return 1;
}
+int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (s->server) {
+ if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+ } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+ !(s->options &
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+ /*
+ * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
+ * support secure renegotiation.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
+
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
+ else
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
+
+ /* mark client_random uninitialized */
+ memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
+ s->hit = 0;
+
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ s->statem.use_timer = 1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
+ * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
+ */
+#define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
+#define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
+
+static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
+ void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
+{
+ static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
+ static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ size_t hashlen;
+
+ /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
+ memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
+ /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
+ if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
+ || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
+ strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
+ else
+ strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
+
+ /*
+ * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
+ * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
+ * that includes the CertVerify itself.
+ */
+ if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
+ || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
+ memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
+ s->cert_verify_hash_len);
+ hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
+ } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *hdata = tls13tbs;
+ *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
+ } else {
+ size_t retlen;
+
+ retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
+ if (retlen <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ *hdatalen = retlen;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
- unsigned u = 0;
- long hdatalen = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+ size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
void *hdata;
unsigned char *sig = NULL;
+ unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ int pktype, ispss = 0;
+
+ pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (mctx == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
- hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
- if (hdatalen <= 0) {
+ /* Get the data to be signed */
+ if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)&& !tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !tls12_get_sigandhash(s, pkt, pkey, md, &ispss)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
- sig = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey));
+ siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
if (sig == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
- || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
- || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
- && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
- (int)s->session->master_key_length,
- s->session->master_key))
- || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, sig, &u, pkey)) {
+
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ispss) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
+ RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
+ (int)s->session->master_key_length,
+ s->session->master_key)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
{
- int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
- BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, u);
+ BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
}
#endif
- if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, u)) {
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- const unsigned char *sig, *data;
+ const unsigned char *data;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
#endif
- int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
- int type = 0, j;
+ int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ int type = 0, j, pktype;
unsigned int len;
X509 *peer;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
- long hdatalen = 0;
+ size_t hdatalen = 0;
void *hdata;
-
+ unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
if (mctx == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
peer = s->session->peer;
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
{
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
int rv;
+ unsigned int sigalg;
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
- rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
+ rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
if (rv == -1) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
} else if (rv == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
+ md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
goto f_err;
}
- hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
- if (hdatalen <= 0) {
+ if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
- if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
- || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
{
- int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
}
#endif
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
+ if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
+ RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
&& !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
(int)s->session->master_key_length,
s->session->master_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
- if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
- ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ else
+ ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
goto err;
}
+ /*
+ * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
+ * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length))
+ return 0;
+
/*
* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
*/
}
} else {
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0,
+ s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
&s->session->master_key_length)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
return 1;
}
-WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+/*
+ * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
+ * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
+ * freed up as well.
+ */
+WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs)
{
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
}
#endif
- /* clean a few things up */
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /*
- * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
- * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
- */
- BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
- s->init_buf = NULL;
+ if (clearbufs) {
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /*
+ * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
+ * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
+ */
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf = NULL;
+ }
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+ s->init_num = 0;
}
- ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
+ if (s->statem.cleanuphand) {
/* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
s->renegotiate = 0;
s->new_session = 0;
+ s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
+
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (s->server) {
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
}
}
+ /*
+ * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
+ * so continue.
+ */
+ if (!clearbufs)
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
}
skip_message = 0;
if (!s->server)
- if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
+ if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
+ && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
/*
* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
* we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
default:
return -1;
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
- return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+ return SSL_PKEY_RSA;
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
switch (server_version) {
default:
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
+ return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
+ /*
+ * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
+ * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
+ * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
+ * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
+ * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
/*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): This check will fail if someone attempts to do
- * renegotiation in TLS1.3 at the moment. We need to ensure we disable
- * renegotiation for TLS1.3
- */
- if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
- return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
- /*
- * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
- * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
- * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
- * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
- * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
+ * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
+ * a HelloRetryRequest
*/
- return 0;
case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
table = tls_version_table;
break;
}
if (best_vers > 0) {
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /*
+ * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this
+ * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3
+ */
+ if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
+ return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
+ return 0;
+ }
s->version = best_vers;
s->method = best_method;
return 0;
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff