/*
- * Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
-#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include "../ssl_local.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include "statem_locl.h"
+#include "statem_local.h"
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(SSL_CIPHER)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID)
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
- s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
+ s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-static int use_ecc(SSL *s)
+static int use_ecc(SSL *s, int min_version, int max_version)
{
- int i, end;
+ int i, end, ret = 0;
unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL;
+ const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
+ size_t num_groups, j;
/* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
return 0;
- cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+ cipher_stack = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(s);
end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack);
for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
|| (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
- || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
+ || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack);
+ if (!ret)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check we have at least one EC supported group */
+ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
+ for (j = 0; j < num_groups; j++) {
+ uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[j];
+
+ if (tls_valid_group(s, ctmp, min_version, max_version)
+ && tls_group_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
return 1;
}
{
const unsigned char *pformats;
size_t num_formats;
+ int reason, min_version, max_version;
- if (!use_ecc(s))
+ reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
+ if (reason != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, reason);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ if (!use_ecc(s, min_version, max_version))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
size_t num_groups = 0, i;
+ int min_version, max_version, reason;
- if (!use_ecc(s))
+ reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
+ if (reason != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, reason);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
+ if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+#else
+ if (!use_ecc(s, min_version, max_version) && max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+#endif
/*
* Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
*/
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
/* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- /* Copy curve ID if supported */
+ /* Copy group ID if supported */
for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i];
- if (tls_curve_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
+ if (tls_valid_group(s, ctmp, min_version, max_version)
+ && tls_group_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
- }
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
}
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
- s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
+ s->s3.alpn_sent = 0;
if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
+ s->s3.alpn_sent = 1;
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS,
{
int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
- reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
+ reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
if (reason != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to whether
- * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
- * reviewed later.
- */
for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
- if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
- }
- } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
size_t encodedlen;
- if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
/*
* Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
*/
- key_share_key = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
+ key_share_key = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
} else {
key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
if (key_share_key == NULL) {
* going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
* we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
*/
- s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
- s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
+ s->s3.group_id = curve_id;
OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
return 1;
err:
- if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL)
+ if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
return 0;
* TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
* now, just send one
*/
- if (s->s3->group_id != 0) {
- curve_id = s->s3->group_id;
+ if (s->s3.group_id != 0) {
+ curve_id = s->s3.group_id;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
- if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
+ if (!tls_group_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
continue;
curve_id = pgroups[i];
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
-#endif
-
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+#else
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+#endif
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
const unsigned char *id = NULL;
size_t idlen = 0;
SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL;
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (psksess == NULL && s->psk_client_callback != NULL) {
+ unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+ size_t psklen = 0;
+
+ memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
+ psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, NULL, identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
+ psk, sizeof(psk));
+
+ if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ } else if (psklen > 0) {
+ const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+ idlen = strlen(identity);
+ if (idlen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ id = (unsigned char *)identity;
+
+ /*
+ * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
+ * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
+ */
+ cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ psksess = SSL_SESSION_new();
+ if (psksess == NULL
+ || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess, psk, psklen)
+ || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess, cipher)
+ || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+
SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
s->psksession = psksess;
if (psksess != NULL) {
if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION
&& s->session->ext.ticklen != 0
&& s->session->cipher != NULL) {
- const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->ctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
if (md != NULL) {
/*
const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
int dores = 0;
- s->session->ext.tick_identity = TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY;
+ s->ext.tick_identity = 0;
/*
* Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- mdres = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
+ mdres = ssl_md(s->ctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
if (mdres == NULL) {
/*
* Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
*/
now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time;
+ /*
+ * We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to
+ * rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is
+ * better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when
+ * the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be
+ * bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never
+ * happen.
+ */
+ if (agesec > 0)
+ agesec--;
if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
/* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres);
+ s->ext.tick_identity++;
dores = 1;
}
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (s->psksession != NULL) {
- mdpsk = ssl_md(s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2);
+ mdpsk = ssl_md(s->ctx, s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2);
if (mdpsk == NULL) {
/*
* Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
+ s->ext.tick_identity++;
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- if (dores)
- s->session->ext.tick_identity = 0;
- if (s->psksession != NULL)
- s->psksession->ext.tick_identity = (dores ? 1 : 0);
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+#else
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+#endif
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ if (!s->pha_enabled)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
#else
#endif
}
+
/*
* Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
*/
int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
- size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
- + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
+ size_t expected_len = s->s3.previous_client_finished_len
+ + s->s3.previous_server_finished_len;
size_t ilen;
const unsigned char *data;
/* Check for logic errors */
if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
- || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0)
+ || s->s3.previous_client_finished_len != 0)
|| !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
- || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0)) {
+ || s->s3.previous_server_finished_len != 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
return 0;
}
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
- || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
- s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
+ || memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
+ s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
- || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
- s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3.previous_server_finished_len)
+ || memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_server_finished,
+ s->s3.previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
- s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
+ s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
return 1;
}
unsigned int value;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
- unsigned int ecpointformats_len;
+ size_t ecpointformats_len;
PACKET ecptformatlist;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) {
}
if (!s->hit) {
ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist);
- s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = 0;
+ if (ecpointformats_len == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.ecpointformats);
- s->session->ext.ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
- if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL) {
+ s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
+ s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
+ if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
+ s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
- s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
+ s->ext.peer_ecpointformats,
ecpointformats_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
+ if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
+ /* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
/*
* MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
* request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
+ if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
+ /* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
/*
* Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
* callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len);
s->ext.npn_len = selected_len;
- s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
+ s->s3.npn_seen = 1;
return 1;
}
size_t len;
/* We must have requested it. */
- if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
+ if (!s->s3.alpn_sent) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
+ s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+ if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.alpn_selected, len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
+ s->s3.alpn_selected_len = len;
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
|| s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len
- || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)
+ || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected, len)
!= 0) {
/* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */
s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
- /* If a new session then update it with the selected ALPN */
+ /*
+ * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been
+ * initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN.
+ */
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
- OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
+ OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
}
return 1;
{
/* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
- && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
- && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
+ && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
+ && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
s->ext.use_etm = 1;
return 1;
int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+ return 1;
+ s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
if (!s->hit)
s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
return 0;
}
- /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
- if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
- version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
+ /*
+ * The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in
+ * a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else.
+ */
+ if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
+ SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */
+ if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST)
+ return 1;
/* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */
s->version = version;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
unsigned int group_id;
PACKET encoded_pt;
- EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3.tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
/* Sanity check */
- if (ckey == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
+ if (ckey == NULL || s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
* It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
* already sent in the first ClientHello
*/
- if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) {
+ if (group_id == s->s3.group_id) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
break;
}
if (i >= num_groups
- || !tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
+ || !tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
- s->s3->group_id = group_id;
- EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
- s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
+ s->s3.group_id = group_id;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
return 1;
}
- if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
+ if (group_id != s->s3.group_id) {
/*
* This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
* key_share!
return 0;
}
- skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
- if (skey == NULL) {
+ skey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (skey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(skey, ckey) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
return 0;
}
+
if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
return 0;
}
- s->s3->peer_tmp = skey;
+ s->s3.peer_tmp = skey;
#endif
return 1;
}
if (!s->ext.early_data_ok
- || !s->hit
- || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0) {
+ || !s->hit) {
/*
* If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
* using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
return 0;
}
- if (s->session->ext.tick_identity == (int)identity) {
+ if (identity >= (unsigned int)s->ext.tick_identity) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
+ SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the
+ * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we
+ * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket.
+ */
+ if (identity == 0 && (s->psksession == NULL || s->ext.tick_identity == 2)) {
s->hit = 1;
SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
s->psksession = NULL;
return 1;
}
- if (s->psksession == NULL
- || s->psksession->ext.tick_identity != (int)identity) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
- SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
+ if (s->psksession == NULL) {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->session = s->psksession;
s->psksession = NULL;
s->hit = 1;
+ /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */
+ if (identity != 0)
+ s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
#endif
return 1;
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff