/*
- * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
/*
- * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
- * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
- * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
- * such.
+ * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366
+ * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations,
+ * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types.
* RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
* is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
* SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
* upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
*/
if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
&s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
&s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
!s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
PACKET_remaining(pkt),
s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
&s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
- else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE)
+ else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
+ && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0)
s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
}
#endif
}
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
- /*
- * Get the clients list of supported curves.
- * TODO(TLS1.3): We should validate that we actually received
- * supported_groups!
- */
+ /* Get the clients list of supported curves. */
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
+ if (clnt_num_curves == 0) {
+ /*
+ * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent,
+ * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that
+ * extension.
+ */
+ *al = SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
|| PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
/* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups);
- s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL;
- s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0;
- if (!PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
- &s->session->ext.supportedgroups,
- &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
+ if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups);
+ s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL;
+ s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0;
+ if (!PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
+ &s->session->ext.supportedgroups,
+ &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
}
return 1;
return 0;
}
+ if (s->hello_retry_request) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
return 1;
}
PACKET identities, binders, binder;
size_t binderoffset, hashsize;
SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
- unsigned int id, i;
+ unsigned int id, i, ext = 0;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
- uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems;
/*
* If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
PACKET identity;
unsigned long ticket_agel;
- int ret;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
|| !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
return 0;
}
- ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel;
-
- ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
- PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0, &sess);
- if (ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC || ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
+ if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL
+ && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
+ PACKET_remaining(&identity),
+ &sess)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- if (ret == TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
- continue;
- md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2);
- if (md == NULL) {
+ if (sess != NULL) {
+ /* We found a PSK */
+ SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0);
+
+ if (sesstmp == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ sess = sesstmp;
+
/*
- * Don't recognise this cipher so we can't use the session.
- * Ignore it
+ * We've just been told to use this session for this context so
+ * make sure the sid_ctx matches up.
*/
+ memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
+ sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
+ ext = 1;
+ s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
+ } else {
+ uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems;
+ int ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
+ PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0,
+ &sess);
+
+ if (ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
+ || ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ret == TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
+ continue;
+
+ ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel;
+ now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
+ agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time;
+ agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
+ ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add;
+
+ /*
+ * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the
+ * client does it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age
+ * is longer than ours (our ticket age calculation should always be
+ * slightly longer than the client's due to the network latency).
+ * Therefore we add 1000ms to our age calculation to adjust for
+ * rounding errors.
+ */
+ if (sess->timeout >= (long)agesec
+ && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
+ && ticket_age <= agems + 1000
+ && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) {
+ /*
+ * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it
+ * for early data
+ */
+ s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2);
+ if (md != ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)) {
+ /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
sess = NULL;
continue;
}
-
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): Somehow we need to handle the case of a ticket renewal.
- * Ignored for now
- */
-
break;
}
|| tls_psk_do_binder(s, md,
(const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL,
- sess, 0) != 1) {
+ sess, 0, ext) != 1) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
sess->ext.tick_identity = id;
- now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
- agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time;
- agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
- ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add;
-
-
- /*
- * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the client does
- * it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age is longer than ours
- * (our ticket age calculation should always be slightly longer than the
- * client's due to the network latency). Therefore we add 1000ms to our age
- * calculation to adjust for rounding errors.
- */
- if (sess->timeout >= (long)agesec
- && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
- && ticket_age <= agems + 1000
- && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) {
- /*
- * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it for early
- * data
- */
- s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
- }
-
-
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = sess;
return 1;
/*
* Add the server's renegotiation binding
*/
-int tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+ /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
-int tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1
|| s->session->ext.hostname == NULL)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-int tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
size_t plistlen;
if (!using_ecc)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
-int tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
- unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
const unsigned char *groups;
size_t numgroups, i, first = 1;
/* s->s3->group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */
if (s->s3->group_id == 0)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/* Get our list of supported groups */
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &groups, &numgroups) || numgroups == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/* Copy group ID if supported */
* so we don't need to add this extension
*/
if (s->s3->group_id == GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0))
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/* Add extension header */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
first = 0;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
+#endif
-int tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
- unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
-int tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
- unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (!s->ext.status_expected)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/*
if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt))
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-int tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
- unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
const unsigned char *npa;
unsigned int npalen;
s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
-int tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-int tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
-int tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (!s->ext.use_etm)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/*
* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
s->ext.use_etm = 0;
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
-int tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
-int tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
unsigned char *encodedPoint;
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
/* Must be resuming. */
if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
if (skey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/* Generate encoding of server key */
if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
#endif
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
-int tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
&& (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
|| (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
-int tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
if (s->max_early_data == 0)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
-int tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (!s->hit)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_identity)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff