X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Frand%2Frand_lib.c;h=d8639c4a03f36be609a8bc7ceacabaf2fd0ac16b;hp=e82a63e5998d6878565924424572c9ab2713456d;hb=e2d227bb4a25bb75354a40816439630a8162f073;hpb=f61f62ea13470a00ae8be691d62abec97f94f0ee diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c index e82a63e599..d8639c4a03 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c @@ -15,11 +15,6 @@ #include #include "internal/thread_once.h" #include "rand_lcl.h" -#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX -# include -# include -# include -#endif #include "e_os.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE @@ -33,6 +28,11 @@ static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; int rand_fork_count; +static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_nonce_lock; +static int rand_nonce_count; + +static int rand_inited = 0; + #ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC /* * IMPORTANT NOTE: It is not currently possible to use this code @@ -59,10 +59,10 @@ size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool) if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 4)) != 0) { for (i = 0; i < TSC_READ_COUNT; i++) { c = (unsigned char)(OPENSSL_rdtsc() & 0xFF); - RAND_POOL_add(pool, &c, 1, 4); + rand_pool_add(pool, &c, 1, 4); } } - return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool); + return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); } #endif @@ -89,35 +89,29 @@ size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool) size_t bytes_needed; unsigned char *buffer; - bytes_needed = RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(pool, 8 /*entropy_per_byte*/); + bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); if (bytes_needed > 0) { - buffer = RAND_POOL_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); + buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); if (buffer != NULL) { - - /* If RDSEED is available, use that. */ + /* Whichever comes first, use RDSEED, RDRAND or nothing */ if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 18)) != 0) { if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed) - == bytes_needed) - return RAND_POOL_add_end(pool, - bytes_needed, - 8 * bytes_needed); - } - - /* Second choice is RDRAND. */ - if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))) != 0) { + == bytes_needed) { + rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed); + } + } else if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))) != 0) { if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed) - == bytes_needed) - return RAND_POOL_add_end(pool, - bytes_needed, - 8 * bytes_needed); + == bytes_needed) { + rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed); + } + } else { + rand_pool_add_end(pool, 0, 0); } - - return RAND_POOL_add_end(pool, 0, 0); } } - return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool); + return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); } #endif @@ -129,34 +123,41 @@ size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool) * is fetched using the parent's RAND_DRBG_generate(). * * Otherwise, the entropy is polled from the system entropy sources - * using RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). + * using rand_pool_acquire_entropy(). * * If a random pool has been added to the DRBG using RAND_add(), then * its entropy will be used up first. */ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - unsigned char **pout, - int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len) + unsigned char **pout, + int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len, + int prediction_resistance) { size_t ret = 0; size_t entropy_available = 0; - RAND_POOL *pool = RAND_POOL_new(entropy, min_len, max_len); + RAND_POOL *pool; - if (pool == NULL) + if (drbg->parent && drbg->strength > drbg->parent->strength) { + /* + * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C + * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source + */ + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GET_ENTROPY, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK); return 0; + } - if (drbg->pool) { - RAND_POOL_add(pool, - RAND_POOL_buffer(drbg->pool), - RAND_POOL_length(drbg->pool), - RAND_POOL_entropy(drbg->pool)); - RAND_POOL_free(drbg->pool); - drbg->pool = NULL; + if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) { + pool = drbg->seed_pool; + pool->entropy_requested = entropy; + } else { + pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, min_len, max_len); + if (pool == NULL) + return 0; } if (drbg->parent) { - size_t bytes_needed = RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(pool, 8); - unsigned char *buffer = RAND_POOL_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); + size_t bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); + unsigned char *buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); if (buffer != NULL) { size_t bytes = 0; @@ -164,144 +165,210 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, /* * Get random from parent, include our state as additional input. * Our lock is already held, but we need to lock our parent before - * generating bits from it. + * generating bits from it. (Note: taking the lock will be a no-op + * if locking if drbg->parent->lock == NULL.) */ - if (drbg->parent->lock) - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->parent->lock); + rand_drbg_lock(drbg->parent); if (RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg->parent, buffer, bytes_needed, - 0, - (unsigned char *)drbg, sizeof(*drbg)) != 0) + prediction_resistance, + NULL, 0) != 0) bytes = bytes_needed; - if (drbg->parent->lock) - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->parent->lock); + drbg->reseed_next_counter + = tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter); + rand_drbg_unlock(drbg->parent); - entropy_available = RAND_POOL_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); + rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); + entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); } } else { + if (prediction_resistance) { + /* + * We don't have any entropy sources that comply with the NIST + * standard to provide prediction resistance (see NIST SP 800-90C, + * Section 5.4). + */ + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GET_ENTROPY, + RAND_R_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE_NOT_SUPPORTED); + goto err; + } + /* Get entropy by polling system entropy sources. */ - entropy_available = RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(pool); + entropy_available = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool); } if (entropy_available > 0) { - ret = RAND_POOL_length(pool); - *pout = RAND_POOL_detach(pool); + ret = rand_pool_length(pool); + *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool); } - RAND_POOL_free(pool); + err: + if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) + rand_pool_free(pool); return ret; } /* - * Generate additional data that can be used for the drbg. The data does - * not need to contain entropy, but it's useful if it contains at least - * some bits that are unpredictable. + * Implements the cleanup_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()) * - * Returns 0 on failure. + */ +void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, + unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) +{ + if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) + OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen); +} + + +/* + * Implements the get_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()) * - * On success it allocates a buffer at |*pout| and returns the length of - * the data. The buffer should get freed using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(). */ -size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(unsigned char **pout, size_t max_len) +size_t rand_drbg_get_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg, + unsigned char **pout, + int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len) { + size_t ret = 0; RAND_POOL *pool; - CRYPTO_THREAD_ID thread_id; - size_t len; -#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX - pid_t pid; - struct timeval tv; -#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) - DWORD pid; - FILETIME ft; - LARGE_INTEGER pc; -#endif -#ifdef OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ - uint32_t tsc = 0; -#endif - pool = RAND_POOL_new(0, 0, max_len); + struct { + void * instance; + int count; + } data = { 0 }; + + pool = rand_pool_new(0, min_len, max_len); if (pool == NULL) return 0; -#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX - pid = getpid(); - RAND_POOL_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&pid, sizeof(pid), 0); -#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) - pid = GetCurrentProcessId(); - RAND_POOL_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&pid, sizeof(pid), 0); -#endif - - thread_id = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); - if (thread_id != 0) - RAND_POOL_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&thread_id, sizeof(thread_id), 0); + if (rand_pool_add_nonce_data(pool) == 0) + goto err; -#ifdef OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ - tsc = OPENSSL_rdtsc(); - if (tsc != 0) - RAND_POOL_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&tsc, sizeof(tsc), 0); -#endif + data.instance = drbg; + CRYPTO_atomic_add(&rand_nonce_count, 1, &data.count, rand_nonce_lock); -#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX - if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0) - RAND_POOL_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof(tv), 0); -#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) - if (QueryPerformanceCounter(&pc) != 0) - RAND_POOL_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&pc, sizeof(pc), 0); - GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&ft); - RAND_POOL_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&ft, sizeof(ft), 0); -#endif + if (rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0) == 0) + goto err; - /* TODO: Use RDSEED? */ + ret = rand_pool_length(pool); + *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool); - len = RAND_POOL_length(pool); - if (len != 0) - *pout = RAND_POOL_detach(pool); - RAND_POOL_free(pool); + err: + rand_pool_free(pool); - return len; + return ret; } /* - * Implements the cleanup_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()) + * Implements the cleanup_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()) * */ -void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) +void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg, + unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) { OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen); } -void rand_fork() +/* + * Generate additional data that can be used for the drbg. The data does + * not need to contain entropy, but it's useful if it contains at least + * some bits that are unpredictable. + * + * Returns 0 on failure. + * + * On success it allocates a buffer at |*pout| and returns the length of + * the data. The buffer should get freed using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(). + */ +size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char **pout) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + + if (rand_pool_add_additional_data(pool) == 0) + goto err; + + ret = rand_pool_length(pool); + *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool); + + err: + return ret; +} + +void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out) +{ + rand_pool_reattach(pool, out); +} + +void rand_fork(void) { rand_fork_count++; } DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init) { - int ret = 1; - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE rand_engine_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); - ret &= rand_engine_lock != NULL; + if (rand_engine_lock == NULL) + return 0; #endif + rand_meth_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); - ret &= rand_meth_lock != NULL; + if (rand_meth_lock == NULL) + goto err1; - return ret; + rand_nonce_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); + if (rand_nonce_lock == NULL) + goto err2; + + if (!rand_pool_init()) + goto err3; + + rand_inited = 1; + return 1; + +err3: + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_nonce_lock); + rand_nonce_lock = NULL; +err2: + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock); + rand_meth_lock = NULL; +err1: +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock); + rand_engine_lock = NULL; +#endif + return 0; } void rand_cleanup_int(void) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth; + if (!rand_inited) + return; + if (meth != NULL && meth->cleanup != NULL) meth->cleanup(); RAND_set_rand_method(NULL); + rand_pool_cleanup(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock); + rand_engine_lock = NULL; #endif CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock); + rand_meth_lock = NULL; + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_nonce_lock); + rand_nonce_lock = NULL; + rand_inited = 0; +} + +/* + * RAND_close_seed_files() ensures that any seed file decriptors are + * closed after use. + */ +void RAND_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) +{ + if (RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init)) + rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(keep); } /* @@ -326,73 +393,53 @@ int RAND_poll(void) if (drbg == NULL) return 0; - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock); + rand_drbg_lock(drbg); ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0); - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock); + rand_drbg_unlock(drbg); return ret; } else { /* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */ - pool = RAND_POOL_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, + pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8, - DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8)); + RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH); if (pool == NULL) return 0; - if (RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0) + if (rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0) goto err; if (meth->add == NULL - || meth->add(RAND_POOL_buffer(pool), - RAND_POOL_length(pool), - (RAND_POOL_entropy(pool) / 8.0)) == 0) + || meth->add(rand_pool_buffer(pool), + rand_pool_length(pool), + (rand_pool_entropy(pool) / 8.0)) == 0) goto err; ret = 1; } err: - RAND_POOL_free(pool); + rand_pool_free(pool); return ret; } -/* - * The 'random pool' acts as a dumb container for collecting random - * input from various entropy sources. The pool has no knowledge about - * whether its randomness is fed into a legacy RAND_METHOD via RAND_add() - * or into a new style RAND_DRBG. It is the callers duty to 1) initialize the - * random pool, 2) pass it to the polling callbacks, 3) seed the RNG, and - * 4) cleanup the random pool again. - * - * The random pool contains no locking mechanism because its scope and - * lifetime is intended to be restricted to a single stack frame. - */ -struct rand_pool_st { - unsigned char *buffer; /* points to the beginning of the random pool */ - size_t len; /* current number of random bytes contained in the pool */ - - size_t min_len; /* minimum number of random bytes requested */ - size_t max_len; /* maximum number of random bytes (allocated buffer size) */ - size_t entropy; /* current entropy count in bits */ - size_t requested_entropy; /* requested entropy count in bits */ -}; - /* * Allocate memory and initialize a new random pool */ -RAND_POOL *RAND_POOL_new(int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len) +RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, size_t min_len, size_t max_len) { RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool)); if (pool == NULL) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; + return NULL; } pool->min_len = min_len; - pool->max_len = max_len; + pool->max_len = (max_len > RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH) ? + RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH : max_len; pool->buffer = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(pool->max_len); if (pool->buffer == NULL) { @@ -400,7 +447,7 @@ RAND_POOL *RAND_POOL_new(int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len) goto err; } - pool->requested_entropy = entropy; + pool->entropy_requested = entropy_requested; return pool; @@ -409,22 +456,61 @@ err: return NULL; } +/* + * Attach new random pool to the given buffer + * + * This function is intended to be used only for feeding random data + * provided by RAND_add() and RAND_seed() into the DRBG. + */ +RAND_POOL *rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, + size_t entropy) +{ + RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool)); + + if (pool == NULL) { + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ATTACH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * The const needs to be cast away, but attached buffers will not be + * modified (in contrary to allocated buffers which are zeroed and + * freed in the end). + */ + pool->buffer = (unsigned char *) buffer; + pool->len = len; + + pool->attached = 1; + + pool->min_len = pool->max_len = pool->len; + pool->entropy = entropy; + + return pool; +} + /* * Free |pool|, securely erasing its buffer. */ -void RAND_POOL_free(RAND_POOL *pool) +void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool) { if (pool == NULL) return; - OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->max_len); + /* + * Although it would be advisable from a cryptographical viewpoint, + * we are not allowed to clear attached buffers, since they are passed + * to rand_pool_attach() as `const unsigned char*`. + * (see corresponding comment in rand_pool_attach()). + */ + if (!pool->attached) + OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->max_len); OPENSSL_free(pool); } /* * Return the |pool|'s buffer to the caller (readonly). */ -const unsigned char *RAND_POOL_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool) +const unsigned char *rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool) { return pool->buffer; } @@ -432,7 +518,7 @@ const unsigned char *RAND_POOL_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool) /* * Return the |pool|'s entropy to the caller. */ -size_t RAND_POOL_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) +size_t rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) { return pool->entropy; } @@ -440,7 +526,7 @@ size_t RAND_POOL_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) /* * Return the |pool|'s buffer length to the caller. */ -size_t RAND_POOL_length(RAND_POOL *pool) +size_t rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool) { return pool->len; } @@ -448,22 +534,34 @@ size_t RAND_POOL_length(RAND_POOL *pool) /* * Detach the |pool| buffer and return it to the caller. * It's the responsibility of the caller to free the buffer - * using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(). + * using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() or to re-attach it + * again to the pool using rand_pool_reattach(). */ -unsigned char *RAND_POOL_detach(RAND_POOL *pool) +unsigned char *rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool) { unsigned char *ret = pool->buffer; pool->buffer = NULL; + pool->entropy = 0; return ret; } +/* + * Re-attach the |pool| buffer. It is only allowed to pass + * the |buffer| which was previously detached from the same pool. + */ +void rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer) +{ + pool->buffer = buffer; + OPENSSL_cleanse(pool->buffer, pool->len); + pool->len = 0; +} /* - * If every byte of the input contains |entropy_per_bytes| bits of entropy, - * how many bytes does one need to obtain at least |bits| bits of entropy? + * If |entropy_factor| bits contain 1 bit of entropy, how many bytes does one + * need to obtain at least |bits| bits of entropy? */ -#define ENTROPY_TO_BYTES(bits, entropy_per_bytes) \ - (((bits) + ((entropy_per_bytes) - 1))/(entropy_per_bytes)) +#define ENTROPY_TO_BYTES(bits, entropy_factor) \ + (((bits) * (entropy_factor) + 7) / 8) /* @@ -474,9 +572,9 @@ unsigned char *RAND_POOL_detach(RAND_POOL *pool) * |entropy| if the entropy count and buffer size is large enough * 0 otherwise */ -size_t RAND_POOL_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool) +size_t rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool) { - if (pool->entropy < pool->requested_entropy) + if (pool->entropy < pool->entropy_requested) return 0; if (pool->len < pool->min_len) @@ -490,31 +588,31 @@ size_t RAND_POOL_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool) * the random pool. */ -size_t RAND_POOL_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool) +size_t rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool) { - if (pool->entropy < pool->requested_entropy) - return pool->requested_entropy - pool->entropy; + if (pool->entropy < pool->entropy_requested) + return pool->entropy_requested - pool->entropy; return 0; } /* * Returns the number of bytes needed to fill the pool, assuming - * the input has 'entropy_per_byte' entropy bits per byte. + * the input has 1 / |entropy_factor| entropy bits per data bit. * In case of an error, 0 is returned. */ -size_t RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_per_byte) +size_t rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor) { size_t bytes_needed; - size_t entropy_needed = RAND_POOL_entropy_needed(pool); + size_t entropy_needed = rand_pool_entropy_needed(pool); - if (entropy_per_byte < 1 || entropy_per_byte > 8) { + if (entropy_factor < 1) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_BYTES_NEEDED, RAND_R_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE); return 0; } - bytes_needed = ENTROPY_TO_BYTES(entropy_needed, entropy_per_byte); + bytes_needed = ENTROPY_TO_BYTES(entropy_needed, entropy_factor); if (bytes_needed > pool->max_len - pool->len) { /* not enough space left */ @@ -531,7 +629,7 @@ size_t RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_per_byte) } /* Returns the remaining number of bytes available */ -size_t RAND_POOL_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool) +size_t rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool) { return pool->max_len - pool->len; } @@ -543,24 +641,28 @@ size_t RAND_POOL_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool) * random input which contains at least |entropy| bits of * randomness. * - * Return available amount of entropy after this operation. - * (see RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool)) + * Returns 1 if the added amount is adequate, otherwise 0 */ -size_t RAND_POOL_add(RAND_POOL *pool, - const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy) +int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool, + const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy) { if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD, RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } + if (pool->buffer == NULL) { + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (len > 0) { memcpy(pool->buffer + pool->len, buffer, len); pool->len += len; pool->entropy += entropy; } - return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool); + return 1; } /* @@ -572,10 +674,10 @@ size_t RAND_POOL_add(RAND_POOL *pool, * If |len| == 0 this is considered a no-op and a NULL pointer * is returned without producing an error message. * - * After updating the buffer, RAND_POOL_add_end() needs to be called + * After updating the buffer, rand_pool_add_end() needs to be called * to finish the udpate operation (see next comment). */ -unsigned char *RAND_POOL_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len) +unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len) { if (len == 0) return NULL; @@ -585,6 +687,11 @@ unsigned char *RAND_POOL_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len) return NULL; } + if (pool->buffer == NULL) { + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_BEGIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + return pool->buffer + pool->len; } @@ -592,12 +699,12 @@ unsigned char *RAND_POOL_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len) * Finish to add random bytes to the random pool in-place. * * Finishes an in-place update of the random pool started by - * RAND_POOL_add_begin() (see previous comment). + * rand_pool_add_begin() (see previous comment). * It is expected that |len| bytes of random input have been added * to the buffer which contain at least |entropy| bits of randomness. * It is allowed to add less bytes than originally reserved. */ -size_t RAND_POOL_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy) +int rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy) { if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_END, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW); @@ -609,7 +716,7 @@ size_t RAND_POOL_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy) pool->entropy += entropy; } - return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool); + return 1; } int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth) @@ -717,10 +824,7 @@ int RAND_priv_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) if (drbg == NULL) return 0; - /* We have to lock the DRBG before generating bits from it. */ - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock); ret = RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, buf, num); - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock); return ret; }