/*
- * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "ssl_local.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 246
+#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 249
/* Always filled with zeros */
static const unsigned char default_zeros[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
/*
- * Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and a |hash| of the
- * handshake messages, derive a new secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in
- * the location pointed to be |out|. The |hash| value may be NULL. Returns 1 on
- * success 0 on failure.
+ * Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and |data| of length
+ * |datalen| (e.g. typically a hash of the handshake messages), derive a new
+ * secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in the location pointed to be |out|.
+ * The |data| value may be zero length. Any errors will be treated as fatal if
+ * |fatal| is set. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
*/
int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal)
{
- const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "TLS 1.3, ";
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL);
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = { 0x74, 0x6C, 0x73, 0x31, 0x33, 0x20, 0x00 };
+#else
+ static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 ";
+#endif
+ EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_HKDF,
+ s->ctx->propq);
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[5], *p = params;
+ int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
+ const char *mdname = EVP_MD_name(md);
int ret;
size_t hkdflabellen;
size_t hashlen;
/*
- * 2 bytes for length of whole HkdfLabel + 1 byte for length of combined
- * prefix and label + bytes for the label itself + bytes for the hash
+ * 2 bytes for length of derived secret + 1 byte for length of combined
+ * prefix and label + bytes for the label itself + 1 byte length of hash
+ * + bytes for the hash itself
*/
- unsigned char hkdflabel[sizeof(uint16_t) + sizeof(uint8_t) +
- + sizeof(label_prefix) + TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN
- + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char hkdflabel[sizeof(uint16_t) + sizeof(uint8_t)
+ + (sizeof(label_prefix) - 1) + TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN
+ + 1 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
WPACKET pkt;
- if (pctx == NULL)
+ kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
+ EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
+ if (kctx == NULL)
return 0;
+ if (labellen > TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN) {
+ if (fatal) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Probably we have been called from SSL_export_keying_material(),
+ * or SSL_export_keying_material_early().
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
+ }
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt, hkdflabel, sizeof(hkdflabel), 0)
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, label_prefix, sizeof(label_prefix) - 1)
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, label, labellen)
|| !WPACKET_close(&pkt)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&pkt, hash, (hash == NULL) ? 0 : hashlen)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&pkt, data, (data == NULL) ? 0 : datalen)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &hkdflabellen)
|| !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
+ if (fatal)
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_hkdf_mode(pctx, EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY)
- <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx, md) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(pctx, secret, hashlen) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(pctx, hkdflabel, hkdflabellen) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &outlen) <= 0;
-
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
+ (char *)mdname, 0);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
+ (unsigned char *)secret, hashlen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO,
+ hkdflabel, hkdflabellen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ ret = EVP_KDF_CTX_set_params(kctx, params) <= 0
+ || EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, outlen) <= 0;
+
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ if (fatal)
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
return ret == 0;
}
* Given a |secret| generate a |key| of length |keylen| bytes. Returns 1 on
* success 0 on failure.
*/
-int tls13_derive_key(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen)
+int tls13_derive_key(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
- static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "key";
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ static const unsigned char keylabel[] ={ 0x6B, 0x65, 0x79, 0x00 };
+#else
+ static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "key";
+#endif
- return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret, keylabel,
- sizeof(keylabel) - 1, NULL, key, keylen);
+ return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1,
+ NULL, 0, key, keylen, 1);
}
/*
* Given a |secret| generate an |iv| of length |ivlen| bytes. Returns 1 on
* success 0 on failure.
*/
-int tls13_derive_iv(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, unsigned char *iv,
- size_t ivlen)
+int tls13_derive_iv(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
+ unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen)
{
- static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "iv";
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = { 0x69, 0x76, 0x00 };
+#else
+ static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "iv";
+#endif
- return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret, ivlabel,
- sizeof(ivlabel) - 1, NULL, iv, ivlen);
+ return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1,
+ NULL, 0, iv, ivlen, 1);
}
int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
const unsigned char *secret,
unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen)
{
- static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "finished";
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = { 0x66, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x69, 0x73, 0x68, 0x65, 0x64, 0x00 };
+#else
+ static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "finished";
+#endif
return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, finishedlabel,
- sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, fin, finlen);
+ sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, fin, finlen, 1);
}
/*
unsigned char *outsecret)
{
size_t mdlen, prevsecretlen;
+ int mdleni;
int ret;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL);
-
- if (pctx == NULL)
+ EVP_KDF *kdf;
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[5], *p = params;
+ int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
+ const char *mdname = EVP_MD_name(md);
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ static const char derived_secret_label[] = { 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x64, 0x00 };
+#else
+ static const char derived_secret_label[] = "derived";
+#endif
+ unsigned char preextractsec[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+ kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_HKDF, s->ctx->propq);
+ kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
+ EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
+ if (kctx == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
+ }
- mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ mdleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
+ if (!ossl_assert(mdleni >= 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ mdlen = (size_t)mdleni;
if (insecret == NULL) {
insecret = default_zeros;
prevsecret = default_zeros;
prevsecretlen = 0;
} else {
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+ /* The pre-extract derive step uses a hash of no messages */
+ if (mctx == NULL
+ || EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+
+ /* Generate the pre-extract secret */
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, prevsecret,
+ (unsigned char *)derived_secret_label,
+ sizeof(derived_secret_label) - 1, hash, mdlen,
+ preextractsec, mdlen, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ prevsecret = preextractsec;
prevsecretlen = mdlen;
}
- ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_hkdf_mode(pctx, EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY)
- <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx, md) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(pctx, insecret, insecretlen) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt(pctx, prevsecret, prevsecretlen)
- <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, outsecret, &mdlen)
- <= 0;
-
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
+ (char *)mdname, 0);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
+ (unsigned char *)insecret,
+ insecretlen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT,
+ (unsigned char *)prevsecret,
+ prevsecretlen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ ret = EVP_KDF_CTX_set_params(kctx, params) <= 0
+ || EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, outsecret, mdlen) <= 0;
+
+ if (ret != 0)
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+ if (prevsecret == preextractsec)
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(preextractsec, mdlen);
return ret == 0;
}
int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL *s, const unsigned char *insecret,
size_t insecretlen)
{
+ /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
return tls13_generate_secret(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), s->early_secret,
insecret, insecretlen,
(unsigned char *)&s->handshake_secret);
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
*secret_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
return tls13_generate_secret(s, md, prev, NULL, 0, out);
}
size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
unsigned char *out)
{
- const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+ const char *mdname = EVP_MD_name(ssl_handshake_md(s));
+ EVP_MAC *hmac = EVP_MAC_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "HMAC", s->ctx->propq);
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char finsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t hashlen, ret = 0;
- EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
- EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[4], *p = params;
- if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen))
+ if (hmac == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_FINAL_FINISH_MAC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
+ }
- if (str == s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label)
- key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
- s->server_finished_secret, hashlen);
- else
- key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
- s->client_finished_secret, hashlen);
-
- if (key == NULL
- || ctx == NULL
- || EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, md, NULL, key) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, hash, hashlen) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, out, &hashlen) <= 0)
+ /* Safe to cast away const here since we're not "getting" any data */
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ALG_PARAM_DIGEST,
+ (char *)mdname, 0);
+ if (s->ctx->propq != NULL)
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES,
+ (char *)s->ctx->propq,
+ 0);
+
+ if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (str == s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label) {
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
+ s->server_finished_secret,
+ hashlen);
+ } else if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
+ s->client_finished_secret,
+ hashlen);
+ } else {
+ if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s),
+ s->client_app_traffic_secret,
+ finsecret, hashlen))
+ goto err;
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, finsecret,
+ hashlen);
+ }
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(hmac);
+ if (ctx == NULL
+ || !EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
+ || !EVP_MAC_init(ctx)
+ || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, hash, hashlen)
+ /* outsize as per sizeof(peer_finish_md) */
+ || !EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, &hashlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_FINAL_FINISH_MAC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
ret = hashlen;
err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(key);
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(finsecret, sizeof(finsecret));
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free(hmac);
return ret;
}
{
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *hash;
- int mac_type = NID_undef;
- s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
- if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp
- (s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+ s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->ctx, s->session, &c, &hash, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
+ SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
return 0;
}
- s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
- s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
+ ssl_evp_cipher_free(s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc);
+ s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
+ ssl_evp_md_free(s->s3.tmp.new_hash);
+ s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash;
return 1;
}
-static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL *s, int send,
+static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL *s, int sending, const EVP_MD *md,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
const unsigned char *insecret,
const unsigned char *hash,
const unsigned char *label,
{
unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
size_t ivlen, keylen, taglen;
- const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
- size_t hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
- const EVP_CIPHER *ciph = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
+ int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ size_t hashlen;
+
+ /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
+ if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV,
+ ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
- if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret, label, labellen, hash, secret,
- hashlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret, label, labellen, hash, hashlen,
+ secret, hashlen, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/* TODO(size_t): convert me */
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(ciph);
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+ uint32_t algenc;
+
ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN;
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc
- & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
+ /* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */
+ algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
+ } else {
+ algenc = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
+ }
+ if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
else
taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
taglen = 0;
}
- if (!tls13_derive_key(s, secret, key, keylen)
- || !tls13_derive_iv(s, secret, iv, ivlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!tls13_derive_key(s, md, secret, key, keylen)
+ || !tls13_derive_iv(s, md, secret, iv, ivlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
- if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, send) <= 0
+ if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, sending) <= 0
|| !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL)
|| (taglen != 0 && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
taglen, NULL))
|| EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV,
+ ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
- if (s->msg_callback) {
- int wh = send ? TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE : 0;
-
- if (ciph->key_len)
- s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY,
- key, ciph->key_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV;
- s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh, iv, ivlen, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
- }
-#endif
-
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
{
- static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] =
- "client handshake traffic secret";
- static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] =
- "client application traffic secret";
- static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] =
- "server handshake traffic secret";
- static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] =
- "server application traffic secret";
- static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] =
- "resumption master secret";
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x65, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
+ static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x68, 0x73, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
+ static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
+ static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = {0x73, 0x20, 0x68, 0x73, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
+ static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = {0x73, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
+ static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
+ static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = {0x72, 0x65, 0x73, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
+ static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = {0x65, 0x20, 0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
+#else
+ static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = "c e traffic";
+ static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = "c hs traffic";
+ static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = "c ap traffic";
+ static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = "s hs traffic";
+ static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = "s ap traffic";
+ static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = "exp master";
+ static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = "res master";
+ static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = "e exp master";
+#endif
unsigned char *iv;
unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
const unsigned char *label;
size_t labellen, hashlen = 0;
int ret = 0;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
} else {
s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
} else {
+ s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_write_ctx);
} else {
s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (((which & SSL3_CC_CLIENT) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
|| ((which & SSL3_CC_SERVER) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
- if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
+ if (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
+ long handlen;
+ void *hdata;
+ unsigned int hashlenui;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
+
+ insecret = s->early_secret;
+ label = client_early_traffic;
+ labellen = sizeof(client_early_traffic) - 1;
+ log_label = CLIENT_EARLY_LABEL;
+
+ handlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+ if (handlen <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
+ && s->max_early_data > 0
+ && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
+ /*
+ * If we are attempting to send early data, and we've decided to
+ * actually do it but max_early_data in s->session is 0 then we
+ * must be using an external PSK.
+ */
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
+ && s->max_early_data ==
+ s->psksession->ext.max_early_data)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
+ }
+ if (sslcipher == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from
+ * the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't
+ * use ssl_handshake_md().
+ */
+ mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (mdctx == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This ups the ref count on cipher so we better make sure we free
+ * it again
+ */
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(s->ctx, sslcipher, &cipher)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ SSL_R_ALGORITHM_FETCH_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ md = ssl_md(s->ctx, sslcipher->algorithm2);
+ if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, hdata, handlen)
+ || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, hashval, &hashlenui)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ hashlen = hashlenui;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
+
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret,
+ early_exporter_master_secret,
+ sizeof(early_exporter_master_secret) - 1,
+ hashval, hashlen,
+ s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen,
+ 1)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL,
+ s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
insecret = s->handshake_secret;
finsecret = s->client_finished_secret;
finsecretlen = EVP_MD_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
label = client_handshake_traffic;
labellen = sizeof(client_handshake_traffic) - 1;
log_label = CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
+ /*
+ * The handshake hash used for the server read/client write handshake
+ * traffic secret is the same as the hash for the server
+ * write/client read handshake traffic secret. However, if we
+ * processed early data then we delay changing the server
+ * read/client write cipher state until later, and the handshake
+ * hashes have moved on. Therefore we use the value saved earlier
+ * when we did the server write/client read change cipher state.
+ */
+ hash = s->handshake_traffic_hash;
} else {
insecret = s->master_secret;
label = client_application_traffic;
hash = s->server_finished_hash;
}
} else {
+ /* Early data never applies to client-read/server-write */
if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
insecret = s->handshake_secret;
finsecret = s->server_finished_secret;
}
}
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
- || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ if (!(which & SSL3_CC_EARLY)) {
+ md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+ cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc;
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
+ || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */;
+ goto err;
+ }
}
/*
if (label == server_application_traffic)
memcpy(s->server_finished_hash, hashval, hashlen);
+ if (label == server_handshake_traffic)
+ memcpy(s->handshake_traffic_hash, hashval, hashlen);
+
if (label == client_application_traffic) {
/*
* We also create the resumption master secret, but this time use the
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
resumption_master_secret,
sizeof(resumption_master_secret) - 1,
- hashval, s->session->master_key, hashlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ hashval, hashlen, s->resumption_master_secret,
+ hashlen, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
- s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
}
- if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, insecret, hash,
- label, labellen, secret, iv, ciph_ctx)) {
+ if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, md, cipher,
+ insecret, hash, label, labellen, secret, iv,
+ ciph_ctx)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
- if (label == server_application_traffic)
+ if (label == server_application_traffic) {
memcpy(s->server_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
- else if (label == client_application_traffic)
+ /* Now we create the exporter master secret */
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
+ exporter_master_secret,
+ sizeof(exporter_master_secret) - 1,
+ hash, hashlen, s->exporter_master_secret,
+ hashlen, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->exporter_master_secret,
+ hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (label == client_application_traffic)
memcpy(s->client_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (finsecret != NULL
&& !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret,
finsecret, finsecretlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
+ if (!s->server && label == client_early_traffic)
+ s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS;
+ else
+ s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
ret = 1;
err:
+ if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0) {
+ /* We up-refed this so now we need to down ref */
+ ssl_evp_cipher_free(cipher);
+ }
OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
return ret;
}
-int tls13_update_key(SSL *s, int send)
+int tls13_update_key(SSL *s, int sending)
{
- static const unsigned char application_traffic[] =
- "application traffic secret";
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = { 0x74, 0x72 ,0x61 ,0x66 ,0x66 ,0x69 ,0x63 ,0x20 ,0x75 ,0x70 ,0x64, 0x00};
+#else
+ static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = "traffic upd";
+#endif
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
size_t hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
unsigned char *insecret, *iv;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
int ret = 0;
- if (s->server == send)
+ if (s->server == sending)
insecret = s->server_app_traffic_secret;
else
insecret = s->client_app_traffic_secret;
- if (send) {
+ if (sending) {
+ s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
iv = s->write_iv;
ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
}
- if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, send, insecret, NULL, application_traffic,
+ if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, sending, ssl_handshake_md(s),
+ s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, insecret, NULL,
+ application_traffic,
sizeof(application_traffic) - 1, secret, iv,
- ciph_ctx))
+ ciph_ctx)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
+ }
memcpy(insecret, secret, hashlen);
+ s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
int tls13_alert_code(int code)
{
- if (code == SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION || code == SSL_AD_END_OF_EARLY_DATA)
+ /* There are 2 additional alerts in TLSv1.3 compared to TLSv1.2 */
+ if (code == SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION || code == SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED)
return code;
return tls1_alert_code(code);
}
+
+int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+ const char *label, size_t llen,
+ const unsigned char *context,
+ size_t contextlen, int use_context)
+{
+ unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
+#else
+ static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "exporter";
+#endif
+ unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_allowed(s))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!use_context)
+ contextlen = 0;
+
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
+ || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->exporter_master_secret,
+ (const unsigned char *)label, llen,
+ data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
+ || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
+ sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
+ out, olen, 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+ const char *label, size_t llen,
+ const unsigned char *context,
+ size_t contextlen)
+{
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
+#else
+ static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "exporter";
+#endif
+ unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
+ int ret = 0;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_early_allowed(s))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!s->server && s->max_early_data > 0
+ && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0)
+ sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
+ else
+ sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
+
+ md = ssl_md(s->ctx, sslcipher->algorithm2);
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate the hash value and store it in |data|. The reason why
+ * the empty string is used is that the definition of TLS-Exporter
+ * is like so:
+ *
+ * TLS-Exporter(label, context_value, key_length) =
+ * HKDF-Expand-Label(Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""),
+ * "exporter", Hash(context_value), key_length)
+ *
+ * Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) =
+ * HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label,
+ * Transcript-Hash(Messages), Hash.length)
+ *
+ * Here Transcript-Hash is the cipher suite hash algorithm.
+ */
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
+ || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_exporter_master_secret,
+ (const unsigned char *)label, llen,
+ data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
+ || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
+ sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
+ out, olen, 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff