*/
#include <stdio.h>
-#include "../ssl_locl.h"
-#include "statem_locl.h"
-#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+#include "../ssl_local.h"
+#include "statem_local.h"
+#include "internal/constant_time.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/trace.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
+typedef struct {
+ ASN1_TYPE *kxBlob;
+ ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
+} GOST_KX_MESSAGE;
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
+ ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
+
static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
/*
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
break;
- s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
+ /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
+ if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
+ s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
+ } else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3.tmp.new_cipher) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PRE_WORK,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
#endif
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
+ size_t dummy;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
- &s->session->master_key_length)
+ &dummy)
|| !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
/* SSLfatal() already called */
&& master_key_length > 0) {
s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
s->hit = 1;
- s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
+ s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
ciphers = NULL;
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
if (pref_cipher == NULL)
- pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
+ pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
- s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+ s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
- s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+ s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
}
}
#endif
/*
- * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
+ * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
*/
if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
- s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
+ s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
#else
s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
#endif
+ if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
}
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
- if (!s->hit) {
- if (s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
- int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
- if (rv == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (rv < 0) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- return WORK_MORE_B;
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- }
- if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
- /* SSLfatal already called */
+ if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
+ int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+ if (rv < 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return WORK_MORE_B;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
/* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
cipher =
- ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+ ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (cipher == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
goto err;
}
- s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, pkdhp);
if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
const EVP_MD *md;
unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
- size_t siglen, tbslen;
- int rv;
+ size_t siglen = 0, tbslen;
- if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
+ if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
/* Should never happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- /*
- * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
- * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
- * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
- * afterwards.
- */
- siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
- || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
+
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
+ md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_name(md),
+ s->ctx->propq, pkey, s->ctx->libctx) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
- rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
- OPENSSL_free(tbs);
- if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
- || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
+
+ if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0
+ || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
+ || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0
+ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
+ || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
+ OPENSSL_free(tbs);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+ OPENSSL_free(tbs);
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
s->pha_context_len = 32;
if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
- || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0
+ || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->pha_context,
+ s->pha_context_len) <= 0
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- int decrypt_len;
- unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
- size_t j, padding_len;
+ size_t outlen;
PACKET enc_premaster;
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL;
unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
int ret = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
+ rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey;
if (rsa == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
}
}
- /*
- * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
- * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
- * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
- * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
- */
- if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
- RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
- return 0;
- }
-
- rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
+ outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
- /*
- * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
- * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
- * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
- * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
- * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
- */
-
- if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
- sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, rsa, s->ctx->propq);
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/*
- * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
- * the timing-sensitive code below.
+ * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
+ * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
+ * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
+ * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automaticaly decrypt the
+ * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
+ * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
+ * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
+ * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
+ * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
*/
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
- decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
- PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
- rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
- if (decrypt_len < 0) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION,
+ (unsigned int *)&s->client_version);
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0)
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
+ OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION,
+ (unsigned int *)&s->version);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- /*
- * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
- * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
- * PS is at least 8 bytes.
- */
- if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
+ || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen,
+ PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
+ PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
- decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
- constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
- for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
- decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
- }
- decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
-
- /*
- * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
- * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
- * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
- * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
- * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
- * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
- */
- version_good =
- constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
- (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
- version_good &=
- constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
- (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
-
- /*
- * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
- * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
- * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
- * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
- * version instead if the server does not support the requested
- * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
- * clients.
- */
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
- unsigned char workaround_good;
- workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
- (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
- workaround_good &=
- constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
- (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
- version_good |= workaround_good;
- }
-
/*
- * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
- * remain non-zero (0xff).
+ * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
+ * we double check anyway.
*/
- decrypt_good &= version_good;
-
- /*
- * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
- * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
- * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
- * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
- */
- for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
- rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
- constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
- rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
- rand_premaster_secret[j]);
+ if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
}
- if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
- sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
+ /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
+ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
#else
/* Should never happen */
const unsigned char *start;
size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
unsigned long alg_a;
- unsigned int asn1id, asn1len;
+ GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *ptr;
int ret = 0;
- PACKET encdata;
/* Get our certificate private key */
alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
}
- pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq);
if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
ERR_clear_error();
}
- /* Decrypt session key */
- if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &asn1id)
- || asn1id != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
- || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt, &asn1len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
+
+ ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
+ /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
+ * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
+ pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
+ if (pKX == NULL
+ || pKX->kxBlob == NULL
+ || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
}
- if (asn1len == 0x81) {
- /*
- * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else
- * isn't supported.
- * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail
- */
- if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 1)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (asn1len >= 0x80) {
- /*
- * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't
- * support it
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
+
+ if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
- } /* else short form length */
+ }
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encdata)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- inlen = PACKET_remaining(&encdata);
- start = PACKET_data(&encdata);
+
+ inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
+ start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
inlen) <= 0) {
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
return ret;
#else
/* Should never happen */
{
unsigned char *senc = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
+ SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
const unsigned char *const_p;
int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
- unsigned int hlen;
+ size_t hlen;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
}
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
- hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+ hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
* all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
*/
- if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
- /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
- int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
- hctx, 1);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
+#else
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
+#endif
+ {
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
+ ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
+ ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
+ 1);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
+ /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
+ ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
+ ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1);
+#endif
if (ret == 0) {
}
OPENSSL_free(senc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+ ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
return 1;
}
if (ret < 0) {
}
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
} else {
- const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
+ EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
+ s->ctx->propq);
+
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
+ SSL_R_ALGORITHM_FETCH_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
- if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0
+ if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, iv, iv_len) <= 0
|| !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
- || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
- sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
- EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
+ || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
+ "SHA256")) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
}
|| encdata1 + len != encdata2
|| len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
- || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
- (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
- macendoffset - macoffset)
+ || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx,
+ (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
+ macendoffset - macoffset)
|| !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
- || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
+ || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)
|| hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
|| macdata1 != macdata2) {
err:
OPENSSL_free(senc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+ ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
return ok;
}
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
- if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
+ if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, age_add_u.age_add_c,
+ sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff