/*
* Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
*/
-int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
unsigned int ilen;
const unsigned char *data;
/* Parse the length byte */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
/* Check that the extension matches */
if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
return 0;
if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
return 0;
* extension.
* - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
*/
-int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
unsigned int servname_type;
PACKET sni, hostname;
return 0;
}
- if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
+ s->session->ext.hostname = NULL;
+ if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->ext.hostname)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
* TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
* fall back to a full handshake.
*/
- s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
- && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
- strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
+ s->servername_done = s->session->ext.hostname
+ && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
+ strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
PACKET srp_I;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
PACKET ec_point_format_list;
if (!s->hit) {
if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
- &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
- &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
+ &s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
+ &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
- if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
- !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
- PACKET_remaining(pkt),
- s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
+ if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb &&
+ !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
+ PACKET_remaining(pkt),
+ s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
PACKET supported_sig_algs;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
- || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
|| PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
- PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs)) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
-int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
- if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
+ /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
+ if (x != NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- if (s->tlsext_status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+ if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
/*
* We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
*/
- s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+ s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
return 1;
}
* We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
* to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
*/
- sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
+ sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
- s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
+ s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
+ if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
} else {
- s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
+ s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
return 0;
}
- if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
+ if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
- sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
+ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts,
X509_EXTENSION_free);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
+ s->ext.ocsp.exts =
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
+ if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
/*
* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
* renegotiation.
- *
- * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
- * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
- * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
- * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
- * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
- * anything like that, but this might change).
- *
- * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
- * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
- * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
- * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
- * Finished message could have been computed.)
*/
- if (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+ if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
+ s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
return 1;
}
* extension, not including type and length. |al| is a pointer to the alert
* value to send in the event of a failure. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
*/
-int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
- if (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0)
+ if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
return 1;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
}
} while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
+ s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
+ s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
&s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
/* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_USE_SRTP,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_USE_SRTP,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
* does nothing.
*/
for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
- const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
+ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
if (sprof->id == id) {
/* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_USE_SRTP,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
-int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+ s->ext.use_etm = 1;
return 1;
}
/*
- * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
- * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
- * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
- * 1) or 0 otherwise.
+ * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
+ * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
+ * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
*/
-static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
- const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups,
- int checkallow)
+int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
- size_t i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ PACKET psk_kex_modes;
+ unsigned int mode;
- if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
+ }
- for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
- unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
-
- if (group_id == share_id
- && (!checkallow
- || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
- break;
- }
+ while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
+ if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
+ s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
+ else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE)
+ s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
}
+#endif
- /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */
- return i < num_groups;
+ return 1;
}
/*
* the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
* If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
*/
-int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
unsigned int group_id;
PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves;
int group_nid, found = 0;
unsigned int curve_flags;
- if (s->hit)
+ if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
return 1;
/* Sanity check */
if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/* Get our list of supported curves */
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
*/
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
|| PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
if (group_nid == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
return 0;
}
group_nid) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return 0;
}
PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
return 0;
}
found = 1;
}
+#endif
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
PACKET supported_groups_list;
return 0;
}
- if (!s->hit
- && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
- &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
- &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups);
+ s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL;
+ s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0;
+ if (!PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
+ &s->session->ext.supportedgroups,
+ &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
-int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
/* The extension must always be empty */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
return 1;
}
+
+int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ PACKET identities, binders, binder;
+ size_t binderoffset, hashsize;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
+ unsigned int id, i;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ uint32_t ticket_age, now, agesec, agems;
+
+ /*
+ * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
+ * ignore this extension
+ */
+ if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode
+ & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
+ PACKET identity;
+ unsigned long ticket_agel;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel;
+
+ ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
+ PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0, &sess);
+ if (ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC || ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ret == TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
+ continue;
+
+ md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2);
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Don't recognise this cipher so we can't use the session.
+ * Ignore it
+ */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ sess = NULL;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): Somehow we need to handle the case of a ticket renewal.
+ * Ignored for now
+ */
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (sess == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize
+ || tls_psk_do_binder(s, md,
+ (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
+ binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL,
+ sess, 0) != 1) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ sess->ext.tick_identity = id;
+
+ now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
+ agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time;
+ agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
+ ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add;
+
+
+ /*
+ * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the client does
+ * it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age is longer than ours
+ * (our ticket age calculation should always be slightly longer than the
+ * client's due to the network latency). Therefore we add 1000ms to our age
+ * calculation to adjust for rounding errors.
+ */
+ if (sess->timeout >= agesec
+ && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
+ && ticket_age <= agems + 1000
+ && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) {
+ /*
+ * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it for early
+ * data
+ */
+ s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
+ }
+
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = sess;
+ return 1;
+err:
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Add the server's renegotiation binding
*/
-int tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding)
return 1;
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-int tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1
- || s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
+ || s->session->ext.hostname == NULL)
return 1;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_stoc_early_data_info(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ if (s->max_early_data == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data_info)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA_INFO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-int tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
- && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
+ && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL);
const unsigned char *plist;
size_t plistlen;
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
#endif
-int tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
- if (!s->tlsext_ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+ if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
return 1;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
-int tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
- if (!s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ if (!s->ext.status_expected)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
return 1;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
+ * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
+ * separate message
+ */
+ if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt))
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
#endif
-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-int tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
const unsigned char *npa;
unsigned int npalen;
int ret;
- int next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
+ int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
- if (!next_proto_neg_seen || s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb == NULL)
+ s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
+ if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
return 1;
- ret = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
- s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
+ ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
+ s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+ s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
-int tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
return 1;
s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-int tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
return 1;
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
#endif
-int tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
- if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) == 0)
+ if (!s->ext.use_etm)
return 1;
/*
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+ s->ext.use_etm = 0;
return 1;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-int tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
return 1;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-int tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
unsigned char *encodedPoint;
size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
- if (s->hit)
- return 1;
-
if (ckey == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ /* No key_share received from client */
+ if (s->hello_retry_request) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Must be resuming. */
+ if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
if (skey == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/* Generate encoding of server key */
encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
return 0;
}
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
return 0;
/* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
+#endif
return 1;
}
-int tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
return 1;
if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ if (!s->hit)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_identity)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff