/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+/* We need access to the deprecated low level HMAC APIs */
+#define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
+
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/provider.h>
#include "internal/nelem.h"
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "internal/evp.h"
+#include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
+#include "ssl_local.h"
#include <openssl/ct.h>
+DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(SSL_CIPHER)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
+
static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
tls1_enc,
return 1;
}
-/*
- * Table of group information.
- */
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
-static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0001}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
- {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0002}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
- {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0003}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
- {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0004}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
- {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0005}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
- {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0006}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
- {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0007}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
- {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0008}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
- {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0009}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
- {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000A}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
- {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000B}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
- {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000C}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
- {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000D}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
- {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000E}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
- {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x000F}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
- {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0010}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
- {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0011}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
- {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0012}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
- {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0013}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
- {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0014}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
- {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0015}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
- {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0016}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
- {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0017}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0018}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
- {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0019}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
- {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001A}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
- {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001B}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
- {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001C}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
- {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001D}, /* X25519 (29) */
- {EVP_PKEY_X448, 224, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001E}, /* X448 (30) */
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- /* Security bit values for FFDHE groups are updated as per RFC 7919 */
- {NID_ffdhe2048, 103, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0100}, /* ffdhe2048 (0x0100) */
- {NID_ffdhe3072, 125, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0101}, /* ffdhe3072 (0x0101) */
- {NID_ffdhe4096, 150, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0102}, /* ffdhe4096 (0x0102) */
- {NID_ffdhe6144, 175, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0103}, /* ffdhe6144 (0x0103) */
- {NID_ffdhe8192, 192, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0104}, /* ffdhe8192 (0x0104) */
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+/* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
+static struct {
+ int nid;
+ uint16_t group_id;
+} nid_to_group[] = {
+ {NID_sect163k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1},
+ {NID_sect163r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1},
+ {NID_sect163r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2},
+ {NID_sect193r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1},
+ {NID_sect193r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2},
+ {NID_sect233k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1},
+ {NID_sect233r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1},
+ {NID_sect239k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1},
+ {NID_sect283k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1},
+ {NID_sect283r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1},
+ {NID_sect409k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1},
+ {NID_sect409r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1},
+ {NID_sect571k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1},
+ {NID_sect571r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1},
+ {NID_secp160k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1},
+ {NID_secp160r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1},
+ {NID_secp160r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2},
+ {NID_secp192k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1},
+ {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1},
+ {NID_secp224k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1},
+ {NID_secp224r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1},
+ {NID_secp256k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1},
+ {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1},
+ {NID_secp384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1},
+ {NID_secp521r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1},
+ {NID_brainpoolP256r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1},
+ {NID_brainpoolP384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1},
+ {NID_brainpoolP512r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1},
+ {EVP_PKEY_X25519, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519},
+ {EVP_PKEY_X448, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448},
+ {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, 0x0022},
+ {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, 0x0023},
+ {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, 0x0024},
+ {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, 0x0025},
+ {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, 0x0026},
+ {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, 0x0027},
+ {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, 0x0028},
+ {NID_ffdhe2048, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048},
+ {NID_ffdhe3072, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072},
+ {NID_ffdhe4096, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096},
+ {NID_ffdhe6144, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144},
+ {NID_ffdhe8192, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192}
};
#endif
25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ 34, /* GC256A (34) */
+ 35, /* GC256B (35) */
+ 36, /* GC256C (36) */
+ 37, /* GC256D (37) */
+ 38, /* GC512A (38) */
+ 39, /* GC512B (39) */
+ 40, /* GC512C (40) */
+# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
};
#endif
-const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id)
+struct provider_group_data_st {
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
+};
+
+#define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
+static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
+static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
+{
+ struct provider_group_data_st *pgd = data;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
+ OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
+ EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
+ unsigned int gid;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (ctx->group_list_max_len == ctx->group_list_len) {
+ TLS_GROUP_INFO *tmp = NULL;
+
+ if (ctx->group_list_max_len == 0)
+ tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO)
+ * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ else
+ tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->group_list,
+ (ctx->group_list_max_len
+ + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
+ * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
+ if (tmp == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->group_list = tmp;
+ memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
+ 0,
+ sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ ctx->group_list_max_len += TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ ginf = &ctx->group_list[ctx->group_list_len];
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME);
+ if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (ginf->tlsname == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
+ if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (ginf->realname == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
+ SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ginf->group_id = (uint16_t)gid;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG);
+ if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (ginf->algorithm == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
+ SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mintls)) {
+ SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxtls)) {
+ SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mindtls)) {
+ SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxdtls)) {
+ SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
+ * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
+ * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
+ * it.
+ */
+ ret = 1;
+ keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
+ if (keymgmt != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
+ * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
+ *
+ * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
+ * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
+ * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
+ * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
+ * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
+ * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
+ * behaviour)?
+ */
+ if (EVP_KEYMGMT_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
+ /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
+ ctx->group_list_len++;
+ ginf = NULL;
+ }
+ EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
+ }
+ err:
+ if (ginf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
+ OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
+ OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
+ ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
+{
+ struct provider_group_data_st pgd;
+
+ pgd.ctx = vctx;
+ pgd.provider = provider;
+ return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-GROUP",
+ add_provider_groups, &pgd);
+}
+
+int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_groups, ctx);
+}
+
+static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ int nid = NID_undef;
+
+ /* See if we can identify a nid for this name */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(name);
+#endif
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ nid = OBJ_sn2nid(name);
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ nid = OBJ_ln2nid(name);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
+ || (nid != NID_undef
+ && nid == tls1_group_id2nid(ctx->group_list[i].group_id,
+ 0)))
+ return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
{
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
size_t i;
- /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 FFDHE group from RFC 8446 */
- for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
- if (nid_list[i].group_id == group_id)
- return &nid_list[i];
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
+ if (ctx->group_list[i].group_id == group_id)
+ return &ctx->group_list[i];
}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) */
+
return NULL;
}
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
-int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id)
+int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
{
- const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id);
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (group_id == 0)
+ return NID_undef;
- return ginf == NULL ? NID_undef : ginf->nid;
+ /*
+ * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
+ * work for groups we don't know about.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
+ {
+ if (nid_to_group[i].group_id == group_id)
+ return nid_to_group[i].nid;
+ }
+ if (!include_unknown)
+ return NID_undef;
+ return TLSEXT_nid_unknown | (int)group_id;
}
static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
{
size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
- if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
- return nid_list[i].group_id;
+ /*
+ * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
+ * work for groups we don't know about.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
+ {
+ if (nid_to_group[i].nid == nid)
+ return nid_to_group[i].group_id;
}
+
return 0;
}
#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
}
-int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int version)
+int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int minversion, int maxversion)
{
- const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id);
+ const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group_id);
+ int ret;
- if (version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
- if ((ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_ONLY_FOR_TLS1_3) != 0)
+ if (ginfo == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 || ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
return 0;
+ if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
+ ret = 1;
+ else
+ ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
+ if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
+ ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
+ } else {
+ if (ginfo->mintls < 0 || ginfo->maxtls < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
+ ret = 1;
+ else
+ ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
+ if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
+ ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
}
- return 1;
+
+ return ret;
}
/* See if group is allowed by security callback */
int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
{
- const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group);
+ const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group);
unsigned char gtmp[2];
if (ginfo == NULL)
return 0;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- if (ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2)
- return 0;
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_FFDHE)
- return 0;
-#endif
+
gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
- return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits, ginfo->nid, (void *)gtmp);
+ return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits,
+ tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo->group_id, 0), (void *)gtmp);
}
/* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
}
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
-# define MAX_GROUPLIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
+/* TODO(3.0): An arbitrary amount for now. Take another look at this */
+# define MAX_GROUPLIST 40
typedef struct {
- size_t nidcnt;
- int nid_arr[MAX_GROUPLIST];
-} nid_cb_st;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ size_t gidcnt;
+ uint16_t gid_arr[MAX_GROUPLIST];
+} gid_cb_st;
-static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
{
- nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
+ gid_cb_st *garg = arg;
size_t i;
- int nid = NID_undef;
+ uint16_t gid = 0;
char etmp[20];
+
if (elem == NULL)
return 0;
- if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_GROUPLIST)
+ if (garg->gidcnt == MAX_GROUPLIST)
return 0;
if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
return 0;
memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
etmp[len] = 0;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
-# endif
- if (nid == NID_undef)
- nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
- if (nid == NID_undef)
- nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
- if (nid == NID_undef)
+
+ gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
+ if (gid == 0)
return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
- if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
+ for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
+ if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
return 0;
- narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
+ garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
return 1;
}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
-/* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
-int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
+/* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
+int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
+ const char *str)
{
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
- nid_cb_st ncb;
- ncb.nidcnt = 0;
- if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
+ gid_cb_st gcb;
+ uint16_t *tmparr;
+
+ gcb.gidcnt = 0;
+ gcb.ctx = ctx;
+ if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
return 0;
if (pext == NULL)
return 1;
- return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
-#else
- return 0;
-#endif
+
+ /*
+ * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
+ * the result
+ */
+ tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
+ if (tmparr == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ *pext = tmparr;
+ *pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
+ return 1;
}
/* Check a group id matches preferences */
size_t i;
/* If not an EC key nothing to check */
- if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
return 1;
ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
*/
return 1;
} else {
- int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
+ int field_type = EC_GROUP_get_field_type(grp);
if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
/* Return group id of a key */
static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
- EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
- const EC_GROUP *grp;
+ int curve_nid = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
- if (ec == NULL)
+ if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
return 0;
- grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
- return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp));
+ return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
}
/*
if (pkey == NULL)
return 0;
/* If not EC nothing to do */
- if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
return 1;
/* Check compression */
if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
{"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
- NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
+ NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1},
{"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
- NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
+ NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1, 1},
{"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
- NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
+ NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1, 1},
{"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
- NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
{"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
- NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
- NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
+ NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef, 1},
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
- NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
+ NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1},
#endif
{"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
- NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
{"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
- NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
{"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
- NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
{"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
- NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
{"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
- NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
{"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
- NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
{"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
- NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
+ NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
{"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
- NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
+ NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
{"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
- NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
+ NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
{"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
- NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
+ NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
{"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
- NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
+ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
- NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
+ NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef, 1},
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
- NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
- NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
- NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
- NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
+ NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef, 1},
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
+ NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
+ NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
+ NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
+ NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
- NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
- NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
- NID_undef, NID_undef}
+ NID_undef, NID_undef, 1}
#endif
};
/* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
"rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
- NID_undef, NID_undef
+ NID_undef, NID_undef, 1
};
/*
TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
- TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
- TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
};
+int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
+ SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache
+ = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
+ EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
+ i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+
+ cache[i] = *lu;
+
+ /*
+ * Check hash is available.
+ * TODO(3.0): This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
+ * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
+ * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
+ * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
+ * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
+ */
+ if (lu->hash != NID_undef
+ && ctx->ssl_digest_methods[lu->hash_idx] == NULL) {
+ cache[i].enabled = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
+ cache[i].enabled = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, tmpkey, ctx->propq);
+ /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
+ if (pctx == NULL)
+ cache[i].enabled = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ }
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
+ cache = NULL;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(cache);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
-static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
+static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL *s, uint16_t sigalg)
{
size_t i;
- const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
- for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
- i++, s++) {
- if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
- return s;
+ for (i = 0, lu = s->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache;
+ /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
+ i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
+ lu++, i++) {
+ if (lu->sigalg == sigalg)
+ return lu;
}
return NULL;
}
/* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
-int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
+int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
{
const EVP_MD *md;
if (lu == NULL)
if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
md = NULL;
} else {
- md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
+ md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
if (md == NULL)
return 0;
}
* with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
*/
#define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
-static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA *rsa, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
+static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
{
const EVP_MD *md;
- if (rsa == NULL)
+ if (pkey == NULL)
return 0;
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md) || md == NULL)
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
return 0;
- if (RSA_size(rsa) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
+ if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
- * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
- * is fixed by the certificate type.
+ * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
+ * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
+ * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
+ * certificate type from |s| will be used.
+ * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
*/
static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
{
}
}
}
+ /*
+ * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
+ * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
+ */
+ else if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256) {
+ int real_idx;
+
+ for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
+ real_idx--) {
+ if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
+ idx = real_idx;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
} else {
idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
}
if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
return NULL;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
- const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
+ return NULL;
+ if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
return NULL;
return lu;
}
+ if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
+ return NULL;
return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
}
/* Set peer sigalg based key type */
}
for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
- const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs[i]);
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sigs[i]);
if (lu == NULL)
continue;
}
#endif
+/*
+ * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
+ * error.
+ */
+static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
+{
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ int secbits = 0;
+
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
+ return 0;
+ if (md != NULL)
+ {
+ /* Security bits: half digest bits */
+ secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
+ } else {
+ /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
+ if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
+ secbits = 128;
+ else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
+ secbits = 224;
+ }
+ return secbits;
+}
+
/*
* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
* algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
char sigalgstr[2];
size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
- int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
+ int pkeyid = -1;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
+ int secbits = 0;
+ pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
/* Should never happen */
if (pkeyid == -1)
return -1;
if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
}
- lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
+ lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
/*
* Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
* is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
/* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
- EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
- int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
+ int curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
- if (md != NULL) {
- /*
- * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
- * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
- */
- sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
- sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
- if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
- EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
- (void *)sigalgstr)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
- SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
- return 0;
- }
+ /*
+ * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
+ * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
+ */
+ sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
+ sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
+ secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
+ if (secbits == 0 ||
+ !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
+ md != NULL ? EVP_MD_type(md) : NID_undef,
+ (void *)sigalgstr)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
}
/* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
*
* Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
*/
-int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
+int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
{
if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
|| c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
size_t mlen;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
+ SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
}
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
- hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+ hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
if (hctx == NULL) {
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
goto end;
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
goto end;
}
- if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
+#else
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
+#endif
+ {
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
- int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
+ rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
+ nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
+ ctx,
+ ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
+ 0);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
+ /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
+ rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
- ctx, hctx, 0);
+ ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
+#endif
if (rv < 0) {
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
goto end;
if (rv == 2)
renew_ticket = 1;
} else {
+ EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
+
/* Check key name matches */
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
goto end;
}
- if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
- sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
- EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
- || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
+
+ aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
+ s->ctx->propq);
+ if (aes256cbc == NULL
+ || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
+ "SHA256") <= 0
+ || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
goto end;
}
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
renew_ticket = 1;
}
* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
* checks on ticket.
*/
- mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
+ mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
if (mlen == 0) {
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
goto end;
}
eticklen -= mlen;
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
- if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
- || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
+ if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
+ || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
goto end;
}
end:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+ ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
/*
* If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
}
/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
-static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
+static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
{
unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
int secbits;
- /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
+ if (lu == NULL || !lu->enabled)
return 0;
/* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
continue;
- if ((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST) != 0)
+ if ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18)) != 0)
break;
}
if (i == num)
}
}
- if (lu->hash == NID_undef)
- return 1;
- /* Security bits: half digest bits */
- secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
/* Finally see if security callback allows it */
+ secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
*/
sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
- const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *sigalgs);
const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
if (lu == NULL)
int rv = 0;
for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
- const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
continue;
const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
- const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *ptmp);
/* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
*rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
if (rsig != NULL)
*rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
- lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
+ lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
if (psign != NULL)
*psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
if (phash != NULL)
}
for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
- ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
+ ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
: s->shared_sigalgs[i];
- if (sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
+ if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
return 1;
}
return 0;
/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
{
- X509_NAME *nm;
+ const X509_NAME *nm;
int i;
nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
size_t j;
const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
- const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *p);
if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
break;
if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
int check_type = 0;
- switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
- case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
- break;
- case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+ else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
- break;
- case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+ else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
- break;
- }
+
if (check_type) {
const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
size_t j;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
{
+ DH *dhp;
+ BIGNUM *p, *g;
int dh_secbits = 80;
- if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
- return DH_get_1024_160();
- if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
- if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
- dh_secbits = 128;
- else
- dh_secbits = 80;
- } else {
- if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
- return NULL;
- dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
+ if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
+ dh_secbits = 128;
+ else
+ dh_secbits = 80;
+ } else {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
+ }
}
- if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
- DH *dhp = DH_new();
- BIGNUM *p, *g;
- if (dhp == NULL)
- return NULL;
- g = BN_new();
- if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
- DH_free(dhp);
- BN_free(g);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (dh_secbits >= 192)
- p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
- else
- p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
- if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
- DH_free(dhp);
- BN_free(p);
- BN_free(g);
- return NULL;
- }
- return dhp;
+ dhp = DH_new();
+ if (dhp == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ g = BN_new();
+ if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
+ DH_free(dhp);
+ BN_free(g);
+ return NULL;
}
- if (dh_secbits >= 112)
- return DH_get_2048_224();
- return DH_get_1024_160();
+ if (dh_secbits >= 192)
+ p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
+ else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
+ p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
+ else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
+ p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
+ else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
+ p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
+ else
+ p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
+ if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
+ DH_free(dhp);
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(g);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return dhp;
}
#endif
if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
- lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
+ lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
if (lu == NULL)
continue;
|| lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
continue;
/* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
continue;
if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
|| (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (curve == -1) {
- EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(tmppkey);
- curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
- }
+ if (curve == -1)
+ curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(tmppkey);
if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
continue;
#else
#endif
} else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
/* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
- if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(tmppkey), lu))
+ if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
continue;
}
break;
size_t i;
if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- int curve;
+ int curve = -1;
/* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
- if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
- EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
- curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
- } else {
- curve = -1;
- }
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+ curve =
+ evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
+ .privatekey);
#endif
/*
/* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
- if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
+ if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
continue;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
#endif
break;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ /*
+ * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
+ * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
+ * we have to assume GOST support.
+ */
+ if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
+ if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
+ if (!fatalerrs)
+ return 1;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ i = 0;
+ sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
if (!fatalerrs)
return 1;
if (!fatalerrs)
return 1;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
return 0;
}
if (!fatalerrs)
return 1;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
return 0;
}
}
{
return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
}
+
+/*
+ * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
+ */
+SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+ EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
+
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
+ && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
+ ret->old_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+ if (ret->old_ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+ mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", NULL);
+ if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_new_ctx(mac)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ EVP_MAC_free(mac);
+ return ret;
+ err:
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ret->ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free(mac);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx->ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->old_ctx);
+#endif
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ }
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+HMAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->old_ctx;
+}
+#endif
+
+EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->ctx;
+}
+
+int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
+
+ if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, key, len);
+ *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+ if (EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx->ctx, params) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx))
+ return 1;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
+ return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->old_ctx, key, len,
+ EVP_get_digestbyname(md), NULL);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+ if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
+ return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
+ return HMAC_Update(ctx->old_ctx, data, len);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
+ size_t max_size)
+{
+ if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
+ return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL) {
+ unsigned int l;
+
+ if (HMAC_Final(ctx->old_ctx, md, &l) > 0) {
+ if (len != NULL)
+ *len = l;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
+ return EVP_MAC_size(ctx->ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
+ return HMAC_size(ctx->old_ctx);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff