X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=CHANGES;h=6f713d9e874bfa27204100a699aa9795a928e17a;hp=50f6cc15c9b60ce27db6baa5eda8637419ed022d;hb=629fd3aa913f547f6228740d5068193f283abe94;hpb=d2a53c223883be765176d8d461034cc8938eaeb7 diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index 50f6cc15c9..6f713d9e87 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -4,6 +4,83 @@ Changes between 1.0.0 and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx] + *) New function OPENSSL_gmtime_diff to find the difference in days + and seconds between two tm structures. This will be used to provide + additional functionality for ASN1_TIME. + [Steve Henson] + + *) New -sigopt option to the ca, req and x509 utilities. Additional + signature parameters can be passed using this option and in + particular PSS. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add RSA PSS signing function. This will generate and set the + appropriate AlgorithmIdentifiers for PSS based on those in the + corresponding EVP_MD_CTX structure. No application support yet. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Support for companion algorithm specific ASN1 signing routines. + New function ASN1_item_sign_ctx() signs a pre-initialised + EVP_MD_CTX structure and sets AlgorithmIdentifiers based on + the appropriate parameters. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add new algorithm specific ASN1 verification initialisation function + to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD: this is not in EVP_PKEY_METHOD since the ASN1 + handling will be the same no matter what EVP_PKEY_METHOD is used. + Add a PSS handler to support verification of PSS signatures: checked + against a number of sample certificates. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add signature printing for PSS. Add PSS OIDs. + [Steve Henson, Martin Kaiser ] + + *) Add algorithm specific signature printing. An individual ASN1 method + can now print out signatures instead of the standard hex dump. + + More complex signatures (e.g. PSS) can print out more meaningful + information. Include DSA version that prints out the signature + parameters r, s. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the + trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs. + OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an + intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first + setting is used: whether to trust or reject. + [Steve Henson] + + *) New -verify_name option in command line utilities to set verification + parameters by name. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Initial CMAC implementation. WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, API MAY CHANGE. + Add CMAC pkey methods. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Experiemental regnegotiation in s_server -www mode. If the client + browses /reneg connection is renegotiated. If /renegcert it is + renegotiated requesting a certificate. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add an "external" session cache for debugging purposes to s_server. This + should help trace issues which normally are only apparent in deployed + multi-process servers. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Initial TLSv1.1 support. Since TLSv1.1 is very similar to TLS v1.0 only + a few changes are required: + + Add SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 flag. + Add TLSv1_1 methods. + Update version checking logic to handle version 1.1. + Add explicit IV handling (ported from DTLS code). + Add command line options to s_client/s_server. + [Steve Henson] + *) Experiemental password based recipient info support for CMS library: implementing RFC3211. [Steve Henson] @@ -27,7 +104,24 @@ whose return value is often ignored. [Steve Henson] - Changes between 0.9.8m (?) and 1.0.0 [xx XXX xxxx] + Changes between 0.9.8n and 1.0.0 [xx XXX xxxx] + + *) Add "missing" function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(). This copies a cipher + context. The operation can be customised via the ctrl mechanism in + case ENGINEs want to include additional functionality. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Tolerate yet another broken PKCS#8 key format: private key value negative. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add new -subject_hash_old and -issuer_hash_old options to x509 utility to + output hashes compatible with older versions of OpenSSL. + [Willy Weisz ] + + *) Fix compression algorithm handling: if resuming a session use the + compression algorithm of the resumed session instead of determining + it from client hello again. Don't allow server to change algorithm. + [Steve Henson] *) Add load_crls() function to apps tidying load_certs() too. Add option to verify utility to allow additional CRLs to be included. @@ -850,18 +944,104 @@ *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default. [NTT] + + Changes between 0.9.8n and 0.9.8o [xx XXX xxxx] + + *) Add SHA2 algorithms to SSL_library_init(). SHA2 is becoming far more + common in certificates and some applications which only call + SSL_library_init and not OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() will fail. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010] + + *) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never + update s->server with a new major version number. As of + - OpenSSL 0.9.8m if 'short' is a 16-bit type, + - OpenSSL 0.9.8f if 'short' is longer than 16 bits, + the previous behavior could result in a read attempt at NULL when + receiving specific incorrect SSL/TLS records once record payload + protection is active. (CVE-2010-####) + [Bodo Moeller, Adam Langley] + + *) Fix for CVE-2010-0433 where some kerberos enabled versions of OpenSSL + could be crashed if the relevant tables were not present (e.g. chrooted). + [Tomas Hoger ] + + Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010] + + *) Always check bn_wexpend() return values for failure. (CVE-2009-3245) + [Martin Olsson, Neel Mehta] + + *) Fix X509_STORE locking: Every 'objs' access requires a lock (to + accommodate for stack sorting, always a write lock!). + [Bodo Moeller] + + *) On some versions of WIN32 Heap32Next is very slow. This can cause + excessive delays in the RAND_poll(): over a minute. As a workaround + include a time check in the inner Heap32Next loop too. + [Steve Henson] + + *) The code that handled flushing of data in SSL/TLS originally used the + BIO_CTRL_INFO ctrl to see if any data was pending first. This caused + the problem outlined in PR#1949. The fix suggested there however can + trigger problems with buggy BIO_CTRL_WPENDING (e.g. some versions + of Apache). So instead simplify the code to flush unconditionally. + This should be fine since flushing with no data to flush is a no op. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Handle TLS versions 2.0 and later properly and correctly use the + highest version of TLS/SSL supported. Although TLS >= 2.0 is some way + off ancient servers have a habit of sticking around for a while... + [Steve Henson] + + *) Modify compression code so it frees up structures without using the + ex_data callbacks. This works around a problem where some applications + call CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data() before application exit (e.g. when + restarting) then use compression (e.g. SSL with compression) later. + This results in significant per-connection memory leaks and + has caused some security issues including CVE-2008-1678 and + CVE-2009-4355. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Constify crypto/cast (i.e., ): a CAST_KEY doesn't + change when encrypting or decrypting. + [Bodo Moeller] + + *) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to + connect and renegotiate with servers which do not support RI. + Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add "missing" ssl ctrls to clear options and mode. + [Steve Henson] + + *) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with + a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746. Some renegotiating + TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive + the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang + waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a + received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because + applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed + and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the + only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if + peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 otherwise. Print out peer + renegotiation support in s_client/s_server. + [Steve Henson] - Changes between 0.9.8l (?) and 0.9.8m (?) [xx XXX xxxx] + *) Replace the highly broken and deprecated SPKAC certification method with + the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8. + [Steve Henson] - *) Implement - https://svn.resiprocate.org/rep/ietf-drafts/ekr/draft-rescorla-tls-renegotiate.txt. Re-enable - renegotiation but require the extension as needed. Unfortunately, - SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION turns out to be a - bad idea. It has been replaced by + *) Implement RFC5746. Re-enable renegotiation but require the extension + as needed. Unfortunately, SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION + turns out to be a bad idea. It has been replaced by SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you know what you are doing. - [Eric Rescorla and Ben Laurie] + [Eric Rescorla , Ben Laurie, Steve Henson] *) Fixes to stateless session resumption handling. Use initial_ctx when issuing and attempting to decrypt tickets in case it has changed during