* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
-#include <assert.h>
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
}
/*
- * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension. We only have two modes we know about
- * at this stage, so we send both.
+ * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension.
*/
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): Do we want this list to be configurable? For now we always
- * just send both supported modes
- */
+ int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX;
+
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE)
+ || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE))
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
+ s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
+ if (nodhe)
+ s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
#endif
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
size_t encodedlen;
if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
- assert(s->hello_retry_request);
- if (!s->hello_retry_request) {
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
if (key_share_key == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ return 0;
}
}
s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
- return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+ return 1;
err:
if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
- return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ return 0;
}
#endif
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
+ const unsigned char *id;
+ size_t idlen = 0;
+ SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL;
+ SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL;
+
+ if (s->hello_retry_request)
+ handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+
+ if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL
+ && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(s, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess)
+ || (psksess != NULL
+ && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(psksess);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
+ s->psksession = psksess;
+ if (psksess != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id);
+ s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen);
+ if (s->psksession_id == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ s->psksession_id_len = idlen;
+ }
+
if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
- || s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
+ || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
+ && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) {
s->max_early_data = 0;
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
- s->max_early_data = s->session->ext.max_early_data;
+ edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess;
+ s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data;
+
+ if ((s->ext.hostname == NULL && edsess->ext.hostname != NULL)
+ || (s->ext.hostname != NULL
+ && (edsess->ext.hostname == NULL
+ || strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
+ SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
+ SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early
+ * data.
+ */
+ if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
+ PACKET prots, alpnpkt;
+ int found = 0;
+
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected,
+ edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
+ SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
* extension, we set it to accepted.
*/
s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
+ s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
/*
* Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
- * 2 bytes for length bytes)
+ * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least
+ * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x,
+ * 8.x are intolerant of that condition)
*/
if (hlen >= 4)
hlen -= 4;
else
- hlen = 0;
+ hlen = 1;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
- uint32_t now, agesec, agems;
- size_t hashsize, binderoffset, msglen;
- unsigned char *binder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
- const EVP_MD *md;
+ uint32_t now, agesec, agems = 0;
+ size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen;
+ unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ int dores = 0;
s->session->ext.tick_identity = TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY;
* so don't add this extension.
*/
if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION
- || s->session->ext.ticklen == 0)
+ || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
- if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
+ if (s->hello_retry_request)
+ handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
- md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
- if (md == NULL) {
- /* Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. Ignore it */
- return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
- }
+ if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) {
+ /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
+ if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ mdres = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
+ if (mdres == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
+ * Ignore it
+ */
+ goto dopsksess;
+ }
+
+ if (s->hello_retry_request && mdres != handmd) {
+ /*
+ * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
+ * so we can't use it.
+ */
+ goto dopsksess;
+ }
- if (s->hello_retry_request && md != ssl_handshake_md(s)) {
/*
- * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session so
- * we can't use it.
+ * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
+ * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
+ * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
+ * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
+ * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
+ * issue.
*/
- return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
- }
+ now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
+ agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time;
- /*
- * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
- * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most implementations
- * follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in seconds since epoch.
- * We've already made the assumption that we can do this in multiple places
- * in the code, so portability shouldn't be an issue.
- */
- now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
- agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time;
+ if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
+ /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
+ goto dopsksess;
+ }
- if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
- /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
- return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
- }
+ /*
+ * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
+ * good enough.
+ */
+ agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
- /*
- * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
- * good enough.
- */
- agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
+ if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
+ /*
+ * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
+ * If so we just ignore it.
+ */
+ goto dopsksess;
+ }
- if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
/*
- * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session. If
- * so we just ignore it.
+ * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
+ * to be mod 2^32.
*/
- return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+ agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
+
+ reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres);
+ dores = 1;
}
- /*
- * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed to
- * be mod 2^32.
- */
- agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
+ dopsksess:
+ if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (s->psksession != NULL) {
+ mdpsk = ssl_md(s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2);
+ if (mdpsk == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
+ * If this happens it's an application bug.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->hello_retry_request && mdpsk != handmd) {
+ /*
+ * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK
+ * session. This is an application bug.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
+ goto err;
+ }
- hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ pskhashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdpsk);
+ }
/* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
- s->session->ext.ticklen)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)
- || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (dores) {
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
+ s->session->ext.ticklen)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->psksession != NULL) {
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id,
+ s->psksession_id_len)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
- || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, hashsize, &binder)
+ || (dores
+ && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder))
+ || (s->psksession != NULL
+ && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder))
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen)
msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
- if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, binder,
- s->session, 1) != 1) {
+ if (dores
+ && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
+ resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->psksession != NULL
+ && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
+ pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- s->session->ext.tick_identity = 0;
+ if (dores)
+ s->session->ext.tick_identity = 0;
+ if (s->psksession != NULL)
+ s->psksession->ext.tick_identity = (dores ? 1 : 0);
ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
err:
const unsigned char *data;
/* Check for logic errors */
- assert(expected_len == 0 || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0);
- assert(expected_len == 0 || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0);
+ if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
+ || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0)
+ || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
+ || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
/* Parse the length byte */
if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (ilen != expected_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
- if (s->ext.hostname == NULL || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
- if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+ if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) {
*al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
* MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
* request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
*/
- if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
- || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0)) {
+ if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
*al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
}
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
+ if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL
+ && (s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len
+ || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected,
+ len) != 0)) {
+ /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */
+ s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ /* If a new session then update it with the selected ALPN */
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
+ OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
+ if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+ }
+
return 1;
}
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
return 0;
return 0;
}
- if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED
+ if (!s->ext.early_data_ok
|| !s->hit
|| s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0) {
/*
* If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
- * using the first identity so the server should not be accepting it.
+ * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
+ * server should not be accepting it.
*/
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
return 0;
}
- if (s->session->ext.tick_identity != (int)identity) {
+ if (s->session->ext.tick_identity == (int)identity) {
+ s->hit = 1;
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
+ s->psksession = NULL;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->psksession == NULL
+ || s->psksession->ext.tick_identity != (int)identity) {
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
return 0;
}
+ /*
+ * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret
+ * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the
+ * early_secret across that we generated earlier.
+ */
+ if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
+ && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
+ || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0
+ || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0)
+ memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = s->psksession;
+ s->psksession = NULL;
s->hit = 1;
#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff