/*
- * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
-#include "../ssl_locl.h"
-#include "statem_locl.h"
+#include "../ssl_local.h"
+#include "statem_local.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+#define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 0
+
+/*
+ * 2 bytes for packet length, 2 bytes for format version, 2 bytes for
+ * protocol version, 2 bytes for group id, 2 bytes for cipher id, 1 byte for
+ * key_share present flag, 4 bytes for timestamp, 2 bytes for the hashlen,
+ * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE for transcript hash, 1 byte for app cookie length, app cookie
+ * length bytes, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes for the HMAC of the whole thing.
+ */
+#define MAX_COOKIE_SIZE (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 4 + 2 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1 \
+ + SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+
+/*
+ * Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes +
+ * + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id
+ * + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression
+ * + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension
+ * + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie
+ */
+#define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \
+ + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \
+ + MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)
/*
* Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
*/
int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned int ilen;
const unsigned char *data;
/* Parse the length byte */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
- SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
+ SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
return 0;
}
/* Check that the extension matches */
- if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
- SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ if (ilen != s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
+ SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
- if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
- s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
- SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ if (memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
+ s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
+ SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
- s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
+ s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
return 1;
}
* - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
*/
int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned int servname_type;
PACKET sni, hostname;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
/* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
|| PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/*
- * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
- * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
- * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
- * such.
+ * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366
+ * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations,
+ * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types.
* RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
* is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
* SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
|| servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
|| !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
- if (!s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.2 and below the SNI is associated with the session. In TLSv1.3
+ * we always use the SNI value from the handshake.
+ */
+ if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
- s->session->ext.hostname = NULL;
- if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->ext.hostname)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ /*
+ * Store the requested SNI in the SSL as temporary storage.
+ * If we accept it, it will get stored in the SSL_SESSION as well.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname);
+ s->ext.hostname = NULL;
+ if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->ext.hostname)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->servername_done = 1;
} else {
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.2 and below we should check if the SNI is consistent between
+ * the initial handshake and the resumption. In TLSv1.3 SNI is not
+ * associated with the session.
+ */
/*
* TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
* fall back to a full handshake.
*/
- s->servername_done = s->session->ext.hostname
+ s->servername_done = (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
&& PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
}
return 1;
}
+int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ unsigned int value;
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */
+ if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
+ SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session
+ * including session resumptions.
+ * We should receive the same code as in resumed session !
+ */
+ if (s->hit && s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode != value) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
+ SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us
+ * and we'll include it in a next Server Hello.
+ */
+ s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
+ return 1;
+}
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET srp_I;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
|| PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
* upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
*/
if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET ec_point_format_list;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
- &s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
- &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ &s->ext.peer_ecpointformats,
+ &s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb &&
!s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
PACKET_remaining(pkt),
s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ PACKET supported_sig_algs;
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
}
int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET supported_sig_algs;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
|| PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
- if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
+ /* We ignore this in a resumption handshake */
+ if (s->hit)
+ return 1;
+
/* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
if (x != NULL)
return 1;
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
} else {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
|| PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
(int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
if (id == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+
return 0;
}
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+
return 0;
}
}
/* Read in request_extensions */
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
s->ext.ocsp.exts =
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ size_t chainidx)
{
/*
* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
* renegotiation.
*/
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
- s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
+ s->s3.npn_seen = 1;
return 1;
}
/*
* Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
- * extension, not including type and length. |al| is a pointer to the alert
- * value to send in the event of a failure. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ * extension, not including type and length. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
*/
int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/* Protocol names can't be empty. */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
|| PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
} while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
- s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
- s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_proposed);
+ s->s3.alpn_proposed = NULL;
+ s->s3.alpn_proposed_len = 0;
if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
- &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ &s->s3.alpn_proposed, &s->s3.alpn_proposed_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ size_t chainidx)
{
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
/* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
+ SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
return 0;
}
/* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
+ SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
+ SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
return 0;
}
#endif
int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ size_t chainidx)
{
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
s->ext.use_etm = 1;
/*
* Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
* the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
- * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
*/
int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
PACKET psk_kex_modes;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes)
|| PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
- else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE)
+ else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
+ && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0)
s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
}
#endif
/*
* Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
* the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
- * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
*/
int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
unsigned int group_id;
PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
- const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves;
- size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves;
- int group_nid, found = 0;
- unsigned int curve_flags;
+ const uint16_t *clntgroups, *srvrgroups;
+ size_t clnt_num_groups, srvr_num_groups;
+ int found = 0;
if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
return 1;
/* Sanity check */
- if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
- /* Get our list of supported curves */
- if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* Get our list of supported groups */
+ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &srvrgroups, &srvr_num_groups);
+ /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
+ tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
+ if (clnt_num_groups == 0) {
+ /*
+ * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent,
+ * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that
+ * extension.
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
- /*
- * Get the clients list of supported curves.
- * TODO(TLS1.3): We should validate that we actually received
- * supported_groups!
- */
- if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (s->s3.group_id != 0 && PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) == 0) {
+ /*
+ * If we set a group_id already, then we must have sent an HRR
+ * requesting a new key_share. If we haven't got one then that is an
+ * error
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
|| PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (found)
continue;
+ /*
+ * If we sent an HRR then the key_share sent back MUST be for the group
+ * we requested, and must be the only key_share sent.
+ */
+ if (s->s3.group_id != 0
+ && (group_id != s->s3.group_id
+ || PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) != 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
/* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
- if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
+ if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
/* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
- if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) {
+ if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups, 1)) {
/* Share not suitable */
continue;
}
- group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
-
- if (group_nid == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
+ if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, group_id)) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
- if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
- /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
- EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ s->s3.group_id = group_id;
- if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- EVP_PKEY_free(key);
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
- } else {
- /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
-
- if (pctx == NULL
- || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
- group_nid) <= 0
- || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- return 0;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- pctx = NULL;
- }
- s->s3->group_id = group_id;
-
- if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.peer_tmp,
PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ unsigned int format, version, key_share, group_id;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *hctx;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ PACKET cookie, raw, chhash, appcookie;
+ WPACKET hrrpkt;
+ const unsigned char *data, *mdin, *ciphdata;
+ unsigned char hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char hrr[MAX_HRR_SIZE];
+ size_t rawlen, hmaclen, hrrlen, ciphlen;
+ unsigned long tm, now;
+
+ /* Ignore any cookie if we're not set up to verify it */
+ if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL
+ || (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ raw = cookie;
+ data = PACKET_data(&raw);
+ rawlen = PACKET_remaining(&raw);
+ if (rawlen < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ || !PACKET_forward(&raw, rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ mdin = PACKET_data(&raw);
+
+ /* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */
+ hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
+ s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
+ sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
+ .cookie_hmac_key));
+ if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(hctx, NULL, "SHA2-256", s->ctx->propq, pkey,
+ s->ctx->libctx) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, data,
+ rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0
+ || hmaclen != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac, mdin, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &format)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Check the cookie format is something we recognise. Ignore it if not */
+ if (format != COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * The rest of these checks really shouldn't fail since we have verified the
+ * HMAC above.
+ */
+
+ /* Check the version number is sane */
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &version)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &group_id)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ciphdata = PACKET_data(&cookie);
+ if (!PACKET_forward(&cookie, 2)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (group_id != s->s3.group_id
+ || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher
+ != ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, ciphdata, 0)) {
+ /*
+ * We chose a different cipher or group id this time around to what is
+ * in the cookie. Something must have changed.
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&cookie, &key_share)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_4(&cookie, &tm)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&cookie, &chhash)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cookie, &appcookie)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&cookie) != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* We tolerate a cookie age of up to 10 minutes (= 60 * 10 seconds) */
+ now = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ if (tm > now || (now - tm) > 600) {
+ /* Cookie is stale. Ignore it */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify the app cookie */
+ if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&appcookie),
+ PACKET_remaining(&appcookie)) == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reconstruct the HRR that we would have sent in response to the original
+ * ClientHello so we can add it to the transcript hash.
+ * Note: This won't work with custom HRR extensions
+ */
+ if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&hrrpkt, hrr, sizeof(hrr), 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&hrrpkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(&hrrpkt, hrrrandom, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&hrrpkt, s->tmp_session_id,
+ s->tmp_session_id_len)
+ || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, &hrrpkt,
+ &ciphlen)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, 0)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)) {
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->version)
+ || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (key_share) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->s3.group_id)
+ || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&hrrpkt, data, rawlen)
+ || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* cookie extension */
+ || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* extension block */
+ || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* message */
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&hrrpkt, &hrrlen)
+ || !WPACKET_finish(&hrrpkt)) {
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Reconstruct the transcript hash */
+ if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, PACKET_data(&chhash),
+ PACKET_remaining(&chhash), hrr,
+ hrrlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */
+ s->hello_retry_request = 1;
+
+ s->ext.cookieok = 1;
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET supported_groups_list;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
|| (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups);
- s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL;
- s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0;
- if (!PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
- &s->session->ext.supportedgroups,
- &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
+ if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_supportedgroups);
+ s->ext.peer_supportedgroups = NULL;
+ s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len = 0;
+ if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list,
+ &s->ext.peer_supportedgroups,
+ &s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
return 1;
#endif
int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ size_t chainidx)
{
/* The extension must always be empty */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EMS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+ return 1;
+
+ s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
return 1;
}
+
+int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *tick,
+ SSL_SESSION **sess)
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *tmpsess = NULL;
+
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
+
+ switch (PACKET_remaining(tick)) {
+ case 0:
+ return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
+
+ case SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH:
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
+ }
+
+ tmpsess = lookup_sess_in_cache(s, PACKET_data(tick),
+ SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
+
+ if (tmpsess == NULL)
+ return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
+
+ *sess = tmpsess;
+ return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
+}
+
int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+ size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET identities, binders, binder;
size_t binderoffset, hashsize;
SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
- unsigned int id, i;
+ unsigned int id, i, ext = 0;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
/*
return 1;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
PACKET identity;
- unsigned long ticket_age;
- int ret;
+ unsigned long ticket_agel;
+ size_t idlen;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
- || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_age)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): Should we validate the ticket age? */
-
- ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
- PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0, &sess);
- if (ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC || ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ idlen = PACKET_remaining(&identity);
+ if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL
+ && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity), idlen,
+ &sess)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
- if (ret == TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
- continue;
- md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2);
- if (md == NULL) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if(sess == NULL
+ && s->psk_server_callback != NULL
+ && idlen <= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ char *pskid = NULL;
+ unsigned char pskdata[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+ unsigned int pskdatalen;
+
+ if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity, &pskid)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pskdatalen = s->psk_server_callback(s, pskid, pskdata,
+ sizeof(pskdata));
+ OPENSSL_free(pskid);
+ if (pskdatalen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ } else if (pskdatalen > 0) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+ const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
+
+ /*
+ * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
+ * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
+ */
+ cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sess = SSL_SESSION_new();
+ if (sess == NULL
+ || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess, pskdata,
+ pskdatalen)
+ || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher)
+ || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess,
+ TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+
+ if (sess != NULL) {
+ /* We found a PSK */
+ SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0);
+
+ if (sesstmp == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ sess = sesstmp;
+
+ /*
+ * We've just been told to use this session for this context so
+ * make sure the sid_ctx matches up.
+ */
+ memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
+ sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
+ ext = 1;
+ if (id == 0)
+ s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
+ } else {
+ uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems;
+ int ret;
+
/*
- * Don't recognise this cipher so we can't use the session.
- * Ignore it
+ * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
+ * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
+ * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
*/
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
+ || (s->max_early_data > 0
+ && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))
+ ret = tls_get_stateful_ticket(s, &identity, &sess);
+ else
+ ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
+ PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0,
+ &sess);
+
+ if (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
+ || ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ret == SSL_TICKET_NONE || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Check for replay */
+ if (s->max_early_data > 0
+ && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0
+ && !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, sess)) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ sess = NULL;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel;
+ now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
+ agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time;
+ agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
+ ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add;
+
+ /*
+ * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the
+ * client does it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age
+ * is longer than ours (our ticket age calculation should always be
+ * slightly longer than the client's due to the network latency).
+ * Therefore we add 1000ms to our age calculation to adjust for
+ * rounding errors.
+ */
+ if (id == 0
+ && sess->timeout >= (long)agesec
+ && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
+ && ticket_age <= agems + 1000
+ && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) {
+ /*
+ * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it
+ * for early data
+ */
+ s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ md = ssl_md(s->ctx, sess->cipher->algorithm2);
+ if (!EVP_MD_is_a(md,
+ EVP_MD_name(ssl_md(s->ctx, s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)))) {
+ /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
sess = NULL;
+ s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
continue;
}
-
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): Somehow we need to handle the case of a ticket renewal.
- * Ignored for now
- */
-
break;
}
hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
goto err;
}
for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
goto err;
}
}
- if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize
- || tls_psk_do_binder(s, md,
- (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
- binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL,
- sess, 0) != 1) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
+ binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, sess, 0,
+ ext) != 1) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
- sess->ext.tick_identity = id;
+ s->ext.tick_identity = id;
+
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = sess;
return 1;
err:
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
return 0;
}
+int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
+ SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* Add the server's renegotiation binding
*/
-int tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
{
- if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- return 1;
+ if (!s->s3.send_connection_binding)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+ /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
- s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
- || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
- s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
+ s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.previous_server_finished,
+ s->s3.previous_server_finished_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
-int tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
{
- if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1
- || s->session->ext.hostname == NULL)
- return 1;
+ if (s->servername_done != 1)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ /*
+ * Prior to TLSv1.3 we ignore any SNI in the current handshake if resuming.
+ * We just use the servername from the initial handshake.
+ */
+ if (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
-int tls_construct_stoc_early_data_info(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
- unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+/* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
{
- if (s->max_early_data == 0)
- return 1;
+ if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data_info)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA_INFO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ /*-
+ * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
+ * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
+ */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-int tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
{
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ unsigned long alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
- && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL);
+ && (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats != NULL);
const unsigned char *plist;
size_t plistlen;
if (!using_ecc)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+ const uint16_t *groups;
+ size_t numgroups, i, first = 1;
+
+ /* s->s3.group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */
+ if (s->s3.group_id == 0)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ /* Get our list of supported groups */
+ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &numgroups);
+ if (numgroups == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy group ID if supported */
+ for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++) {
+ uint16_t group = groups[i];
+
+ if (tls_valid_group(s, group, SSL_version(s))
+ && tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
+ if (first) {
+ /*
+ * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If
+ * so we don't need to add this extension
+ */
+ if (s->s3.group_id == group)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ /* Add extension header */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
+ /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ first = 0;
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
-int tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
- unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
{
if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
-int tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
- unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
{
+ /* We don't currently support this extension inside a CertificateRequest */
+ if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
if (!s->ext.status_expected)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/*
* send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
* separate message
*/
- if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt))
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-int tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
- unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
{
const unsigned char *npa;
unsigned int npalen;
int ret;
- int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen;
+ int npn_seen = s->s3.npn_seen;
- s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
+ s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
+ s->s3.npn_seen = 1;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
-int tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
- return 1;
+ if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3.alpn_selected,
+ s->s3.alpn_selected_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-int tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
{
if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
-int tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (!s->ext.use_etm)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/*
* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
* for other cases too.
*/
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
- || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
- || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
- || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
+ || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
+ || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
+ || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
s->ext.use_etm = 0;
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
-int tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
- if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
- return 1;
+ if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
-int tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+ if (!ossl_assert(SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
unsigned char *encodedPoint;
size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
- EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3.peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
- if (ckey == NULL) {
- /* No key_share received from client */
- if (s->hello_retry_request) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
+ if (ckey != NULL) {
+ /* Original key_share was acceptable so don't ask for another one */
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- /* Must be resuming. */
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+ }
+
+ if (ckey == NULL) {
+ /* No key_share received from client - must be resuming */
if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
+ skey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, ckey);
if (skey == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/* Generate encoding of server key */
encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
+ ERR_R_EC_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
/* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
- s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = skey;
if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+#else
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
#endif
+}
- return 1;
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ unsigned char *hashval1, *hashval2, *appcookie1, *appcookie2, *cookie;
+ unsigned char *hmac, *hmac2;
+ size_t startlen, ciphlen, totcookielen, hashlen, hmaclen, appcookielen;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *hctx;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ int ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+
+ if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
+ SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &startlen)
+ || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, MAX_COOKIE_SIZE, &cookie)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)
+ || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt,
+ &ciphlen)
+ /* Is there a key_share extension present in this HRR? */
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, (unsigned int)time(NULL))
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashval1)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get the hash of the initial ClientHello. ssl_handshake_hash() operates
+ * on raw buffers, so we first reserve sufficient bytes (above) and then
+ * subsequently allocate them (below)
+ */
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
+ || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval1, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hashlen, &hashval2)
+ || !ossl_assert(hashval1 == hashval2)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH, &appcookie1)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate the application cookie */
+ if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb(s, appcookie1, &appcookielen) == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, appcookielen, &appcookie2)
+ || !ossl_assert(appcookie1 == appcookie2)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &totcookielen)
+ || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &hmac)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+ totcookielen -= startlen;
+ if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /* HMAC the cookie */
+ hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
+ s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
+ sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
+ .cookie_hmac_key));
+ if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(hctx, NULL, "SHA2-256", s->ctx->propq, pkey,
+ s->ctx->libctx) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, cookie,
+ totcookielen) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen + hmaclen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hmaclen, &hmac2)
+ || !ossl_assert(hmac == hmac2)
+ || !ossl_assert(cookie == hmac - totcookielen)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return ret;
+#else
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+#endif
}
-int tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
{
const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
};
- if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
- && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
+ if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
+ && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
|| (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+ if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
+ if (s->max_early_data == 0)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+ }
+
+ if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
-int tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (!s->hit)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_identity)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->ext.tick_identity)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff