X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Frand%2Fdrbg_lib.c;h=94a4e98d73aedb153b9cf42f716d8cf080eecccc;hp=9c315ed68d973e596098b53d94f9a2e2acb87ba0;hb=4bffc025fd1b75b690f50552f443cbd3b1f1cbaf;hpb=c402e943cd0d748ca2a74a37caeccdfc59ce2870 diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c index 9c315ed68d..94a4e98d73 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* - * Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2011-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * - * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html @@ -11,10 +11,11 @@ #include #include #include -#include "rand_lcl.h" +#include "rand_local.h" #include "internal/thread_once.h" -#include "internal/rand_int.h" -#include "internal/cryptlib_int.h" +#include "crypto/rand.h" +#include "crypto/rand_pool.h" +#include "crypto/cryptlib.h" /* * Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG @@ -29,52 +30,72 @@ * a much bigger deal than just re-setting an allocated resource.) */ -/* - * The three shared DRBG instances - * - * There are three shared DRBG instances: , , and . - */ -/* - * The DRBG - * - * Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other - * DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy - * sources or by consuming randomness which was added by RAND_add(). - * - * The DRBG is a global instance which is accessed concurrently by - * all threads. The necessary locking is managed automatically by its child - * DRBG instances during reseeding. - */ -static RAND_DRBG *master_drbg; -/* - * The DRBG - * - * Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes(). - * - * The DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per thread. - */ -static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL public_drbg; -/* - * The DRBG - * - * Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes() - * - * The DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per thread. - */ -static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg; +typedef struct drbg_global_st { + /* + * The three shared DRBG instances + * + * There are three shared DRBG instances: , , and . + */ + /* + * The DRBG + * + * Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other + * DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy + * sources or by consuming randomness which was added by RAND_add(). + * + * The DRBG is a global instance which is accessed concurrently by + * all threads. The necessary locking is managed automatically by its child + * DRBG instances during reseeding. + */ + RAND_DRBG *master_drbg; + /* + * The DRBG + * + * Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes(). + * + * The DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per + * thread. + */ + CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL public_drbg; + /* + * The DRBG + * + * Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes() + * + * The DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per + * thread. + */ + CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg; +} DRBG_GLOBAL; +typedef struct drbg_nonce_global_st { + CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_nonce_lock; + int rand_nonce_count; +} DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL; /* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */ -static const char ossl_pers_string[] = "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG"; +static const char ossl_pers_string[] = DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING; -static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_drbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; +#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS ( \ + RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE ) +#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER 0 +#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC 1 +#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE 2 - -static int rand_drbg_type = RAND_DRBG_TYPE; -static unsigned int rand_drbg_flags = RAND_DRBG_FLAGS; +/* Defaults */ +static int rand_drbg_type[3] = { + RAND_DRBG_TYPE, /* Master */ + RAND_DRBG_TYPE, /* Public */ + RAND_DRBG_TYPE /* Private */ +}; +static unsigned int rand_drbg_flags[3] = { + RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER, /* Master */ + RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC, /* Public */ + RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE /* Private */ +}; static unsigned int master_reseed_interval = MASTER_RESEED_INTERVAL; static unsigned int slave_reseed_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL; @@ -84,15 +105,237 @@ static time_t slave_reseed_time_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL; /* A logical OR of all used DRBG flag bits (currently there is only one) */ static const unsigned int rand_drbg_used_flags = - RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF; + RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC | RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS; -static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent); -static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure, +static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type); + +static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, + int secure, int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent); +static int rand_drbg_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags); +static int rand_drbg_init_method(RAND_DRBG *drbg); + +static int is_ctr(int type) +{ + switch (type) { + case NID_aes_128_ctr: + case NID_aes_192_ctr: + case NID_aes_256_ctr: + return 1; + default: + return 0; + } +} + +static int is_digest(int type) +{ + switch (type) { + case NID_sha1: + case NID_sha224: + case NID_sha256: + case NID_sha384: + case NID_sha512: + case NID_sha512_224: + case NID_sha512_256: + case NID_sha3_224: + case NID_sha3_256: + case NID_sha3_384: + case NID_sha3_512: + return 1; + default: + return 0; + } +} + +/* + * Initialize the OPENSSL_CTX global DRBGs on first use. + * Returns the allocated global data on success or NULL on failure. + */ +static void *drbg_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx) +{ + DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dgbl)); + + if (dgbl == NULL) + return NULL; + +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + /* + * We need to ensure that base libcrypto thread handling has been + * initialised. + */ + OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL); +#endif + + if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, NULL)) + goto err1; + + if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, NULL)) + goto