-/* ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-# include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
* b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
* list if we requested a certificate)
*/
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
- && (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request
- || (!((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
- && (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)))) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
- return 1;
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
+ && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
+ /*
+ * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
+ * not going to accept it because we require a client
+ * cert.
+ */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+ SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE,
+ SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
+ return 1;
+ }
} else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
return 1;
- }
+ }
}
break;
}
/* No valid transition found */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return 0;
}
* the server certificate contains the server's public key for
* key exchange.
*/
- if ( (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
- || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)
/*
* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
* provided
&& (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
/*
* ... except when the application insists on
- * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
+ * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
* this for SSL 3)
*/
|| (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
break;
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
/* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
- if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
/*
* The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
* treat like it was the first packet
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
+ * calculated as follows:
+ *
+ * 2 + # client_version
+ * 32 + # only valid length for random
+ * 1 + # length of session_id
+ * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
+ * 2 + # length of cipher suites
+ * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
+ * 1 + # length of compression_methods
+ * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
+ * 2 + # length of extensions
+ * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
+ */
+#define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
+
#define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
#define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
switch(st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
- return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+ return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
return s->max_cert_list;
len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH],
s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
- dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0,
+ dtls1_set_message_header(s, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0,
len);
len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
unsigned int j, complen = 0;
unsigned long id;
- SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
#endif
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
- int protverr = 1;
+ int protverr;
/* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
int is_v2_record;
+ static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
}
}
- /* Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable */
+ /*
+ * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
+ * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
+ */
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- if (s->client_version >= s->version) {
- protverr = 0;
- }
- } else if (s->client_version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
- switch(s->client_version) {
- default:
- case TLS1_2_VERSION:
- if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
- s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
- s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
- protverr = 0;
- break;
- }
- /* Deliberately fall through */
- case TLS1_1_VERSION:
- if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
- s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
- s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
- protverr = 0;
- break;
- }
- /* Deliberately fall through */
- case TLS1_VERSION:
- if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
- s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
- s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
- protverr = 0;
- break;
- }
- /* Deliberately fall through */
- case SSL3_VERSION:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
- if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
- s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
- s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
- protverr = 0;
- break;
- }
-#else
- break;
-#endif
- }
- }
- } else if (s->client_version <= s->version
- || s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- /*
- * For DTLS we just check versions are potentially compatible. Version
- * negotiation comes later.
- */
+ protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
+ } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
+ DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) {
+ protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
+ } else {
protverr = 0;
}
if (protverr) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
/*
* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
goto f_err;
}
+ if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
goto f_err;
}
- /* Load the client random */
+ /* Load the client random and compression list. */
challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
challenge_len;
memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
- challenge_len, challenge_len)) {
+ challenge_len, challenge_len)
+ /* Advertise only null compression. */
+ || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
- PACKET_null_init(&compression);
PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
} else {
/* Regular ClientHello. */
goto f_err;
}
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
extensions = *pkt;
}
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
+ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
+ PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ /* else cookie verification succeeded */
+ }
+ /* default verification */
+ } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie,
+ s->d1->cookie_len)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
+ }
+ if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
+ if (protverr != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
+ s->version = s->client_version;
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
s->hit = 0;
/*
}
}
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
- if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
- PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- /* else cookie verification succeeded */
- }
- /* default verification */
- } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie,
- s->d1->cookie_len)) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
- }
- if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- /* Select version to use */
- if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
- s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
- s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
- } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
- s->version = s->client_version;
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
- s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
- s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- s->version = s->client_version;
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
- }
- }
-
if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
goto f_err;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
-
+
/* TLS extensions */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
}
if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
- SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
if (k >= complen) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
+ SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
} else if (s->hit)
WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
if (!s->hit) {
int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encodedlen = 0;
int curve_id = 0;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
int al, i;
unsigned long type;
int n;
- BIGNUM *r[4];
+ const BIGNUM *r[4];
int nr[4], kn;
BUF_MEM *buf;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
CERT *cert = s->cert;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
+ DH *dh;
+
if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
- dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
- if (dhp == NULL) {
+ DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
+ pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
+ DH_free(dhp);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
- } else
- dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
- if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
- dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
- if (dhp == NULL) {
+ EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
+ pkdhp = pkdh;
+ } else {
+ pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
+ }
+ if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
+ DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
+ pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
+ if (pkdh == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ pkdhp = pkdh;
+ }
+ if (pkdhp == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
- DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) {
+ EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
}
- if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
- dh = dhp;
- else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp, NID_undef);
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
- s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
- if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
- dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
- (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
- if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
- dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
- if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- r[0] = dh->p;
- r[1] = dh->g;
- r[2] = dh->pub_key;
+ dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
+ pkdh = NULL;
+
+ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
+ DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
+ int nid;
- /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
- int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
- if (nid != NID_undef)
- ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
- if (ecdh == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
- if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
- (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
- (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
- if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
- (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
- (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
- * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
- * non-zero.
- */
- if ((curve_id =
- tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
- == 0) {
+ /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
+ nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
+ curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
+ if (curve_id == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
goto err;
}
-
- /*
- * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
- * allocate memory accordingly.
- */
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- NULL, 0, NULL);
-
- encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
- bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
+ s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(NULL, nid);
+ /* Generate a new key for this curve */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
}
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
+ /* Encode the public key. */
+ encodedlen = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->tmp.pkey),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ &encodedPoint, NULL);
if (encodedlen == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- bn_ctx = NULL;
-
/*
- * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
- * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
- * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
- * structure.
+ * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
+ * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to
+ * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure.
*/
n += 4 + encodedlen;
goto f_err;
}
kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ /* Allow space for signature algorithm */
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+ kn += 2;
+ /* Allow space for signature length */
+ kn += 2;
} else {
pkey = NULL;
kn = 0;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
- int al;
- unsigned int i;
- unsigned long alg_k;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
- DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
- EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+ size_t psklen;
+ PACKET psk_identity;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
+ psk, sizeof(psk));
+
+ if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ } else if (psklen == 0) {
+ /*
+ * PSK related to the given identity not found
+ */
+ *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
+ s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
+
+ return 1;
+#else
+ /* Should never happen */
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
#endif
- PACKET enc_premaster;
- unsigned char *data, *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
+}
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
- if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
- unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
- size_t psklen;
- PACKET psk_identity;
+static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ int decrypt_len;
+ unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
+ size_t j, padding_len;
+ PACKET enc_premaster;
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+ unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ enc_premaster = *pkt;
+ } else {
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
- goto f_err;
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
}
+ }
- if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
+ /*
+ * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
+ * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
+ * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
+ * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
+ */
+ if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
- psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
- psk, sizeof(psk));
+ rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
+ if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- } else if (psklen == 0) {
- /*
- * PSK related to the given identity not found
- */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
- al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
- goto f_err;
- }
+ /*
+ * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
+ * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
+ * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
+ * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
+ * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
+ */
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
- s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
+ if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
+ sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
- if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ /*
+ * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
+ * the timing-sensitive code below.
+ */
+ decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
+ PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
+ rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+ if (decrypt_len < 0)
+ goto err;
- s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
+ /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
+
+ /*
+ * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
+ * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
+ * PS is at least 8 bytes.
+ */
+ if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
}
- if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
- /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
- if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
- unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- int decrypt_len;
- unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
- size_t j;
-
- /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
- pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
- if ((pkey == NULL) ||
- (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
- /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- enc_premaster = *pkt;
- } else {
- PACKET orig = *pkt;
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- /* Try SSLv3 behaviour for TLS. */
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG) {
- enc_premaster = orig;
- } else {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- }
+ padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
+ constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
+ for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
+ decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
+ }
+ decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
- /*
- * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
- * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
- * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
- * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
- */
- if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ /*
+ * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
+ * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
+ * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+ * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
+ * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
+ * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
+ */
+ version_good =
+ constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
+ (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
+ version_good &=
+ constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
+ (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
- rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
- if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ /*
+ * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
+ * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
+ * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
+ * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
+ * version instead if the server does not support the requested
+ * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
+ * clients.
+ */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
+ unsigned char workaround_good;
+ workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
+ (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
+ workaround_good &=
+ constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
+ (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
+ version_good |= workaround_good;
+ }
- /*
- * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
- * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
- * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
- * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
- * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
- */
+ /*
+ * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
+ * remain non-zero (0xff).
+ */
+ decrypt_good &= version_good;
- if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
- sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
- goto err;
- }
+ /*
+ * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
+ * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
+ * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
+ * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
+ rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
+ constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
+ rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
+ rand_premaster_secret[j]);
+ }
- decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
- PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
- rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- ERR_clear_error();
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
+ sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
- /*
- * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
- * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
- */
- decrypt_good =
- constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
+ return ret;
+#else
+ /* Should never happen */
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
- /*
- * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
- * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
- * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
- * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
- * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
- * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
- */
- version_good =
- constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0],
- (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
- version_good &=
- constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
- (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ int al = -1;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
- /*
- * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
- * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
- * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
- * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
- * version instead if the server does not support the requested
- * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
- * clients.
- */
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
- unsigned char workaround_good;
- workaround_good =
- constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
- workaround_good &=
- constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
- (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
- version_good |= workaround_good;
- }
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- /*
- * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
- * remain non-zero (0xff).
- */
- decrypt_good &= version_good;
+ /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
+ goto err;
- /*
- * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
- * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
- * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
- * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
- */
- for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
- rsa_decrypt[j] =
- constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, rsa_decrypt[j],
- rand_premaster_secret[j]);
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
}
-
- if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
- sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
+ /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
- OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
- rsa_decrypt = NULL;
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
+ if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
+ goto err;
} else
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
- int idx = -1;
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
- PACKET bookmark = *pkt;
- unsigned char shared[(OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS + 7) / 8];
+ DH *cdh;
+ unsigned int i;
+ BIGNUM *pub_key;
+ const unsigned char *data;
+ EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)) {
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto err;
}
- if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
- idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
- idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
- if (idx >= 0) {
- skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
- if ((skey == NULL) ||
- (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
- } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
+ skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
+ if (skey == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
- } else
- dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
+ }
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
- /* Get pubkey from cert */
- EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
- if (clkey) {
- if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
- dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
- }
- if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
- pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
- } else {
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
- /* We already checked we have enough data */
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- pub = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
}
- if (pub == NULL) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
+ /* We already checked we have enough data */
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
goto err;
}
+ cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
+ pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
- i = DH_compute_key(shared, pub, dh_srvr);
-
- if (i <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- BN_clear_free(pub);
+ if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (pub_key != NULL)
+ BN_free(pub_key);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
goto err;
}
- DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
- s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
- if (dh_clnt)
- DH_free(dh_clnt);
- else
- BN_clear_free(pub);
- pub = NULL;
- if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 0)) {
+ if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
goto f_err;
}
- if (dh_clnt) {
- s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
- return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
- }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
+ s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
+
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
- int field_size = 0;
- const EC_KEY *tkey;
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- const BIGNUM *priv_key;
- unsigned char *shared;
-
- /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
- if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Let's get server private key and group information */
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
- /* use the certificate */
- tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
- } else {
- /*
- * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
- * ServerKeyExchange msg.
- */
- tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
- }
-
- group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
- priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
-
- if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
- !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Let's get client's public key */
- if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+ EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
+ EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
- /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
-
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
- == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
- /*
- * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
- * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
- * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
- * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
- * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
- * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
- */
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
- pkey.ec)) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
+ /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
} else {
+ unsigned int i;
+ const unsigned char *data;
+
/*
* Get client's public key from encoded point in the
* ClientKeyExchange message.
*/
- if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
/* Get encoded point length */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
- if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, data, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
+ ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey), data, i,
+ NULL) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
goto err;
}
}
- /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
- field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
- if (field_size <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- shared = OPENSSL_malloc((field_size + 7) / 8);
- if (shared == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- i = ECDH_compute_key(shared, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint,
- srvr_ecdh, NULL);
- if (i <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- OPENSSL_free(shared);
- goto err;
- }
-
- EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
- EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
- EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
- s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
-
- if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 1)) {
+ if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
goto f_err;
}
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
+ s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
+
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+ unsigned int i;
+ const unsigned char *data;
+
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
- s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+ s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
- unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
+ unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
+ const unsigned char *start;
size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
unsigned long alg_a;
int Ttag, Tclass;
long Tlen;
long sess_key_len;
+ const unsigned char *data;
/* Get our certificate private key */
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
* EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
* client certificate for authorization only.
*/
- client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (client_pub_pkey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
ERR_clear_error();
(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
- EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
gerr:
- EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
goto f_err;
} else
}
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
err:
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
- EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
- EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
-#endif
+ f_err:
+ if (al != -1)
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
}
#endif
- if (s->statem.no_cert_verify) {
- /* No certificate verify so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
- BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
- s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+ if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
+ /* No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need the
+ * handshake_buffer
+ */
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
} else {
- if (!s->session->peer) {
- /* No peer certificate so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
- BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
- }
if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- unsigned char *sig, *data;
+ const unsigned char *sig, *data;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
+#endif
int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
int type = 0, j;
unsigned int len;
}
peer = s->session->peer;
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
* length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 && pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
+ && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
len = 64;
} else
#endif
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
- || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
- || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
- BUF_reverse(data, NULL, len);
+ {
+ int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
+ if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
+ || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
+ || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
+ if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
+ data = gost_data;
+ }
}
#endif
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
+#endif
return ret;
}
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
X509 *x = NULL;
unsigned long l, llen;
- const unsigned char *certstart;
- unsigned char *certbytes;
+ const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
PACKET spkt;
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
if (pkey == NULL) {
al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
- * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
+ * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
*/
sk = NULL;
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *senc = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
unsigned char *p, *macstart;
const unsigned char *const_p;
unsigned int hlen;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char key_name[16];
+ unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
+ int iv_len;
/* get session encoding length */
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
return 0;
}
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
p = senc;
* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows handshake_header_length +
* 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
- * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
- * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
- * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
+ * sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+ * max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) +
+ * max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length.
*/
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
- SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
- EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
+ SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 + sizeof(key_name) +
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
goto err;
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
* all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
*/
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, hctx, 1) < 0)
+ /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
+ int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
+ hctx, 1);
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ l2n(0, p); /* timeout */
+ s2n(0, p); /* length */
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s)))
+ goto err;
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (ret < 0)
goto err;
+ iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
} else {
- if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
+
+ iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
+ if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
goto err;
- if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
+ sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
EVP_sha256(), NULL))
goto err;
- memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+ memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
+ sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
}
/*
p += 2;
/* Output key name */
macstart = p;
- memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
- p += 16;
+ memcpy(p, key_name, sizeof(key_name));
+ p += sizeof(key_name);
/* output IV */
- memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
- p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ memcpy(p, iv, iv_len);
+ p += iv_len;
/* Encrypt session data */
- if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
+ if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
goto err;
p += len;
- if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
+ if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len))
goto err;
p += len;
if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen))
goto err;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+ ctx = NULL;
+ hctx = NULL;
p += hlen;
/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(senc);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
goto err;
}
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
-#endif
continue;
}
* version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
* downgrade.
*/
- if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) {
+ if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
*al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff