/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+/* We need access to the deprecated low level HMAC APIs */
+#define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
+
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "internal/nelem.h"
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "internal/evp.h"
+#include "ssl_local.h"
#include <openssl/ct.h>
+static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
+
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
tls1_enc,
tls1_mac,
return 0;
if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
- s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
+ s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
else
s->version = s->method->version;
return 1;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-
/*
- * Table of curve information.
- * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
- * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
+ * Table of group information.
*/
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
- {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
- {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
- {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
- {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
- {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
- {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
- {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
- {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
- {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
- {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
- {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
- {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
- {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
- {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
- {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
- {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
- {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
- {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
- {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
- {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
- {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
- {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
- {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
- {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
- {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
- {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
- {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
- {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
- {EVP_PKEY_X448, 224, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X448 (30) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0001}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0002}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0003}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+ {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0004}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0005}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
+ {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0006}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0007}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
+ {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0008}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0009}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000A}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
+ {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000B}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000C}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+ {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000D}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
+ {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000E}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x000F}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0010}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0011}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
+ {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0012}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0013}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
+ {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0014}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0015}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+ {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0016}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0017}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0018}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0019}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001A}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
+ {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001B}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
+ {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001C}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+ {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001D}, /* X25519 (29) */
+ {EVP_PKEY_X448, 224, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001E}, /* X448 (30) */
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ /* Security bit values for FFDHE groups are updated as per RFC 7919 */
+ {NID_ffdhe2048, 103, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0100}, /* ffdhe2048 (0x0100) */
+ {NID_ffdhe3072, 125, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0101}, /* ffdhe3072 (0x0101) */
+ {NID_ffdhe4096, 150, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0102}, /* ffdhe4096 (0x0102) */
+ {NID_ffdhe6144, 175, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0103}, /* ffdhe6144 (0x0103) */
+ {NID_ffdhe8192, 192, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0104}, /* ffdhe8192 (0x0104) */
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
};
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
};
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
/* The default curves */
-static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
+static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
29, /* X25519 (29) */
23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
30, /* X448 (30) */
25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
+ 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
+ 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
+ 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
+ 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
+# endif
};
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
TLSEXT_curve_P_384
};
+#endif
const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id)
{
- /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
- if (group_id < 1 || group_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))
- return NULL;
- return &nid_list[group_id - 1];
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 FFDHE group from RFC 8446 */
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
+ if (nid_list[i].group_id == group_id)
+ return &nid_list[i];
+ }
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) */
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
+int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id)
+{
+ const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id);
+
+ return ginf == NULL ? NID_undef : ginf->nid;
}
static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
{
size_t i;
+
for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
- return (uint16_t)(i + 1);
+ return nid_list[i].group_id;
}
return 0;
}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
/*
* Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
size_t *pgroupslen)
{
-
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
/* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
*pgroups = suiteb_curves;
*pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
*pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
*pgroupslen = 1;
break;
+# endif
default:
if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
- *pgroups = eccurves_default;
- *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default);
+ *pgroups = supported_groups_default;
+ *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default);
} else {
*pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
*pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
}
break;
}
+#else
+ *pgroups = NULL;
+ *pgroupslen = 0;
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
}
-/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
-int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op)
+int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int version)
{
- const TLS_GROUP_INFO *cinfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(curve);
- unsigned char ctmp[2];
+ const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id);
- if (cinfo == NULL)
+ if (version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ if ((ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_ONLY_FOR_TLS1_3) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* See if group is allowed by security callback */
+int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
+{
+ const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group);
+ unsigned char gtmp[2];
+
+ if (ginfo == NULL)
return 0;
-# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ if (ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2)
return 0;
-# endif
- ctmp[0] = curve >> 8;
- ctmp[1] = curve & 0xff;
- return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)ctmp);
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_FFDHE)
+ return 0;
+#endif
+ gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
+ gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
+ return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits, ginfo->nid, (void *)gtmp);
}
/* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
* these are acceptable due to previous checks.
*/
- unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+ unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
uint16_t id = pref[i];
if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
- || !tls_curve_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
+ || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
continue;
if (nmatch == k)
return id;
int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
int *groups, size_t ngroups)
{
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
uint16_t *glist;
size_t i;
/*
- * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
- * ids < 32
+ * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
+ * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
*/
- unsigned long dup_list = 0;
+ unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
+ unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
+ unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
if (ngroups == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
unsigned long idmask;
uint16_t id;
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
- idmask = 1L << id;
- if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
- OPENSSL_free(glist);
- return 0;
- }
- dup_list |= idmask;
+ if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
+ goto err;
+ idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
+ dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
+ if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
+ goto err;
+ *dup_list |= idmask;
glist[i] = id;
}
OPENSSL_free(*pext);
*pext = glist;
*pextlen = ngroups;
return 1;
+err:
+ OPENSSL_free(glist);
+ return 0;
+#else
+ return 0;
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
}
-# define MAX_CURVELIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+# define MAX_GROUPLIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
typedef struct {
size_t nidcnt;
- int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
+ int nid_arr[MAX_GROUPLIST];
} nid_cb_st;
static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
{
nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
size_t i;
- int nid;
+ int nid = NID_undef;
char etmp[20];
if (elem == NULL)
return 0;
- if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
+ if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_GROUPLIST)
return 0;
if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
return 0;
memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
etmp[len] = 0;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
+# endif
if (nid == NID_undef)
nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
if (nid == NID_undef)
narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
return 1;
}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
/* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
{
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
nid_cb_st ncb;
ncb.nidcnt = 0;
if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
if (pext == NULL)
return 1;
return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
-}
-/* Return group id of a key */
-static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
- const EC_GROUP *grp;
-
- if (ec == NULL)
- return 0;
- grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
- return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp));
-}
-
-/* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
-static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- const EC_KEY *ec;
- const EC_GROUP *grp;
- unsigned char comp_id;
- size_t i;
-
- /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
- if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
- return 1;
- ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
- grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
-
- /* Get required compression id */
- if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
- comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
- } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- /*
- * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
- * this check.
- */
- return 1;
- } else {
- int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
-
- if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
- comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
- else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
- comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
- else
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
- * supported (see RFC4492).
- */
- if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len; i++) {
- if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
- return 1;
- }
+#else
return 0;
+#endif
}
/* Check a group id matches preferences */
return 0;
/* Check for Suite B compliance */
- if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
- unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
+ unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
return 0;
}
- if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
+ if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
return 0;
/* For clients, nothing more to check */
return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
size_t *num_formats)
{
}
}
+/* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
+static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ const EC_KEY *ec;
+ const EC_GROUP *grp;
+ unsigned char comp_id;
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
+ return 1;
+ ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
+ grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
+
+ /* Get required compression id */
+ if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
+ comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
+ } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /*
+ * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
+ * this check.
+ */
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
+
+ if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
+ comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
+ else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
+ comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
+ * supported (see RFC4492).
+ */
+ if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
+ if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Return group id of a key */
+static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ int curve_nid = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
+
+ if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
+ return 0;
+ return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
+}
+
/*
* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
* certificates have compatible curves and compression.
if (pkey == NULL)
return 0;
/* If not EC nothing to do */
- if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
return 1;
/* Check compression */
if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
int check_md;
size_t i;
- CERT *c = s->cert;
/* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
else
return 0; /* Should never happen */
- for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
- if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
+ for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
+ if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
return 1;;
}
return 0;
return NULL;
}
/* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
-int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
+int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
{
const EVP_MD *md;
if (lu == NULL)
if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
md = NULL;
} else {
- md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
+ md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
if (md == NULL)
return 0;
}
* with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
*/
#define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
-static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA *rsa, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
+static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
{
const EVP_MD *md;
- if (rsa == NULL)
+ if (pkey == NULL)
return 0;
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md) || md == NULL)
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
return 0;
- if (RSA_size(rsa) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
+ if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
- * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
- * is fixed by the certificate type.
+ * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
+ * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
+ * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
+ * certificate type from |s| will be used.
+ * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
*/
static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
{
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
- if (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
+ if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
idx = i;
break;
}
/*
* Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
* */
- if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
+ if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
int real_idx;
for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
+ return NULL;
+ if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
return NULL;
return lu;
}
+ if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
+ return NULL;
return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
}
/* Set peer sigalg based key type */
lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
if (lu == NULL)
return 0;
- s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
+ s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
return 1;
}
}
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/*
+ * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
+ * specified EC curve.
+ */
+int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
+{
+ const uint16_t *sigs;
+ size_t siglen, i;
+
+ if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
+ sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
+ siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+ } else {
+ sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
+ siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs[i]);
+
+ if (lu == NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
+ && lu->curve != NID_undef
+ && curve == lu->curve)
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
+ * error.
+ */
+static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
+{
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ int secbits = 0;
+
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
+ return 0;
+ if (md != NULL)
+ {
+ /* Security bits: half digest bits */
+ secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
+ } else {
+ /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
+ if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
+ secbits = 128;
+ else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
+ secbits = 224;
+ }
+ return secbits;
+}
+
/*
* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
* algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
char sigalgstr[2];
size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
- int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
+ int pkeyid = -1;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
+ int secbits = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0) Remove this when we adapted this function for provider
+ * side keys. We know that EVP_PKEY_get0() downgrades an EVP_PKEY
+ * to contain a legacy key.
+ *
+ * THIS IS TEMPORARY
+ */
+ EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_NONE)
+ return 0;
+ pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
/* Should never happen */
if (pkeyid == -1)
return -1;
/* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
- EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
- int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
+ int curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
- if (md != NULL) {
- /*
- * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
- * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
- */
- sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
- sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
- if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
- EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
- (void *)sigalgstr)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
- SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
- return 0;
- }
+ /*
+ * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
+ * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
+ */
+ sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
+ sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
+ secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
+ if (secbits == 0 ||
+ !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
+ md != NULL ? EVP_MD_type(md) : NID_undef,
+ (void *)sigalgstr)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
}
/* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
- s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
+ s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
return 1;
}
int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
{
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
+ if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
return 0;
- *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
+ *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
+{
+ if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
return 1;
}
*/
int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
{
- s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
- s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
- ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
- if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver,
- &s->s3->tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
+ s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
+ s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
+ ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
+ if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
+ &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
return 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
- s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
- s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
+ s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+ s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
- s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
- s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
+ s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
+ s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
}
#endif
return 1;
*
* Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
*/
-int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
+int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
{
- if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
- || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
+ if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
+ || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
return 1;
- if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
+ if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
return 1;
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
int min_tls = c->min_tls;
&& (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
- if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
+ if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
return 1;
}
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
- || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
+ || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
return 1;
return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
size_t i;
/* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
- OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
- s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
- s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
+ s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+ s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
/* Clear certificate validity flags */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
- s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
+ s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
/*
* If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
* the default algorithm for each certificate type
*/
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
- && s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
+ && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
/* Check default matches a type we sent */
for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
- s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+ s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
break;
}
}
SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
+ if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
return 1;
/* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
size_t mlen;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
+ SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
}
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
- hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+ hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
if (hctx == NULL) {
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
goto end;
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
goto end;
}
- if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
+#else
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
+#endif
+ {
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
- int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
+ rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
+ nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
+ ctx,
+ ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
+ 0);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
+ /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
+ rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
- ctx, hctx, 0);
+ ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
+#endif
if (rv < 0) {
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
goto end;
if (rv == 2)
renew_ticket = 1;
} else {
+ EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
+
/* Check key name matches */
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
goto end;
}
- if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
- sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
- EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
- || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
+
+ aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
+ s->ctx->propq);
+ if (aes256cbc == NULL
+ || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
+ "SHA256") <= 0
+ || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
goto end;
}
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
renew_ticket = 1;
}
* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
* checks on ticket.
*/
- mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
+ mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
if (mlen == 0) {
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
goto end;
}
eticklen -= mlen;
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
- if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
- || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
+ if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
+ || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
goto end;
}
end:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+ ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
/*
* If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
}
/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
-static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
+static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
{
unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
int secbits;
/* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
return 0;
/* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
return 0;
/* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
- if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
+ if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
&& (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
|| lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
|| lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
return 0;
if (!s->server
&& s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
- && s->s3->tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
int i, num;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
* ciphersuites enabled.
*/
- if (s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
+ if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
return 0;
sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
}
}
- if (lu->hash == NID_undef)
- return 1;
- /* Security bits: half digest bits */
- secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
/* Finally see if security callback allows it */
+ secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
continue;
clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
- if (clu == NULL)
- continue;
+ if (clu == NULL)
+ continue;
/* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
CERT *c = s->cert;
unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
- OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
- c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
- c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
+ s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+ s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
/* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
conf = c->client_sigalgs;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
pref = conf;
preflen = conflen;
- allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
- allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
+ allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
+ allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
} else {
allow = conf;
allowlen = conflen;
- pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
- preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
+ pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
+ preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
}
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
if (nmatch) {
} else {
salgs = NULL;
}
- c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
- c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
+ s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
+ s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
return 1;
}
return 0;
if (cert)
- return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
- &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
+ return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
+ &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
else
- return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs,
- &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
+ return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
+ &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
}
int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
{
size_t i;
- uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
- CERT *c = s->cert;
+ uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
pvalid[i] = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
- const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
+ for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
/* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
{
- uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
- size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
+ uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
+ size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
return 0;
if (idx >= 0) {
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
{
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
- if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
+ if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
|| idx < 0
- || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
- || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
+ || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
+ || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
return 0;
- shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
+ shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
if (phash != NULL)
*phash = shsigalgs->hash;
if (psign != NULL)
*rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
if (rhash != NULL)
*rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
- return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
+ return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
}
/* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
return 0;
}
-static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
+static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
{
- int sig_nid;
+ int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
size_t i;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
+ size_t sigalgslen;
if (default_nid == -1)
return 1;
sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
if (default_nid)
return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
- for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
- if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
+ * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
+ * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
+ */
+ sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
+ use_pc_sigalgs = 1;
+ } else {
+ sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
+ sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
+ ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
+ : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
+ if (sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
return 1;
+ }
return 0;
}
/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
{
- X509_NAME *nm;
+ const X509_NAME *nm;
int i;
nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
} else
cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
- pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
+ pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
x = cpk->x509;
pk = cpk->privatekey;
chain = cpk->chain;
if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
return 0;
idx = certidx;
- pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
+ pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
int default_nid;
int rsign = 0;
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
- || s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
+ || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
default_nid = 0;
/* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
} else {
}
}
/* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
- if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /*
+ * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
+ * so check_flags is always set.
+ */
+ if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
+ } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
if (!check_flags)
goto end;
} else
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
- if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
+ if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
if (check_flags) {
rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
break;
if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
int check_type = 0;
- switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
- case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
- break;
- case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+ else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
- break;
- case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+ else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
- break;
- }
+
if (check_type) {
- const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype;
+ const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
size_t j;
- for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
if (*ctypes == check_type) {
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
break;
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
}
- ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names;
+ ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
int dh_secbits = 80;
if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
return DH_get_1024_160();
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
dh_secbits = 128;
else
dh_secbits = 80;
} else {
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
+ if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
return NULL;
- dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
+ dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
}
if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
/* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
if (clu == NULL
- || (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
+ || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
|| (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
- && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
+ && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
return -1;
- return s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
+ return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
}
/*
- * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
- * with signature scheme |sig|.
- * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
- * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
- * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
+ * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
+ * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
+ * the key.
+ * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
*/
-static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
+static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
- int mdnid, pknid, default_mdnid;
- int mandatory_md = 0;
+ int mdnid, pknid, supported;
size_t i;
- /* TLS 1.2 callers can override lu->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
- if (idx == -1)
- idx = sig->sig_idx;
- if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
- return 0;
- /* If the EVP_PKEY reports a mandatory digest, allow nothing else. */
+ /*
+ * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
+ * the answer is simply 'no'.
+ */
ERR_set_mark();
- switch (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey,
- &default_mdnid)) {
- case 2:
- mandatory_md = 1;
- break;
- case 1:
- break;
- default: /* If it didn't report a mandatory NID, for whatever reasons,
- * just clear the error and allow all hashes to be used. */
- ERR_pop_to_mark();
- }
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
- lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
- if (lu == NULL
- || !X509_get_signature_info(s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509, &mdnid,
- &pknid, NULL, NULL)
- || (mandatory_md && mdnid != default_mdnid))
+ supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey, sig->hash);
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ if (supported == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
+ * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
+ */
+ if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
+ if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
+ lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
+ if (lu == NULL)
continue;
+
/*
* TODO this does not differentiate between the
* rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
}
return 0;
}
- return !mandatory_md || sig->hash == default_mdnid;
+
+ /*
+ * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
+ * a viable public key is permitted.
+ */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
+ * with signature scheme |sig|.
+ * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
+ * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
+ * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
+ */
+static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
+{
+ /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
+ if (idx == -1)
+ idx = sig->sig_idx;
+ if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
+ return 0;
+
+ return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
+ s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
+ * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
+ */
+static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ size_t idx;
+
+ if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
+ if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
+ return 0;
+
+ return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
+ * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
+ * available certs/keys to find one that works.
+ */
+static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
+ size_t i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ int curve = -1;
+#endif
+ EVP_PKEY *tmppkey;
+
+ /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
+ lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
+
+ /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
+ if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
+ || lu->hash == NID_sha224
+ || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
+ || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ continue;
+ /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
+ continue;
+ if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
+ || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
+ continue;
+
+ tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
+ : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
+
+ if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (curve == -1)
+ curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(tmppkey);
+ if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
+ continue;
+#else
+ continue;
+#endif
+ } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
+ /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
+ if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return lu;
}
/*
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
int sig_idx = -1;
- s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
- s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
+ s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
+ s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- size_t i;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- int curve = -1;
-#endif
-
- /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
- for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
- lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
- sig_idx = -1;
-
- /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
- if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
- || lu->hash == NID_sha224
- || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
- || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
- continue;
- /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL) || !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
- continue;
- if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (curve == -1) {
- EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
-
- curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
- }
- if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
- continue;
-#else
- continue;
-#endif
- } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
- /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-
- pkey = s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
- if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
- continue;
- }
- break;
- }
- if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
+ lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
+ if (lu == NULL) {
if (!fatalerrs)
return 1;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
}
} else {
/* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
+ if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
return 1;
if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
return 1;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
size_t i;
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- int curve;
+ int curve = -1;
/* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
- if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
- EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
- curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
- } else {
- curve = -1;
- }
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+ curve =
+ evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
+ .privatekey);
#endif
/*
* Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
* cert type
*/
- for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
- lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
+ for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
+ lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
if (s->server) {
if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
/* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
- if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
+ if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
continue;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
#endif
break;
}
- if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ /*
+ * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
+ * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
+ * we have to assume GOST support.
+ */
+ if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
+ if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
+ if (!fatalerrs)
+ return 1;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ i = 0;
+ sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
if (!fatalerrs)
return 1;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
if (!fatalerrs)
return 1;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
return 0;
}
if (!fatalerrs)
return 1;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
return 0;
}
}
}
if (sig_idx == -1)
sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
- s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
- s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
- s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;
+ s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
+ s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
+ s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
return 1;
}
{
return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
}
+
+/*
+ * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
+ */
+SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+ EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
+
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
+ && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
+ ret->old_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+ if (ret->old_ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+ mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", NULL);
+ if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ EVP_MAC_free(mac);
+ return ret;
+ err:
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free(mac);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->old_ctx);
+#endif
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ }
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+HMAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->old_ctx;
+}
+#endif
+
+EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->ctx;
+}
+
+int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
+
+ if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, key, len);
+ *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+ if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx->ctx, params) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx))
+ return 1;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
+ return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->old_ctx, key, len,
+ EVP_get_digestbyname(md), NULL);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+ if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
+ return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
+ return HMAC_Update(ctx->old_ctx, data, len);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
+ size_t max_size)
+{
+ if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
+ return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL) {
+ unsigned int l;
+
+ if (HMAC_Final(ctx->old_ctx, md, &l) > 0) {
+ if (len != NULL)
+ *len = l;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
+ return EVP_MAC_size(ctx->ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
+ return HMAC_size(ctx->old_ctx);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff