X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=CHANGES;h=7cca7f00a7ad5e221f70f25e6e00c134e9d6fc02;hp=04b14bda8c168e3b50f777bf75b4d8d15f55a0c0;hb=4242a090c7fe60a4b84a68bfac836596590c66c5;hpb=2ec0497f080bc53c99ab895fc0caa7af20b9a02e diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index 04b14bda8c..7cca7f00a7 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -4,6 +4,42 @@ Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx] + *) Support for automatic EC temporary key parameter selection. If enabled + the most preferred EC parameters are automatically used instead of + hardcoded fixed parameters. Now a server just has to call: + SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1) and the server will automatically + support ECDH and use the most appropriate parameters. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Enhance and tidy EC curve and point format TLS extension code. Use + static structures instead of allocation if default values are used. + New ctrls to set curves we wish to support and to retrieve shared curves. + Print out shared curves in s_server. New options to s_server and s_client + to set list of supported curves. + [Steve Henson] + + *) New ctrls to retrieve supported signature algorithms and + supported curve values as an array of NIDs. Extend openssl utility + to print out received values. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add new APIs EC_curve_nist2nid and EC_curve_nid2nist which convert + between NIDs and the more common NIST names such as "P-256". Enhance + ecparam utility and ECC method to recognise the NIST names for curves. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Enhance SSL/TLS certificate chain handling to support different + chains for each certificate instead of one chain in the parent SSL_CTX. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuite client authentication: where both + server and client use DH certificates with common parameters. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuites: those requiring DH server + certificates. + [Steve Henson] + *) Transparently support X9.42 DH parameters when calling PEM_read_bio_DHparameters. This means existing applications can handle the new parameter format automatically. @@ -252,8 +288,111 @@ is enable if DEBUG_UNUSED is set. Add to several functions in evp.h whose return value is often ignored. [Steve Henson] - - Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.1 [xx XXX xxxx] + + Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [xx XXX xxxx] + + *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello + if renegotiating. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012] + + *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS + 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to avoid DoS attack. + + Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic + fuzzing as a service testing platform. + (CVE-2012-2333) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages. + Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue. + [Steve Henson] + + *) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not + approved. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012] + + *) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and + 1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately + mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting + SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disablng + TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to + 0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against + OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 + will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in + inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context, + in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below]. + [Steve Henson] + + *) In order to ensure interoperabilty SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not + disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are + protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means + that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and + above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass + SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to + client side. + [Andy Polyakov] + + Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012] + + *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio + BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer + in CRYPTO_realloc_clean. + + Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this + issue and to Adam Langley for fixing it. + (CVE-2012-2110) + [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team] + + *) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections. + [Adam Langley] + + *) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello + record length exceeds 255 bytes: + + 1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client + hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work. + 2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate + the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be + set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing: + -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure. + Most broken servers should now work. + 3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable + TLS 1.2 client support entirely. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH. + [Andy Polyakov] + + Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012] + + *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET + STRING form instead of a DigestInfo. + [Steve Henson] + + *) The format used for MDC2 RSA signatures is inconsistent between EVP + and the RSA_sign/RSA_verify functions. This was made more apparent when + OpenSSL used RSA_sign/RSA_verify for some RSA signatures in particular + those which went through EVP_PKEY_METHOD in 1.0.0 and later. Detect + the correct format in RSA_verify so both forms transparently work. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET + STRING form instead of a DigestInfo. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Some servers which support TLS 1.0 can choke if we initially indicate + support for TLS 1.2 and later renegotiate using TLS 1.0 in the RSA + encrypted premaster secret. As a workaround use the maximum pemitted + client version in client hello, this should keep such servers happy + and still work with previous versions of OpenSSL. + [Steve Henson] *) Add support for TLS/DTLS heartbeats. [Robin Seggelmann ] @@ -279,9 +418,6 @@ (removal of unnecessary code) [Peter Sylvester ] - *) Add -attime option to openssl utilities. - [Peter Eckersley , Ben Laurie and Steve Henson] - *) Add TLS key material exporter from RFC 5705. [Eric Rescorla] @@ -407,8 +543,8 @@ keep original code iff non-FIPS operations are allowed. [Steve Henson] - *) Add -attime option to openssl verify. - [Peter Eckersley and Ben Laurie] + *) Add -attime option to openssl utilities. + [Peter Eckersley , Ben Laurie and Steve Henson] *) Redirect DSA and DH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] @@ -521,9 +657,55 @@ Add command line options to s_client/s_server. [Steve Henson] - Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [xx XXX xxxx] + Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012] + + *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness + in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for + content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack + needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The + old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the + CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where + an MMA defence is not necessary. + Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode for discovering + this issue. (CVE-2012-0884) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a + client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to + Ivan Nestlerode for discovering this bug. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012] + + *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109. + Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and + Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and + preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050) + [Antonio Martin] + + Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012] + + *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension + of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption + which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against + the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing + differences arising during decryption processing. A research + paper describing this attack can be found at: + http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf + Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information + Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London + (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann + and Michael Tuexen + for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108) + [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen] + + *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records. + (CVE-2011-4576) + [Adam Langley (Google)] - *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. (CVE-2011-4619) + *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George + Kadianakis for discovering this issue and + Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619) [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027) @@ -534,6 +716,9 @@ and Rob Austein for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577) [Rob Austein ] + *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS. + [Paul Green ] + *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race. [Adam Langley (Google)] @@ -1461,8 +1646,47 @@ *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default. [NTT] + + Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012] + + *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109. + Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and + Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and + preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050) + [Antonio Martin] - Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [xx XXX xxxx] + Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012] + + *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension + of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption + which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against + the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing + differences arising during decryption processing. A research + paper describing this attack can be found at: + http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf + Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information + Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London + (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann + and Michael Tuexen + for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108) + [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen] + + *) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109) + [Ben Laurie, Kasper ] + + *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records. + (CVE-2011-4576) + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George + Kadianakis for discovering this issue and + Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619) + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure. + Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw + and Rob Austein for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577) + [Rob Austein ] *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race. [Adam Langley (Google)]