err2; + + dgbl->master_drbg = drbg_setup(libctx, NULL, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER); + if (dgbl->master_drbg == NULL) + goto err3; + + return dgbl; + + err3: + CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public_drbg); + err2: + CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg); + err1: + OPENSSL_free(dgbl); + return NULL; +} + +static void drbg_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdgbl) +{ + DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = vdgbl; + + if (dgbl == NULL) + return; + + RAND_DRBG_free(dgbl->master_drbg); + CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg); + CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public_drbg); + + OPENSSL_free(dgbl); +} + +static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD drbg_ossl_ctx_method = { + drbg_ossl_ctx_new, + drbg_ossl_ctx_free, +}; + +/* + * drbg_ossl_ctx_new() calls drgb_setup() which calls rand_drbg_get_nonce() + * which needs to get the rand_nonce_lock out of the OPENSSL_CTX...but since + * drbg_ossl_ctx_new() hasn't finished running yet we need the rand_nonce_lock + * to be in a different global data object. Otherwise we will go into an + * infinite recursion loop. + */ +static void *drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx) +{ + DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dngbl)); + + if (dngbl == NULL) + return NULL; + + dngbl->rand_nonce_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); + if (dngbl->rand_nonce_lock == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(dngbl); + return NULL; + } + + return dngbl; +} + +static void drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdngbl) +{ + DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl = vdngbl; + + if (dngbl == NULL) + return; + + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dngbl->rand_nonce_lock); + + OPENSSL_free(dngbl); +} + +static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_method = { + drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_new, + drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_free, +}; + +static DRBG_GLOBAL *drbg_get_global(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx) +{ + return openssl_ctx_get_data(libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_INDEX, + &drbg_ossl_ctx_method); +} + +/* Implements the get_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()) */ +size_t rand_drbg_get_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg, + unsigned char **pout, + int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + RAND_POOL *pool; + DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl + = openssl_ctx_get_data(drbg->libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_NONCE_INDEX, + &drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_method); + struct { + void *instance; + int count; + } data; + + if (dngbl == NULL) + return 0; + + memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data)); + pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, min_len, max_len); + if (pool == NULL) + return 0; + + if (rand_pool_add_nonce_data(pool) == 0) + goto err; + + data.instance = drbg; + CRYPTO_atomic_add(&dngbl->rand_nonce_count, 1, &data.count, + dngbl->rand_nonce_lock); + + if (rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0) == 0) + goto err; + + ret = rand_pool_length(pool); + *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool); + + err: + rand_pool_free(pool); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Implements the cleanup_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()) + * + */ +void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg, + unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) +{ + OPENSSL_clear_free(out, outlen); +} + +/* + * Set the |drbg|'s callback data pointer for the entropy and nonce callbacks + * + * The ownership of the context data remains with the caller, + * i.e., it is the caller's responsibility to keep it available as long + * as it is need by the callbacks and free it after use. + * + * Setting the callback data is allowed only if the drbg has not been + * initialized yet. Otherwise, the operation will fail. + * + * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. + */ +int RAND_DRBG_set_callback_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg, void *data) +{ + if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED + || drbg->parent != NULL) + return 0; + + drbg->callback_data = data; + return 1; +} + +/* Retrieve the callback data pointer */ +void *RAND_DRBG_get_callback_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg) +{ + return drbg->callback_data; +} + /* * Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |type|, with optional |flags|. * @@ -102,33 +345,65 @@ static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure, */ int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags) { - int ret = 1; + return rand_drbg_set(drbg, type, flags) && rand_drbg_init_method(drbg); +} +static int rand_drbg_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags) +{ if (type == 0 && flags == 0) { - type = rand_drbg_type; - flags = rand_drbg_flags; + type = rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER]; + flags = rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER]; + } + + /* If set is called multiple times - clear the old one */ + if (drbg->type != 0 && (type != drbg->type || flags != drbg->flags)) { + if (drbg->meth != NULL) + drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg); + rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool); + drbg->adin_pool = NULL; } drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED; drbg->flags = flags; drbg->type = type; + drbg->meth = NULL; - switch (type) { - default: - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE); - return 0; - case 0: - /* Uninitialized; that's okay. */ + if (type == 0 || is_ctr(type) || is_digest(type)) return 1; - case NID_aes_128_ctr: - case NID_aes_192_ctr: - case NID_aes_256_ctr: + + drbg->type = 0; + drbg->flags = 0; + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE); + + return 0; +} + +static int rand_drbg_init_method(RAND_DRBG *drbg) +{ + int ret; + + if (drbg->meth != NULL) + return 1; + + if (is_ctr(drbg->type)) { ret = drbg_ctr_init(drbg); - break; + } else if (is_digest(drbg->type)) { + if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC) + ret = drbg_hmac_init(drbg); + else + ret = drbg_hash_init(drbg); + } else { + /* other cases should already be excluded */ + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INIT_METHOD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + drbg->type = 0; + drbg->flags = 0; + return 0; } - if (ret == 0) - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG); + if (ret == 0) { + drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INIT_METHOD, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG); + } return ret; } @@ -139,16 +414,10 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags) */ int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags) { - int ret = 1; - - switch (type) { - default: + int all; + if (!(is_digest(type) || is_ctr(type))) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE); return 0; - case NID_aes_128_ctr: - case NID_aes_192_ctr: - case NID_aes_256_ctr: - break; } if ((flags & ~rand_drbg_used_flags) != 0) { @@ -156,10 +425,20 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags) return 0; } - rand_drbg_type = type; - rand_drbg_flags = flags; - - return ret; + all = ((flags & RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS) == 0); + if (all || (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER) != 0) { + rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER] = type; + rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER] = flags | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER; + } + if (all || (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC) != 0) { + rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC] = type; + rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC] = flags | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC; + } + if (all || (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE) != 0) { + rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE] = type; + rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE] = flags | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE; + } + return 1; } @@ -170,21 +449,23 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags) * * Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure. */ -static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure, +static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, + int secure, int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent) { - RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ? - OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg)) : OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg)); + RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ? OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg)) + : OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg)); if (drbg == NULL) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } + drbg->libctx = ctx; drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg); - drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count; + drbg->fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id(); drbg->parent = parent; if (parent == NULL) { @@ -228,25 +509,33 @@ static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure, return drbg; -err: - if (drbg->secure) - OPENSSL_secure_free(drbg); - else - OPENSSL_free(drbg); + err: + RAND_DRBG_free(drbg); return NULL; } +RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type, unsigned int flags, + RAND_DRBG *parent) +{ + return rand_drbg_new(ctx, 0, type, flags, parent); +} + RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent) { - return rand_drbg_new(0, type, flags, parent); + return RAND_DRBG_new_ex(NULL, type, flags, parent); } -RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent) +RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type, + unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent) { - return rand_drbg_new(1, type, flags, parent); + return rand_drbg_new(ctx, 1, type, flags, parent); } +RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent) +{ + return RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(NULL, type, flags, parent); +} /* * Uninstantiate |drbg| and free all memory. */ @@ -257,8 +546,11 @@ void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg) if (drbg->meth != NULL) drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg); + rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(drbg->lock); - CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data); +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RAND_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data); +#endif if (drbg->secure) OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg)); @@ -279,26 +571,29 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, { unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL; size_t noncelen = 0, entropylen = 0; - size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength; - size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen; - size_t max_entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen; + size_t min_entropy, min_entropylen, max_entropylen; - if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) { + if (drbg->meth == NULL && !rand_drbg_init_method(drbg)) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, - RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG); + RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED); goto end; } - if (drbg->meth == NULL) { + min_entropy = drbg->strength; + min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen; + max_entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen; + + if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, - RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED); + RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG); goto end; } if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, - drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR ? RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE - : RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED); + if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE); + else + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED); goto end; } @@ -307,7 +602,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, /* * NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting the entropy * and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy with 50% and increasing - * the minimum length to accomadate the length of the nonce. + * the minimum length to accommodate the length of the nonce. * We do this in case a nonce is require and get_nonce is NULL. */ if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) { @@ -316,11 +611,18 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, max_entropylen += drbg->max_noncelen; } + drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter); + if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) { + drbg->reseed_next_counter++; + if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter) + drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1; + } + if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL) entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, min_entropy, min_entropylen, max_entropylen, 0); if (entropylen < min_entropylen - || entropylen > max_entropylen) { + || entropylen > max_entropylen) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY); goto end; } @@ -341,29 +643,15 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, } drbg->state = DRBG_READY; - drbg->generate_counter = 0; + drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1; drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL); - if (drbg->reseed_counter > 0) { - if (drbg->parent == NULL) - drbg->reseed_counter++; - else - drbg->reseed_counter = drbg->parent->reseed_counter; - } + tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter); -end: + end: if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL) drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen); - if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce!= NULL ) + if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce != NULL) drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce, noncelen); - if (drbg->pool != NULL) { - if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, - RAND_R_ERROR_ENTROPY_POOL_WAS_IGNORED); - drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; - } - rand_pool_free(drbg->pool); - drbg->pool = NULL; - } if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) return 1; return 0; @@ -378,18 +666,28 @@ end: */ int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) { - if (drbg->meth == NULL) { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_UNINSTANTIATE, - RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED); - return 0; + int index = -1, type, flags; + if (drbg->meth != NULL) { + drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg); + drbg->meth = NULL; } - /* Clear the entire drbg->ctr struct, then reset some important - * members of the drbg->ctr struct (e.g. keysize, df_ks) to their - * initial values. - */ - drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg); - return RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, drbg->type, drbg->flags); + /* The reset uses the default values for type and flags */ + if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER) + index = RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER; + else if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE) + index = RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE; + else if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC) + index = RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC; + + if (index != -1) { + flags = rand_drbg_flags[index]; + type = rand_drbg_type[index]; + } else { + flags = drbg->flags; + type = drbg->type; + } + return rand_drbg_set(drbg, type, flags); } /* @@ -423,13 +721,21 @@ int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, } drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; + + drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter); + if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) { + drbg->reseed_next_counter++; + if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter) + drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1; + } + if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL) entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength, drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen, prediction_resistance); if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen - || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) { + || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY); goto end; } @@ -438,16 +744,11 @@ int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, goto end; drbg->state = DRBG_READY; - drbg->generate_counter = 0; + drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1; drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL); - if (drbg->reseed_counter > 0) { - if (drbg->parent == NULL) - drbg->reseed_counter++; - else - drbg->reseed_counter = drbg->parent->reseed_counter; - } + tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter); -end: + end: if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL) drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen); if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) @@ -479,10 +780,12 @@ int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg, const unsigned char *adin = NULL; size_t adinlen = 0; - if (drbg->pool != NULL) { + if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - rand_pool_free(drbg->pool); - drbg->pool = NULL; + drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; + rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool); + drbg->seed_pool = NULL; + return 0; } if (buffer != NULL) { @@ -490,24 +793,25 @@ int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg, if (drbg->max_entropylen < len) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG); + drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; return 0; } if (entropy > 8 * len) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ENTROPY_OUT_OF_RANGE); + drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; return 0; } /* will be picked up by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback */ - drbg->pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, len, len); - if (drbg->pool == NULL) + drbg->seed_pool = rand_pool_attach(buffer, len, entropy); + if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) return 0; - - rand_pool_add(drbg->pool, buffer, len, entropy); } else { if (drbg->max_adinlen < len) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG); + drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; return 0; } adin = buffer; @@ -547,14 +851,8 @@ int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg, } } - /* check whether a given entropy pool was cleared properly during reseed */ - if (drbg->pool != NULL) { - drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - rand_pool_free(drbg->pool); - drbg->pool = NULL; - return 0; - } + rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool); + drbg->seed_pool = NULL; return drbg->state == DRBG_READY; } @@ -573,6 +871,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int prediction_resistance, const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen) { + int fork_id; int reseed_required = 0; if (drbg->state != DRBG_READY) { @@ -598,13 +897,15 @@ int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, return 0; } - if (drbg->fork_count != rand_fork_count) { - drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count; + fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id(); + + if (drbg->fork_id != fork_id) { + drbg->fork_id = fork_id; reseed_required = 1; } if (drbg->reseed_interval > 0) { - if (drbg->generate_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval) + if (drbg->reseed_gen_counter > drbg->reseed_interval) reseed_required = 1; } if (drbg->reseed_time_interval > 0) { @@ -613,8 +914,11 @@ int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, || now - drbg->reseed_time >= drbg->reseed_time_interval) reseed_required = 1; } - if (drbg->reseed_counter > 0 && drbg->parent != NULL) { - if (drbg->reseed_counter != drbg->parent->reseed_counter) + if (drbg->parent != NULL) { + unsigned int reseed_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter); + if (reseed_counter > 0 + && tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter) + != reseed_counter) reseed_required = 1; } @@ -633,7 +937,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, return 0; } - drbg->generate_counter++; + drbg->reseed_gen_counter++; return 1; } @@ -651,9 +955,18 @@ int RAND_DRBG_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) unsigned char *additional = NULL; size_t additional_len; size_t chunk; - size_t ret; + size_t ret = 0; + + if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL) { + if (drbg->type == 0) + goto err; + drbg->adin_pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, 0, drbg->max_adinlen); + if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL) + goto err; + } - additional_len = rand_drbg_get_additional_data(&additional, drbg->max_adinlen); + additional_len = rand_drbg_get_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool, + &additional); for ( ; outlen > 0; outlen -= chunk, out += chunk) { chunk = outlen; @@ -665,9 +978,9 @@ int RAND_DRBG_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) } ret = 1; -err: - if (additional_len != 0) - OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(additional, additional_len); + err: + if (additional != NULL) + rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool, additional); return ret; } @@ -686,7 +999,8 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *drbg, RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce, RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce) { - if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) + if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED + || drbg->parent != NULL) return 0; drbg->get_entropy = get_entropy; drbg->cleanup_entropy = cleanup_entropy; @@ -825,6 +1139,7 @@ int rand_drbg_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg) return 1; } +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE /* * Get and set the EXDATA */ @@ -837,7 +1152,7 @@ void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx); } - +#endif /* * The following functions provide a RAND_METHOD that works on the @@ -850,11 +1165,12 @@ void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx) * * Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure. */ -static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent) +static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type) { RAND_DRBG *drbg; - drbg = RAND_DRBG_secure_new(rand_drbg_type, rand_drbg_flags, parent); + drbg = RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(ctx, rand_drbg_type[drbg_type], + rand_drbg_flags[drbg_type], parent); if (drbg == NULL) return NULL; @@ -863,7 +1179,7 @@ static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent) goto err; /* enable seed propagation */ - drbg->reseed_counter = 1; + tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, 1); /* * Ignore instantiation error to support just-in-time instantiation. @@ -881,60 +1197,20 @@ err: return NULL; } -/* - * Initialize the global DRBGs on first use. - * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. - */ -DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_drbg_init) -{ - /* - * ensure that libcrypto is initialized, otherwise the - * DRBG locks are not cleaned up properly - */ - if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL)) - return 0; - - if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&private_drbg, NULL)) - return 0; - - if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&public_drbg, NULL)) - goto err1; - - master_drbg = drbg_setup(NULL); - if (master_drbg == NULL) - goto err2; - - return 1; - -err2: - CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&public_drbg); -err1: - CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&private_drbg); - return 0; -} - -/* Clean up the global DRBGs before exit */ -void rand_drbg_cleanup_int(void) -{ - if (master_drbg != NULL) { - RAND_DRBG_free(master_drbg); - master_drbg = NULL; - - CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&private_drbg); - CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&public_drbg); - } -} - -void drbg_delete_thread_state(void) +static void drbg_delete_thread_state(void *arg) { + OPENSSL_CTX *ctx = arg; + DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx); RAND_DRBG *drbg; - drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&public_drbg); - CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&public_drbg, NULL); + if (dgbl == NULL) + return; + drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg); + CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, NULL); RAND_DRBG_free(drbg); - drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&private_drbg); - CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&private_drbg, NULL); + drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg); + CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, NULL); RAND_DRBG_free(drbg); } @@ -952,11 +1228,49 @@ static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count) return ret; } +/* + * Calculates the minimum length of a full entropy buffer + * which is necessary to seed (i.e. instantiate) the DRBG + * successfully. + */ +size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg) +{ + /* + * If no os entropy source is available then RAND_seed(buffer, bufsize) + * is expected to succeed if and only if the buffer length satisfies + * the following requirements, which follow from the calculations + * in RAND_DRBG_instantiate(). + */ + size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength; + size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen; + + /* + * Extra entropy for the random nonce in the absence of a + * get_nonce callback, see comment in RAND_DRBG_instantiate(). + */ + if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) { + min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2; + min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen; + } + + /* + * Convert entropy requirement from bits to bytes + * (dividing by 8 without rounding upwards, because + * all entropy requirements are divisible by 8). + */ + min_entropy >>= 3; + + /* Return a value that satisfies both requirements */ + return min_entropy > min_entropylen ? min_entropy : min_entropylen; +} + /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_add() method */ static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness) { int ret = 0; RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master(); + size_t buflen; + size_t seedlen; if (drbg == NULL) return 0; @@ -964,20 +1278,59 @@ static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness) if (num < 0 || randomness < 0.0) return 0; - if (randomness > (double)drbg->max_entropylen) { + rand_drbg_lock(drbg); + seedlen = rand_drbg_seedlen(drbg); + + buflen = (size_t)num; + +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE + /* + * NIST SP-800-90A mandates that entropy *shall not* be provided + * by the consuming application. By setting the randomness to zero, + * we ensure that the buffer contents will be added to the internal + * state of the DRBG only as additional data. + * + * (NIST SP-800-90Ar1, Sections 9.1 and 9.2) + */ + randomness = 0.0; +#endif + if (buflen < seedlen || randomness < (double) seedlen) { +#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) + /* + * If no os entropy source is available, a reseeding will fail + * inevitably. So we use a trick to mix the buffer contents into + * the DRBG state without forcing a reseeding: we generate a + * dummy random byte, using the buffer content as additional data. + * Note: This won't work with RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF. + */ + unsigned char dummy[1]; + + ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, dummy, sizeof(dummy), 0, buf, buflen); + rand_drbg_unlock(drbg); + return ret; +#else + /* + * If an os entropy source is available then we declare the buffer content + * as additional data by setting randomness to zero and trigger a regular + * reseeding. + */ + randomness = 0.0; +#endif + } + + if (randomness > (double)seedlen) { /* * The purpose of this check is to bound |randomness| by a * relatively small value in order to prevent an integer * overflow when multiplying by 8 in the rand_drbg_restart() - * call below. + * call below. Note that randomness is measured in bytes, + * not bits, so this value corresponds to eight times the + * security strength. */ - return 0; + randomness = (double)seedlen; } - rand_drbg_lock(drbg); - ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, buf, - (size_t)(unsigned int)num, - (size_t)(8*randomness)); + ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, buf, buflen, (size_t)(8 * randomness)); rand_drbg_unlock(drbg); return ret; @@ -1009,56 +1362,87 @@ static int drbg_status(void) * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure. * */ -RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void) +RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx) { - if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init)) + DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx); + + if (dgbl == NULL) return NULL; - return master_drbg; + return dgbl->master_drbg; +} + +RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void) +{ + return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(NULL); } /* * Get the public DRBG. * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure. */ -RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void) +RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx) { + DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx); RAND_DRBG *drbg; - if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init)) + if (dgbl == NULL) return NULL; - drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&public_drbg); + drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg); if (drbg == NULL) { - if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND)) + ctx = openssl_ctx_get_concrete(ctx); + /* + * If the private_drbg is also NULL then this is the first time we've + * used this thread. + */ + if (CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg) == NULL + && !ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, drbg_delete_thread_state)) return NULL; - drbg = drbg_setup(master_drbg); - CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&public_drbg, drbg); + drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, dgbl->master_drbg, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC); + CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, drbg); } return drbg; } +RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void) +{ + return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(NULL); +} + /* * Get the private DRBG. * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure. */ -RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_private(void) +RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx) { + DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx); RAND_DRBG *drbg; - if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init)) + if (dgbl == NULL) return NULL; - drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&private_drbg); + drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg); if (drbg == NULL) { - if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND)) + ctx = openssl_ctx_get_concrete(ctx); + /* + * If the public_drbg is also NULL then this is the first time we've + * used this thread. + */ + if (CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg) == NULL + && !ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, drbg_delete_thread_state)) return NULL; - drbg = drbg_setup(master_drbg); - CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&private_drbg, drbg); + drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, dgbl->master_drbg, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE); + CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, drbg); } return drbg; } +RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_private(void) +{ + return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(NULL); +} + RAND_METHOD rand_meth = { drbg_seed, drbg_bytes, @@ -1070,5 +1454,9 @@ RAND_METHOD rand_meth = { RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void) { +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE return &rand_meth; +#else + return NULL; +#endif }