X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=CHANGES;h=594d7c511e60ba61a874386e404c7ed76e385ed7;hp=6494184bad8a291f7c65974f2b9e41895de25bd3;hb=178c562a4621162dbe19a7c34fa2ad558684f40e;hpb=197e0ea817ad64820789d86711d55ff50d71f631 diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index 6494184bad..594d7c511e 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -2,7 +2,300 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ - Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [xx XXX xxxx] + Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [xx XXX xxxx] + + *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral + ECDH ciphersuites. + + Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue. + (CVE-2014-3572) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code + violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in + non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively + downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server + certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue. + (CVE-2015-0204) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its + SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX. + + The session ID context is typically set from the parent SSL_CTX, + and can vary with the CTX. + [Adam Langley] + + *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues. + + By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a + certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature. + Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed + this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the + certificate fingerprint for blacklists. + + 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits. + + If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject + the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits. + + 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency. + + Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the + certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure + errors for some broken certificates. + + Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue. + + 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER. + + Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received + signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch. + + This will reject various cases including garbage after signature + (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS + program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs + (negative or with leading zeroes). + + Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson + of the OpenSSL core team. + + (CVE-2014-8275) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol + version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different + version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable + sanity and breaks all known clients. + [David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper] + + *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject + early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because + renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.) + [Emilia Käsper] + + *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation: + ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends + the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would + reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was + announced in the initial ServerHello. + + Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one + was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would + ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message. + [Emilia Käsper] + + Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014] + + *) SRTP Memory Leak. + + A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who + sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail + to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be + exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL + 1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of + whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that + have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected. + + The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team. + (CVE-2014-3513) + [OpenSSL team] + + *) Session Ticket Memory Leak. + + When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the + integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session + ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory + causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session + tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service + attack. + (CVE-2014-3567) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete. + + When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers + could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be + configured to send them. + (CVE-2014-3568) + [Akamai and the OpenSSL team] + + *) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV. + Client applications doing fallback retries should call + SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV). + (CVE-2014-3566) + [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] + + *) Add additional DigestInfo checks. + + Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when + verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded + DigestInfo structures. + + Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known. + + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014] + + *) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the + SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that + g, A, B < N to SRP code. + + Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC + Group for discovering this issue. + (CVE-2014-3512) + [Steve Henson] + + *) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate + TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message + is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a + downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a + higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records. + + Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and + researching this issue. + (CVE-2014-3511) + [David Benjamin] + + *) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject + to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client + with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH + ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages. + + Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this + issue. + (CVE-2014-3510) + [Emilia Käsper] + + *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl + to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. + Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue. + (CVE-2014-3507) + [Adam Langley] + + *) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst + processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a + Denial of Service attack. + Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue. + (CVE-2014-3506) + [Adam Langley] + + *) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash + whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This + can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. + Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching + this issue. + (CVE-2014-3505) + [Adam Langley] + + *) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed + session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write + up to 255 bytes to freed memory. + + Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this + issue. + (CVE-2014-3509) + [Gabor Tyukasz] + + *) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer + dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not + properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a + Denial of Service attack. + + Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for + discovering and researching this issue. + (CVE-2014-5139) + [Steve Henson] + + *) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as + X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information + from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing + output to the attacker. + + Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue. + (CVE-2014-3508) + [Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson] + + *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.) + for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to + bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.) + [Bodo Moeller] + + Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014] + + *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted + handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL + SSL/TLS clients and servers. + + Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and + researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224) + [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson] + + *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an + OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing + in a DoS attack. + + Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue. + (CVE-2014-0221) + [Imre Rad, Steve Henson] + + *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can + be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS + client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary + code on a vulnerable client or server. + + Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195) + [Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson] + + *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites + are subject to a denial of service attack. + + Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering + this issue. (CVE-2014-3470) + [Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson] + + *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display + compilation flags. + [mancha ] + + *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure + in i2d_ECPrivateKey. + [mancha ] + + *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable. + [mancha ] + + Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014] + + *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension + can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or + server. + + Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to + Adam Langley and Bodo Moeller for + preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160) + [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] + + *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL + ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack" + by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from: + http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140 + + Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this + flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076) + [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger] + + *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03 + + Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the + TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and + less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it + is at least 512 bytes long. + + [Adam Langley, Steve Henson] + + Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014] *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception.