/*
- * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
-#include <assert.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ /* Add RI if renegotiating */
+ if (!s->renegotiate)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ if (s->ext.hostname == NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+ /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname,
+ strlen(s->ext.hostname))
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ /* Add SRP username if there is one */
+ if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
+ /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
+ /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
+ || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
+ strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static int use_ecc(SSL *s)
+{
+ int i, end;
+ unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL;
+
+ /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return 0;
+
+ cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+ end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack);
+ for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
+
+ alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
+ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
+ || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
+ || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ const unsigned char *pformats;
+ size_t num_formats;
+
+ if (!use_ecc(s))
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
+ tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
+ /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL, *pcurvestmp;
+ size_t num_curves = 0, i;
+
+ if (!use_ecc(s))
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ /*
+ * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
+ */
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
+ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ pcurvestmp = pcurves;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
+ /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ /* Copy curve ID if supported */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
+ if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurvestmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+#endif
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ size_t ticklen;
+
+ if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL
+ && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
+ && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen;
+ } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL
+ && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) {
+ ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length;
+ s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
+ if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->session->ext.tick,
+ s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen);
+ s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
+ } else {
+ ticklen = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL &&
+ s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ size_t salglen;
+ const uint16_t *salg;
+
+ if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
+ /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
+ if (x != NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
+ /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
+ /* Sub-packet for the ids */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) {
+ unsigned char *idbytes;
+ OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i);
+ int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
+
+ if (idlen <= 0
+ /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
+ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
+ || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) {
+ unsigned char *extbytes;
+ int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL);
+
+ if (extlen < 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
+ || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes)
+ != extlen) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ /*
+ * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
+ * for Next Protocol Negotiation
+ */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+#endif
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
+
+ if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
+ /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
+ int i, end;
+
+ if (clnt == NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+ /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
+ for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
+ const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof =
+ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
+
+ if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ /* Add an empty use_mki value */
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+#endif
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ /* Not defined for client Certificates */
+ if (x != NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+#endif
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
+ if (reason != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to whether
+ * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
+ * reviewed later.
+ */
+ for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
+ if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension.
+ */
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
+ || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE))
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
+ if (nodhe)
+ s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
+#endif
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id)
+{
+ unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
+ size_t encodedlen;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
+ */
+ key_share_key = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
+ } else {
+ key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
+ if (key_share_key == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the public key. */
+ encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
+ &encoded_point);
+ if (encodedlen == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Create KeyShareEntry */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
+ * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
+ * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
+ */
+ s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
+ s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
+ OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
+ OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ size_t i, num_curves = 0;
+ const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
+ unsigned int curve_id = 0;
+
+ /* key_share extension */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
+ /* Extension data sub-packet */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
+ * now, just send one
+ */
+ if (s->s3->group_id != 0) {
+ curve_id = s->s3->group_id;
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
+
+ if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
+ continue;
+
+ curve_id = bytestogroup(pcurves);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (curve_id == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id))
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+
+ /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
+ if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
+ /* Extension data sub-packet */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie,
+ s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+ end:
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
+ s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL;
+ s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ const unsigned char *id;
+ size_t idlen;
+ SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL;
+ SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL;
+
+ if (s->hello_retry_request)
+ handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+
+ if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL
+ && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(s, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess)
+ || (psksess != NULL
+ && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(psksess);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
+ s->psksession = psksess;
+ if (psksess != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id);
+ s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen);
+ if (s->psksession_id == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ s->psksession_id_len = idlen;
+ }
+
+ if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
+ || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
+ && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) {
+ s->max_early_data = 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+ }
+ edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess;
+ s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data;
+
+ if ((s->ext.hostname == NULL && edsess->ext.hostname != NULL)
+ || (s->ext.hostname != NULL
+ && (edsess->ext.hostname == NULL
+ || strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
+ SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
+ SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early
+ * data.
+ */
+ if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
+ PACKET prots, alpnpkt;
+ int found = 0;
+
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected,
+ edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
+ SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
+ * extension, we set it to accepted.
+ */
+ s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+#define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
+#define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
+
+/*
+ * PSK pre binder overhead =
+ * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
+ * 2 bytes for extension length
+ * 2 bytes for identities list length
+ * 2 bytes for identity length
+ * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
+ * 2 bytes for binder list length
+ * 1 byte for binder length
+ * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
+ * subsequent binder bytes
+ */
+#define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ unsigned char *padbytes;
+ size_t hlen;
+
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ /*
+ * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
+ * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
+ * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
+ * this extension MUST always appear second to last.
+ */
+ if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
+ * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
+ */
+ if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION
+ && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0
+ && s->session->cipher != NULL) {
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
+
+ if (md != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
+ * length.
+ */
+ hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen
+ + EVP_MD_size(md);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) {
+ /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
+ hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
+ * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least
+ * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x,
+ * 8.x are intolerant of that condition)
+ */
+ if (hlen >= 4)
+ hlen -= 4;
+ else
+ hlen = 1;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
+ */
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ uint32_t now, agesec, agems = 0;
+ size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen;
+ unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
+ EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ int dores = 0;
+
+ s->session->ext.tick_identity = TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY;
+
+ /*
+ * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
+ * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
+ * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
+ * so don't add this extension.
+ */
+ if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION
+ || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL))
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (s->hello_retry_request)
+ handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+
+ if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) {
+ /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
+ if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ mdres = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
+ if (mdres == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
+ * Ignore it
+ */
+ goto dopsksess;
+ }
+
+ if (s->hello_retry_request && mdres != handmd) {
+ /*
+ * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
+ * so we can't use it.
+ */
+ goto dopsksess;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
+ * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
+ * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
+ * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
+ * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
+ * issue.
+ */
+ now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
+ agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time;
+
+ if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
+ /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
+ goto dopsksess;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
+ * good enough.
+ */
+ agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
+
+ if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
+ /*
+ * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
+ * If so we just ignore it.
+ */
+ goto dopsksess;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
+ * to be mod 2^32.
+ */
+ agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
+
+ reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres);
+ dores = 1;
+ }
+
+ dopsksess:
+ if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (s->psksession != NULL) {
+ mdpsk = ssl_md(s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2);
+ if (mdpsk == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
+ * If this happens it's an application bug.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->hello_retry_request && mdpsk != handmd) {
+ /*
+ * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK
+ * session. This is an application bug.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pskhashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdpsk);
+ }
+
+ /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (dores) {
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
+ s->session->ext.ticklen)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->psksession != NULL) {
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id,
+ s->psksession_id_len)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || (dores
+ && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder))
+ || (s->psksession != NULL
+ && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder))
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen)
+ /*
+ * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
+ * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
+ */
+ || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
+
+ if (dores
+ && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
+ resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->psksession != NULL
+ && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
+ pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (dores)
+ s->session->ext.tick_identity = 0;
+ if (s->psksession != NULL)
+ s->psksession->ext.tick_identity = (dores ? 1 : 0);
+
+ ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+ err:
+ return ret;
+#else
+ return 1;
+#endif
+}
+
/*
* Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
*/
-int tls_parse_server_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
const unsigned char *data;
/* Check for logic errors */
- assert(expected_len == 0 || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0);
- assert(expected_len == 0 || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0);
+ if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
+ || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0)
+ || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
+ || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
/* Parse the length byte */
if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
/* Consistency check */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
/* Check that the extension matches */
if (ilen != expected_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
|| memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
|| memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
return 1;
}
-int tls_parse_server_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
- if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
+ if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+ s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
+ if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-int tls_parse_server_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
- unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
+ unsigned int ecpointformats_len;
PACKET ecptformatlist;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) {
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
- ecpointformatlist_length = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist);
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist);
+ s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = 0;
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
- OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length);
- if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.ecpointformats);
+ s->session->ext.ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
+ if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
+ s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
- ecpointformatlist_length)) {
+ s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
+ ecpointformats_len)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
-int tls_parse_server_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
- if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
- !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
- PACKET_remaining(pkt),
- s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
+ if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL &&
+ !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
+ PACKET_remaining(pkt),
+ s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+
+ if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) {
*al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
return 1;
}
-int tls_parse_server_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
/*
- * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
- * request message.
+ * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
+ * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
*/
- if (s->tlsext_status_type == -1 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+ if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
*al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
+ * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
+ */
+ if (chainidx != 0)
+ return 1;
+ return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, al);
+ }
+
/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+ s->ext.status_expected = 1;
return 1;
}
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
-int tls_parse_server_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
/*
* Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
/* Simply copy it off for later processing */
- if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
- s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
- }
- s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts);
+ s->ext.scts = NULL;
+
+ s->ext.scts_len = size;
if (size > 0) {
- s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
- if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL
- || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_scts, size)) {
+ s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
+ if (s->ext.scts == NULL
+ || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
} else {
- if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
- PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), al) <= 0)
+ ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0
+ ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH;
+
+ /*
+ * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension,
+ * otherwise this is unsolicited.
+ */
+ if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role,
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
+ NULL) == NULL) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (custom_ext_parse(s, context,
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
+ PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
+ x, chainidx, al) <= 0)
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-int tls_parse_server_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
unsigned char *selected;
unsigned char selected_len;
PACKET tmppkt;
- if (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0)
+ /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
+ if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
return 1;
/* We must have requested it. */
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
+ if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
+
/* The data must be valid */
tmppkt = *pkt;
if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&tmppkt)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
- PACKET_data(pkt),
- PACKET_remaining(pkt),
- s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
+ if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
+ PACKET_data(pkt),
+ PACKET_remaining(pkt),
+ s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
+
/*
* Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
* a single Serverhello
*/
- OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
- s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
- if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn);
+ s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
+ if (s->ext.npn == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+ memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len);
+ s->ext.npn_len = selected_len;
+ s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
return 1;
}
#endif
-int tls_parse_server_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
size_t len;
}
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
+ /* We also put a copy in the session */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected,
+ s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+
+ if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-int tls_parse_server_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
unsigned int id, ct, mki;
int i;
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct)
- || ct != 2 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
- || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_USE_SRTP,
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
+ || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
if (mki != 0) {
/* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
- clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
-
/* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
+ clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
if (clnt == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
}
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_USE_SRTP,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
#endif
-int tls_parse_server_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
/* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+ s->ext.use_etm = 1;
return 1;
}
-int tls_parse_server_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
if (!s->hit)
return 1;
}
-int tls_parse_server_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
unsigned int group_id;
PACKET encoded_pt;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
/* Sanity check */
- if (ckey == NULL) {
+ if (ckey == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
+ if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) {
+ unsigned const char *pcurves = NULL;
+ size_t i, num_curves;
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
+ * already sent in the first ClientHello
+ */
+ if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
+ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
+ if (group_id == bytestogroup(pcurves))
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i >= num_curves
+ || !tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->group_id = group_id;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
+ s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
/*
* This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
* key_share!
*/
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt)
|| PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
if (skey == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
return 0;
}
if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
return 0;
}
- EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+ s->s3->peer_tmp = skey;
+#endif
return 1;
}
-static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
- size_t num_extensions = 0;
- RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
- PACKET extpkt;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-#endif
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+ PACKET cookie;
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)
+ || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie,
+ &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+ return 1;
+}
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
+int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
+{
+ if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
+ unsigned long max_early_data;
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
- /* Extensions block may be completely absent in SSLv3 */
- if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
- PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
- }
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): We give multiple contexts for now until we're ready to
- * give something more specific
- */
+ s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
- if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
- | EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
- | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
- | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
- &extensions, &num_extensions, al))
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
- * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
- * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
- * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
- * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
- */
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
- && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
- && tls_get_extension_by_type(extensions, num_extensions,
- TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
- if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
- | EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
- | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
- | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
- extensions, num_extensions, al))
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
+ }
- if (s->hit) {
+ if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED
+ || !s->hit
+ || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0) {
/*
- * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
- * original session.
+ * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
+ * using the first identity so the server should not be accepting it.
*/
- if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
- !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
- return 0;
- }
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
}
+ s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
+
return 1;
}
-static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ unsigned int identity;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /*
- * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
- * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
- * must contain uncompressed.
- */
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
- && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
- && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
- && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
- && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
- /* we are using an ECC cipher */
- size_t i;
- unsigned char *list;
- int found_uncompressed = 0;
- list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
- if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
- found_uncompressed = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!found_uncompressed) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
- return -1;
- }
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
}
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret =
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
- && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret =
- s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->
- initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
- /*
- * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
- * that we don't receive a status message
- */
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
- switch (ret) {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
- return 1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->servername_done = 0;
- default:
+ if (s->session->ext.tick_identity == (int)identity) {
+ s->hit = 1;
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
+ s->psksession = NULL;
return 1;
}
-}
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
-{
- int al = -1;
- if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
- return 1;
- if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ if (s->psksession == NULL
+ || s->psksession->ext.tick_identity != (int)identity) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
return 0;
}
- if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return 0;
- }
+ /*
+ * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret
+ * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the
+ * early_secret across that we generated earlier.
+ */
+ if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
+ && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
+ || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0
+ || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0)
+ memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = s->psksession;
+ s->psksession = NULL;
+ s->hit = 1;
+#endif
+
return 1;
}