fd != -1) + out = fdopen(fd, "wb"); + } +#endif + +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS + /* VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ + * version of the rand file for each call into this routine, then + * deleted all existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed + * the current version as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this + * resulted in an RMS race condition in rename() which could + * orphan files (see vms message help for RMS$_REENT). With the + * fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares the top-level + * version of the rand file. Note that there may still be + * conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this + * code will then create a new version of the rand file. Without + * the delete and rename code, this can result in ascending file + * versions that stop at version 32767, and this routine will then + * return an error. The remedy for this is to recode the calling + * application to avoid concurrent use of the rand file, or + * synchronize usage at the application level. Also consider + * whether or not you NEED a persistent rand file in a concurrent + * use situation. + */ + + out = vms_fopen(file,"rb+",VMS_OPEN_ATTRS); + if (out == NULL) + out = vms_fopen(file,"wb",VMS_OPEN_ATTRS); +#else + if (out == NULL) + out = fopen(file,"wb"); +#endif if (out == NULL) goto err; + +#ifndef NO_CHMOD chmod(file,0600); +#endif n=RAND_DATA; for (;;) { i=(n > BUFSIZE)?BUFSIZE:n; n-=BUFSIZE; - RAND_bytes(buf,i); + if (RAND_bytes(buf,i) <= 0) + rand_err=1; i=fwrite(buf,1,i,out); if (i <= 0) { @@ -134,37 +250,69 @@ const char *file; } ret+=i; if (n <= 0) break; - } + } + fclose(out); - memset(buf,0,BUFSIZE); + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,BUFSIZE); err: - return(ret); + return (rand_err ? -1 : ret); } -char *RAND_file_name(buf,size) -char *buf; -int size; +const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size) { - char *s; - char *ret=NULL; + char *s=NULL; + int ok = 0; +#ifdef __OpenBSD__ + struct stat sb; +#endif - s=getenv("RANDFILE"); - if (s != NULL) + if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0) + s=getenv("RANDFILE"); + if (s != NULL && *s && strlen(s) + 1 < size) { - strncpy(buf,s,size-1); - buf[size-1]='\0'; - ret=buf; + if (BUF_strlcpy(buf,s,size) >= size) + return NULL; } else { - s=getenv("HOME"); - if (s == NULL) return(RFILE); - if (((int)(strlen(s)+strlen(RFILE)+2)) > size) - return(RFILE); - strcpy(buf,s); - strcat(buf,"/"); - strcat(buf,RFILE); - ret=buf; + if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0) + s=getenv("HOME"); +#ifdef DEFAULT_HOME + if (s == NULL) + { + s = DEFAULT_HOME; + } +#endif + if (s && *s && strlen(s)+strlen(RFILE)+2 < size) + { + BUF_strlcpy(buf,s,size); +#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS + BUF_strlcat(buf,"/",size); +#endif + BUF_strlcat(buf,RFILE,size); + ok = 1; + } + else + buf[0] = '\0'; /* no file name */ } - return(ret); + +#ifdef __OpenBSD__ + /* given that all random loads just fail if the file can't be + * seen on a stat, we stat the file we're returning, if it + * fails, use /dev/arandom instead. this allows the user to + * use their own source for good random data, but defaults + * to something hopefully decent if that isn't available. + */ + + if (!ok) + if (BUF_strlcpy(buf,"/dev/arandom",size) >= size) { + return(NULL); + } + if (stat(buf,&sb) == -1) + if (BUF_strlcpy(buf,"/dev/arandom",size) >= size) { + return(NULL); + } + +#endif + return(buf); }