return 1;
}
+int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (s->server) {
+ if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+ } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+ !(s->options &
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+ /*
+ * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
+ * support secure renegotiation.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
+
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
+ else
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
+
+ /* mark client_random uninitialized */
+ memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
+ s->hit = 0;
+
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ s->statem.use_timer = 1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
+ * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
+ */
+#define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
+#define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
+
+static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
+ void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
+{
+ static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
+ static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ size_t hashlen;
+
+ /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
+ memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
+ /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
+ if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
+ || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
+ strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
+ else
+ strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
+
+ /*
+ * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
+ * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
+ * that includes the CertVerify itself.
+ */
+ if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
+ || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
+ memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
+ s->cert_verify_hash_len);
+ hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
+ } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *hdata = tls13tbs;
+ *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
+ } else {
+ size_t retlen;
+
+ retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
+ if (retlen <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ *hdatalen = retlen;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
+ const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+ size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
+ void *hdata;
+ unsigned char *sig = NULL;
+ unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ int pktype, ispss = 0;
+
+ pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
+
+ mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (mctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the data to be signed */
+ if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !tls12_get_sigandhash(s, pkt, pkey, md, &ispss)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+ siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
+ if (sig == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ispss) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
+ RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
+ (int)s->session->master_key_length,
+ s->session->master_key)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ {
+ if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
+ || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
+ || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
+ BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(sig);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(sig);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *data;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
+#endif
+ int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ int type = 0, j, pktype;
+ unsigned int len;
+ X509 *peer;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ size_t hdatalen = 0;
+ void *hdata;
+ unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+
+ if (mctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ peer = s->session->peer;
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
+ type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
+
+ if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
+ /*
+ * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
+ * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
+ && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
+ len = 64;
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ int rv;
+ unsigned int sigalg;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
+ if (rv == -1) {
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (rv == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+ } else {
+ /* Use default digest for this key type */
+ int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
+ if (idx >= 0)
+ md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
+ || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ {
+ if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
+ || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
+ || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
+ if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
+ data = gost_data;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
+ RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
+ && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
+ (int)s->session->master_key_length,
+ s->session->master_key)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ else
+ ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+ if (0) {
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ }
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
+#endif
+ return ret;
+}
+
int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
size_t finish_md_len;
goto err;
}
+ /*
+ * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
+ * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length))
+ return 0;
+
/*
* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
*/
}
#endif
-/*
- * Comparison function used in a call to qsort (see tls_collect_extensions()
- * below.)
- * The two arguments |p1| and |p2| are expected to be pointers to RAW_EXTENSIONs
- *
- * Returns:
- * 1 if the type for p1 is greater than p2
- * 0 if the type for p1 and p2 are the same
- * -1 if the type for p1 is less than p2
- */
-static int compare_extensions(const void *p1, const void *p2)
-{
- const RAW_EXTENSION *e1 = (const RAW_EXTENSION *)p1;
- const RAW_EXTENSION *e2 = (const RAW_EXTENSION *)p2;
-
- if (e1->type < e2->type)
- return -1;
- else if (e1->type > e2->type)
- return 1;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Gather a list of all the extensions. We don't actually process the content
- * of the extensions yet, except to check their types.
- *
- * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
- * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
- * This function returns 1 if all extensions are unique and we have parsed their
- * types, and 0 if the extensions contain duplicates, could not be successfully
- * parsed, or an internal error occurred.
- */
-/*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): Refactor ServerHello extension parsing to use this and then
- * remove tls1_check_duplicate_extensions()
- */
-int tls_collect_extensions(PACKET *packet, RAW_EXTENSION **res,
- size_t *numfound, int *ad)
-{
- PACKET extensions = *packet;
- size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
- RAW_EXTENSION *raw_extensions = NULL;
-
- /* First pass: count the extensions. */
- while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
- unsigned int type;
- PACKET extension;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
- !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
- *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto err;
- }
- num_extensions++;
- }
-
- if (num_extensions > 0) {
- raw_extensions = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*raw_extensions)
- * num_extensions);
- if (raw_extensions == NULL) {
- *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Second pass: collect the extensions. */
- for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(packet, &raw_extensions[i].type) ||
- !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(packet,
- &raw_extensions[i].data)) {
- /* This should not happen. */
- *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (PACKET_remaining(packet) != 0) {
- *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
- qsort(raw_extensions, num_extensions, sizeof(*raw_extensions),
- compare_extensions);
- for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
- if (raw_extensions[i - 1].type == raw_extensions[i].type) {
- *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
-
- *res = raw_extensions;
- *numfound = num_extensions;
- return 1;
-
- err:
- OPENSSL_free(raw_extensions);
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al;
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
- int al;
+ int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
size_t md_len;
/* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
goto f_err;
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
}
+ /*
+ * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
+ * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (s->server) {
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
+ &s->session->master_key_length)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return 1;
}
-unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
+/* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
+static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain,
+ int *al)
{
+ int len;
+ unsigned char *outbytes;
+
+ len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
+ || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
+ chain, al))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
+static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al)
+{
+ int i, chain_count;
+ X509 *x;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+ X509_STORE *chain_store;
+ int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ x = cpk->x509;
+
+ /*
+ * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
+ */
+ if (cpk->chain != NULL)
+ extra_certs = cpk->chain;
+ else
+ extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
+
+ if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
+ chain_store = NULL;
+ else if (s->cert->chain_store)
+ chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
+ else
+ chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+
+ if (chain_store != NULL) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+
+ if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
+ * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
+ * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
+ * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
+ */
+ (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
+ /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
+ i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
+ if (i != 1) {
+#if 0
+ /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
+#endif
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
+ for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+
+ if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+ } else {
+ i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
+ if (i != 1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal))
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
+ if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ *al = tmpal;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk,
+ int *al)
+{
+ int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
- || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)
+ || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = tmpal;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+/*
+ * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
+ * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
+ * freed up as well.
+ */
+WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs)
{
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
}
#endif
- /* clean a few things up */
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /*
- * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
- * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
- */
- BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
- s->init_buf = NULL;
+ if (clearbufs) {
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /*
+ * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
+ * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
+ */
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf = NULL;
+ }
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+ s->init_num = 0;
}
- ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
+ if (s->statem.cleanuphand) {
/* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
s->renegotiate = 0;
s->new_session = 0;
+ s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
+
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (s->server) {
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
}
}
+ /*
+ * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
+ * so continue.
+ */
+ if (!clearbufs)
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
}
skip_message = 0;
if (!s->server)
- if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
+ if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
+ && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
/*
* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
* we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
default:
return -1;
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
- return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+ return SSL_PKEY_RSA;
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
switch (server_version) {
default:
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
+ return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
+ /*
+ * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
+ * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
+ * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
+ * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
+ * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
/*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): This check will fail if someone attempts to do
- * renegotiation in TLS1.3 at the moment. We need to ensure we disable
- * renegotiation for TLS1.3
- */
- if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
- return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
- /*
- * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
- * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
- * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
- * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
- * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
+ * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
+ * a HelloRetryRequest
*/
- return 0;
case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
table = tls_version_table;
break;
break;
}
- suppversions = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
- hello->num_extensions,
- TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions);
+ suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
- if (suppversions != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
unsigned int best_vers = 0;
const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
PACKET versionslist;
+ suppversions->parsed = 1;
+
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
/* Trailing or invalid data? */
return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
- if ((int)candidate_vers > s->client_version)
- s->client_version = candidate_vers;
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
+ * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
+ * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
+ */
if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
continue;
for (vent = table;
}
if (best_vers > 0) {
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /*
+ * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this
+ * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3
+ */
+ if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
+ return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
+ return 0;
+ }
s->version = best_vers;
s->method = best_method;
return 0;
/*
* ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
- * the initial ClientHello.
+ * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
*
* @s: client SSL handle.
*
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
- s->client_version = s->version = ver_max;
+ s->version = ver_max;
+
+ /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+
+ s->client_version = ver_max;
return 0;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff