/*
- * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "ssl_local.h"
+#include "internal/ktls.h"
+#include "record/record_local.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 246
+#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 249
-/* Always filled with zeros */
-static const unsigned char default_zeros[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+/* ASCII: "tls13 ", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "\x74\x6C\x73\x31\x33\x20";
/*
- * Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and a |hash| of the
- * handshake messages, derive a new secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in
- * the location pointed to be |out|. The |hash| value may be NULL. Returns 1 on
- * success 0 on failure.
+ * Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and |data| of length
+ * |datalen| (e.g. typically a hash of the handshake messages), derive a new
+ * secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in the location pointed to be |out|.
+ * The |data| value may be zero length. Any errors will be treated as fatal if
+ * |fatal| is set. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
+ * If |raise_error| is set, ERR_raise is called on failure.
*/
-int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
- const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
- const unsigned char *hash,
- unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+int tls13_hkdf_expand_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq,
+ const EVP_MD *md,
+ const unsigned char *secret,
+ const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int raise_error)
{
- const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "TLS 1.3, ";
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL);
+ EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, propq);
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params;
+ int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
+ const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
int ret;
- size_t hkdflabellen;
size_t hashlen;
- /*
- * 2 bytes for length of whole HkdfLabel + 1 byte for length of combined
- * prefix and label + bytes for the label itself + bytes for the hash
- */
- unsigned char hkdflabel[sizeof(uint16_t) + sizeof(uint8_t) +
- + sizeof(label_prefix) + TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN
- + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- WPACKET pkt;
- if (pctx == NULL)
+ kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
+ EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
+ if (kctx == NULL)
return 0;
- hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
-
- if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt, hkdflabel, sizeof(hkdflabel), 0)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&pkt, outlen)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(&pkt)
- || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, label_prefix, sizeof(label_prefix) - 1)
- || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, label, labellen)
- || !WPACKET_close(&pkt)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&pkt, hash, (hash == NULL) ? 0 : hashlen)
- || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &hkdflabellen)
- || !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
- WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
+ if (labellen > TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN) {
+ if (raise_error)
+ /*
+ * Probably we have been called from SSL_export_keying_material(),
+ * or SSL_export_keying_material_early().
+ */
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
+
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
return 0;
}
- ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_hkdf_mode(pctx, EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY)
- <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx, md) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(pctx, secret, hashlen) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(pctx, hkdflabel, hkdflabellen) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &outlen) <= 0;
-
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ if ((ret = EVP_MD_get_size(md)) <= 0) {
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+ if (raise_error)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ hashlen = (size_t)ret;
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
+ (char *)mdname, 0);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
+ (unsigned char *)secret, hashlen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PREFIX,
+ (unsigned char *)label_prefix,
+ sizeof(label_prefix) - 1);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_LABEL,
+ (unsigned char *)label, labellen);
+ if (data != NULL)
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DATA,
+ (unsigned char *)data,
+ datalen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ ret = EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, outlen, params) <= 0;
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ if (raise_error)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
return ret == 0;
}
+int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+ const unsigned char *secret,
+ const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal)
+{
+ int ret;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+
+ ret = tls13_hkdf_expand_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, md,
+ secret, label, labellen, data, datalen,
+ out, outlen, !fatal);
+ if (ret == 0 && fatal)
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Given a |secret| generate a |key| of length |keylen| bytes. Returns 1 on
* success 0 on failure.
*/
-int tls13_derive_key(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen)
+int tls13_derive_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+ const unsigned char *secret,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
- static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "key";
+ /* ASCII: "key", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "\x6B\x65\x79";
- return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret, keylabel,
- sizeof(keylabel) - 1, NULL, key, keylen);
+ return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1,
+ NULL, 0, key, keylen, 1);
}
/*
* Given a |secret| generate an |iv| of length |ivlen| bytes. Returns 1 on
* success 0 on failure.
*/
-int tls13_derive_iv(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, unsigned char *iv,
- size_t ivlen)
+int tls13_derive_iv(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+ const unsigned char *secret,
+ unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen)
{
- static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "iv";
+ /* ASCII: "iv", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "\x69\x76";
- return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret, ivlabel,
- sizeof(ivlabel) - 1, NULL, iv, ivlen);
+ return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1,
+ NULL, 0, iv, ivlen, 1);
}
-int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
const unsigned char *secret,
unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen)
{
- static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "finished";
+ /* ASCII: "finished", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "\x66\x69\x6E\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64";
return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, finishedlabel,
- sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, fin, finlen);
+ sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, fin, finlen, 1);
}
/*
* length |insecretlen|, generate a new secret and store it in the location
* pointed to by |outsecret|. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
*/
-int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+int tls13_generate_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
const unsigned char *prevsecret,
const unsigned char *insecret,
size_t insecretlen,
unsigned char *outsecret)
{
- size_t mdlen, prevsecretlen;
+ size_t mdlen;
+ int mdleni;
int ret;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL);
-
- if (pctx == NULL)
+ EVP_KDF *kdf;
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params;
+ int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
+ const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
+ /* ASCII: "derived", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const char derived_secret_label[] = "\x64\x65\x72\x69\x76\x65\x64";
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+
+ kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(sctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, sctx->propq);
+ kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
+ EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
+ if (kctx == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
-
- mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
-
- if (insecret == NULL) {
- insecret = default_zeros;
- insecretlen = mdlen;
- }
- if (prevsecret == NULL) {
- prevsecret = default_zeros;
- prevsecretlen = 0;
- } else {
- prevsecretlen = mdlen;
}
- ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_hkdf_mode(pctx, EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY)
- <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx, md) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(pctx, insecret, insecretlen) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt(pctx, prevsecret, prevsecretlen)
- <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, outsecret, &mdlen)
- <= 0;
-
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ mdleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
+ /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
+ if (!ossl_assert(mdleni >= 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ mdlen = (size_t)mdleni;
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
+ (char *)mdname, 0);
+ if (insecret != NULL)
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
+ (unsigned char *)insecret,
+ insecretlen);
+ if (prevsecret != NULL)
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT,
+ (unsigned char *)prevsecret, mdlen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PREFIX,
+ (unsigned char *)label_prefix,
+ sizeof(label_prefix) - 1);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_LABEL,
+ (unsigned char *)derived_secret_label,
+ sizeof(derived_secret_label) - 1);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ ret = EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, outsecret, mdlen, params) <= 0;
+
+ if (ret != 0)
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
return ret == 0;
}
* handshake secret. This requires the early secret to already have been
* generated. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
*/
-int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL *s, const unsigned char *insecret,
- size_t insecretlen)
+int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ const unsigned char *insecret,
+ size_t insecretlen)
{
+ /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
return tls13_generate_secret(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), s->early_secret,
insecret, insecretlen,
(unsigned char *)&s->handshake_secret);
* secret and store its length in |*secret_size|. Returns 1 on success 0 on
* failure.
*/
-int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
+int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *out,
unsigned char *prev, size_t prevlen,
size_t *secret_size)
{
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+ int md_size;
- *secret_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
+ if (md_size <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *secret_size = (size_t)md_size;
+ /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
return tls13_generate_secret(s, md, prev, NULL, 0, out);
}
* Generates the mac for the Finished message. Returns the length of the MAC or
* 0 on error.
*/
-size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
+size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
unsigned char *out)
{
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+ const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- size_t hashlen, ret = 0;
- EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
- EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ unsigned char finsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *key = NULL;
+ size_t len = 0, hashlen;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+
+ if (md == NULL)
+ return 0;
- if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen))
+ /* Safe to cast away const here since we're not "getting" any data */
+ if (sctx->propq != NULL)
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES,
+ (char *)sctx->propq,
+ 0);
+ *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
+ }
- if (str == s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label)
- key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
- s->server_finished_secret, hashlen);
- else
- key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
- s->client_finished_secret, hashlen);
-
- if (key == NULL
- || ctx == NULL
- || EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, md, NULL, key) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, hash, hashlen) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, out, &hashlen) <= 0)
+ if (str == SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label) {
+ key = s->server_finished_secret;
+ } else if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
+ key = s->client_finished_secret;
+ } else {
+ if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, md,
+ s->client_app_traffic_secret,
+ finsecret, hashlen))
+ goto err;
+ key = finsecret;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_Q_mac(sctx->libctx, "HMAC", sctx->propq, mdname,
+ params, key, hashlen, hash, hashlen,
+ /* outsize as per sizeof(peer_finish_md) */
+ out, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2, &len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
+ }
- ret = hashlen;
err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(key);
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
- return ret;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(finsecret, sizeof(finsecret));
+ return len;
}
/*
* There isn't really a key block in TLSv1.3, but we still need this function
* for initialising the cipher and hash. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
*/
-int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
+int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *hash;
- int mac_type = NID_undef;
- s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
- if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp
- (s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+ s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), s->session, &c, &hash,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
+ /* Error is already recorded */
+ SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
- s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
+ ssl_evp_cipher_free(s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc);
+ s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
+ ssl_evp_md_free(s->s3.tmp.new_hash);
+ s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash;
return 1;
}
-int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+ const unsigned char *insecret,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ const unsigned char *label,
+ size_t labellen, unsigned char *secret,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen,
+ unsigned char *iv, size_t *ivlen,
+ size_t *taglen)
{
- static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] =
- "client handshake traffic secret";
- static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] =
- "client application traffic secret";
- static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] =
- "server handshake traffic secret";
- static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] =
- "server application traffic secret";
- static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] =
- "resumption master secret";
+ int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
+ size_t hashlen;
+ int mode;
+
+ /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
+ if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
+
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret, label, labellen, hash, hashlen,
+ secret, hashlen, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *keylen = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(ciph);
+
+ mode = EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph);
+ if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+ uint32_t algenc;
+
+ *ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN;
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
+ algenc = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
+ } else if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
+ /* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */
+ algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
+ } else if (s->psksession != NULL && s->psksession->cipher != NULL) {
+ /* We must be doing early data with out-of-band PSK */
+ algenc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc;
+ } else {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
+ *taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ else
+ *taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ } else {
+ int iivlen;
+
+ if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
+ *taglen = EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ } else {
+ /* CHACHA20P-POLY1305 */
+ *taglen = EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ }
+ iivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(ciph);
+ if (iivlen < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *ivlen = iivlen;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls13_derive_key(s, md, secret, key, *keylen)
+ || !tls13_derive_iv(s, md, secret, iv, *ivlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int which)
+{
+ /* ASCII: "c e traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x65\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
+ /* ASCII: "c hs traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x68\x73\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
+ /* ASCII: "c ap traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x61\x70\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
+ /* ASCII: "s hs traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = "\x73\x20\x68\x73\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
+ /* ASCII: "s ap traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = "\x73\x20\x61\x70\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
+ /* ASCII: "exp master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72";
+ /* ASCII: "res master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = "\x72\x65\x73\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72";
+ /* ASCII: "e exp master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = "\x65\x20\x65\x78\x70\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72";
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char *iv;
unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *hash = hashval;
unsigned char *insecret;
unsigned char *finsecret = NULL;
const char *log_label = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *ciph = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
- size_t ivlen, keylen, taglen, finsecretlen = 0;
+ int finsecretlen = 0;
const unsigned char *label;
size_t labellen, hashlen = 0;
int ret = 0;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+ size_t keylen, ivlen, taglen;
+ int level;
+ int direction = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0 ? OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
+ : OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE;
- if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
- if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
- } else {
- s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
- if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (((which & SSL3_CC_CLIENT) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
+ || ((which & SSL3_CC_SERVER) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
+ if (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
+ long handlen;
+ void *hdata;
+ unsigned int hashlenui;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
+
+ insecret = s->early_secret;
+ label = client_early_traffic;
+ labellen = sizeof(client_early_traffic) - 1;
+ log_label = CLIENT_EARLY_LABEL;
+
+ handlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+ if (handlen <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
- }
- ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
- iv = s->read_iv;
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
- } else {
- if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_write_ctx);
- } else {
- s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
- if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
+ && s->max_early_data > 0
+ && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
+ /*
+ * If we are attempting to send early data, and we've decided to
+ * actually do it but max_early_data in s->session is 0 then we
+ * must be using an external PSK.
+ */
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
+ && s->max_early_data ==
+ s->psksession->ext.max_early_data)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
+ }
+ if (sslcipher == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
goto err;
}
- }
- ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
- iv = s->write_iv;
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
- }
+ /*
+ * We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from
+ * the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't
+ * use ssl_handshake_md().
+ */
+ mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (mdctx == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
- if (((which & SSL3_CC_CLIENT) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
- || ((which & SSL3_CC_SERVER) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
- if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
+ /*
+ * This ups the ref count on cipher so we better make sure we free
+ * it again
+ */
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(sctx, sslcipher, &cipher)) {
+ /* Error is already recorded */
+ SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ md = ssl_md(sctx, sslcipher->algorithm2);
+ if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, hdata, handlen)
+ || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, hashval, &hashlenui)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ hashlen = hashlenui;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
+
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret,
+ early_exporter_master_secret,
+ sizeof(early_exporter_master_secret) - 1,
+ hashval, hashlen,
+ s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen,
+ 1)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL,
+ s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
insecret = s->handshake_secret;
finsecret = s->client_finished_secret;
- finsecretlen = EVP_MD_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
+ finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
+ if (finsecretlen <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
label = client_handshake_traffic;
labellen = sizeof(client_handshake_traffic) - 1;
log_label = CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
+ /*
+ * The handshake hash used for the server read/client write handshake
+ * traffic secret is the same as the hash for the server
+ * write/client read handshake traffic secret. However, if we
+ * processed early data then we delay changing the server
+ * read/client write cipher state until later, and the handshake
+ * hashes have moved on. Therefore we use the value saved earlier
+ * when we did the server write/client read change cipher state.
+ */
+ hash = s->handshake_traffic_hash;
} else {
insecret = s->master_secret;
label = client_application_traffic;
hash = s->server_finished_hash;
}
} else {
+ /* Early data never applies to client-read/server-write */
if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
insecret = s->handshake_secret;
finsecret = s->server_finished_secret;
- finsecretlen = EVP_MD_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
+ finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
+ if (finsecretlen <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
label = server_handshake_traffic;
labellen = sizeof(server_handshake_traffic) - 1;
log_label = SERVER_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
}
}
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
- || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ if (!(which & SSL3_CC_EARLY)) {
+ md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+ cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc;
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
+ || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */;
+ goto err;
+ }
}
/*
if (label == server_application_traffic)
memcpy(s->server_finished_hash, hashval, hashlen);
- if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret, label, labellen,
- hash, secret, hashlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
+ if (label == server_handshake_traffic)
+ memcpy(s->handshake_traffic_hash, hashval, hashlen);
if (label == client_application_traffic) {
/*
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
resumption_master_secret,
sizeof(resumption_master_secret) - 1,
- hashval, s->session->master_key, hashlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ hashval, hashlen, s->resumption_master_secret,
+ hashlen, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
- s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
}
- /* TODO(size_t): convert me */
- keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(ciph);
- if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
- ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN;
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc
- & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
- taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
- else
- taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
- } else {
- ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(ciph);
- taglen = 0;
+ /* check whether cipher is known */
+ if (!ossl_assert(cipher != NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, md, cipher,
+ insecret, hash, label, labellen, secret, key,
+ &keylen, iv, &ivlen, &taglen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
}
+ if (label == server_application_traffic) {
+ memcpy(s->server_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
+ /* Now we create the exporter master secret */
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
+ exporter_master_secret,
+ sizeof(exporter_master_secret) - 1,
+ hash, hashlen, s->exporter_master_secret,
+ hashlen, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->exporter_master_secret,
+ hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (label == client_application_traffic)
+ memcpy(s->client_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
+
if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
- if (!tls13_derive_key(s, secret, key, keylen)
- || !tls13_derive_iv(s, secret, iv, ivlen)
- || (finsecret != NULL && !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s,
- ssl_handshake_md(s),
- secret,
- finsecret,
- finsecretlen))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (finsecret != NULL
+ && !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret,
+ finsecret, (size_t)finsecretlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
- if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL,
- (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) <= 0
- || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL)
- || (taglen != 0 && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
- taglen, NULL))
- || EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ if ((which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) != 0) {
+ if (!s->server && label == client_early_traffic)
+ s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.wrl, 1);
+ else
+ s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.wrl, 0);
+ }
+
+ level = (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0
+ ? OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
+ : ((which &SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) != 0
+ ? OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE
+ : OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION);
+
+ if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version,
+ direction,
+ level, secret, hashlen, key, keylen, iv,
+ ivlen, NULL, 0, cipher, taglen, NID_undef,
+ NULL, NULL, md)) {
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
goto err;
}
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
- if (s->msg_callback) {
- int wh = which & SSL3_CC_WRITE ? TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE : 0;
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0) {
+ /* We up-refed this so now we need to down ref */
+ ssl_evp_cipher_free(cipher);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int tls13_update_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int sending)
+{
+ /* ASCII: "traffic upd", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = "\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63\x20\x75\x70\x64";
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+ size_t hashlen;
+ unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *insecret;
+ unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ char *log_label;
+ size_t keylen, ivlen, taglen;
+ int ret = 0, l;
+ int direction = sending ? OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
+ : OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+
+ if ((l = EVP_MD_get_size(md)) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ hashlen = (size_t)l;
+
+ if (s->server == sending)
+ insecret = s->server_app_traffic_secret;
+ else
+ insecret = s->client_app_traffic_secret;
+
+ if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, md,
+ s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, insecret, NULL,
+ application_traffic,
+ sizeof(application_traffic) - 1, secret, key,
+ &keylen, iv, &ivlen, &taglen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
- if (ciph->key_len)
- s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY,
- key, ciph->key_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ memcpy(insecret, secret, hashlen);
- wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV;
- s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh, iv, ivlen, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
+ if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version,
+ direction,
+ OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION,
+ insecret, hashlen, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, NULL, 0,
+ s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, taglen, NID_undef, NULL,
+ NULL, md)) {
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
+ goto err;
}
-#endif
+ /* Call Key log on successful traffic secret update */
+ log_label = s->server == sending ? SERVER_APPLICATION_N_LABEL : CLIENT_APPLICATION_N_LABEL;
+ if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
ret = 1;
err:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
return ret;
}
int tls13_alert_code(int code)
{
- if (code == SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION)
+ /* There are 2 additional alerts in TLSv1.3 compared to TLSv1.2 */
+ if (code == SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION || code == SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED)
return code;
return tls1_alert_code(code);
}
+
+int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+ const char *label, size_t llen,
+ const unsigned char *context,
+ size_t contextlen, int use_context)
+{
+ unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ /* ASCII: "exporter", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x6F\x72\x74\x65\x72";
+ unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || md == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_allowed(s))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!use_context)
+ contextlen = 0;
+
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
+ || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->exporter_master_secret,
+ (const unsigned char *)label, llen,
+ data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
+ || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
+ sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
+ out, olen, 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+ const char *label, size_t llen,
+ const unsigned char *context,
+ size_t contextlen)
+{
+ /* ASCII: "exporter", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x6F\x72\x74\x65\x72";
+ unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
+ int ret = 0;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_early_allowed(s))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!s->server && s->max_early_data > 0
+ && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0)
+ sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
+ else
+ sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
+
+ md = ssl_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), sslcipher->algorithm2);
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate the hash value and store it in |data|. The reason why
+ * the empty string is used is that the definition of TLS-Exporter
+ * is like so:
+ *
+ * TLS-Exporter(label, context_value, key_length) =
+ * HKDF-Expand-Label(Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""),
+ * "exporter", Hash(context_value), key_length)
+ *
+ * Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) =
+ * HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label,
+ * Transcript-Hash(Messages), Hash.length)
+ *
+ * Here Transcript-Hash is the cipher suite hash algorithm.
+ */
+ if (md == NULL
+ || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
+ || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_exporter_master_secret,
+ (const unsigned char *)label, llen,
+ data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
+ || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
+ sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
+ out, olen, 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff