#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
+static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
+static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
PACKET *cipher_suites,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
int *al);
/*
- * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
- * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
- * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
- * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
+ * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
+ * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
+ * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
+ * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
*
- * Valid return values are:
- * 1: Success (transition allowed)
- * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
+ * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
+ * (transition not allowed)
+ */
+static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ /*
+ * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
+ * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
+ * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
+ */
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ default:
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
+ if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* No valid transition found */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
+ * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
+ * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
+ * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
+ *
+ * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
+ * (transition not allowed)
*/
int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
+ goto err;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
break;
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+ if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
return 1;
break;
}
+ err:
/* No valid transition found */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
* during re-negotiation:
*/
- && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
+ && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
/*
* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
}
/*
- * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
- * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
+ * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
+ * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
+ * client.
+ */
+static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ /*
+ * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
+ * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
+ */
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ /* Try to read from the client instead */
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
+ if (s->hello_retry_request)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
+ if (s->hit)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
+ else if (send_certificate_request(s))
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
+
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
+ /*
+ * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
+ * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
+ * immediately.
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
+ * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
+ * session ticket?
+ */
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
+ if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
+ * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
*/
WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+ /*
+ * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
+ * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
+ */
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
+
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
+ /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
+ st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
+ if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
/* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
- case TLS_ST_OK:
- /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
- return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
-
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
if (s->hit) {
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
+ if (s->ext.status_expected) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
- } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /*
+ * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
+ * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
+ * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
+ */
+ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
+ } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_OK:
- return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
+ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
/* No post work to be done */
break;
+ case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ break;
+
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
#endif
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
+ * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
+ * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
+ * something clever in the record layer for this.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
+ || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)
+ || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
0, NULL);
}
#endif
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
+ &s->session->master_key_length)
+ || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
+ if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
break;
}
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
break;
+ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
+ break;
+
+
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
*confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
*mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
*confunc = tls_construct_finished;
*mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
+ break;
}
return 1;
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
+ return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
}
}
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
+ return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
+
}
}
#endif
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
-
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
return 1;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/*-
+ * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
+ * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
+ * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
+ * SNI,
+ * elliptic_curves
+ * ec_point_formats
+ *
+ * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
+ * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
+ * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
+ * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
+ */
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
+{
+ static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
+ 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
+ 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
+ 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
+ 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
+ 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
+
+ 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
+ 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
+ 0x01, /* 1 point format */
+ 0x00, /* uncompressed */
+ /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
+ 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
+ 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
+ 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
+ 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
+ 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
+ 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
+ 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
+ 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+ };
+ /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
+ static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
+ unsigned int type;
+ PACKET sni, tmppkt;
+ size_t ext_len;
+
+ tmppkt = hello->extensions;
+
+ if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+ return;
+
+ ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
+ sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
+
+ s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
+ ext_len);
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello;
+ /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
+ if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
+ s->renegotiate = 1;
+ s->new_session = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
+ s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
+
/*
* First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
*/
if (clienthello.isv2) {
unsigned int mt;
+ if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/*-
* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
* header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
}
clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len;
- /* Load the client random and compression list. */
- challenge_len = challenge_len > sizeof(clienthello.random)
- ? sizeof(clienthello.random) : challenge_len;
- memset(clienthello.random, 0, sizeof(clienthello.random));
+ /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit
+ * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
+ * sizeof(clienthello.random) does.
+ */
+ challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
+ memset(clienthello.random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
- clienthello.random + sizeof(clienthello.random) -
+ clienthello.random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
challenge_len, challenge_len)
/* Advertise only null compression. */
|| !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
/* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
extensions = clienthello.extensions;
- if (!tls_collect_extensions(&extensions, &clienthello.pre_proc_exts,
- &clienthello.num_extensions, &al)) {
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ &clienthello.pre_proc_exts, &al,
+ &clienthello.pre_proc_exts_len)) {
/* SSLerr already been called */
goto f_err;
}
if (protverr) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
- if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
+ if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
/* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
}
s->hit = 0;
/* We need to do this before getting the session */
- if (!tls_check_client_ems_support(s, &clienthello)) {
- /* Only fails if the extension is malformed */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
+ EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto f_err;
}
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
} else {
- i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello);
- /*
- * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
- * version.
- * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
- * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
- * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
- * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
- * will abort the handshake with an error.
- */
- if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
+ i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello, &al);
+ if (i == 1) {
/* previous session */
s->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1) {
- goto err;
+ goto f_err;
} else {
/* i == 0 */
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto f_err;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
+ ssl_check_for_safari(s, &clienthello);
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
/* TLS extensions */
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &clienthello)) {
+ if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
- goto err;
+ goto f_err;
}
/*
}
}
- if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
+ if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
/*
* s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
int master_key_length;
master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
- if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+ if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&master_key_length, ciphers,
&pref_cipher,
- s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)
+ s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
&& master_key_length > 0) {
s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
s->hit = 1;
ciphers = NULL;
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
- pref_cipher =
- pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
- s->
- session->ciphers,
- SSL_get_ciphers
- (s));
+ if (pref_cipher == NULL)
+ pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
+ SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
+/*
+ * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
+ * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
+ */
+static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al)
+{
+ s->ext.status_expected = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
+ * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
+ * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
+ * influence which certificate is sent
+ */
+ if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
+ && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
+ int ret;
+
+ /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
+ * et al can pick it up.
+ */
+ s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
+ ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
+ switch (ret) {
+ /* We don't want to send a status request response */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+ s->ext.status_expected = 0;
+ break;
+ /* status request response should be sent */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
+ if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
+ s->ext.status_expected = 1;
+ break;
+ /* something bad happened */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ default:
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
+ if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, &al))
+ goto f_err;
/* check whether we should disable session resumption */
if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
- s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
- ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
+ s->session->not_resumable =
+ s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey
+ & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
+ != 0));
if (s->session->not_resumable)
/* do not send a session ticket */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
} else {
/* Session-id reuse */
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
}
- if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
/*-
* we now have the following setup.
* client_random
* s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
*/
- /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
- if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
- if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ /*
+ * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
+ * certificate callbacks etc above.
+ */
+ if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto f_err;
}
wst = WORK_MORE_B;
if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto f_err;
}
}
#endif
- s->renegotiate = 2;
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
f_err:
{
int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
size_t sl, len;
+ int version;
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version)
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
+ version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
/*
* Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
* tls_process_client_hello()
compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
- if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl)
+ if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
|| !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
- || !ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s)
- || !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al)) {
+ || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
+ || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
+ SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
+ : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
+ NULL, 0, &al)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+ if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
+ && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
return 1;
err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return 0;
}
size_t encodedlen = 0;
int curve_id = 0;
#endif
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
unsigned long type;
const BIGNUM *r[4];
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
}
/* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
- nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
+ nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
if (curve_id == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
goto f_err;
}
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
- if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
- == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else {
- pkey = NULL;
+ if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
+ || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
+ lu = NULL;
+ } else if (lu == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
#endif
/* not anonymous */
- if (pkey != NULL) {
+ if (lu != NULL) {
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
+ unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
+ size_t siglen;
+
+ if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
/*
* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
* points to the space at the end.
*/
- if (md) {
- unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
- unsigned int siglen;
- /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
- if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* send signature algorithm */
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
- /* Should never happen */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
- /*
- * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
- * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
- * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
- * afterwards.
- */
- if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey),
- &sigbytes1)
- || EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
- || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
- || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
- || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
- paramlen) <= 0
- || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, pkey) <= 0
- || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
- || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
+ /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
+ if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* send signature algorithm */
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg))
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
+ * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
+ * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
+ * afterwards.
+ */
+ siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
+ || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
- } else {
- /* Is this error check actually needed? */
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx,
+ s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
+ paramlen) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0
+ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
+ || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
}
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- const unsigned char *psigs;
- size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
+ const uint16_t *psigs;
+ size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
+
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
int ret = 0;
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
if (rsa == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
goto err;
}
- if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
+ if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
- if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
+ if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
0) <= 0) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
- return WORK_ERROR;;
+ return WORK_ERROR;
}
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- const unsigned char *sig, *data;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
-#endif
- int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- int type = 0, j;
- unsigned int len;
- X509 *peer;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
- long hdatalen = 0;
- void *hdata;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-
- if (mctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- peer = s->session->peer;
- pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
- type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
-
- if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
- SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
- /*
- * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
- * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
- && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
- len = 64;
- } else
-#endif
- {
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- int rv;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
- if (rv == -1) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- } else if (rv == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
- } else {
- /* Use default digest for this key type */
- int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
- if (idx >= 0)
- md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
- if (md == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
- || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
- if (hdatalen <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
- if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
- || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- {
- int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
- if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
- || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
- || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
- if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
- data = gost_data;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
- && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
- (int)s->session->master_key_length,
- s->session->master_key)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
- if (0) {
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
- }
- BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
- s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
-#endif
- return ret;
-}
-
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
unsigned long l, llen;
const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
- PACKET spkt;
+ PACKET spkt, context;
+ size_t chainidx;
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
- if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
- || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
+ if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
+ || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
+ || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
+ for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
+ PACKET extensions;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
+ &rawexts, &al, NULL)
+ || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
+ rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
+ }
+
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
+
+ /*
+ * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
+ * message
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
* certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
*/
sk = NULL;
+
+ /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
+ sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
+ &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
goto done;
int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
- CERT_PKEY *cpk;
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
+ int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
if (cpk == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
+ * for the server Certificate message
+ */
+ if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
+ || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return 0;
}
int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned int hlen;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
- int iv_len;
+ int iv_len, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
+ union {
+ unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
+ uint32_t age_add;
+ } age_add_u;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
+ }
/* get session encoding length */
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
* all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
*/
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
/* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
- int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
+ int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
hctx, 1);
if (ret == 0) {
if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
goto err;
if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
+ tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv))
goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
- sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
EVP_sha256(), NULL))
goto err;
- memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
- sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
+ memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
}
/*
* new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
*/
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
+ || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add))
/* Now the actual ticket data */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
|| hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
|| macdata1 != macdata2
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
+ EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ NULL, 0, &al))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
+ * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
+ */
+int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
+ s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->tlsext_status_type)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
goto err;
}
- if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
+ if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
+ s->ext.npn_len = 0;
goto err;
}
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
+ s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
err:
}
#endif
+static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ int al;
+
+ if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+ NULL, 0, &al)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
#define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
return NULL;
}
- if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
- sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
- if (sk == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return NULL;
- }
- } else {
- sk = *skp;
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
+ sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
+ if (sk == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return NULL;
}
- if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
- &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
+ s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
+ s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
+
+ if (sslv2format) {
+ size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n;
+ PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites;
+ unsigned int leadbyte;
+ unsigned char *raw;
+
+ /*
+ * We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some
+ * preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only
+ * ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to
+ * slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a
+ * problem.
+ */
+ raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN);
+ s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw;
+ if (raw == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
+ PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0;
+ raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte)
+ || (leadbyte == 0
+ && !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw,
+ TLS_CIPHER_LEN))
+ || (leadbyte != 0
+ && !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
+ s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
+ s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (leadbyte == 0)
+ s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
+ }
+ } else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
+ &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
}
goto err;
}
- if (skp != NULL)
- *skp = sk;
- return (sk);
+ *skp = sk;
+ return sk;
err:
- if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
return NULL;
}
+
+static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
+ * (should be s->version)
+ */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
+ || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
+ NULL, 0, &al)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = NULL;
+ s->hit = 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff