X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Frand%2Fdrbg_lib.c;h=c6397b22c6d4e94bcbd88556699326168ab23776;hp=c0c0b91cfd72a25b4b6c2259c1bdbe2bc53c08c8;hb=272c0df8e1aa549da9060bf70b34c9aabb3bcb0d;hpb=1648338ba1a63c19c7bae32170cd1d825b48eaee diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c index c0c0b91cfd..c6397b22c6 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c @@ -14,10 +14,12 @@ #include "rand_lcl.h" #include "internal/thread_once.h" #include "internal/rand_int.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib_int.h" /* - * Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG, AES-CTR mode. - * The RAND_DRBG is OpenSSL's pointer to an instance of the DRBG. + * Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG + * + * See manual page RAND_DRBG(7) for a general overview. * * The OpenSSL model is to have new and free functions, and that new * does all initialization. That is not the NIST model, which has @@ -28,69 +30,40 @@ */ /* - * THE THREE SHARED DRBGs - * - * There are three shared DRBGs (master, public and private), which are - * accessed concurrently by all threads. + * The three shared DRBG instances * - * THE MASTER DRBG + * There are three shared DRBG instances: , , and . + */ + +/* + * The DRBG * * Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other * DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy - * sources or by consuming randomnes which was added by RAND_add() + * sources or by consuming randomness which was added by RAND_add(). + * + * The DRBG is a global instance which is accessed concurrently by + * all threads. The necessary locking is managed automatically by its child + * DRBG instances during reseeding. */ -static RAND_DRBG *drbg_master; +static RAND_DRBG *master_drbg; /* - * THE PUBLIC DRBG + * The DRBG * * Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes(). + * + * The DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per thread. */ -static RAND_DRBG *drbg_public; +static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL public_drbg; /* - * THE PRIVATE DRBG + * The DRBG * * Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes() - */ -static RAND_DRBG *drbg_private; -/*+ - * DRBG HIERARCHY - * - * In addition there are DRBGs, which are not shared, but used only by a - * single thread at every time, for example the DRBGs which are owned by - * an SSL context. All DRBGs are organized in a hierarchical fashion - * with the DRBG as root. - * - * This gives the following overall picture: - * - * - * | - * RAND_add() ==> \ - * / \ | shared DRBGs (with locking) - * / - * | - * owned by an SSL context - * - * AUTOMATIC RESEEDING * - * Before satisfying a generate request, a DRBG reseeds itself automatically, - * if one of the following two conditions holds: - * - * - the number of generate requests since the last reseeding exceeds a - * certain threshold, the so called |reseed_interval|. This behaviour - * can be disabled by setting the |reseed_interval| to 0. - * - * - the time elapsed since the last reseeding exceeds a certain time - * interval, the so called |reseed_time_interval|. This behaviour - * can be disabled by setting the |reseed_time_interval| to 0. - * - * MANUAL RESEEDING - * - * For the three shared DRBGs (and only for these) there is another way to - * reseed them manually by calling RAND_seed() (or RAND_add() with a positive - * |randomness| argument). This will immediately reseed the DRBG. - * The and DRBG will detect this on their next generate - * call and reseed, pulling randomness from . + * The DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per thread. */ +static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg; + /* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */ @@ -98,23 +71,45 @@ static const char ossl_pers_string[] = "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG"; static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_drbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; + + +static int rand_drbg_type = RAND_DRBG_TYPE; +static unsigned int rand_drbg_flags = RAND_DRBG_FLAGS; + +static unsigned int master_reseed_interval = MASTER_RESEED_INTERVAL; +static unsigned int slave_reseed_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL; + +static time_t master_reseed_time_interval = MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL; +static time_t slave_reseed_time_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL; + static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent); -static void drbg_cleanup(RAND_DRBG *drbg); + +static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure, + int type, + unsigned int flags, + RAND_DRBG *parent); /* - * Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |nid|, with optional |flags|. + * Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |type|, with optional |flags|. + * + * If |type| and |flags| are zero, use the defaults * * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. */ -int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int nid, unsigned int flags) +int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags) { int ret = 1; + if (type == 0 && flags == 0) { + type = rand_drbg_type; + flags = rand_drbg_flags; + } + drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED; drbg->flags = flags; - drbg->nid = nid; + drbg->type = type; - switch (nid) { + switch (type) { default: RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE); return 0; @@ -134,36 +129,120 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int nid, unsigned int flags) } /* - * Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The |parent|, if not - * NULL, will be used to auto-seed this RAND_DRBG as needed. + * Set/initialize default |type| and |flag| for new drbg instances. + * + * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. + */ +int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags) +{ + int ret = 1; + + switch (type) { + default: + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE); + return 0; + case NID_aes_128_ctr: + case NID_aes_192_ctr: + case NID_aes_256_ctr: + break; + } + + if ((flags & ~RAND_DRBG_USED_FLAGS) != 0) { + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_FLAGS); + return 0; + } + + rand_drbg_type = type; + rand_drbg_flags = flags; + + return ret; +} + + +/* + * Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The DRBG is allocated on + * the secure heap if |secure| is nonzero and the secure heap is enabled. + * The |parent|, if not NULL, will be used as random source for reseeding. * * Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure. */ -RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent) +static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure, + int type, + unsigned int flags, + RAND_DRBG *parent) { - RAND_DRBG *drbg = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg)); + RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ? + OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg)) : OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg)); if (drbg == NULL) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; + return NULL; } + + drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg); drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count; drbg->parent = parent; + + if (parent == NULL) { + drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy; + drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy; +#ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE + drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce; + drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce; +#endif + + drbg->reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval; + drbg->reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval; + } else { + drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy; + drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy; + /* + * Do not provide nonce callbacks, the child DRBGs will + * obtain their nonce using random bits from the parent. + */ + + drbg->reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval; + drbg->reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval; + } + if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0) goto err; - if (!RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, rand_drbg_get_entropy, - rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy, - NULL, NULL)) - goto err; + if (parent != NULL) { + rand_drbg_lock(parent); + if (drbg->strength > parent->strength) { + /* + * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C + * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source + */ + rand_drbg_unlock(parent); + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK); + goto err; + } + rand_drbg_unlock(parent); + } return drbg; err: - OPENSSL_free(drbg); + if (drbg->secure) + OPENSSL_secure_free(drbg); + else + OPENSSL_free(drbg); + return NULL; } +RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent) +{ + return rand_drbg_new(0, type, flags, parent); +} + +RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent) +{ + return rand_drbg_new(1, type, flags, parent); +} + /* * Uninstantiate |drbg| and free all memory. */ @@ -174,8 +253,13 @@ void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg) if (drbg->meth != NULL) drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg); + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(drbg->lock); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data); - OPENSSL_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg)); + + if (drbg->secure) + OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg)); + else + OPENSSL_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg)); } /* @@ -191,6 +275,9 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, { unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL; size_t noncelen = 0, entropylen = 0; + size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength; + size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen; + size_t max_entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen; if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, @@ -198,8 +285,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, goto end; } - if (drbg->meth == NULL) - { + if (drbg->meth == NULL) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED); goto end; @@ -213,21 +299,33 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, } drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; + + /* + * NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting the entropy + * and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy with 50% and increasing + * the minimum length to accomadate the length of the nonce. + * We do this in case a nonce is require and get_nonce is NULL. + */ + if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) { + min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2; + min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen; + max_entropylen += drbg->max_noncelen; + } + if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL) - entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength, - drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen); - if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen - || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) { + entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, min_entropy, + min_entropylen, max_entropylen, 0); + if (entropylen < min_entropylen + || entropylen > max_entropylen) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY); goto end; } - if (drbg->max_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) { + if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) { noncelen = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->strength / 2, drbg->min_noncelen, drbg->max_noncelen); if (noncelen < drbg->min_noncelen || noncelen > drbg->max_noncelen) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, - RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE); + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE); goto end; } } @@ -259,7 +357,7 @@ end: RAND_R_ERROR_ENTROPY_POOL_WAS_IGNORED); drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; } - RAND_POOL_free(drbg->pool); + rand_pool_free(drbg->pool); drbg->pool = NULL; } if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) @@ -276,8 +374,7 @@ end: */ int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) { - if (drbg->meth == NULL) - { + if (drbg->meth == NULL) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_UNINSTANTIATE, RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED); return 0; @@ -288,7 +385,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) * initial values. */ drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg); - return RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, drbg->nid, drbg->flags); + return RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, drbg->type, drbg->flags); } /* @@ -299,7 +396,8 @@ int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. */ int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen) + const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen, + int prediction_resistance) { unsigned char *entropy = NULL; size_t entropylen = 0; @@ -313,9 +411,9 @@ int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, return 0; } - if (adin == NULL) + if (adin == NULL) { adinlen = 0; - else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) { + } else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } @@ -323,7 +421,9 @@ int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL) entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength, - drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen); + drbg->min_entropylen, + drbg->max_entropylen, + prediction_resistance); if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY); @@ -377,7 +477,7 @@ int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg, if (drbg->pool != NULL) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - RAND_POOL_free(drbg->pool); + rand_pool_free(drbg->pool); drbg->pool = NULL; } @@ -395,11 +495,11 @@ int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg, } /* will be picked up by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback */ - drbg->pool = RAND_POOL_new(entropy, len, len); + drbg->pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, len, len); if (drbg->pool == NULL) return 0; - RAND_POOL_add(drbg->pool, buffer, len, entropy); + rand_pool_add(drbg->pool, buffer, len, entropy); } else { if (drbg->max_adinlen < len) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, @@ -439,7 +539,7 @@ int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg, drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0); } else if (reseeded == 0) { /* do a full reseeding if it has not been done yet above */ - RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0); + RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0); } } @@ -447,7 +547,7 @@ int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg, if (drbg->pool != NULL) { drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - RAND_POOL_free(drbg->pool); + rand_pool_free(drbg->pool); drbg->pool = NULL; return 0; } @@ -515,7 +615,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, } if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) { - if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen)) { + if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, prediction_resistance)) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -571,40 +671,10 @@ err: /* * Set the RAND_DRBG callbacks for obtaining entropy and nonce. * - * In the following, the signature and the semantics of the - * get_entropy() and cleanup_entropy() callbacks are explained. - * - * GET_ENTROPY - * - * size_t get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *ctx, - * unsigned char **pout, - * int entropy, - * size_t min_len, size_t max_len); - * - * This is a request to allocate and fill a buffer of size - * |min_len| <= size <= |max_len| (in bytes) which contains - * at least |entropy| bits of randomness. The buffer's address is - * to be returned in |*pout| and the number of collected - * randomness bytes (which may be less than the allocated size - * of the buffer) as return value. - * - * If the callback fails to acquire at least |entropy| bits of - * randomness, it shall return a buffer length of 0. - * - * CLEANUP_ENTROPY + * Setting the callbacks is allowed only if the drbg has not been + * initialized yet. Otherwise, the operation will fail. * - * void cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *ctx, - * unsigned char *out, size_t outlen); - * - * A request to clear and free the buffer allocated by get_entropy(). - * The values |out| and |outlen| are expected to be the random buffer's - * address and length, as returned by the get_entropy() callback. - * - * GET_NONCE, CLEANUP_NONCE - * - * Signature and semantics of the get_nonce() and cleanup_nonce() - * callbacks are analogous to get_entropy() and cleanup_entropy(). - * Currently, the nonce is used only for the known answer tests. + * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. */ int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *drbg, RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn get_entropy, @@ -656,6 +726,101 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_time_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, time_t interval) return 1; } +/* + * Set the default values for reseed (time) intervals of new DRBG instances + * + * The default values can be set independently for master DRBG instances + * (without a parent) and slave DRBG instances (with parent). + * + * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. + */ + +int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults( + unsigned int _master_reseed_interval, + unsigned int _slave_reseed_interval, + time_t _master_reseed_time_interval, + time_t _slave_reseed_time_interval + ) +{ + if (_master_reseed_interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL + || _slave_reseed_interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL) + return 0; + + if (_master_reseed_time_interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL + || _slave_reseed_time_interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL) + return 0; + + master_reseed_interval = _master_reseed_interval; + slave_reseed_interval = _slave_reseed_interval; + + master_reseed_time_interval = _master_reseed_time_interval; + slave_reseed_time_interval = _slave_reseed_time_interval; + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Locks the given drbg. Locking a drbg which does not have locking + * enabled is considered a successful no-op. + * + * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. + */ +int rand_drbg_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg) +{ + if (drbg->lock != NULL) + return CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock); + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Unlocks the given drbg. Unlocking a drbg which does not have locking + * enabled is considered a successful no-op. + * + * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. + */ +int rand_drbg_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg) +{ + if (drbg->lock != NULL) + return CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock); + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Enables locking for the given drbg + * + * Locking can only be enabled if the random generator + * is in the uninitialized state. + * + * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. + */ +int rand_drbg_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg) +{ + if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) { + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING, + RAND_R_DRBG_ALREADY_INITIALIZED); + return 0; + } + + if (drbg->lock == NULL) { + if (drbg->parent != NULL && drbg->parent->lock == NULL) { + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING, + RAND_R_PARENT_LOCKING_NOT_ENABLED); + return 0; + } + + drbg->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); + if (drbg->lock == NULL) { + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING, + RAND_R_FAILED_TO_CREATE_LOCK); + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} + /* * Get and set the EXDATA */ @@ -685,48 +850,30 @@ static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent) { RAND_DRBG *drbg; - drbg = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(RAND_DRBG)); + drbg = RAND_DRBG_secure_new(rand_drbg_type, rand_drbg_flags, parent); if (drbg == NULL) return NULL; - drbg->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); - if (drbg->lock == NULL) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_DRBG_SETUP, RAND_R_FAILED_TO_CREATE_LOCK); - goto err; - } - - if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, - RAND_DRBG_NID, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) != 1) + /* Only the master DRBG needs to have a lock */ + if (parent == NULL && rand_drbg_enable_locking(drbg) == 0) goto err; - if (RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, rand_drbg_get_entropy, - rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy, NULL, NULL) != 1) - goto err; - - if (parent == NULL) { - drbg->reseed_interval = MASTER_RESEED_INTERVAL; - drbg->reseed_time_interval = MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL; - } else { - drbg->parent = parent; - drbg->reseed_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL; - drbg->reseed_time_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL; - } /* enable seed propagation */ drbg->reseed_counter = 1; /* - * Ignore instantiation error so support just-in-time instantiation. + * Ignore instantiation error to support just-in-time instantiation. * * The state of the drbg will be checked in RAND_DRBG_generate() and * an automatic recovery is attempted. */ - RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, - (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string, - sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1); + (void)RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, + (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string, + sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1); return drbg; err: - drbg_cleanup(drbg); + RAND_DRBG_free(drbg); return NULL; } @@ -743,59 +890,59 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_drbg_init) if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL)) return 0; - drbg_master = drbg_setup(NULL); - drbg_public = drbg_setup(drbg_master); - drbg_private = drbg_setup(drbg_master); - - if (drbg_master == NULL || drbg_public == NULL || drbg_private == NULL) + if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&private_drbg, NULL)) return 0; + if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&public_drbg, NULL)) + goto err1; + + master_drbg = drbg_setup(NULL); + if (master_drbg == NULL) + goto err2; + return 1; -} -/* Cleans up the given global DRBG */ -static void drbg_cleanup(RAND_DRBG *drbg) -{ - if (drbg != NULL) { - RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg); - CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(drbg->lock); - OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(RAND_DRBG)); - } +err2: + CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&public_drbg); +err1: + CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&private_drbg); + return 0; } /* Clean up the global DRBGs before exit */ void rand_drbg_cleanup_int(void) { - drbg_cleanup(drbg_private); - drbg_cleanup(drbg_public); - drbg_cleanup(drbg_master); + RAND_DRBG_free(master_drbg); + master_drbg = NULL; + + CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&private_drbg); + CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&public_drbg); +} + +void drbg_delete_thread_state() +{ + RAND_DRBG *drbg; - drbg_private = drbg_public = drbg_master = NULL; + drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&public_drbg); + CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&public_drbg, NULL); + RAND_DRBG_free(drbg); + + drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&private_drbg); + CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&private_drbg, NULL); + RAND_DRBG_free(drbg); } /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_bytes() method */ static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count) { - int ret = 0; - size_t chunk; + int ret; RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_public(); if (drbg == NULL) return 0; - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock); - for ( ; count > 0; count -= chunk, out += chunk) { - chunk = count; - if (chunk > drbg->max_request) - chunk = drbg->max_request; - ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, out, chunk, 0, NULL, 0); - if (!ret) - goto err; - } - ret = 1; + ret = RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, out, count); -err: - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock); return ret; } @@ -821,11 +968,11 @@ static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness) return 0; } - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock); + rand_drbg_lock(drbg); ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, buf, (size_t)(unsigned int)num, (size_t)(8*randomness)); - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock); + rand_drbg_unlock(drbg); return ret; } @@ -845,9 +992,9 @@ static int drbg_status(void) if (drbg == NULL) return 0; - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock); + rand_drbg_lock(drbg); ret = drbg->state == DRBG_READY ? 1 : 0; - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock); + rand_drbg_unlock(drbg); return ret; } @@ -861,7 +1008,7 @@ RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void) if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init)) return NULL; - return drbg_master; + return master_drbg; } /* @@ -870,10 +1017,19 @@ RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void) */ RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void) { + RAND_DRBG *drbg; + if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init)) return NULL; - return drbg_public; + drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&public_drbg); + if (drbg == NULL) { + if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND)) + return NULL; + drbg = drbg_setup(master_drbg); + CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&public_drbg, drbg); + } + return drbg; } /* @@ -882,10 +1038,19 @@ RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void) */ RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_private(void) { + RAND_DRBG *drbg; + if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init)) return NULL; - return drbg_private; + drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&private_drbg); + if (drbg == NULL) { + if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND)) + return NULL; + drbg = drbg_setup(master_drbg); + CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&private_drbg, drbg); + } + return drbg; } RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {