/*
- * Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
#endif
#define NUM_EXTRA_CERTS 40
+#define CLIENT_VERSION_LEN 2
/*
* This structure is used to validate that the correct number of log messages
return 1;
}
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3)
static int test_keylog(void)
{
SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL;
return testresult;
}
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
static int test_keylog_no_master_key(void)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
-static int full_early_callback(SSL *s, int *al, void *arg)
+static int full_client_hello_callback(SSL *s, int *al, void *arg)
{
int *ctr = arg;
const unsigned char *p;
/* Make sure we can defer processing and get called back. */
if ((*ctr)++ == 0)
- return -1;
+ return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY;
- len = SSL_early_get0_ciphers(s, &p);
+ len = SSL_client_hello_get0_ciphers(s, &p);
if (!TEST_mem_eq(p, len, expected_ciphers, sizeof(expected_ciphers))
- || !TEST_size_t_eq(SSL_early_get0_compression_methods(s, &p), 1)
+ || !TEST_size_t_eq(
+ SSL_client_hello_get0_compression_methods(s, &p), 1)
|| !TEST_int_eq(*p, 0))
- return 0;
- if (!SSL_early_get1_extensions_present(s, &exts, &len))
- return 0;
+ return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR;
+ if (!SSL_client_hello_get1_extensions_present(s, &exts, &len))
+ return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR;
if (len != OSSL_NELEM(expected_extensions) ||
memcmp(exts, expected_extensions, len * sizeof(*exts)) != 0) {
- printf("Early callback expected ClientHello extensions mismatch\n");
+ printf("ClientHello callback expected extensions mismatch\n");
OPENSSL_free(exts);
- return 0;
+ return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR;
}
OPENSSL_free(exts);
- return 1;
+ return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS;
}
-static int test_early_cb(void)
+static int test_client_hello_cb(void)
{
SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL;
SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
TLS_client_method(), &sctx,
&cctx, cert, privkey)))
goto end;
- SSL_CTX_set_early_cb(sctx, full_early_callback, &testctr);
+ SSL_CTX_set_client_hello_cb(sctx, full_client_hello_callback, &testctr);
/* The gimpy cipher list we configure can't do TLS 1.3. */
SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(cctx, TLS1_2_VERSION);
|| !TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl,
&clientssl, NULL, NULL))
|| !TEST_false(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
- SSL_ERROR_WANT_EARLY))
+ SSL_ERROR_WANT_CLIENT_HELLO_CB))
/*
* Passing a -1 literal is a hack since
* the real value was lost.
* */
- || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_error(serverssl, -1), SSL_ERROR_WANT_EARLY)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_error(serverssl, -1),
+ SSL_ERROR_WANT_CLIENT_HELLO_CB)
|| !TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
goto end;
return execute_test_ssl_bio(0, CHANGE_WBIO);
}
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3)
typedef struct {
/* The list of sig algs */
const int *list;
} sigalgs_list;
static const int validlist1[] = {NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA};
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
static const int validlist2[] = {NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_EC};
static const int validlist3[] = {NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_EC};
-#endif
+# endif
static const int invalidlist1[] = {NID_undef, EVP_PKEY_RSA};
static const int invalidlist2[] = {NID_sha256, NID_undef};
static const int invalidlist3[] = {NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_sha256};
static const int invalidlist4[] = {NID_sha256};
static const sigalgs_list testsigalgs[] = {
{validlist1, OSSL_NELEM(validlist1), NULL, 1, 1},
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
{validlist2, OSSL_NELEM(validlist2), NULL, 1, 1},
{validlist3, OSSL_NELEM(validlist3), NULL, 1, 0},
-#endif
+# endif
{NULL, 0, "RSA+SHA256", 1, 1},
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
{NULL, 0, "RSA+SHA256:ECDSA+SHA512", 1, 1},
{NULL, 0, "ECDSA+SHA512", 1, 0},
-#endif
+# endif
{invalidlist1, OSSL_NELEM(invalidlist1), NULL, 0, 0},
{invalidlist2, OSSL_NELEM(invalidlist2), NULL, 0, 0},
{invalidlist3, OSSL_NELEM(invalidlist3), NULL, 0, 0},
return testresult;
}
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+static SSL_SESSION *clientpsk = NULL;
+static SSL_SESSION *serverpsk = NULL;
+static const char *pskid = "Identity";
+static const char *srvid;
+
+static int use_session_cb_cnt = 0;
+static int find_session_cb_cnt = 0;
+
+static int use_session_cb(SSL *ssl, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char **id,
+ size_t *idlen, SSL_SESSION **sess)
+{
+ switch (++use_session_cb_cnt) {
+ case 1:
+ /* The first call should always have a NULL md */
+ if (md != NULL)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+
+ case 2:
+ /* The second call should always have an md */
+ if (md == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /* We should only be called a maximum of twice */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (clientpsk != NULL)
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(clientpsk);
+
+ *sess = clientpsk;
+ *id = (const unsigned char *)pskid;
+ *idlen = strlen(pskid);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int find_session_cb(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *identity,
+ size_t identity_len, SSL_SESSION **sess)
+{
+ find_session_cb_cnt++;
+
+ /* We should only ever be called a maximum of twice per connection */
+ if (find_session_cb_cnt > 2)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (serverpsk == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Identity should match that set by the client */
+ if (strlen(srvid) != identity_len
+ || strncmp(srvid, (const char *)identity, identity_len) != 0) {
+ /* No PSK found, continue but without a PSK */
+ *sess = NULL;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(serverpsk);
+ *sess = serverpsk;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
#define MSG1 "Hello"
#define MSG2 "World."
#define MSG3 "This"
#define MSG6 "test"
#define MSG7 "message."
+#define TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384_BYTES ((const unsigned char *)"\x13\x02")
+
/*
* Helper method to setup objects for early data test. Caller frees objects on
* error.
cctx, cert, privkey)))
return 0;
- /* When idx == 1 we repeat the tests with read_ahead set */
- if (idx > 0) {
+ if (idx == 1) {
+ /* When idx == 1 we repeat the tests with read_ahead set */
SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(*cctx, 1);
SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(*sctx, 1);
+ } else if (idx == 2) {
+ /* When idx == 2 we are doing early_data with a PSK. Set up callbacks */
+ SSL_CTX_set_psk_use_session_callback(*cctx, use_session_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_psk_find_session_callback(*sctx, find_session_cb);
+ use_session_cb_cnt = 0;
+ find_session_cb_cnt = 0;
+ srvid = pskid;
}
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(*sctx, *cctx, serverssl, clientssl,
- NULL, NULL))
- || !TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(*serverssl, *clientssl,
- SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
+ NULL, NULL)))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * For one of the run throughs (doesn't matter which one), we'll try sending
+ * some SNI data in the initial ClientHello. This will be ignored (because
+ * there is no SNI cb set up by the server), so it should not impact
+ * early_data.
+ */
+ if (idx == 1
+ && !TEST_true(SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(*clientssl, "localhost")))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (idx == 2) {
+ /* Create the PSK */
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
+ const unsigned char key[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a,
+ 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15,
+ 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x20,
+ 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b,
+ 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f
+ };
+
+ cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(*clientssl, TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384_BYTES);
+ clientpsk = SSL_SESSION_new();
+ if (!TEST_ptr(clientpsk)
+ || !TEST_ptr(cipher)
+ || !TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(clientpsk, key,
+ sizeof(key)))
+ || !TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(clientpsk, cipher))
+ || !TEST_true(
+ SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(clientpsk,
+ TLS1_3_VERSION))
+ /*
+ * We just choose an arbitrary value for max_early_data which
+ * should be big enough for testing purposes.
+ */
+ || !TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set_max_early_data(clientpsk,
+ 0x100))
+ || !TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_up_ref(clientpsk))) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(clientpsk);
+ clientpsk = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ serverpsk = clientpsk;
+
+ if (sess != NULL)
+ *sess = clientpsk;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (sess == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(*serverssl, *clientssl,
+ SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
return 0;
*sess = SSL_get1_session(*clientssl);
|| !TEST_mem_eq(buf, readbytes, MSG7, strlen(MSG7)))
goto end;
- SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ /* We keep the PSK session around if using PSK */
+ if (idx != 2)
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
sess = SSL_get1_session(clientssl);
+ use_session_cb_cnt = 0;
+ find_session_cb_cnt = 0;
SSL_shutdown(clientssl);
SSL_shutdown(serverssl);
testresult = 1;
end:
- SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ if (sess != clientpsk)
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(clientpsk);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(serverpsk);
+ clientpsk = serverpsk = NULL;
SSL_free(serverssl);
SSL_free(clientssl);
SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
/* Force an HRR to occur */
if (!TEST_true(SSL_set1_groups_list(serverssl, "P-256")))
goto end;
+ } else if (idx == 2) {
+ /*
+ * We force early_data rejection by ensuring the PSK identity is
+ * unrecognised
+ */
+ srvid = "Dummy Identity";
} else {
/*
* Deliberately corrupt the creation time. We take 20 seconds off the
* time. It could be any value as long as it is not within tolerance.
* This should mean the ticket is rejected.
*/
- if (!TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set_time(sess, time(NULL) - 20)))
+ if (!TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set_time(sess, (long)(time(NULL) - 20))))
goto end;
}
testresult = 1;
end:
+ if (sess != clientpsk)
+ SSL_SESSION_free(clientpsk);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(serverpsk);
+ clientpsk = serverpsk = NULL;
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
SSL_free(serverssl);
SSL_free(clientssl);
* Should block due to the NewSessionTicket arrival unless we're using
* read_ahead
*/
- if (idx == 0) {
+ if (idx != 1) {
if (!TEST_false(SSL_read_ex(clientssl, buf, sizeof(buf), &readbytes)))
goto end;
}
testresult = 1;
end:
+ /* If using PSK then clientpsk and sess are the same */
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(serverpsk);
+ clientpsk = serverpsk = NULL;
+ SSL_free(serverssl);
+ SSL_free(clientssl);
+ SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+ SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
+ return testresult;
+}
+
+static int hostname_cb(SSL *s, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+ const char *hostname = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
+
+ if (hostname != NULL && strcmp(hostname, "goodhost") == 0)
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+}
+
+static const char *servalpn;
+
+static int alpn_select_cb(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out,
+ unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
+{
+ unsigned int protlen = 0;
+ const unsigned char *prot;
+
+ for (prot = in; prot < in + inlen; prot += protlen) {
+ protlen = *prot++;
+ if (in + inlen < prot + protlen)
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+
+ if (protlen == strlen(servalpn)
+ && memcmp(prot, servalpn, protlen) == 0) {
+ *out = prot;
+ *outlen = protlen;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+}
+
+/* Test that a PSK can be used to send early_data */
+static int test_early_data_psk(int idx)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL;
+ SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
+ int testresult = 0;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
+ unsigned char alpnlist[] = {
+ 0x08, 'g', 'o', 'o', 'd', 'a', 'l', 'p', 'n', 0x07, 'b', 'a', 'd', 'a',
+ 'l', 'p', 'n'
+ };
+#define GOODALPNLEN 9
+#define BADALPNLEN 8
+#define GOODALPN (alpnlist)
+#define BADALPN (alpnlist + GOODALPNLEN)
+ int err = 0;
+ unsigned char buf[20];
+ size_t readbytes, written;
+ int readearlyres = SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_SUCCESS, connectres = 1;
+ int edstatus = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
+
+ /* We always set this up with a final parameter of "2" for PSK */
+ if (!TEST_true(setupearly_data_test(&cctx, &sctx, &clientssl,
+ &serverssl, &sess, 2)))
+ goto end;
+
+ servalpn = "goodalpn";
+
+ /*
+ * Note: There is no test for inconsistent SNI with late client detection.
+ * This is because servers do not acknowledge SNI even if they are using
+ * it in a resumption handshake - so it is not actually possible for a
+ * client to detect a problem.
+ */
+ switch (idx) {
+ case 0:
+ /* Set inconsistent SNI (early client detection) */
+ err = SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI;
+ if (!TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set1_hostname(sess, "goodhost"))
+ || !TEST_true(SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(clientssl, "badhost")))
+ goto end;
+ break;
+
+ case 1:
+ /* Set inconsistent ALPN (early client detection) */
+ err = SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN;
+ /* SSL_set_alpn_protos returns 0 for success and 1 for failure */
+ if (!TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set1_alpn_selected(sess, GOODALPN,
+ GOODALPNLEN))
+ || !TEST_false(SSL_set_alpn_protos(clientssl, BADALPN,
+ BADALPNLEN)))
+ goto end;
+ break;
+
+ case 2:
+ /*
+ * Set invalid protocol version. Technically this affects PSKs without
+ * early_data too, but we test it here because it is similar to the
+ * SNI/ALPN consistency tests.
+ */
+ err = SSL_R_BAD_PSK;
+ if (!TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess, TLS1_2_VERSION)))
+ goto end;
+ break;
+
+ case 3:
+ /*
+ * Set inconsistent SNI (server detected). In this case the connection
+ * will succeed but reject early_data.
+ */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(serverpsk);
+ serverpsk = SSL_SESSION_dup(clientpsk);
+ if (!TEST_ptr(serverpsk)
+ || !TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set1_hostname(serverpsk, "badhost")))
+ goto end;
+ edstatus = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
+ readearlyres = SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_FINISH;
+ /* Fall through */
+ case 4:
+ /* Set consistent SNI */
+ if (!TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set1_hostname(sess, "goodhost"))
+ || !TEST_true(SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(clientssl, "goodhost"))
+ || !TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(sctx,
+ hostname_cb)))
+ goto end;
+ break;
+
+ case 5:
+ /*
+ * Set inconsistent ALPN (server detected). In this case the connection
+ * will succeed but reject early_data.
+ */
+ servalpn = "badalpn";
+ edstatus = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
+ readearlyres = SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_FINISH;
+ /* Fall through */
+ case 6:
+ /*
+ * Set consistent ALPN.
+ * SSL_set_alpn_protos returns 0 for success and 1 for failure. It
+ * accepts a list of protos (each one length prefixed).
+ * SSL_set1_alpn_selected accepts a single protocol (not length
+ * prefixed)
+ */
+ if (!TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set1_alpn_selected(sess, GOODALPN + 1,
+ GOODALPNLEN - 1))
+ || !TEST_false(SSL_set_alpn_protos(clientssl, GOODALPN,
+ GOODALPNLEN)))
+ goto end;
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(sctx, alpn_select_cb, NULL);
+ break;
+
+ case 7:
+ /* Set inconsistent ALPN (late client detection) */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(serverpsk);
+ serverpsk = SSL_SESSION_dup(clientpsk);
+ if (!TEST_ptr(serverpsk)
+ || !TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set1_alpn_selected(clientpsk,
+ BADALPN + 1,
+ BADALPNLEN - 1))
+ || !TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set1_alpn_selected(serverpsk,
+ GOODALPN + 1,
+ GOODALPNLEN - 1))
+ || !TEST_false(SSL_set_alpn_protos(clientssl, alpnlist,
+ sizeof(alpnlist))))
+ goto end;
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(sctx, alpn_select_cb, NULL);
+ edstatus = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
+ readearlyres = SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_SUCCESS;
+ /* SSL_connect() call should fail */
+ connectres = -1;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ TEST_error("Bad test index");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ SSL_set_connect_state(clientssl);
+ if (err != 0) {
+ if (!TEST_false(SSL_write_early_data(clientssl, MSG1, strlen(MSG1),
+ &written))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_error(clientssl, 0), SSL_ERROR_SSL)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_get_error()), err))
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ if (!TEST_true(SSL_write_early_data(clientssl, MSG1, strlen(MSG1),
+ &written)))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_read_early_data(serverssl, buf, sizeof(buf),
+ &readbytes), readearlyres)
+ || (readearlyres == SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_SUCCESS
+ && !TEST_mem_eq(buf, readbytes, MSG1, strlen(MSG1)))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_early_data_status(serverssl), edstatus)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_connect(clientssl), connectres))
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ testresult = 1;
+
+ end:
+ SSL_SESSION_free(clientpsk);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(serverpsk);
+ clientpsk = serverpsk = NULL;
SSL_free(serverssl);
SSL_free(clientssl);
SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
unsigned char buf[20];
size_t readbytes, written;
-
if (!TEST_true(setupearly_data_test(&cctx, &sctx, &clientssl,
&serverssl, &sess, idx)))
goto end;
testresult = 1;
end:
+ /* If using PSK then clientpsk and sess are the same */
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(serverpsk);
+ clientpsk = serverpsk = NULL;
SSL_free(serverssl);
SSL_free(clientssl);
SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
unsigned char buf[20];
size_t readbytes, written;
- if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(),
- TLS_client_method(), &sctx,
- &cctx, cert, privkey)))
- goto end;
-
- /* When idx == 1 we repeat the tests with read_ahead set */
- if (idx > 0) {
- SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(cctx, 1);
- SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(sctx, 1);
- }
-
- if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl,
- &clientssl, NULL, NULL)))
+ if (!TEST_true(setupearly_data_test(&cctx, &sctx, &clientssl,
+ &serverssl, NULL, idx)))
goto end;
/* Write some data - should block due to handshake with server */
testresult = 1;
end:
+ /* If using PSK then clientpsk and sess are the same */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(clientpsk);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(serverpsk);
+ clientpsk = serverpsk = NULL;
SSL_free(serverssl);
SSL_free(clientssl);
SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
SSL_free(clientssl);
serverssl = clientssl = NULL;
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305)
/* Check we can resume a session with a different SHA-256 ciphersuite */
if (!TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(cctx,
"TLS13-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256"))
SSL_free(serverssl);
SSL_free(clientssl);
serverssl = clientssl = NULL;
+# endif
/*
* Check attempting to resume a SHA-256 session with no SHA-256 ciphersuites
return testresult;
}
-
-static SSL_SESSION *psk = NULL;
-static const char *pskid = "Identity";
-static const char *srvid;
-
-static int use_session_cb_cnt = 0;
-static int find_session_cb_cnt = 0;
-
-static int use_session_cb(SSL *ssl, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char **id,
- size_t *idlen, SSL_SESSION **sess)
-{
- switch (++use_session_cb_cnt) {
- case 1:
- /* The first call should always have a NULL md */
- if (md != NULL)
- return 0;
- break;
-
- case 2:
- /* The second call should always have an md */
- if (md == NULL)
- return 0;
- break;
-
- default:
- /* We should only be called a maximum of twice */
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (psk != NULL)
- SSL_SESSION_up_ref(psk);
-
- *sess = psk;
- *id = (const unsigned char *)pskid;
- *idlen = strlen(pskid);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int find_session_cb(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *identity,
- size_t identity_len, SSL_SESSION **sess)
-{
- find_session_cb_cnt++;
-
- /* We should only ever be called a maximum of twice per connection */
- if (find_session_cb_cnt > 2)
- return 0;
-
- if (psk == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- /* Identity should match that set by the client */
- if (strlen(srvid) != identity_len
- || strncmp(srvid, (const char *)identity, identity_len) != 0) {
- /* No PSK found, continue but without a PSK */
- *sess = NULL;
- return 1;
- }
-
- SSL_SESSION_up_ref(psk);
- *sess = psk;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-#define TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384_BYTES ((const unsigned char *)"\x13\x02")
-
static int test_tls13_psk(void)
{
SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
SSL_CTX_set_psk_use_session_callback(cctx, use_session_cb);
SSL_CTX_set_psk_find_session_callback(sctx, find_session_cb);
srvid = pskid;
+ use_session_cb_cnt = 0;
+ find_session_cb_cnt = 0;
/* Check we can create a connection if callback decides not to send a PSK */
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl,
/* Create the PSK */
cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(clientssl, TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384_BYTES);
- psk = SSL_SESSION_new();
- if (!TEST_ptr(psk)
+ clientpsk = SSL_SESSION_new();
+ if (!TEST_ptr(clientpsk)
|| !TEST_ptr(cipher)
- || !TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psk, key, sizeof(key)))
- || !TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psk, cipher))
- || !TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psk,
- TLS1_3_VERSION)))
+ || !TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(clientpsk, key,
+ sizeof(key)))
+ || !TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(clientpsk, cipher))
+ || !TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(clientpsk,
+ TLS1_3_VERSION))
+ || !TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_up_ref(clientpsk)))
goto end;
+ serverpsk = clientpsk;
/* Check we can create a connection and the PSK is used */
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE))
testresult = 1;
end:
- SSL_SESSION_free(psk);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(clientpsk);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(serverpsk);
+ clientpsk = serverpsk = NULL;
SSL_free(serverssl);
SSL_free(clientssl);
SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
return testresult;
}
+static unsigned char cookie_magic_value[] = "cookie magic";
+
+static int generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
+ unsigned int *cookie_len)
+{
+ /*
+ * Not suitable as a real cookie generation function but good enough for
+ * testing!
+ */
+ memcpy(cookie, cookie_magic_value, sizeof(cookie_magic_value) - 1);
+ *cookie_len = sizeof(cookie_magic_value) - 1;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie,
+ unsigned int cookie_len)
+{
+ if (cookie_len == sizeof(cookie_magic_value) - 1
+ && memcmp(cookie, cookie_magic_value, cookie_len) == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_stateless(void)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
+ SSL *serverssl = NULL, *clientssl = NULL;
+ int testresult = 0;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(),
+ TLS_client_method(), &sctx,
+ &cctx, cert, privkey)))
+ goto end;
+
+ /* Set up the cookie generation and verification callbacks */
+ SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(sctx, generate_cookie_callback);
+ SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(sctx, verify_cookie_callback);
+
+ /* The arrival of CCS messages can confuse the test */
+ SSL_CTX_clear_options(cctx, SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT);
+
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl,
+ NULL, NULL))
+ /* Send the first ClientHello */
+ || !TEST_false(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
+ SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ))
+ /* This should fail because there is no cookie */
+ || !TEST_false(SSL_stateless(serverssl)))
+ goto end;
+
+ /* Abandon the connection from this client */
+ SSL_free(clientssl);
+ clientssl = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Now create a connection from a new client but with the same server SSL
+ * object
+ */
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl,
+ NULL, NULL))
+ /* Send the first ClientHello */
+ || !TEST_false(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
+ SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ))
+ /* This should fail because there is no cookie */
+ || !TEST_false(SSL_stateless(serverssl))
+ /* Send the second ClientHello */
+ || !TEST_false(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
+ SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ))
+ /* This should succeed because a cookie is now present */
+ || !TEST_true(SSL_stateless(serverssl))
+ /* Complete the connection */
+ || !TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
+ SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
+ goto end;
+
+ shutdown_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl);
+ serverssl = clientssl = NULL;
+ testresult = 1;
+
+ end:
+ SSL_free(serverssl);
+ SSL_free(clientssl);
+ SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+ SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
+ return testresult;
+
+}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 */
static int clntaddoldcb = 0;
SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
unsigned int context;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3)
+ /* Skip tests for TLSv1.2 and below in this case */
+ if (tst < 3)
+ return 1;
+#endif
+
/* Reset callback counters */
clntaddoldcb = clntparseoldcb = srvaddoldcb = srvparseoldcb = 0;
clntaddnewcb = clntparsenewcb = srvaddnewcb = srvparsenewcb = 0;
return testresult;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+/*
+ * Test that SSL_export_keying_material_early() produces expected
+ * results. There are no test vectors so all we do is test that both
+ * sides of the communication produce the same results for different
+ * protocol versions.
+ */
+static int test_export_key_mat_early(int idx)
+{
+ static const char label[] = "test label";
+ static const unsigned char context[] = "context";
+ int testresult = 0;
+ SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL;
+ SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *emptycontext = NULL;
+ unsigned char ckeymat1[80], ckeymat2[80];
+ unsigned char skeymat1[80], skeymat2[80];
+ unsigned char buf[1];
+ size_t readbytes, written;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(setupearly_data_test(&cctx, &sctx, &clientssl, &serverssl,
+ &sess, idx)))
+ goto end;
+
+ /* Here writing 0 length early data is enough. */
+ if (!TEST_true(SSL_write_early_data(clientssl, NULL, 0, &written))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_read_early_data(serverssl, buf, sizeof(buf),
+ &readbytes),
+ SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_early_data_status(serverssl),
+ SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_export_keying_material_early(
+ clientssl, ckeymat1, sizeof(ckeymat1), label,
+ sizeof(label) - 1, context, sizeof(context) - 1), 1)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_export_keying_material_early(
+ clientssl, ckeymat2, sizeof(ckeymat2), label,
+ sizeof(label) - 1, emptycontext, 0), 1)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_export_keying_material_early(
+ serverssl, skeymat1, sizeof(skeymat1), label,
+ sizeof(label) - 1, context, sizeof(context) - 1), 1)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_export_keying_material_early(
+ serverssl, skeymat2, sizeof(skeymat2), label,
+ sizeof(label) - 1, emptycontext, 0), 1)
+ /*
+ * Check that both sides created the same key material with the
+ * same context.
+ */
+ || !TEST_mem_eq(ckeymat1, sizeof(ckeymat1), skeymat1,
+ sizeof(skeymat1))
+ /*
+ * Check that both sides created the same key material with an
+ * empty context.
+ */
+ || !TEST_mem_eq(ckeymat2, sizeof(ckeymat2), skeymat2,
+ sizeof(skeymat2))
+ /* Different contexts should produce different results */
+ || !TEST_mem_ne(ckeymat1, sizeof(ckeymat1), ckeymat2,
+ sizeof(ckeymat2)))
+ goto end;
+
+ testresult = 1;
+
+ end:
+ if (sess != clientpsk)
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(clientpsk);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(serverpsk);
+ clientpsk = serverpsk = NULL;
+ SSL_free(serverssl);
+ SSL_free(clientssl);
+ SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+ SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
+
+ return testresult;
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 */
+
static int test_ssl_clear(int idx)
{
SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL;
return testresult;
}
+/* Parse CH and retrieve any MFL extension value if present */
+static int get_MFL_from_client_hello(BIO *bio, int *mfl_codemfl_code)
+{
+ long len;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ PACKET pkt = {0}, pkt2 = {0}, pkt3 = {0};
+ unsigned int MFL_code = 0, type = 0;
+
+ if (!TEST_uint_gt( len = BIO_get_mem_data( bio, (char **) &data ), 0 ) )
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!TEST_true( PACKET_buf_init( &pkt, data, len ) )
+ /* Skip the record header */
+ || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ /* Skip the handshake message header */
+ || !TEST_true(PACKET_forward(&pkt, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
+ /* Skip client version and random */
+ || !TEST_true(PACKET_forward(&pkt, CLIENT_VERSION_LEN
+ + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
+ /* Skip session id */
+ || !TEST_true(PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &pkt2))
+ /* Skip ciphers */
+ || !TEST_true(PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &pkt2))
+ /* Skip compression */
+ || !TEST_true(PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &pkt2))
+ /* Extensions len */
+ || !TEST_true(PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &pkt2)))
+ goto end;
+
+ /* Loop through all extensions */
+ while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt2)) {
+ if (!TEST_true(PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt2, &type))
+ || !TEST_true(PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt2, &pkt3)))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length) {
+ if (!TEST_uint_ne(PACKET_remaining(&pkt3), 0)
+ || !TEST_true(PACKET_get_1(&pkt3, &MFL_code)))
+ goto end;
+
+ *mfl_codemfl_code = MFL_code;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ end:
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Maximum-Fragment-Length TLS extension mode to test */
+static const unsigned char max_fragment_len_test[] = {
+ TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_512,
+ TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_1024,
+ TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_2048,
+ TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_4096
+};
+
+static int test_max_fragment_len_ext(int idx_tst)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ SSL *con = NULL;
+ int testresult = 0, MFL_mode = 0;
+ BIO *rbio, *wbio;
+
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method());
+ if (!TEST_ptr(ctx))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(
+ ctx, max_fragment_len_test[idx_tst])))
+ goto end;
+
+ con = SSL_new(ctx);
+ if (!TEST_ptr(con))
+ goto end;
+
+ rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ if (!TEST_ptr(rbio)|| !TEST_ptr(wbio)) {
+ BIO_free(rbio);
+ BIO_free(wbio);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ SSL_set_bio(con, rbio, wbio);
+ SSL_set_connect_state(con);
+
+ if (!TEST_int_le(SSL_connect(con), 0)) {
+ /* This shouldn't succeed because we don't have a server! */
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!TEST_true(get_MFL_from_client_hello(wbio, &MFL_mode)))
+ /* no MFL in client hello */
+ goto end;
+ if (!TEST_true(max_fragment_len_test[idx_tst] == MFL_mode))
+ goto end;
+
+ testresult = 1;
+
+end:
+ SSL_free(con);
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ return testresult;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+static int test_pha_key_update(void)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL;
+ SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
+ int testresult = 0;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(),
+ TLS_client_method(),
+ &sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey)))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(sctx, TLS1_3_VERSION))
+ || !TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(sctx, TLS1_3_VERSION))
+ || !TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(cctx, TLS1_3_VERSION))
+ || !TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(cctx, TLS1_3_VERSION)))
+ goto end;
+
+
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl,
+ NULL, NULL)))
+ goto end;
+
+ SSL_force_post_handshake_auth(clientssl);
+
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
+ SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
+ goto end;
+
+ SSL_set_verify(serverssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL);
+ if (!TEST_true(SSL_verify_client_post_handshake(serverssl)))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(SSL_key_update(clientssl, SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED)))
+ goto end;
+
+ /* Start handshake on the server */
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_do_handshake(serverssl), 1))
+ goto end;
+
+ /* Starts with SSL_connect(), but it's really just SSL_do_handshake() */
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
+ SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
+ goto end;
+
+ SSL_shutdown(clientssl);
+ SSL_shutdown(serverssl);
+
+ testresult = 1;
+
+ end:
+ SSL_free(serverssl);
+ SSL_free(clientssl);
+ SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+ SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
+ return testresult;
+}
+#endif
+
int setup_tests(void)
{
if (!TEST_ptr(cert = test_get_argument(0))
ADD_TEST(test_ssl_bio_pop_ssl_bio);
ADD_TEST(test_ssl_bio_change_rbio);
ADD_TEST(test_ssl_bio_change_wbio);
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3)
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_set_sigalgs, OSSL_NELEM(testsigalgs) * 2);
ADD_TEST(test_keylog);
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
ADD_TEST(test_keylog_no_master_key);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
- ADD_TEST(test_early_cb);
+ ADD_TEST(test_client_hello_cb);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
- ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_read_write, 2);
- ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_skip, 2);
- ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_skip_hrr, 2);
- ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_not_sent, 2);
- ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_not_expected, 2);
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_read_write, 3);
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_skip, 3);
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_skip_hrr, 3);
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_not_sent, 3);
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_psk, 8);
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_not_expected, 3);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
- ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_tls1_2, 2);
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_tls1_2, 3);
# endif
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
ADD_TEST(test_ciphersuite_change);
ADD_TEST(test_tls13_psk);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_custom_exts, 5);
+ ADD_TEST(test_stateless);
+ ADD_TEST(test_pha_key_update);
#else
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_custom_exts, 3);
#endif
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_serverinfo, 8);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_export_key_mat, 4);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_export_key_mat_early, 3);
+#endif
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ssl_clear, 2);
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_max_fragment_len_ext, OSSL_NELEM(max_fragment_len_test));
return 1;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff