/*
- * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
#include <stdio.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
+/*
+ * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
+ */
+typedef struct x509err2alert_st {
+ int x509err;
+ int alert;
+} X509ERR2ALERT;
+
+/* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
+const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = {
+ 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
+ 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
+ 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
+};
+
/*
* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
* SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
s->init_num, &written);
if (ret < 0)
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
/*
* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
* ignore the result anyway
+ * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
*/
- if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
- (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
- written))
- return -1;
-
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
+ && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
+ && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE))
+ if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
+ (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
+ written))
+ return -1;
if (written == s->init_num) {
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
(size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
- return (1);
+ return 1;
}
s->init_off += written;
s->init_num -= written;
- return (0);
+ return 0;
}
int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
{
- if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
+ if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
+ }
/* Reset any extension flags */
memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
* ClientHello.
*/
if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
break;
}
if (!ok) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
+ SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
"SSL/TLS version");
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
- } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- /* Renegotiation is disabled */
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
- return 0;
- } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
- !(s->options &
- SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- /*
- * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
- * support secure renegotiation.
- */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return 0;
+ /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
+ tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
} else {
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
+ /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
+ tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
}
} else {
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
- s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
+ tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect);
else
- s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
+ tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
/* mark client_random uninitialized */
memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
} else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
size_t retlen;
retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
- if (retlen <= 0)
+ if (retlen <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
+ }
*hdatalen = retlen;
}
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (mctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Get the data to be signed */
if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
if (sig == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
s->session->master_key)
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
} else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
#endif
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
+ }
OPENSSL_free(sig);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
err:
OPENSSL_free(sig);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
#endif
- int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- int type = 0, j;
+ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ int j;
unsigned int len;
X509 *peer;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
if (mctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
}
peer = s->session->peer;
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
- if (pkey == NULL)
- goto f_err;
-
- type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
- if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
- SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- goto f_err;
+ if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
+ goto err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- int rv;
unsigned int sigalg;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_BAD_PACKET);
+ goto err;
}
- rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
- if (rv == -1) {
- goto f_err;
- } else if (rv == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
+ if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
} else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
/* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
} else
#endif
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
|| (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
+ goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
{
|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
}
BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
data = gost_data;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
}
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
|| !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
(int)s->session->master_key_length,
s->session->master_key)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
}
} else {
j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
if (j <= 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
}
}
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
- if (0) {
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
- }
+ err:
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
size_t slen;
/* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
- if (!s->server)
+ if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
/*
&& !s->server
&& s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0
&& (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
- goto err;
+ SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {;
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
}
if (s->server) {
sender, slen,
s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
if (finish_md_len == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
}
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
/*
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
s->session->master_key,
s->session->master_key_length)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
*/
if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
if (!s->server) {
memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
}
return 1;
- err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
}
int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
return 1;
-
- err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
- int al;
unsigned int updatetype;
s->key_update_count++;
if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
+ SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
/*
* be on a record boundary.
*/
if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
+ SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
/*
*/
if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
&& updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
/*
s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
- err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
* to far.
*/
-static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
{
const char *sender;
size_t slen;
- /*
- * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
- * the appropriate error.
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
- return;
+
if (!s->server) {
sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
}
- s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
- sender,
- slen,
- s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
}
-#endif
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
- int al;
size_t remain;
remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
&& remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
|| (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
- SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+ SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
} else {
if (remain != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
- SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+ SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
}
/* Check we have a cipher to change to */
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
}
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
- int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
size_t md_len;
/* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
- if (s->server)
- s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
+ if (s->server) {
+ /*
+ * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
+ * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less
+ * than TLSv1.3
+ */
+ s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
+ s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
/*
* In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
* message must be on a record boundary.
*/
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
+ SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
/* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
+ SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
+ SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
md_len) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
+ SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
/*
* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
*/
if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (s->server) {
memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
*/
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (s->server) {
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED &&
+ !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
- goto f_err;
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
} else {
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
&s->session->master_key_length)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
- goto f_err;
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
- goto f_err;
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
- if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
- goto f_err;
}
}
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- ossl_statem_set_error(s);
- return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
/* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
-static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain,
- int *al)
+static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain)
{
int len;
unsigned char *outbytes;
len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
if (len < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
+ ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
|| i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
&& !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
- chain, al))
+ chain)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
+ }
return 1;
}
/* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
-static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al)
+static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
{
int i, chain_count;
X509 *x;
STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
X509_STORE *chain_store;
- int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
return 1;
X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
}
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
+ ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ return 0;
}
/*
* It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
#endif
X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
+ return 0;
}
chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
- if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) {
+ if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
- goto err;
+ return 0;
}
}
X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
} else {
i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
if (i != 1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
}
- if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal))
- goto err;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
- if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal))
- goto err;
+ if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
}
}
return 1;
-
- err:
- *al = tmpal;
- return 0;
}
-unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk,
- int *al)
+unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
{
- int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk))
+ return 0;
- if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
- || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- *al = tmpal;
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
+
return 1;
}
* in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
* freed up as well.
*/
-WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs)
+WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop)
{
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
- WORK_STATE ret;
- ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
- if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
- return ret;
- }
-#endif
-
if (clearbufs) {
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf = NULL;
}
- if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s))
+ if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
s->init_num = 0;
}
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server
+ && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
+ s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
+
+ /*
+ * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
+ * post handshake exchange
+ */
if (s->statem.cleanuphand) {
/* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
s->renegotiate = 0;
s->new_session = 0;
s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (s->server) {
- ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
+ * NewSessionTicket
+ */
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
+ /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
+ tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * We are finishing after the client. We start the timer going
+ * in case there are any retransmits of our final flight
+ * required.
+ */
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ }
} else {
- ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /*
+ * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
+ * so we remove this one from the cache.
+ */
+ if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode
+ & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0)
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
+ * NewSessionTicket
+ */
+ ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+ }
if (s->hit)
- s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+ tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit);
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
- s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
- }
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+ tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * We are finishing after the server. We start the timer going
+ * in case there are any retransmits of our final flight
+ * required.
+ */
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ }
+ }
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* done with handshaking */
}
}
- /*
- * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
- * so continue.
- */
- if (!clearbufs)
- return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+ /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+
+ if (!stop) {
+ /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+ }
+
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
}
int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
{
/* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
- int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
+ int skip_message, i, recvd_type;
unsigned char *p;
size_t l, readbytes;
* in the middle of a handshake message.
*/
if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
- SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+ SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
+ SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
+ && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
+ * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
+ * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
+ * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
+ * with a valid cookie.
+ */
+ return 0;
}
s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
return 1;
} else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+ SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
+ SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ return 0;
}
s->init_num += readbytes;
}
n2l3(p, l);
/* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
+ SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ return 0;
}
s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
}
return 1;
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return 0;
}
int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
n -= readbytes;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
* Finished verification.
*/
- if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
- ssl3_take_mac(s);
-#endif
+ if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ *len = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
/* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
s->init_num)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
*len = 0;
return 0;
}
/*
* We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
* processing the message
+ * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
+ * message.
*/
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
- && !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
- s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- *len = 0;
- return 0;
+#define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
+ /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
+ && s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
+ || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ || memcmp(hrrrandom,
+ s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) {
+ if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
+ s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ *len = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
return 1;
}
-int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk)
-{
- if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL)
- return -1;
-
- switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
- default:
- return -1;
- case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
- return SSL_PKEY_RSA;
- case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
- return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- case EVP_PKEY_EC:
- return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
- case EVP_PKEY_ED25519:
- return SSL_PKEY_ED25519;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
- return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
- case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
- return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
- case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
- return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
-#endif
- }
-}
+static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = {
+ {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
+ {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
+ {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
+ {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
+ {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
+ {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
+ {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
+
+ /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
+ {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN}
+};
-int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
+int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err)
{
- int al;
+ const X509ERR2ALERT *tp;
- switch (type) {
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
- al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
- case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
- case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
- case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
- case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
- case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
- case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
- case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
- case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
- case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
- case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
- case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
- case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
- case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
- case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
- al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
- al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
- case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
- case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
- case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
- case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
- case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
- case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
- al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
- al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
- break;
- default:
- al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
- break;
- }
- return (al);
+ for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp)
+ if (tp->x509err == x509err)
+ break;
+ return tp->alert;
}
int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
+ * certificate type, or has PSK configured. Otherwise returns 0.
+ */
+static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s)
+{
+ int i;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
+ return 1;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
+ switch (i) {
+ case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
+ case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
+ case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
+ case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
+ continue;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ssl_has_cert(s, i))
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
* `SSL *` instance
*
* Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
*/
-int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
+int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth)
{
const version_info *vent;
const version_info *table;
for (vent = table;
vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
++vent) {
- if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
- version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
- ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
+ if (vent->cmeth != NULL
+ && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0
+ && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0
+ && (!s->server
+ || version != TLS1_3_VERSION
+ || is_tls13_capable(s))) {
+ if (meth != NULL)
+ *meth = vent->cmeth();
return 1;
}
}
static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
{
if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
- && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
+ && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) {
*dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
} else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
- && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION)
- || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
+ && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)
+ || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL))) {
*dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
} else {
*dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
+ /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
+ if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
+ return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
+
if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
unsigned int best_vers = 0;
const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
PACKET versionslist;
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
+ unsigned int orig_candidate = 0;
suppversions->parsed = 1;
return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
}
+ /*
+ * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
+ * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
+ * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
+ * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
+ * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
+ * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
+ * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
+ */
+ if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION)
+ return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION;
+
while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
- if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
+ if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
+ || candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT_27
+ || candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT_26) {
+ if (best_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION
+ && orig_candidate > candidate_vers)
+ continue;
+ orig_candidate = candidate_vers;
candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
+ } else if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ /* Don't actually accept real TLSv1.3 */
+ continue;
+ }
/*
* TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
* whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
*/
if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
continue;
- for (vent = table;
- vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers;
- ++vent)
- continue;
- if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) {
- const SSL_METHOD *method;
-
- method = vent->smeth();
- if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
- best_vers = candidate_vers;
- best_method = method;
- }
- }
+ if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method))
+ best_vers = candidate_vers;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
/* Trailing data? */
}
if (best_vers > 0) {
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
/*
- * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this
- * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3
+ * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
+ * negotiated TLSv1.3
*/
if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
}
check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
s->version = best_vers;
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
+ if (best_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION)
+ s->version_draft = orig_candidate;
s->method = best_method;
return 0;
}
*
* @s: client SSL handle.
* @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
- * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random
- * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated
+ * @extensions: The extensions received
*
- * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
+ * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
*/
-int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al)
+int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
{
const version_info *vent;
const version_info *table;
int highver = 0;
+ int origv;
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
- if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
- version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
+ origv = s->version;
+ s->version = version;
- if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
- *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
+ /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
+ if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
+ SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions,
+ NULL, 0)) {
+ s->version = origv;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
+ && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ s->version = origv;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+ return 0;
}
switch (s->method->version) {
default:
- if (version != s->version) {
- *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
+ if (s->version != s->method->version) {
+ s->version = origv;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+ SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+ return 0;
}
/*
* If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
* versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
* ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
*/
- return 0;
+ return 1;
case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
table = tls_version_table;
break;
if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
continue;
- if (highver != 0 && version != vent->version)
+ if (highver != 0 && s->version != vent->version)
continue;
+ if (highver == 0 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) != 0)
+ highver = vent->version;
+
method = vent->cmeth();
err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
if (err != 0) {
- if (version == vent->version) {
- *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- return err;
+ if (s->version == vent->version) {
+ s->version = origv;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+ SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, err);
+ return 0;
}
continue;
if (highver == 0)
highver = vent->version;
- if (version != vent->version)
+ if (s->version != vent->version)
continue;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
/* Check for downgrades */
- if (checkdgrd) {
- if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > version) {
- if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
- s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
- - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
- sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
- }
- } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
- && version < TLS1_2_VERSION
- && highver > version) {
- if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
- s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
- - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
- sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
- }
+ if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > s->version) {
+ if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
+ s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
+ sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
+ s->version = origv;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
+ SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
+ && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
+ && highver > s->version) {
+ if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
+ s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
+ sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
+ s->version = origv;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
+ SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ return 0;
}
}
#endif
s->method = method;
- s->version = version;
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
- *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
+ s->version = origv;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ return 0;
}
/*
{
int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
+ /*
+ * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
+ * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
+ return 0;
+
ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
if (ret != 0)
* 1) or 0 otherwise.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, const unsigned char *groups,
+int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
{
size_t i;
if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
- if (group_id == GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0)
+ for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
+ uint16_t group = groups[i];
+
+ if (group_id == group
&& (!checkallow
- || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
+ || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
return 1;
}
}
#endif
/* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
-int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s)
+int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval,
+ size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
+ size_t hrrlen)
{
- unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- size_t hashlen = 0;
+ unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
- /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
- || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ if (hashval == NULL) {
+ hashval = hashvaltmp;
+ hashlen = 0;
+ /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
+ || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp),
+ &hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
}
/* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
- if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
+ if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
+ }
/* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
- msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = hashlen;
+ msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen;
if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
|| !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
+ * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
+ * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
+ */
+ if (hrr != NULL
+ && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen)
+ || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
+ s->s3->tmp.message_size
+ + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
}
-int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
PACKET cadns;
if (ca_sk == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto decerr;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
}
/* get the CA RDNs */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto decerr;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto decerr;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
namestart = namebytes;
if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto decerr;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
+ ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto decerr;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
+ SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
xn = NULL;
return 1;
- decerr:
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
err:
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
X509_NAME_free(xn);
const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
/* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
- if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt))
+ if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
+ }
if (ca_sk != NULL) {
int i;
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
&namebytes)
|| i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
}
- if (!WPACKET_close(pkt))
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
+ }
return 1;
}
/* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
-size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(const SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
+size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
const void *param, size_t paramlen)
{
size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
- if (tbs == NULL)
+ if (tbs == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
+ }
memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
*ptbs = tbs;
return tbslen;
}
+
+/*
+ * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
+ * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
+ */
+int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+
+ s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst,
+ s->s3->handshake_dgst)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
+ * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
+ */
+int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst,
+ s->pha_dgst)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff