if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
return 0;
+ /* Reset any extension flags */
+ memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
+
if (s->server) {
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+ int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
+ * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
+ * ClientHello.
+ */
+ if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
+ DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
+ ok = 1;
+ } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
+ ok = 1;
+ }
+ if (ok)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!ok) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
+ "SSL/TLS version");
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+ } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+ /* Renegotiation is disabled */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ return 0;
} else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
!(s->options &
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
goto err;
}
- if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
- } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
- (int)s->session->master_key_length,
- s->session->master_key)) {
+ }
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
+ || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
+ (int)s->session->master_key_length,
+ s->session->master_key)
+ || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
+
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
- }
-
- if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
+ } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
#endif
int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- int type = 0, j, pktype;
+ int type = 0, j;
unsigned int len;
X509 *peer;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
peer = s->session->peer;
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
- if (pkey == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ if (pkey == NULL)
goto f_err;
- }
- pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
- if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
{
+ int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
- } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
- && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
- (int)s->session->master_key_length,
- s->session->master_key)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto f_err;
}
-
- if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
+ || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
+ (int)s->session->master_key_length,
+ s->session->master_key)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
+ if (j < 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (j == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
}
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
- ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
- else
- ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+ ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
*/
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
s->session->master_key,
- s->session->master_key_length))
- return 0;
+ s->session->master_key_length)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
/*
* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
*/
+ if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
if (!s->server) {
- OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
finish_md_len);
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
} else {
- OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
finish_md_len);
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
}
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
- || (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
- && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)) {
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
goto err;
}
+ /*
+ * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
+ * didn't recognise.
+ */
+ if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
+ && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/*
* If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
* to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
&& remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
|| (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
goto f_err;
}
} else {
if (remain != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
goto f_err;
/*
* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
*/
+ if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
if (s->server) {
- OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
md_len);
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
} else {
- OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
md_len);
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
}
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
+ && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
chain, al))
return 0;
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf = NULL;
}
- ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+ if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s))
+ return WORK_ERROR;
s->init_num = 0;
}
# error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
#endif
+/* Must be in order high to low */
static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
{TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
# error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
#endif
+/* Must be in order high to low */
static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
{DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
return 1;
}
+static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
+{
+ if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
+ && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
+ *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
+ } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
+ && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
+ *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
+ } else {
+ *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
+ }
+}
+
/*
* ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
* client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
*
* Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
*/
-int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
+int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
{
/*-
* With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
+ *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
/*
* If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
* (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
* Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
* a HelloRetryRequest
*/
+ /* fall thru */
case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
table = tls_version_table;
break;
candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
/*
* TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
- * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
+ * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
* moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
*/
if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
return 0;
}
+ check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
s->version = best_vers;
s->method = best_method;
return 0;
continue;
method = vent->smeth();
if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
+ check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
s->version = vent->version;
s->method = method;
return 0;
*
* @s: client SSL handle.
* @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
+ * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random
+ * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated
*
* Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
*/
-int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
+int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al)
{
const version_info *vent;
const version_info *table;
+ int highver = 0;
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
+ if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
+ }
+
switch (s->method->version) {
default:
- if (version != s->version)
+ if (version != s->version) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
+ }
/*
* If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
* (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
const SSL_METHOD *method;
int err;
- if (version != vent->version)
- continue;
if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
- break;
- if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION)
- return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
+ continue;
+
+ if (highver != 0 && version != vent->version)
+ continue;
method = vent->cmeth();
err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
- if (err != 0)
- return err;
+ if (err != 0) {
+ if (version == vent->version) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (highver == 0)
+ highver = vent->version;
+
+ if (version != vent->version)
+ continue;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
+ /* Check for downgrades */
+ if (checkdgrd) {
+ if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > version) {
+ if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
+ s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
+ sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
+ }
+ } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
+ && version < TLS1_2_VERSION
+ && highver > version) {
+ if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
+ s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
+ sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
s->method = method;
s->version = version;
return 0;
}
+ *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
}
/*
- * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
+ * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
* @s: The SSL connection
* @min_version: The minimum supported version
* @max_version: The maximum supported version
* Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
* min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
*/
-int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
- int *max_version)
+int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version)
{
int version;
int hole;
{
int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
- ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
+ ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
- unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
-
- if (group_id == share_id
+ if (group_id == GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0)
&& (!checkallow
|| tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
- break;
+ return 1;
}
}
- /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */
- return i < num_groups;
+ return 0;
}
#endif
{
unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t hashlen = 0;
- unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH] = {
- SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH,
- 0,
- 0,
- 0
- };
+ unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
+
+ memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
/* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
return 0;
/* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
+ msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = hashlen;
if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
|| !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
return 1;
}
+
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
+{
+ return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
+}
+
+int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
+ X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+ PACKET cadns;
+
+ if (ca_sk == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto decerr;
+ }
+ /* get the CA RDNs */
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto decerr;
+ }
+
+ while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
+ const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
+ unsigned int name_len;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto decerr;
+ }
+
+ namestart = namebytes;
+ if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto decerr;
+ }
+ if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto decerr;
+ }
+
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ xn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
+
+ return 1;
+
+ decerr:
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ err:
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
+
+ /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
+ if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ca_sk != NULL) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
+ unsigned char *namebytes;
+ X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
+ int namelen;
+
+ if (name == NULL
+ || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
+ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
+ &namebytes)
+ || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}