/*
* Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
*/
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+#include <openssl/srp.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+# define USE_SOCKETS
+# include "e_os.h"
+#endif
#include "handshake_helper.h"
+#include "testutil.h"
+
+HANDSHAKE_RESULT *HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new()
+{
+ HANDSHAKE_RESULT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+ TEST_check(ret != NULL);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result)
+{
+ if (result == NULL)
+ return;
+ OPENSSL_free(result->client_npn_negotiated);
+ OPENSSL_free(result->server_npn_negotiated);
+ OPENSSL_free(result->client_alpn_negotiated);
+ OPENSSL_free(result->server_alpn_negotiated);
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(result->server_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(result->client_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+ OPENSSL_free(result);
+}
/*
* Since there appears to be no way to extract the sent/received alert
* from the SSL object directly, we use the info callback and stash
* the result in ex_data.
*/
-typedef struct handshake_ex_data {
+typedef struct handshake_ex_data_st {
int alert_sent;
+ int num_fatal_alerts_sent;
int alert_received;
+ int session_ticket_do_not_call;
+ ssl_servername_t servername;
} HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA;
+typedef struct ctx_data_st {
+ unsigned char *npn_protocols;
+ size_t npn_protocols_len;
+ unsigned char *alpn_protocols;
+ size_t alpn_protocols_len;
+ char *srp_user;
+ char *srp_password;
+} CTX_DATA;
+
+/* |ctx_data| itself is stack-allocated. */
+static void ctx_data_free_data(CTX_DATA *ctx_data)
+{
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->npn_protocols);
+ ctx_data->npn_protocols = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->alpn_protocols);
+ ctx_data->alpn_protocols = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->srp_user);
+ ctx_data->srp_user = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->srp_password);
+ ctx_data->srp_password = NULL;
+}
+
static int ex_data_idx;
-static void info_callback(const SSL *s, int where, int ret)
+static void info_cb(const SSL *s, int where, int ret)
{
if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) {
HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data =
(HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx));
if (where & SSL_CB_WRITE) {
ex_data->alert_sent = ret;
+ if (strcmp(SSL_alert_type_string(ret), "F") == 0
+ || strcmp(SSL_alert_desc_string(ret), "CN") == 0)
+ ex_data->num_fatal_alerts_sent++;
} else {
ex_data->alert_received = ret;
}
}
}
-static int verify_reject_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
+/* Select the appropriate server CTX.
+ * Returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if a match was found.
+ * If |ignore| is 1, returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK on mismatch.
+ * Otherwise, returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL on mismatch.
+ * An empty SNI extension also returns SSL_TSLEXT_ERR_NOACK.
+ */
+static int select_server_ctx(SSL *s, void *arg, int ignore)
+{
+ const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
+ HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data =
+ (HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx));
+
+ if (servername == NULL) {
+ ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(servername, "server2") == 0) {
+ SSL_CTX *new_ctx = (SSL_CTX*)arg;
+ SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, new_ctx);
+ /*
+ * Copy over all the SSL_CTX options - reasonable behavior
+ * allows testing of cases where the options between two
+ * contexts differ/conflict
+ */
+ SSL_clear_options(s, 0xFFFFFFFFL);
+ SSL_set_options(s, SSL_CTX_get_options(new_ctx));
+
+ ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER2;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+ } else if (strcmp(servername, "server1") == 0) {
+ ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+ } else if (ignore) {
+ ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ } else {
+ /* Don't set an explicit alert, to test library defaults. */
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ }
+}
+
+static int early_select_server_ctx(SSL *s, void *arg, int ignore)
+{
+ const char *servername;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ size_t len, remaining;
+ HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data =
+ (HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx));
+
+ /*
+ * The server_name extension was given too much extensibility when it
+ * was written, so parsing the normal case is a bit complex.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_early_get0_ext(s, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, &p, &remaining) ||
+ remaining <= 2)
+ return 0;
+ /* Extract the length of the supplied list of names. */
+ len = (*(p++) << 1);
+ len += *(p++);
+ if (len + 2 != remaining)
+ return 0;
+ remaining = len;
+ /*
+ * The list in practice only has a single element, so we only consider
+ * the first one.
+ */
+ if (remaining == 0 || *p++ != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
+ return 0;
+ remaining--;
+ /* Now we can finally pull out the byte array with the actual hostname. */
+ if (remaining <= 2)
+ return 0;
+ len = (*(p++) << 1);
+ len += *(p++);
+ if (len + 2 > remaining)
+ return 0;
+ remaining = len;
+ servername = (const char *)p;
+
+ if (len == strlen("server2") && strncmp(servername, "server2", len) == 0) {
+ SSL_CTX *new_ctx = arg;
+ SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, new_ctx);
+ /*
+ * Copy over all the SSL_CTX options - reasonable behavior
+ * allows testing of cases where the options between two
+ * contexts differ/conflict
+ */
+ SSL_clear_options(s, 0xFFFFFFFFL);
+ SSL_set_options(s, SSL_CTX_get_options(new_ctx));
+
+ ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER2;
+ return 1;
+ } else if (len == strlen("server1") &&
+ strncmp(servername, "server1", len) == 0) {
+ ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1;
+ return 1;
+ } else if (ignore) {
+ ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+/*
+ * (RFC 6066):
+ * If the server understood the ClientHello extension but
+ * does not recognize the server name, the server SHOULD take one of two
+ * actions: either abort the handshake by sending a fatal-level
+ * unrecognized_name(112) alert or continue the handshake.
+ *
+ * This behaviour is up to the application to configure; we test both
+ * configurations to ensure the state machine propagates the result
+ * correctly.
+ */
+static int servername_ignore_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+{
+ return select_server_ctx(s, arg, 1);
+}
+
+static int servername_reject_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+{
+ return select_server_ctx(s, arg, 0);
+}
+
+static int early_ignore_cb(SSL *s, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+ if (!early_select_server_ctx(s, arg, 1)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int early_reject_cb(SSL *s, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+ if (!early_select_server_ctx(s, arg, 0)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int early_nov12_cb(SSL *s, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned int v;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+
+ v = SSL_early_get0_legacy_version(s);
+ if (v > TLS1_2_VERSION || v < SSL3_VERSION) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ (void)SSL_early_get0_session_id(s, &p);
+ if (p == NULL ||
+ SSL_early_get0_random(s, &p) == 0 ||
+ SSL_early_get0_ciphers(s, &p) == 0 ||
+ SSL_early_get0_compression_methods(s, &p) == 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = early_select_server_ctx(s, arg, 0);
+ SSL_set_max_proto_version(s, TLS1_1_VERSION);
+ if (!ret)
+ *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static unsigned char dummy_ocsp_resp_good_val = 0xff;
+static unsigned char dummy_ocsp_resp_bad_val = 0xfe;
+
+static int server_ocsp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+ unsigned char *resp;
+
+ resp = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+ if (resp == NULL)
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ /*
+ * For the purposes of testing we just send back a dummy OCSP response
+ */
+ *resp = *(unsigned char *)arg;
+ if (!SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, resp, 1))
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+static int client_ocsp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+ const unsigned char *resp;
+ int len;
+
+ len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &resp);
+ if (len != 1 || *resp != dummy_ocsp_resp_good_val)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int verify_reject_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION);
return 0;
}
-static int verify_accept_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
+static int verify_accept_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
return 1;
}
+static int broken_session_ticket_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char *key_name, unsigned char *iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int do_not_call_session_ticket_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char *key_name,
+ unsigned char *iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)
+{
+ HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data =
+ (HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx));
+ ex_data->session_ticket_do_not_call = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Parse the comma-separated list into TLS format. */
+static void parse_protos(const char *protos, unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen)
+{
+ size_t len, i, prefix;
+
+ len = strlen(protos);
+
+ /* Should never have reuse. */
+ TEST_check(*out == NULL);
+
+ /* Test values are small, so we omit length limit checks. */
+ *out = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
+ TEST_check(*out != NULL);
+ *outlen = len + 1;
+
+ /*
+ * foo => '3', 'f', 'o', 'o'
+ * foo,bar => '3', 'f', 'o', 'o', '3', 'b', 'a', 'r'
+ */
+ memcpy(*out + 1, protos, len);
+
+ prefix = 0;
+ i = prefix + 1;
+ while (i <= len) {
+ if ((*out)[i] == ',') {
+ TEST_check(i - 1 - prefix > 0);
+ (*out)[prefix] = i - 1 - prefix;
+ prefix = i;
+ }
+ i++;
+ }
+ TEST_check(len - prefix > 0);
+ (*out)[prefix] = len - prefix;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/*
+ * The client SHOULD select the first protocol advertised by the server that it
+ * also supports. In the event that the client doesn't support any of server's
+ * protocols, or the server doesn't advertise any, it SHOULD select the first
+ * protocol that it supports.
+ */
+static int client_npn_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
+ void *arg)
+{
+ CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen,
+ ctx_data->npn_protocols,
+ ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
+ /* Accept both OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED and OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP. */
+ TEST_check(ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED || ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP);
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+static int server_npn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
+ unsigned int *len, void *arg)
+{
+ CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
+ *data = ctx_data->npn_protocols;
+ *len = ctx_data->npn_protocols_len;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The server SHOULD select the most highly preferred protocol that it supports
+ * and that is also advertised by the client. In the event that the server
+ * supports no protocols that the client advertises, then the server SHALL
+ * respond with a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert.
+ */
+static int server_alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out,
+ unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
+{
+ CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
+ int ret;
+
+ /* SSL_select_next_proto isn't const-correct... */
+ unsigned char *tmp_out;
+
+ /*
+ * The result points either to |in| or to |ctx_data->alpn_protocols|.
+ * The callback is allowed to point to |in| or to a long-lived buffer,
+ * so we can return directly without storing a copy.
+ */
+ ret = SSL_select_next_proto(&tmp_out, outlen,
+ ctx_data->alpn_protocols,
+ ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len, in, inlen);
+
+ *out = tmp_out;
+ /* Unlike NPN, we don't tolerate a mismatch. */
+ return ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED ? SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
+ : SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+static char *client_srp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+ CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
+ return OPENSSL_strdup(ctx_data->srp_password);
+}
+
+static int server_srp_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+{
+ CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
+ if (strcmp(ctx_data->srp_user, SSL_get_srp_username(s)) != 0)
+ return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ if (SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(s, ctx_data->srp_user,
+ ctx_data->srp_password,
+ "2048" /* known group */) < 0) {
+ *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ }
+ return SSL_ERROR_NONE;
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+
/*
* Configure callbacks and other properties that can't be set directly
* in the server/client CONF.
*/
-static void configure_handshake(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *client_ctx,
- const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
+static void configure_handshake_ctx(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
+ SSL_CTX *client_ctx,
+ const SSL_TEST_CTX *test,
+ const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra,
+ CTX_DATA *server_ctx_data,
+ CTX_DATA *server2_ctx_data,
+ CTX_DATA *client_ctx_data)
{
- switch (test_ctx->client_verify_callback) {
+ unsigned char *ticket_keys;
+ size_t ticket_key_len;
+
+ TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(server_ctx,
+ test->max_fragment_size) == 1);
+ if (server2_ctx != NULL) {
+ TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(server2_ctx,
+ test->max_fragment_size) == 1);
+ }
+ TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(client_ctx,
+ test->max_fragment_size) == 1);
+
+ switch (extra->client.verify_callback) {
case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_ACCEPT_ALL:
- SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_accept_callback,
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_accept_cb,
NULL);
break;
case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_REJECT_ALL:
- SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_reject_callback,
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_reject_cb,
NULL);
break;
- default:
+ case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_NONE:
break;
}
+
+ /*
+ * Link the two contexts for SNI purposes.
+ * Also do early callbacks here, as setting both early and SNI is bad.
+ */
+ switch (extra->server.servername_callback) {
+ case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_IGNORE_MISMATCH:
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx, servername_ignore_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_ctx, server2_ctx);
+ break;
+ case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_REJECT_MISMATCH:
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx, servername_reject_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_ctx, server2_ctx);
+ break;
+ case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_CB_NONE:
+ break;
+ case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_EARLY_IGNORE_MISMATCH:
+ SSL_CTX_set_early_cb(server_ctx, early_ignore_cb, server2_ctx);
+ break;
+ case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_EARLY_REJECT_MISMATCH:
+ SSL_CTX_set_early_cb(server_ctx, early_reject_cb, server2_ctx);
+ break;
+ case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_EARLY_NO_V12:
+ SSL_CTX_set_early_cb(server_ctx, early_nov12_cb, server2_ctx);
+ }
+
+ if (extra->server.cert_status != SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_NONE) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type(client_ctx, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(client_ctx, client_ocsp_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(client_ctx, NULL);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_ctx, server_ocsp_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_ctx,
+ ((extra->server.cert_status == SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_GOOD_RESPONSE)
+ ? &dummy_ocsp_resp_good_val : &dummy_ocsp_resp_bad_val));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The initial_ctx/session_ctx always handles the encrypt/decrypt of the
+ * session ticket. This ticket_key callback is assigned to the second
+ * session (assigned via SNI), and should never be invoked
+ */
+ if (server2_ctx != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server2_ctx,
+ do_not_call_session_ticket_cb);
+
+ if (extra->server.broken_session_ticket) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server_ctx, broken_session_ticket_cb);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ if (extra->server.npn_protocols != NULL) {
+ parse_protos(extra->server.npn_protocols,
+ &server_ctx_data->npn_protocols,
+ &server_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
+ SSL_CTX_set_npn_advertised_cb(server_ctx, server_npn_cb,
+ server_ctx_data);
+ }
+ if (extra->server2.npn_protocols != NULL) {
+ parse_protos(extra->server2.npn_protocols,
+ &server2_ctx_data->npn_protocols,
+ &server2_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
+ TEST_check(server2_ctx != NULL);
+ SSL_CTX_set_npn_advertised_cb(server2_ctx, server_npn_cb,
+ server2_ctx_data);
+ }
+ if (extra->client.npn_protocols != NULL) {
+ parse_protos(extra->client.npn_protocols,
+ &client_ctx_data->npn_protocols,
+ &client_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(client_ctx, client_npn_cb,
+ client_ctx_data);
+ }
+#endif
+ if (extra->server.alpn_protocols != NULL) {
+ parse_protos(extra->server.alpn_protocols,
+ &server_ctx_data->alpn_protocols,
+ &server_ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len);
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(server_ctx, server_alpn_cb, server_ctx_data);
+ }
+ if (extra->server2.alpn_protocols != NULL) {
+ TEST_check(server2_ctx != NULL);
+ parse_protos(extra->server2.alpn_protocols,
+ &server2_ctx_data->alpn_protocols,
+ &server2_ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len);
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(server2_ctx, server_alpn_cb, server2_ctx_data);
+ }
+ if (extra->client.alpn_protocols != NULL) {
+ unsigned char *alpn_protos = NULL;
+ size_t alpn_protos_len;
+ parse_protos(extra->client.alpn_protocols,
+ &alpn_protos, &alpn_protos_len);
+ /* Reversed return value convention... */
+ TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(client_ctx, alpn_protos,
+ alpn_protos_len) == 0);
+ OPENSSL_free(alpn_protos);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Use fixed session ticket keys so that we can decrypt a ticket created with
+ * one CTX in another CTX. Don't address server2 for the moment.
+ */
+ ticket_key_len = SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(server_ctx, NULL, 0);
+ ticket_keys = OPENSSL_zalloc(ticket_key_len);
+ TEST_check(ticket_keys != NULL);
+ TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(server_ctx, ticket_keys,
+ ticket_key_len) == 1);
+ OPENSSL_free(ticket_keys);
+
+ /* The default log list includes EC keys, so CT can't work without EC. */
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
+ TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(client_ctx));
+ switch (extra->client.ct_validation) {
+ case SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE:
+ TEST_check(SSL_CTX_enable_ct(client_ctx, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE));
+ break;
+ case SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT:
+ TEST_check(SSL_CTX_enable_ct(client_ctx, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT));
+ break;
+ case SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_NONE:
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (extra->server.srp_user != NULL) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(server_ctx, server_srp_cb);
+ server_ctx_data->srp_user = OPENSSL_strdup(extra->server.srp_user);
+ server_ctx_data->srp_password = OPENSSL_strdup(extra->server.srp_password);
+ SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(server_ctx, server_ctx_data);
+ }
+ if (extra->server2.srp_user != NULL) {
+ TEST_check(server2_ctx != NULL);
+ SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(server2_ctx, server_srp_cb);
+ server2_ctx_data->srp_user = OPENSSL_strdup(extra->server2.srp_user);
+ server2_ctx_data->srp_password = OPENSSL_strdup(extra->server2.srp_password);
+ SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(server2_ctx, server2_ctx_data);
+ }
+ if (extra->client.srp_user != NULL) {
+ TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(client_ctx, extra->client.srp_user));
+ SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(client_ctx, client_srp_cb);
+ client_ctx_data->srp_password = OPENSSL_strdup(extra->client.srp_password);
+ SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(client_ctx, client_ctx_data);
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
}
+/* Configure per-SSL callbacks and other properties. */
+static void configure_handshake_ssl(SSL *server, SSL *client,
+ const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra)
+{
+ if (extra->client.servername != SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_NONE)
+ SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(client,
+ ssl_servername_name(extra->client.servername));
+}
+/* The status for each connection phase. */
typedef enum {
PEER_SUCCESS,
PEER_RETRY,
- PEER_ERROR
+ PEER_ERROR,
+ PEER_WAITING
} peer_status_t;
-static peer_status_t do_handshake_step(SSL *ssl)
+/* An SSL object and associated read-write buffers. */
+typedef struct peer_st {
+ SSL *ssl;
+ /* Buffer lengths are int to match the SSL read/write API. */
+ unsigned char *write_buf;
+ int write_buf_len;
+ unsigned char *read_buf;
+ int read_buf_len;
+ int bytes_to_write;
+ int bytes_to_read;
+ peer_status_t status;
+} PEER;
+
+static void create_peer(PEER *peer, SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ static const int peer_buffer_size = 64 * 1024;
+
+ peer->ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+ TEST_check(peer->ssl != NULL);
+ peer->write_buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(peer_buffer_size);
+ TEST_check(peer->write_buf != NULL);
+ peer->read_buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(peer_buffer_size);
+ TEST_check(peer->read_buf != NULL);
+ peer->write_buf_len = peer->read_buf_len = peer_buffer_size;
+}
+
+static void peer_free_data(PEER *peer)
+{
+ SSL_free(peer->ssl);
+ OPENSSL_free(peer->write_buf);
+ OPENSSL_free(peer->read_buf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note that we could do the handshake transparently under an SSL_write,
+ * but separating the steps is more helpful for debugging test failures.
+ */
+static void do_handshake_step(PEER *peer)
{
int ret;
- ret = SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
+ TEST_check(peer->status == PEER_RETRY);
+ ret = SSL_do_handshake(peer->ssl);
if (ret == 1) {
- return PEER_SUCCESS;
+ peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS;
} else if (ret == 0) {
- return PEER_ERROR;
+ peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
} else {
- int error = SSL_get_error(ssl, ret);
+ int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret);
/* Memory bios should never block with SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE. */
- if (error == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
- return PEER_RETRY;
- else
- return PEER_ERROR;
+ if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
+ peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+ }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Send/receive some application data. The read-write sequence is
+ * Peer A: (R) W - first read will yield no data
+ * Peer B: R W
+ * ...
+ * Peer A: R W
+ * Peer B: R W
+ * Peer A: R
+ */
+static void do_app_data_step(PEER *peer)
+{
+ int ret = 1, write_bytes;
+
+ TEST_check(peer->status == PEER_RETRY);
+
+ /* We read everything available... */
+ while (ret > 0 && peer->bytes_to_read) {
+ ret = SSL_read(peer->ssl, peer->read_buf, peer->read_buf_len);
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ TEST_check(ret <= peer->bytes_to_read);
+ peer->bytes_to_read -= ret;
+ } else if (ret == 0) {
+ peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+ return;
+ } else {
+ int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret);
+ if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
+ peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+ return;
+ } /* Else continue with write. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* ... but we only write one write-buffer-full of data. */
+ write_bytes = peer->bytes_to_write < peer->write_buf_len ? peer->bytes_to_write :
+ peer->write_buf_len;
+ if (write_bytes) {
+ ret = SSL_write(peer->ssl, peer->write_buf, write_bytes);
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ /* SSL_write will only succeed with a complete write. */
+ TEST_check(ret == write_bytes);
+ peer->bytes_to_write -= ret;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We should perhaps check for SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ/WRITE here
+ * but this doesn't yet occur with current app data sizes.
+ */
+ peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We could simply finish when there was nothing to read, and we have
+ * nothing left to write. But keeping track of the expected number of bytes
+ * to read gives us somewhat better guarantees that all data sent is in fact
+ * received.
+ */
+ if (!peer->bytes_to_write && !peer->bytes_to_read) {
+ peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS;
+ }
+}
+
+static void do_reneg_setup_step(const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, PEER *peer)
+{
+ int ret;
+ char buf;
+
+ TEST_check(peer->status == PEER_RETRY);
+ TEST_check(test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_SERVER
+ || test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_CLIENT
+ || test_ctx->handshake_mode
+ == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_KEY_UPDATE_SERVER
+ || test_ctx->handshake_mode
+ == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_KEY_UPDATE_CLIENT);
+
+ /* Reset the count of the amount of app data we need to read/write */
+ peer->bytes_to_write = peer->bytes_to_read = test_ctx->app_data_size;
+
+ /* Check if we are the peer that is going to initiate */
+ if ((test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_SERVER
+ && SSL_is_server(peer->ssl))
+ || (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_CLIENT
+ && !SSL_is_server(peer->ssl))) {
+ /*
+ * If we already asked for a renegotiation then fall through to the
+ * SSL_read() below.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_renegotiate_pending(peer->ssl)) {
+ /*
+ * If we are the client we will always attempt to resume the
+ * session. The server may or may not resume dependant on the
+ * setting of SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+ */
+ if (SSL_is_server(peer->ssl)) {
+ ret = SSL_renegotiate(peer->ssl);
+ } else {
+ if (test_ctx->extra.client.reneg_ciphers != NULL) {
+ if (!SSL_set_cipher_list(peer->ssl,
+ test_ctx->extra.client.reneg_ciphers)) {
+ peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+ return;
+ }
+ ret = SSL_renegotiate(peer->ssl);
+ } else {
+ ret = SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(peer->ssl);
+ }
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+ return;
+ }
+ do_handshake_step(peer);
+ /*
+ * If status is PEER_RETRY it means we're waiting on the peer to
+ * continue the handshake. As far as setting up the renegotiation is
+ * concerned that is a success. The next step will continue the
+ * handshake to its conclusion.
+ *
+ * If status is PEER_SUCCESS then we are the server and we have
+ * successfully sent the HelloRequest. We need to continue to wait
+ * until the handshake arrives from the client.
+ */
+ if (peer->status == PEER_RETRY)
+ peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS;
+ else if (peer->status == PEER_SUCCESS)
+ peer->status = PEER_RETRY;
+ return;
+ }
+ } else if (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_KEY_UPDATE_SERVER
+ || test_ctx->handshake_mode
+ == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_KEY_UPDATE_CLIENT) {
+ if (SSL_is_server(peer->ssl)
+ != (test_ctx->handshake_mode
+ == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_KEY_UPDATE_SERVER)) {
+ peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ret = SSL_key_update(peer->ssl, test_ctx->key_update_type);
+ if (!ret) {
+ peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+ return;
+ }
+ do_handshake_step(peer);
+ /*
+ * This is a one step handshake. We shouldn't get anything other than
+ * PEER_SUCCESS
+ */
+ if (peer->status != PEER_SUCCESS)
+ peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The SSL object is still expecting app data, even though it's going to
+ * get a handshake message. We try to read, and it should fail - after which
+ * we should be in a handshake
+ */
+ ret = SSL_read(peer->ssl, &buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (ret >= 0) {
+ /*
+ * We're not actually expecting data - we're expecting a reneg to
+ * start
+ */
+ peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+ return;
+ } else {
+ int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret);
+ if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
+ peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+ return;
+ }
+ /* If we're not in init yet then we're not done with setup yet */
+ if (!SSL_in_init(peer->ssl))
+ return;
+ }
+
+ peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * RFC 5246 says:
+ *
+ * Note that as of TLS 1.1,
+ * failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a
+ * session not be resumed. This is a change from TLS 1.0 to conform
+ * with widespread implementation practice.
+ *
+ * However,
+ * (a) OpenSSL requires that a connection be shutdown for all protocol versions.
+ * (b) We test lower versions, too.
+ * So we just implement shutdown. We do a full bidirectional shutdown so that we
+ * can compare sent and received close_notify alerts and get some test coverage
+ * for SSL_shutdown as a bonus.
+ */
+static void do_shutdown_step(PEER *peer)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ TEST_check(peer->status == PEER_RETRY);
+ ret = SSL_shutdown(peer->ssl);
+
+ if (ret == 1) {
+ peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS;
+ } else if (ret < 0) { /* On 0, we retry. */
+ int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret);
+
+ if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ && error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
+ peer->status = PEER_ERROR;
+ }
+}
+
+typedef enum {
+ HANDSHAKE,
+ RENEG_APPLICATION_DATA,
+ RENEG_SETUP,
+ RENEG_HANDSHAKE,
+ APPLICATION_DATA,
+ SHUTDOWN,
+ CONNECTION_DONE
+} connect_phase_t;
+
+static connect_phase_t next_phase(const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx,
+ connect_phase_t phase)
+{
+ switch (phase) {
+ case HANDSHAKE:
+ if (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_SERVER
+ || test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_CLIENT
+ || test_ctx->handshake_mode
+ == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_KEY_UPDATE_CLIENT
+ || test_ctx->handshake_mode
+ == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_KEY_UPDATE_SERVER)
+ return RENEG_APPLICATION_DATA;
+ return APPLICATION_DATA;
+ case RENEG_APPLICATION_DATA:
+ return RENEG_SETUP;
+ case RENEG_SETUP:
+ if (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_KEY_UPDATE_SERVER
+ || test_ctx->handshake_mode
+ == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_KEY_UPDATE_CLIENT)
+ return APPLICATION_DATA;
+ return RENEG_HANDSHAKE;
+ case RENEG_HANDSHAKE:
+ return APPLICATION_DATA;
+ case APPLICATION_DATA:
+ return SHUTDOWN;
+ case SHUTDOWN:
+ return CONNECTION_DONE;
+ case CONNECTION_DONE:
+ TEST_check(0);
+ break;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static void do_connect_step(const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, PEER *peer,
+ connect_phase_t phase)
+{
+ switch (phase) {
+ case HANDSHAKE:
+ do_handshake_step(peer);
+ break;
+ case RENEG_APPLICATION_DATA:
+ do_app_data_step(peer);
+ break;
+ case RENEG_SETUP:
+ do_reneg_setup_step(test_ctx, peer);
+ break;
+ case RENEG_HANDSHAKE:
+ do_handshake_step(peer);
+ break;
+ case APPLICATION_DATA:
+ do_app_data_step(peer);
+ break;
+ case SHUTDOWN:
+ do_shutdown_step(peer);
+ break;
+ case CONNECTION_DONE:
+ TEST_check(0);
+ break;
}
}
}
case PEER_RETRY:
- if (previous_status == PEER_RETRY) {
- /* Neither peer is done. */
- return HANDSHAKE_RETRY;
- } else {
- /*
- * Deadlock: second peer is waiting for more input while first
- * peer thinks they're done (no more input is coming).
- */
- return INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
+ return HANDSHAKE_RETRY;
+
case PEER_ERROR:
switch (previous_status) {
+ case PEER_WAITING:
+ /* The client failed immediately before sending the ClientHello */
+ return client_spoke_last ? CLIENT_ERROR : INTERNAL_ERROR;
case PEER_SUCCESS:
/*
* First peer succeeded but second peer errored.
* TODO(emilia): we should be able to continue here (with some
* application data?) to ensure the first peer receives the
* alert / close_notify.
+ * (No tests currently exercise this branch.)
*/
return client_spoke_last ? CLIENT_ERROR : SERVER_ERROR;
case PEER_RETRY:
return INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
-HANDSHAKE_RESULT do_handshake(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *client_ctx,
- const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
+/* Convert unsigned char buf's that shouldn't contain any NUL-bytes to char. */
+static char *dup_str(const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ char *ret;
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Assert that the string does not contain NUL-bytes. */
+ TEST_check(OPENSSL_strnlen((const char*)(in), len) == len);
+ ret = OPENSSL_strndup((const char*)(in), len);
+ TEST_check(ret != NULL);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int pkey_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
- SSL *server, *client;
- BIO *client_to_server, *server_to_client;
+ int nid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (nid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ const EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
+ return EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
+ }
+#endif
+ return nid;
+}
+
+static int peer_pkey_type(SSL *s)
+{
+ X509 *x = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s);
+
+ if (x != NULL) {
+ int nid = pkey_type(X509_get0_pubkey(x));
+
+ X509_free(x);
+ return nid;
+ }
+ return NID_undef;
+}
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SCTP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
+static int set_sock_as_sctp(int sock)
+{
+ /*
+ * For SCTP we have to set various options on the socket prior to
+ * connecting. This is done automatically by BIO_new_dgram_sctp().
+ * We don't actually need the created BIO though so we free it again
+ * immediately.
+ */
+ BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new_dgram_sctp(sock, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ if (tmpbio == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ BIO_free(tmpbio);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int create_sctp_socks(int *ssock, int *csock)
+{
+ BIO_ADDRINFO *res = NULL;
+ const BIO_ADDRINFO *ai = NULL;
+ int lsock = INVALID_SOCKET, asock = INVALID_SOCKET;
+ int consock = INVALID_SOCKET;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int family = 0;
+
+ if (!BIO_sock_init())
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Port is 4463. It could be anything. It will fail if it's already being
+ * used for some other SCTP service. It seems unlikely though so we don't
+ * worry about it here.
+ */
+ if (!BIO_lookup_ex(NULL, "4463", BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER, family, SOCK_STREAM,
+ IPPROTO_SCTP, &res))
+ return 0;
+
+ for (ai = res; ai != NULL; ai = BIO_ADDRINFO_next(ai)) {
+ family = BIO_ADDRINFO_family(ai);
+ lsock = BIO_socket(family, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_SCTP, 0);
+ if (lsock == INVALID_SOCKET) {
+ /* Maybe the kernel doesn't support the socket family, even if
+ * BIO_lookup() added it in the returned result...
+ */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (!set_sock_as_sctp(lsock)
+ || !BIO_listen(lsock, BIO_ADDRINFO_address(ai),
+ BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR)) {
+ BIO_closesocket(lsock);
+ lsock = INVALID_SOCKET;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Success, don't try any more addresses */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (lsock == INVALID_SOCKET)
+ goto err;
+
+ BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res);
+ res = NULL;
+
+ if (!BIO_lookup_ex(NULL, "4463", BIO_LOOKUP_CLIENT, family, SOCK_STREAM,
+ IPPROTO_SCTP, &res))
+ goto err;
+
+ consock = BIO_socket(family, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_SCTP, 0);
+ if (consock == INVALID_SOCKET)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!set_sock_as_sctp(consock)
+ || !BIO_connect(consock, BIO_ADDRINFO_address(res), 0)
+ || !BIO_socket_nbio(consock, 1))
+ goto err;
+
+ asock = BIO_accept_ex(lsock, NULL, BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK);
+ if (asock == INVALID_SOCKET)
+ goto err;
+
+ *csock = consock;
+ *ssock = asock;
+ consock = asock = INVALID_SOCKET;
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res);
+ if (consock != INVALID_SOCKET)
+ BIO_closesocket(consock);
+ if (lsock != INVALID_SOCKET)
+ BIO_closesocket(lsock);
+ if (asock != INVALID_SOCKET)
+ BIO_closesocket(asock);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Note that |extra| points to the correct client/server configuration
+ * within |test_ctx|. When configuring the handshake, general mode settings
+ * are taken from |test_ctx|, and client/server-specific settings should be
+ * taken from |extra|.
+ *
+ * The configuration code should never reach into |test_ctx->extra| or
+ * |test_ctx->resume_extra| directly.
+ *
+ * (We could refactor test mode settings into a substructure. This would result
+ * in cleaner argument passing but would complicate the test configuration
+ * parsing.)
+ */
+static HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake_internal(
+ SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx, SSL_CTX *client_ctx,
+ const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra,
+ SSL_SESSION *session_in, SSL_SESSION **session_out)
+{
+ PEER server, client;
+ BIO *client_to_server = NULL, *server_to_client = NULL;
HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA server_ex_data, client_ex_data;
- HANDSHAKE_RESULT ret;
- int client_turn = 1;
- peer_status_t client_status = PEER_RETRY, server_status = PEER_RETRY;
+ CTX_DATA client_ctx_data, server_ctx_data, server2_ctx_data;
+ HANDSHAKE_RESULT *ret = HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new();
+ int client_turn = 1, client_turn_count = 0;
+ connect_phase_t phase = HANDSHAKE;
handshake_status_t status = HANDSHAKE_RETRY;
+ const unsigned char* tick = NULL;
+ size_t tick_len = 0;
+ SSL_SESSION* sess = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *proto = NULL;
+ /* API dictates unsigned int rather than size_t. */
+ unsigned int proto_len = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY *tmp_key;
+ const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names;
+ time_t start;
+
+ memset(&server_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(server_ctx_data));
+ memset(&server2_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(server2_ctx_data));
+ memset(&client_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(client_ctx_data));
+ memset(&server, 0, sizeof(server));
+ memset(&client, 0, sizeof(client));
- configure_handshake(server_ctx, client_ctx, test_ctx);
+ configure_handshake_ctx(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx, test_ctx, extra,
+ &server_ctx_data, &server2_ctx_data, &client_ctx_data);
- server = SSL_new(server_ctx);
- client = SSL_new(client_ctx);
- OPENSSL_assert(server != NULL && client != NULL);
+ /* Setup SSL and buffers; additional configuration happens below. */
+ create_peer(&server, server_ctx);
+ create_peer(&client, client_ctx);
+
+ server.bytes_to_write = client.bytes_to_read = test_ctx->app_data_size;
+ client.bytes_to_write = server.bytes_to_read = test_ctx->app_data_size;
+
+ configure_handshake_ssl(server.ssl, client.ssl, extra);
+ if (session_in != NULL) {
+ /* In case we're testing resumption without tickets. */
+ TEST_check(SSL_CTX_add_session(server_ctx, session_in));
+ TEST_check(SSL_set_session(client.ssl, session_in));
+ }
memset(&server_ex_data, 0, sizeof(server_ex_data));
memset(&client_ex_data, 0, sizeof(client_ex_data));
- memset(&ret, 0, sizeof(ret));
- ret.result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- client_to_server = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- server_to_client = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_assert(client_to_server != NULL && server_to_client != NULL);
+ if (test_ctx->use_sctp) {
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SCTP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
+ int csock, ssock;
+
+ if (create_sctp_socks(&ssock, &csock)) {
+ client_to_server = BIO_new_dgram_sctp(csock, BIO_CLOSE);
+ server_to_client = BIO_new_dgram_sctp(ssock, BIO_CLOSE);
+ }
+#endif
+ } else {
+ client_to_server = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ server_to_client = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ }
+
+ TEST_check(client_to_server != NULL);
+ TEST_check(server_to_client != NULL);
/* Non-blocking bio. */
BIO_set_nbio(client_to_server, 1);
BIO_set_nbio(server_to_client, 1);
- SSL_set_connect_state(client);
- SSL_set_accept_state(server);
+ SSL_set_connect_state(client.ssl);
+ SSL_set_accept_state(server.ssl);
/* The bios are now owned by the SSL object. */
- SSL_set_bio(client, server_to_client, client_to_server);
- OPENSSL_assert(BIO_up_ref(server_to_client) > 0);
- OPENSSL_assert(BIO_up_ref(client_to_server) > 0);
- SSL_set_bio(server, client_to_server, server_to_client);
+ if (test_ctx->use_sctp) {
+ SSL_set_bio(client.ssl, client_to_server, client_to_server);
+ SSL_set_bio(server.ssl, server_to_client, server_to_client);
+ } else {
+ SSL_set_bio(client.ssl, server_to_client, client_to_server);
+ TEST_check(BIO_up_ref(server_to_client) > 0);
+ TEST_check(BIO_up_ref(client_to_server) > 0);
+ SSL_set_bio(server.ssl, client_to_server, server_to_client);
+ }
ex_data_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "ex data", NULL, NULL, NULL);
- OPENSSL_assert(ex_data_idx >= 0);
+ TEST_check(ex_data_idx >= 0);
- OPENSSL_assert(SSL_set_ex_data(server, ex_data_idx,
- &server_ex_data) == 1);
- OPENSSL_assert(SSL_set_ex_data(client, ex_data_idx,
- &client_ex_data) == 1);
+ TEST_check(SSL_set_ex_data(server.ssl, ex_data_idx, &server_ex_data) == 1);
+ TEST_check(SSL_set_ex_data(client.ssl, ex_data_idx, &client_ex_data) == 1);
- SSL_set_info_callback(server, &info_callback);
- SSL_set_info_callback(client, &info_callback);
+ SSL_set_info_callback(server.ssl, &info_cb);
+ SSL_set_info_callback(client.ssl, &info_cb);
+
+ client.status = PEER_RETRY;
+ server.status = PEER_WAITING;
+
+ start = time(NULL);
/*
* Half-duplex handshake loop.
*/
for(;;) {
if (client_turn) {
- client_status = do_handshake_step(client);
- status = handshake_status(client_status, server_status,
+ do_connect_step(test_ctx, &client, phase);
+ status = handshake_status(client.status, server.status,
1 /* client went last */);
+ if (server.status == PEER_WAITING)
+ server.status = PEER_RETRY;
} else {
- server_status = do_handshake_step(server);
- status = handshake_status(server_status, client_status,
+ do_connect_step(test_ctx, &server, phase);
+ status = handshake_status(server.status, client.status,
0 /* server went last */);
}
switch (status) {
case HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS:
- ret.result = SSL_TEST_SUCCESS;
- goto err;
+ client_turn_count = 0;
+ phase = next_phase(test_ctx, phase);
+ if (phase == CONNECTION_DONE) {
+ ret->result = SSL_TEST_SUCCESS;
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ client.status = server.status = PEER_RETRY;
+ /*
+ * For now, client starts each phase. Since each phase is
+ * started separately, we can later control this more
+ * precisely, for example, to test client-initiated and
+ * server-initiated shutdown.
+ */
+ client_turn = 1;
+ break;
+ }
case CLIENT_ERROR:
- ret.result = SSL_TEST_CLIENT_FAIL;
+ ret->result = SSL_TEST_CLIENT_FAIL;
goto err;
case SERVER_ERROR:
- ret.result = SSL_TEST_SERVER_FAIL;
+ ret->result = SSL_TEST_SERVER_FAIL;
goto err;
case INTERNAL_ERROR:
- ret.result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
case HANDSHAKE_RETRY:
- /* Continue. */
- client_turn ^= 1;
+ if (test_ctx->use_sctp) {
+ if (time(NULL) - start > 3) {
+ /*
+ * We've waited for too long. Give up.
+ */
+ ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * With "real" sockets we only swap to processing the peer
+ * if they are expecting to retry. Otherwise we just retry the
+ * same endpoint again.
+ */
+ if ((client_turn && server.status == PEER_RETRY)
+ || (!client_turn && client.status == PEER_RETRY))
+ client_turn ^= 1;
+ } else {
+ if (client_turn_count++ >= 2000) {
+ /*
+ * At this point, there's been so many PEER_RETRY in a row
+ * that it's likely both sides are stuck waiting for a read.
+ * It's time to give up.
+ */
+ ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Continue. */
+ client_turn ^= 1;
+ }
break;
}
}
err:
- ret.server_alert_sent = server_ex_data.alert_sent;
- ret.server_alert_received = client_ex_data.alert_received;
- ret.client_alert_sent = client_ex_data.alert_sent;
- ret.client_alert_received = server_ex_data.alert_received;
- ret.server_protocol = SSL_version(server);
- ret.client_protocol = SSL_version(client);
-
- SSL_free(server);
- SSL_free(client);
+ ret->server_alert_sent = server_ex_data.alert_sent;
+ ret->server_num_fatal_alerts_sent = server_ex_data.num_fatal_alerts_sent;
+ ret->server_alert_received = client_ex_data.alert_received;
+ ret->client_alert_sent = client_ex_data.alert_sent;
+ ret->client_num_fatal_alerts_sent = client_ex_data.num_fatal_alerts_sent;
+ ret->client_alert_received = server_ex_data.alert_received;
+ ret->server_protocol = SSL_version(server.ssl);
+ ret->client_protocol = SSL_version(client.ssl);
+ ret->servername = server_ex_data.servername;
+ if ((sess = SSL_get0_session(client.ssl)) != NULL)
+ SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(sess, &tick, &tick_len);
+ if (tick == NULL || tick_len == 0)
+ ret->session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_NO;
+ else
+ ret->session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_YES;
+ ret->compression = (SSL_get_current_compression(client.ssl) == NULL)
+ ? SSL_TEST_COMPRESSION_NO
+ : SSL_TEST_COMPRESSION_YES;
+ ret->session_ticket_do_not_call = server_ex_data.session_ticket_do_not_call;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(client.ssl, &proto, &proto_len);
+ ret->client_npn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
+
+ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(server.ssl, &proto, &proto_len);
+ ret->server_npn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
+#endif
+
+ SSL_get0_alpn_selected(client.ssl, &proto, &proto_len);
+ ret->client_alpn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
+
+ SSL_get0_alpn_selected(server.ssl, &proto, &proto_len);
+ ret->server_alpn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
+
+ ret->client_resumed = SSL_session_reused(client.ssl);
+ ret->server_resumed = SSL_session_reused(server.ssl);
+
+ if (session_out != NULL)
+ *session_out = SSL_get1_session(client.ssl);
+
+ if (SSL_get_server_tmp_key(client.ssl, &tmp_key)) {
+ ret->tmp_key_type = pkey_type(tmp_key);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(tmp_key);
+ }
+
+ SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(client.ssl, &ret->server_sign_hash);
+ SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(server.ssl, &ret->client_sign_hash);
+
+ SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(client.ssl, &ret->server_sign_type);
+ SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(server.ssl, &ret->client_sign_type);
+
+ names = SSL_get0_peer_CA_list(client.ssl);
+ if (names == NULL)
+ ret->client_ca_names = NULL;
+ else
+ ret->client_ca_names = SSL_dup_CA_list(names);
+
+ names = SSL_get0_peer_CA_list(server.ssl);
+ if (names == NULL)
+ ret->server_ca_names = NULL;
+ else
+ ret->server_ca_names = SSL_dup_CA_list(names);
+
+ ret->server_cert_type = peer_pkey_type(client.ssl);
+ ret->client_cert_type = peer_pkey_type(server.ssl);
+
+ ctx_data_free_data(&server_ctx_data);
+ ctx_data_free_data(&server2_ctx_data);
+ ctx_data_free_data(&client_ctx_data);
+
+ peer_free_data(&server);
+ peer_free_data(&client);
return ret;
}
+
+HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
+ SSL_CTX *client_ctx, SSL_CTX *resume_server_ctx,
+ SSL_CTX *resume_client_ctx,
+ const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
+{
+ HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result;
+ SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
+
+ result = do_handshake_internal(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx,
+ test_ctx, &test_ctx->extra,
+ NULL, &session);
+ if (test_ctx->handshake_mode != SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (result->result != SSL_TEST_SUCCESS) {
+ result->result = SSL_TEST_FIRST_HANDSHAKE_FAILED;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(result);
+ /* We don't support SNI on second handshake yet, so server2_ctx is NULL. */
+ result = do_handshake_internal(resume_server_ctx, NULL, resume_client_ctx,
+ test_ctx, &test_ctx->resume_extra,
+ session, NULL);
+ end:
+ SSL_SESSION_free(session);
+ return result;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff